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Miklós Szinai
The Roots
of Democratic Change
I t was in Hungary and Poland that the radical political changes of the recent past in East Central Europe were initiated. In addition to the influence the Hungarian example had 
on the whole of East Central Europe, the immediate political assistance rendered by 
Hungary to East Germany and Rumania (the latter posing the most serious problems 
within what was once the socialist community) has made Hungary the prime motor of 
democratic transformation in the entire region. Was the role of Hungary merely the result 
of improvisations or of a contingent series of actions, or can Hungary’s behaviour be 
attributed to deeper historical causes? Is there an historical explanation for Hungary’s 
pioneering role in triggering off this East Central European metamorphosis which has 
amazed the whole world?
Twenty years ago the Hungarian historian lenő Szűcs discussed and defined, begin­
ning with the Middle Ages, the position of East Central Europe between the Russian and 
the German languange areas, the zone of the present changes. I shall first deal with 
Hungary’s history of the past four hundred years in this geographic context.
Around 1500 major changes established differences with Western Europe. In 1433 the 
Turks took Constantinpole; the last great ruler of Hungary, Matthias Corvinus, died in 
1490; in 1492 Columbus discovered America; in 1526 the Osmanli forces decisively 
defeated the Hungarian armies at Mohács. In Italy the Renaissance continued and 
Western Europe became the scene of accelerated economic, social and cultural develop­
ment. East Central Europe however, stagnated. The region became the sphere of 
influence of three Powers: the Ottoman, Habsburg and Czarist Empires. The Kingdom 
of Hungary became a Habsburg crownland, and the heart of the country and the southern 
marches became Turkish pashaliks. In time the Turks were pushed back, but up to 1918 
East Central Europe as a political notion had ceased to exist. The differences that had 
arisen between Western and East Central Europe up to the 15th century, differences 
discussed by Jenő Szűcs, grew in the course of subsequent centuries into structural 
inequalities. What then made Hungary stand out in this context?
In the early 16th century all of Christian Europe, including those Habsburg lands that 
were under direct threat, left Hungary entirely on her own against the Turks.
When judging Hungary’s struggle against the Turks, the following factors should be 
taken into account:
(1) By the beginning of the 16th century the Renaissance had taken root in Hungary.
Miklós Szinai, a historian, was Senior Archivist at the Hungarian National Archives for 
seventeen years as well as spending eight years at the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in 
Vienna. This article is the abbreviated text o f a lecture given at the universities o f Graz 
and Salzburg in January 1990.
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The many arcaded courtyards are evidence of a Renaissance influence that went well 
beyond the royal court.
(2) The Hungarian nobility as a whole stood for Christiana Libertás, but the 
Hungarians had to wage war in two directions, against the Turks and against the 
Habsburgs.
(3) This fact split Hungary. The division was intensified by the rapid spread of the 
Reformation. Political conflicts grew into religious conflicts and, conversely, religious 
differences developed into political disputes.
The struggle between the two camps also found expression on the battlefield. After 
Mohács, starting with the 1540s, the Principality of Transylvania emerged as a new 
bastion of Hungarian national resistance and an island allowing the coexistence of faiths 
in a Europe torn by wars of religion, becoming the easternmost outpost of the Renais­
sance.
Starting with the early 17th century, there were frequent Hungarian insurrections 
against the Habsburgs: István Bocskai in 1604, George I Rákóczi in 1644, Francis I 
Rákócziin 1670, Imre Thököly in 1678. and Francis II Rákóczi between 1703 and 1711. 
All these attempts failed.
The pro-Habsburg party in Hungary also profited from these anti-Habsburg insurrec­
tions and Transylvania’s rise to independence. Péter Pázmány, Archbishop of Eszter­
gom and leader of the Counter-Reformation in Hungary, a wholehearted supporter 
of the Habsburgs, wrote: “... at present, young man, we enjoy a certain standing and the 
confidence of our gracious Christian emperor, but this only holds good with the 
German nation as long as there is talk of a flourishing Hungarian principality in 
Transylvania: afterwards, as we quickly lose our standing, the German will spit under our 
collar.”
Hungarian political ingenuity was able to exploit the battles and even defeat in battle 
to obtain political compromises. This is why the struggle inside the Hungarian Diet and 
for the rights of the Diet went far beyond a fight waged merely for feudal privileges: it 
secured the unbroken continuity of the most important attributes of Hungarian statehood, 
the Diet itself and the county system (the body of the low and middle level self-govern­
ing organizations of the nobility); thus it preserved, in a way unique in East Central 
Europe, the continuity of Hungary’s statehood until the 19th century.
At a time when the ruling classes of the other countries of the region were annihilated 
after their centuries of struggle against foreign oppression, the continuity of important 
institutions of Hungarian statehood also guaranteed the preservation of the estates of the 
Hungarian lower and higher nobility and, with that—likewise in an almost unique 
manner in Eastern Central Europe—the vigorous survival of all the nobility, of the 
Hungarian national élite, until the mid-19th century.
The reaction of Francis I and Metternich followed the reforms of Maria Theresa and 
Joseph II in Austria, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. In the first half of 
the 19th century the Hungarian feudal opposition changed its nature in the struggle 
against a new oppression. The reform era preceding the March 1848 events in Hungary 
was a period linking the national cause to liberalism (and thereby the 19th-century 
aspirations for national independence) with the Hungarian nobility’s three centuries of 
struggle. The serfs in Hungary, in contrast with Austria or Russia, obtained freedom and 
land not from the king but from the Hungarian nobility. This gave a national dimension 
to the fight against foreign oppression, against the foreign dynasty, and tied Hungarian 
liberalism closely to the national cause. Liberalism in Austria collapsed in 1879 but it 
survived in Hungary until 1918. Only the Hungarian counter-revolution of 1919 isolated
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nationalism from liberalism. In 1921 the historian Gyula Szekfű defined this break in his 
famous Három nemzedék (Three Generations). Liberalism in Hungary was strong. In 
Austria, at the time of the First Republic (1918-1934), no party married to a liberal 
ideology was formed, whereas in Hungary there were several parties with liberal 
programmes throughout the Horthy period (1919-1944), until the German occupation 
in 1944.
The dominant role of legalism was also a particular feature of Hungarian public life. 
This legal sensitivity had evolved in the centuries of struggle of the Hungarian nobility 
against central power, then against foreign domination, against the Habsburgs. The 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 was a prominent achievement of Hungarian 
legal skills. How deep the roots of this legalism were is shown by the fact that, after the 
Hungarian counter-revolutionary regime in 1920 reintroduced flogging, not a single 
Hungarian judge ever applied this penalty. The Hungarian legal system, the Corpus 
Juris, enjoyed such authority that it prevented the Horthy regime from carrying out many 
anti-democratic measures.
A nother peculiar feature of modem historical development is the position of Jews in Hungary. The middle class was far weaker than in neighbouring Austria, 
and Jews therefore had a specific role to play. Because of obstacles to their upward 
mobility, and since they were prohibited from purchasing landed estates, the Jews re­
invested their money in the economy and thereby contributed to the internal accumula­
tion of capital, to industrialization, first of all in the food processing industries, then in 
Hungarian industry as a whole. It was on this economic base that the political sphere, 
including two of its important elements, liberalism and Hungarian nationalism, later 
promoted the assimilation of Hungarian Jews. In a country where the ruling nation was 
almost outnumbered by ethnic minorities, the increasing assimilation of Jews—besides 
the assimilation of the minorities—was in the national interest. The ruling classes also 
favoured Jewish assimilation because in 1848/1849, when the national minorities had 
turned against the Hungarians, the Hungarian Jews had taken part in the revolution. The 
remarkable patriotism of Hungarian Jews offered Austrian absolutism (1849-1867) the 
excuse to levy particularly high taxes on all of Hungarian Jewry. Y et the Jews of Hungary 
and the poorly developed bourgeoisie had no essential part in political life during the 
liberal period either, following the Compromise. (In 1867 the Hungarian ruling classes 
made an agreement with the Habsburg rulers. The period between 1867 and 1918 is called 
the era of Dualism.) Just as in the early 18th century, Hungarian magnates had allowed 
Jews expelled from other countries to settle on their estates, so late in the 19th century 
and early in the 20th, Jewish capitalists invited members of the Hungarian aristocracy to 
join the boards of industrial enterprises and banks. An aristocracy with an interest in 
capitalist development became—in a manner of speaking—a representative of bourgeois 
interests in opposition to the gentry.
The Hungarian gentry developed in ways different from the Hungarian aristocracy. 
This gentry class, which during the reform era and in 1848 had still been the standard- 
bearer of liberalism and progress, turned conservative and anti-semitic by the end of the 
century; in 1919 it took a leading role in the Counter-Revolution, and in the late 1930s 
it provided the staunchest political support for the pro-Nazi extreme right in the civil 
service and in the army.
Before and during the Second World War it was again the Hungarian aristocratic 
political élite which, as opposed to the Hungarian gentry seeking power with German 
assistance, represented, together with the democratic opposition, Hungary’s anti-Ger-
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man and anti-Nazi national resistance and maintained until 1945 the continuity of the 
centuries of struggle for national independence.
The other geographic context of my analysis is the broad expanse extending from the 
west towards the east, perpendicular to the north-south axis so far taken into considera­
tion. Metternich once said: Asia begins at the Landstrasse (a district in the SE of Vienna). 
East of the Leitha and the Elbe, a vast ocean extending to Vladivostok on the Pacific coast 
really begins: the immense sea of rural small-commodity production. The break runs 
along the Leitha-Elbe line. Is it all the same water east of it? Does Hungary, the Hungarian 
peasantry, belong there?
There are common features. The centuries of what is called the second serfdom took 
the Hungarian peasant closer to the East European than to the West European peasant. 
As I already mentioned in a different context, however, the Hungarian peasantry was 
delivered from serfdom not by a king but by the Hungarian nobility. This meant that the 
Hungarian aristocracy was able to continue to control its large estates (up to 1945), but 
also that the Hungarian peasant was given greater freedom and more land than the 
peasantry of the countries lying north or east. First of all because the emancipation of serfs 
in Hungary was much fuller than in the liquidation of Russian, Polish or Rumanian 
serfdom. In the second place, it must be taken into account that Hungary’s struggles for 
independence, beginning with the 16th century, salvaged not only a considerable 
measure of Hungarian statehood but also the Protestant faith of many Hungarians, 
including that of Hungarian peasants. In the rebellions of the magnates, Hungarian 
peasants fought for their own faith. In 1848/1849, during the anti-Habsburg Hungarian 
revolution, these ties only became stronger. The former serfs received most from the 
revolution and sacrificed most for it. The Protestant peasantry of the Great Hungarian 
Plain provided the strongest support for the national cause in the era of Absolutism and 
Dualism. Under the open-ballot anti-democratic electoral system, however, only one or 
two peasants could be elected to Parliament. This electoral system was directed not 
against the national minorities, against the fringe of the country inhabited by other nations 
as was imagined abroad, but primarily against the centre, the militant Hungarian peasants 
of the Great Plain. But when voting in Hungary was by secret ballot—and prior to 1990 
this happened only twice (in 1920 and 1945) during the past hundred years—the majority 
voted on both occasions for the Smallholders’ Party. In addition to the political élite, it 
was the peasantry and, within it, the Protestant Hungarian peasantry of the Great Plain, 
which forms that other element to be taken into consideration in respect of the political 
structure of Hungary. As Calvinist elders, the aristocrats sat side by side with peasants. 
Here the preponderance of peasant votes could make itself felt. What with the imperfec­
tions of Hungarian parliamentarism, Protestant, Calvinist democracy was an important 
and revitalizing element in Hungarian democracy, comparable to the paramount role it 
played in the West (in the Netherlands, in Scandinavia, in Great Britain and in North 
America). Hungarian Protestantism played a part not only in the fight for national 
independence but also in the struggle for democracy.
Hungarian Social Democrats are nowhere near as numerous as Austrian or German Social Democrats, yet they were strong once, and their importance in the past 
hundred years cannot be denied. In the first decade of the 20th century they were able to 
mobilise hundreds of thousands for the extension of the franchise, for universal suffrage 
and the secret ballot. One cannot identify the Hungarian people with the conservative, au­
thoritarian Horthy regime that had come to power in 1919 and survived for 25 years. Even 
during the White Terror the Smallholders’ Party obtained more votes than the parties of
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the right at two consecutive elections in 1920. The Social Democratic Party—because of 
the terror—did not take part in those elections, but when it ran in the 1922 general 
elections and in the 1925 municipal elections in Budapest, in alliance with the Budapest 
liberal parties, an absolute majority was won in Budapest on both occasions. Red 
Budapest was nowhere as strong as Red Vienna, but three factors taken together—the 
Social Democrats and the liberal middle class as well as the Hungarian democratic 
press—turned out to be a force which was able, for more than two decades, to prevent the 
Hungarian counter-revolutionary regime from keeping down Budapest. But, even 
outside the capital, there was no town in Hungary where the Social Democratic Party and 
the trade-union movement were not active. These maintained their organizations, in the 
face of all persecutions by the regime, for 25 years—even during the Second World 
War—up to the country’s occupation by the Germans in 1944.
It was not out of nothing that Hungarian democracy was restored after the Second 
World War in 1945. Without a knowledge of the past of Hungarian liberalism and of the 
centuries of struggle of the Hungarian peasantry and Social Democrats, it is impossible 
to understand the impressive political progress which, following the Horthy era and the 
years of war, galvanised the country into activity between 1945 and 1948. It is these three 
years that link the past with 1956, with 1988 and 1989. That flourishing democracy was 
destroyed by the Rákosi dictatorship. Yet the latter was internally weak in face of the 
resistance of the Hungarian people, as can be seen from the fact that barely five years later, 
as early as 1953, it was already shaken, and that in 1956 the uprising of the Hungarian 
people overthrew it within a few hours. Orthodox Stalinism dominated in Hungary for 
the shortest time of all the East European countries.
The Kádár regime cannot be exonerated from responsibility for the post-1956 
retaliation and repression, and for the execution in 1958 of Imre Nagy and his associates. 
It is difficult—without a knowledge of the character of Hungarians—to understand the 
subsequent thirty years, that is the dominance of the Kádár regime, and its peaceful 
overthrow, the specific features of Hungarian democratic change.
Hungary is the only country beyond the Leitha where the Renaissance, the Reforma­
tion, and liberalism existed.
In East Central Europe, Hungary is the only country which could, for four hundred 
years, starting with the 16th century, preserve important attributes of its statehood in 
unbroken continuity and, at the same time—also in a unique way in the region—maintain 
its ruling classes, the national elite, up to the 19th century.
Hungary is the easternmost extension in Europe where Protestants and assimilated 
Jews, together, made up almost forty per cent of the population before 1945.
The pluralism that evolved historically in the structure of Hungarian society could— 
to a certain extent—eclipse the weaknesses of Hungarian political democracy; at the 
same time it became the basis of Hungarian political ways composed mostly of the 
aforesaid elements. Only thus can it be understood that—just as the Rákóczi Rebellion 
was followed by the peace of Szatmár (1711) and the 1848/1849 Revolution by the 
Compromise of 1867—the national uprising of 1956, in spite of being crushed by the 
numerical superiority of an alien power, was able again to achieve a sort of compro­
mise—never put in writing—between the people and the regime.
From the early 1960s onwards there has come about in Hungary a kind of political 
consolidation, the like of which did not come about after the Soviet intervention of 1968 
in Czechoslovakia. In Hungary there never were such large-scale investments in heavy 
industry, to the detriment of living standards, as in Poland or Rumania. Of all the socialist 
countries, it was Hungary alone where agrarian reforms were introduced while safe-
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guarding—though in a limited manner—peasant interests and enlarging the scope of the 
market economy. Hungary is the only East European country that has escaped food 
supply problems.
All these circumstances contributed to easing the political tension at the start of the 
crisis in Hungary in 1988; on the other hand, they heightened intellectual freedom as 
compared to the other socialist countries. Characteristic of Hungarian democratic 
change is that—other than e.g., in Poland—it has been directed exclusively by intellec­
tuals. Of all the features of the Hungarian intellectual élite, I should like to stress, hie et 
nunc, the importance of the national aspect.
The greatest trauma suffered by the Hungarian nation, not only in the 20th century, but in its entire history after Mohács, was the Peace Treaty of Trianon. The Trianon 
treaty, signed on 4 June 1920, took nearly two-thirds of Hungary’s population and 
territory. After the Second World War the victorious Allies confirmed Trianon in the 
Paris peace treaty. Three million Hungarians were set under the rule of neighbouring 
countries. New injustices replaced the old. A new factor emerged after the Secord World 
War. At Yalta, the Western Powers turned all of East Central Europe over to Stalin and 
the Soviet Union. This fact also altered the interplay of important factors in East Central 
Europe.
The new Hungarian democratic national forces after 1945 renounced all claims to 
territorial revision, which had been compromised by the alliance with the National 
Socialists and by its linkage with reactionary Hungarian domestic policy. Even after 
1945, however, official circles in the countries neighbouring Hungary went on scaring 
their peoples with the spectre of non-existent Hungarian revisionism. But after Yalta, 
when the Western Powers had withdrawn, this policy could be pursued only in 
conjunction with the Soviet Union. The “new Little Entente” differed from the old only 
in that this same Hungary, against which it had originally been directed, was now part of 
it within the Soviet alliance. After 1948 this fact basically determined Hungary ’ s position 
in the Eastern bloc. While Austria, which after 1945 orientated itself towards the West, 
had been described as “the first victim of German aggression”, Hungary in the eastern 
Soviet system was labelled, during the years of Rákosi’s dictatorship, as “the last satellite 
of Germany”.
October 1956, the Hungarian revolution only strengthened these tendencies in the 
Eastern bloc. In the countries of the former Little Entente, fear of Hungarian revisionism 
was intensified in order to counteract the alarming example of the rising. An attempt was 
made to stengthen the ties between the Stalinist system and the intelligentsia of various 
countries by alleging thet only the Soviet alliance was able to save these countries from 
the contagion of the Hungarian “counter-revolution”.
Before 1945 there was a connection between revisionism and a reactionary domestic 
policy in Hungary. After 1956, in the neighbouring countries, an alliance came into being 
between an artificially induced antirevisionism and the reactionary Stalinist domestic 
policy. The reactionary character of this alliance was only boosted by the oppression of 
the Hungarian minorities.
In consequence of these manipulations—in particular after 1956— the relations which 
the Hungarian intellectuals and the intellectuals of the neighbour countries entertained 
with the regime and the Soviet Union, changed considerably. Whereas public opinion, 
represented by the intellectuals of the countries between the German language area and 
the Soviet Union, could for a long time be blackmailed by the spectre of Hungarian 
threats (in addition to the German menace), Hungarian public opinion could not, of
8 The New Hungarian Quarterly
.course, be influenced by such methods. The occupation of Hungary by the Soviets since 
1945, the larger intellectual independence of Hungarian national public opinion from the 
Soviet Union, the growing oppression of Hungarian minorities in the countries of the 
Warsaw Pact, the singular subordinate role of Hungary inside the Soviet alliance—all 
this, together with the memories of 1956, may well explain the fact that the Hungarian 
intelligentsia was emancipated from Soviet influence and from the Stalinist system 
earlier than the intellectuals of the neighbouring countries.
Nevertheless it is perhaps primarily, even if obviously not exclusively, three factors— 
the traditions of militant Hungarian national resistance, Hungarian political ways and the 
wider and earlier established independence of the Hungarian intelligentsia—as well as 
the joint influence of these factors, which we have to turn to for the causes determining 
Hungary’s pioneering role in the current radical changes in this region.
In 1918, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Czarist Russia and the Habsburg 
Empire, the West was confronted by the problem of Eastern Central Europe. Since it had 
no experience regarding this part of Europe, it fashioned the political system of the entire 
zone exclusively in accordance with its temporary interests. The watchword was: 
Détruisez VAutriche-Hongrie! And this was done. The result was not able to save this 
vast area between Germany and Russia from the aggression of the Third Reich before the 
Second World War, from oppression by Stalinist Russia, nor repeated aggressions after 
it. Both solutions, the post-Great War solution and the post-Second World War expedi­
ent, were realised in practice at the expense of Hungary alone. In spite of all this, I am 
firmly convinced, Hungary is not motivated by any sort of revisionism even today. The 
country hopes that this new opportunity in East Central Europe—the third one in seventy 
years—should not again be at the expense of Hungary, the country which has played a 
pioneering role in creating this opportunity.
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György Spiró
Danilo Kis
1935-1989
Imet his legend first.In the mid-60s I lived in Yugoslavia for a time and was then told stories about a young 
Serbian writer, a genuine talent and really avant-garde. It was said that he knew some 
Hungarian and translated Hungarian poets into Serbo-Croatian, remarkably well, too. He 
was, according to the stories, half Hungarian and half Jewish. I wondered which half then 
was Serbian: perhaps, I thought, the third, the writer’s.
Then I read his works in succession, beginning with Mansard, a poetic novella, to 
which he owed his first success. It is a lyrical, surrealist confession of a young man who 
wants to become an author and escapes into life from the obsession of writing, but his 
experience really educates him to be a writer. Such self-mocking, self-mythologizing 
novellas were common in the sixties, however, there was something unique, something 
fresh about Danilo Kis’s work, which set it apart from the rest.
A series of more ambitious works followed. The novel Psalm 44 is an attempt to depict 
the world of extermination camps; Clepsydra does the same for Eastern Europe in the 
war, and the cycle of short-stories A Tomb for Boris Davidovich (Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich, 1978; Penguin, 1980) for Stalinism in its entirety. Garden, Ashes (Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich, 1975; Faber & Faber, 1985) is a memoir of his father, and because 
he thought in terms of cycles at the time, his father is presumably also the protagonist of 
Clepsydra. Nazism, the Second World War, Stalinism: no serious writer of Danilo Kis’s 
generation could afford to evade these issues. But for Danilo Kis the problem was less 
one of the theme than of form. Kis put it quite clearly in his essays: form is the alpha and 
omega of all art, and aesthetic problems at the same time have moral implications.
Kis, I felt, was bom to be a poet. He had experienced war in childhood, and it was 
relatively easy to give it formal expression. He, however, wanted more, although he had 
only indirect experience of Hitler’s world, nor did he personally experience Stalinism, 
at least not in its labour camp depths. He thus suffered an insurmountable handicap in 
comparison with the Pole Tadeusz Borowski, the Hungarian Imre Kertész or the Russian 
Solzhenitsyn or Salamov, to mention only a few of the major writers who were able to 
formulate, on the basis of personal experience, a number of philosophically and 
aesthetically valid truths about the scandals of the century, the universe of death camps 
and gulags. Danilo Kis’s ambitions were just as great as theirs. But at the same time he 
was perfectly aware that the depth of his most personal experience fell short of the 
experience of those who had descended to hell, and that he had to be very careful not to 
reach artistically false conclusions on the basis of his more limited experience. Like all 
true artists, he too was tormented by the insoluble paradox of personal and objective truth.
György Spiró A latest novel, A jövevény (The Newcomer) appeared in 1990.
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T he task he set himself was to write up the major themes of the age using the techniques of what he took to be the best western literary schools. He employed 
montage, made ample use of irony, spoke the language of Kafka’s Angst as a native, at 
times imposed the discipline of Camus on himself, often within a single work, to achieve 
fullness by mingling disparate technical elements. He deliberately incorporated docu­
ments in his work, facts and knowledge recorded and suffered by others, which, so he 
thought, would guarantee the truth of the work.
Kis thus trusted the absolute value of real events and the exploitability of the avant- 
garde theories of the literature of the 60s and 70s. He chose the most important themes 
and wrote them up using the most fashionable technique. It was perhaps this that 
contributed to his being championed and excessively praised by the more advanced 
Yugoslav and, later, by other European and North American critics.
The conservatives, on the other hand, after some initial hesitation, began to attack him. 
An unsavoury controversy, concerning a charge of plagiarism in connection with A Tomb 
for Boris Davidovich, occured in the Yugoslav press, and I suspect that it was from this 
hostile environment that Kis escaped to France, where he spent his last years in a kind of 
voluntary exile, although he was never banned from his native land, and in fact he did visit 
it from time to time.
Excessive praise and a charge of plagiarism—either in itself would be enough to crack 
a less strong character. Being fashionable is particularly dangerous. It has happened to 
countless writers in East and West alike that they started turning out cheap best-sellers, 
became bankrupt.
Kis opted for silence instead. He taught Yugoslav literature in France, and in the 80s 
he did no more than sum up his critical conviction in Homo Poeticus, perhaps for those 
who will once follow him on his self-destructive road striving for the highest.
I met him on three occasions.I glimpsed him first when working for the Kaposvár Theatre. I accompanied the 
company to a banquet in the Skadarlija that followed the second highly successful 
performance of Marat/Sade in Belgrade. We were very pleased because the tremendous 
international success we had had averted the danger of our being banned. Sitting there in 
the garden-restaurant and waiting for us was a slightly inebriated, tall, thin, dark-haired, 
bespectacled, ageless man: Kis Dani, we were told. It slowly dawned on me that Danilo 
Kis’s name had been translated into Hungarian. He spoke good Hungarian, joking and 
telling stories; he didn’t say much that was memorable that night and didn’t do anything 
particular, he just drank and chatted away, yet he stayed at the centre all through, though 
it wasn’t his success that we had gathered to celebrate. Perhaps this was so because he 
radiated a naive, child-like benevolence.
In early summer 19891 met him for the second time, in Paris, where two evenings were 
devoted to Hungarian letters in the Pompidou Centre. On this second occasion he sat on 
the platform among the Hungarian guest writers. I had heard that he ’ d recently undergone 
surgery for lung cancer, and I was glad to find him in good health, and my throat only 
tightened when I heard his rasping voice. As an invited speaker he spoke about Hungarian 
literature, showing a good command of French. He did not make a secret of his bias 
favouring Krúdy, Szomory and, particularly, Kosztolányi, whose Édes Anna (Anna 
Édes, 1926), published in a French translation, but without attracting much notice, he 
discussed with understanding for an audience consisting, naturally, mostly of Hunga­
rians. He knew as well as anyone else that he was not going to soften the hearts of French 
publishers or critics, but he went on saying what he thought of the novel all the same.
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Then we went to a nearby restaurant, where he ate and drank with gusto and was only 
sorry that he could not smoke: life wasn’t worth much without tobacco, he said, while he 
washed smoked salmon down with red wine.
Then, last year, I saw him for the third time, during an oversized writers’ get-together 
aboard a ship anchored off the Chain Bridge in Budapest. The company was made up of 
millionaires and Nobel laureate celebrities, politicians earlier thought of as dissidents of 
every hue of the spectrum, editors, ladies and gentlemen who controlled international 
literary exchange, who were to nominate candidates for the Nobel Prize, and not without 
success. The ship set sail, for an hour or two, and there was no chance to get off. I 
registered with great relief that Danilo was of the company and I managed to sit at his 
table. The chatter was conducted in a variety of languages, and so was the undisguised 
exhibitionism of the writers. The western guests took part in this with wise restraint, 
keeping a condescending silence most of the time, and letting the editors and journalists 
come before them; the easterners offered themselves for sale with breathless excitement, 
as if all they were doing was declare their views and sacred convictions. What happened 
was what invariably happens on such occasions; Danilo ate and drank, joking about girls 
with the macho writers who had less success with women than he had. Then he just sat 
in silence and later tried to convince some of the millionaires what a great writer 
Kosztolányi was and how much it would be worth their while to support the publication 
of his novels in the West. I could tell from the glitter of his spectacles that he knew how 
hopeless the attempt was, still he would not let go of the opportunity.
All he said about modem literature, and within it about his own work,was that it was 
a mere stylistic game and hardly worth the candle. No one these days wrote as they used 
to, that was the real thing. No, he’d stopped writing a long time before: whatever for? That 
was all over. In France, where he lived, nobody took the least interest in literature; in his 
native country, for different reasons, the situation was the same. America was hopeless: 
but what a great writer Dezső Kosztolányi had been!
Danilo Kis did not hurt anyone except perhaps himself; yet the modern authors and the 
literary and financial potentates at the table were shocked as they listened to him. Even 
those with the thickest skins must have been aware that the contemptuous glitter of his 
spectacles was directed at them. But because he was a charmer (which is rarer in the case 
of writers), they had to forgive him his murderous honesty.
It was then that I had this spine-chilling realisation that Danilo Kis was perhaps already 
speaking to us from the other shore.
Two or three weeks later news of his death arrived from Paris.
I mourn him not as the Serbian translator of Hungarian letters, nor even as a major 
modem Serbian writer. I mourn a sincere, wise man who was never taken in, not even 
by his own success, but he simply loved women, wine, cigarettes, good company 
and real, honest, simple writing speaking with a human voice.
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Commitment—in thisies the bondage an the greatness of Hungarian poetry. To those who follow Sartre this may sound paradoxical, since Sartre connects the 
concept of commitment to prose only: “prose consists of the realm of signals”, and ranks 
poetry with painting and music—arts which by definition cannot be committed, at least 
not in Sartre ’ s existentialist sense. However much one might resist this (as has been done 
recently by R. Champigny), Sartre’s position is basically valid—particularly if one 
considers that he is getting out from a literature in which poetry long ago lost its syncretic 
character and ritual meaning and has been approaching metaphysics and oneirism. A 
comparative sociological study of literature would clearly place the issue in a new light; 
sociographical analysis may reveal the underlying reasons as well as resolve the many 
contradictions involved. A sociological examination of this nature could establish that 
Hungarian poetry provides a counter-example to Sartre’s argument, for poetry has 
always been a leading art form in Hungary and has remained so to the present day. Indeed 
the prevailing circumstances have compelled Hungarian poetry to carry commitment and 
the transmission of ideological messages, functions which in French and Russian 
literature have devolved on the novel, the drama, the essay, philosophy or political 
thinking. Hungarian poetry, from Petőfi onwards, has not only perceived the necessity 
for intertwining poetry and morality, but has also perceived, to use the words of György 
Lukács, that “this new relationship, on a broader level, between public life and literature 
has been the outcome of Hungarian development as a whole.” Looked at from this aspect, 
the question of the essence of poetry is considerably wider, even though its aesthetic and 
poetic character, its versification as such, do not lose significance. Quite the contrary!
Of course, Hungarian poetry is not the only one unable to choose between the transcen­
dental and the literal, the European and the local, the oneiric and the syncretic. This is a 
problem for modem poetry as a whole, which for long has wavered between “a demand 
for the totality of the intellect and man’s existence confined within limits” (Raymond). 
If these limits are not only transcendental but social as well (that is socio-political), as is 
the case with many small nations, including the Hungarians, then it is self-evident that 
this contradiction is magnified and poetry becomes not only a question of ethics but of 
politics as well. Through such existential limitations and such an expansion of the 
influence of poetry, it will undoubtedly lose in metaphysical character and will lose its 
ancient, fundamental role of helping “man to arrive at his essence”. If poetry is 
incessantly hamstrung by the difficulties of daily life, and if it becomes committed in the 
political and social struggle, it takes on a local character, shouldering the premises of 
literary and non-literary forms, which will necessarily degrade it. Thus poetry falls within 
the competence of other fields of the mind, above all of prose, and by sacrificing itself,
Danilo Kis (1935—1989) was an internationally known and published Serbian novelist, 
Hungarian on one side o f his family. This is his Introduction to Novija madarska lirika, 
(New Hungarian Lyrical Poetry) edited by Ivan Ivanji and Danilo Kis; Nolit, 
Belgrade, 1970. Poems translated by Ivan Ivanji, Danilo Kis and Ivan V. Lalic.
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becomes concrete and committed. “Every word is used for its clear and social meaning 
as well as its mysterious resonance,” Sartre says, “I might even say, for its own 
physiognomy”. Under extremely unfavourable social circumstances, the poet necessar­
ily neglects this second prerequisite and discards the mysterious resonance of the words, 
since that would only disturb the transmission of the message, and he is mostly the loser 
by it.
But the temptation is very strong. The poet wants to fight with his own weapons on all 
fronts: in love and in poetry equally, just as he would mostly like to earn his living through 
his poetry. Even the most stubborn give in to this temptation. Petőfi produced a radical 
solution to the question through an early and tragical decision, while Endre Ady went on 
wrestling with it throughout his life.
Rimbaud’s way to exchange lives proved to be ambivalent in Ady’s case, since for him 
this also had metaphysical and social contexts. He never wanted to submit to his 
Hungarian fate, as he was aware of the fact that the romantic revolt of Verlaine and 
Baudelaire offered a surer poetic course than a bloody and ephemeral political and social 
struggle might ensure for him. Ady, in a romantic manner, equated metaphysical revolt 
and social revolt; had dreadful Hungarian reality not existed, he would not have stopped 
half-way but definitely turned towards the potentials within his own self and the extasy 
of his personal horror, as did Baudelaire and Rimbaud before him—who themselves 
chose to recoil before their decision. Ady did stop. He admired Verlaine, but looked upon 
him through the eyes of a Hungarian, claiming that he (Verlaine) “is crying on behalf of 
all those who have been crippled by a base, mendacious and butchering society”. In the 
Hungary of the Emperor Francis Joseph, Ady could not disavow himself, he could not 
become a Verlaine, and so he became a Hugo. He was tossed about between Pest and 
Paris, between political slogans and symbolist syncretism, between metaphysical disil­
lusionment and the Hungarian fate—this is what makes Ady’s an accursed and great 
poetry. According to the logic of poetry influences, and following from his personal 
receptivity, Ady, after years of idyllic journeys to Paris, had to return as a decadent, as 
a French student, principally because this decadence perferctly suited his excessive 
sensibility and neurotically Bohemian personality. Verlainesque tones and the gloomy 
music of the fin de siécle do in fact resound in many of Ady’s poems, with all the 
requisites of symbolistdisenchantment, the tints of the eternal themes of love and death— 
Baudelairesque spleen and Verlainesque despair. But in Ady’s poetry these lyrical and 
decadent motifs emerge parallel with his most militant publications and political articles. 
His poetry smoulders between two poles, burning in two contrasting fires: “between a 
Petőfi’s Jacobin sweep, whose banners he carried with an unswerving faith in ultimate 
victory, and an imaginary revolution and the hopelessness of Vörösmarty’s old Gypsy” 
(Krleza). His is a Baudelairean personality, a kinsman of the poétes maudits both in his 
personality and vocation, a poet who is glowing with the desire to achieve contemplation 
and with the stimulus of the strong potions of sin, desiring to be not an “illusionist” but 
“everything”, in constant struggle with his own contradictions; out of this self-tormenting 
emerges the greatest and most tragic figure in modem Hungarian literature. Within him 
the vitalism of Bergson and Nietzsche clashes with Verlaine’s conscience-stricken 
frenzy: Je suis 1’empire á la fin de la decadence. But alongside these neurotic and fatally 
projected mental regions, Ady also portrays for Hungarian poetry the landscape of the 
desolate Hungarian puszta, that very puszta which Petőfi once portrayed with such 
affection. The Hungarian language resounds in a previously unheard rhythm in his 
poetry. His lexical severity sounds a new tone in Hungarian poetry, permanently set in 
a major key, which up to the 18th century had been considered the only pure scale. Here
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he resembles Bartók, inasmuch as he succeeded in uniting the cosmopolitan and the 
autochton personality within himself, the European and the Hungarian; thus he becomes 
a paradoxical yet unique personality, the poet of the apocalyptic themes of the Great War, 
and a lyrical dreamer, who is also a bard and a champion of the 1919 Hungarian 
revolution.
t the beginning of the century, which was heralded everywhere in Europe with a
“grey dawn”, poetry was quickly consolidated in Hungary. In 1908, two years after 
the appearance of Ady’s volume of Új versek (New Poems), there appeared the first 
number of Nyugat (West), the periodical that played a revolutionary role in Hungarian 
culture, particularly poetry. The history of modem Hungarian poetry, with the giant 
figure of Ady at its vanguard, is closely linked with the history of Nyugat, whose title itself 
expresses a programme.*
On an aesthetic level, Mihály Babits displayed most consistently a synthesis of 
Hungarian with European culture, the faith in humanist ideals, and in poetry, as a 
possibility for the purification of the universal spirit, a stubborn Europeanism and 
occidentalism. A poet of enormous erudition, with a command of several languages, 
Babits, like Valéry and T.S. Eliot, and above all like Valéry Briusov, was a fabricator 
in the noblest and purest meaning of the word. He succeeded in what Ady was unable to 
accomplish: he demonstrated how much can be accomplished in the life of the mind and 
in culture by a poetic and consistent intellectual asceticism. He portrayed all of the inward 
life, sought out the innermost and latent meaning behind things, their divine identity, not 
remaining content with what is visible on the surface. When he plays with words and their 
meaning, he does so not only for poetic delight but with the conviction that there is a 
hidden meaning below the layers of the words and their rhythm, some new substances of 
the thought of the demiurge. Unlike Ady, who always thrust his own personality into 
prominence, Babits concealed the physical presence which lay hidden behind his 
conceptual absorption, the personality which loomed in the background of the most 
diverse poetic forms possible—oriental, antique and strictly prosodic forms, because, 
like Valéry, he “consciously refuses to be anything whatever”. His style—which is rigid 
even when used in a playful mood, and serious even when striking a singing tone—is a 
poetic synthesis of what in European art, primarily in architecture, is called Sezession or 
art nouveau. In Babits’s poetry this Sezession, (which at the beginning of the century had 
one of its citadels in the Pest of the nouveau riche, and which is apt to seem sad and drab 
in its over-adornment, as if distastefully imitating antique models), has preserved some­
thing of its antique nobility, yet even so seems sometimes to be pseudo-classicist. Babits 
often used arabesques to arrive at the essence, and vice versa: he arrived at an arabesque 
complexity from the essence: all these quests turned him into a congenial alchemist of 
the Hungarian poetic idiom. (Dante’s terza rima remain in his translation so Italianately 
close to the original that one does really begin to suspect alchemy.) He was bed-ridden 
for several years, and this Christian moralist, the translator of St Augustine, created on 
his “mattras grave” his prophetic, hugely significant poems, of which special mention
*At the time of the launching of Nyugat, similar processes took place in other Europen literatures as well. In 
Spain, this intellectual revival unfolded in 1898, under the wings of the periodical Revista de Occidente, in 
Russia the occidentalists congregated around Vesy and Apolon, while in France, Mitoir issued the first number 
of Occident in December, a periodical intended to counter the “naturalistic and sentimental excesses of 
romanticism”, advocating a programme which was essentially in conformity with that of Nyugat.
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must be made of the ascetic lament, Jónás könyve (The Book of Jonah). This morbid 
explorer of poetic forms and a devotee of the craft of poetry restored Hungarian poetry’s 
inclination to experimentation and the desire for an alchemistic submersion in the 
“proximate chaos” of human existence. After Babits, Hungarian poetry could not easily 
return to the rhythms of the leaping dance and csárdás.
Babits’s intellectual adventure and the Nyugat cult of poetic perfection was followed 
by Dezső Kosztolányi.** A less rigid poet than Babits, Kosztolányi is lyrical rather than 
mystical, even though for lyrical vibrations he too turns to the scarcely conceivable and 
extricable radiation of the objects and phenomena that are thrust into the vortex of 
existence. Kosztolányi has enriched Hungarian poetry with Rilke’s world of childhood, 
with Impressionist pastels, which have become somewhat faded, like old photographs, 
from which he drew inspiration more than once. He, too, is obsessed with the themes that 
occupied Babits—death and stupefaction over the transience of human life. In his 
expressionist periods he rid himself of this nightmare, and his poetry became exteriorised 
and objective. He uses the same melancholy tone in recounting his childhood memories 
and in describing the Pest proletariat and the depressing nights of a large city.
The intimate tradition of Nyugat was carried on by Gyula Juhász and Árpád Tóth, 
poets related to one another by their solitary and tragic fates. Juhász portrayed the 
Hungarian landscape with a bitter affection, in a plein air style and in dark colours; he 
wrote about solitary and wasted human life. The cycle of love poems written to the 
“eternal Anna” is imbued with Proustian notions of time regained. Árpád Tóth is an 
elegist, like Musset, whose poems he also translated, but these elegiac themes are filled 
with a Verlainean sensuality and eroticism, that lend a wryness to his poems. Like the 
other poets of the Nyugat circle, he carefully polished the poems on his solitude, which 
display an almost Keatsian verve, and devoted minute care to his choice of words— 
weighty and wry, solemn and scintillating. Nor was he to escape the “Hungarian curse” 
either, he did not confine himself to blending alliteration with onomatopoeia: his April 
Capriccio, woven out of Impressionist shimmering, turns into a Don Quixotic ’’April 
outrage” that degrades the lyrical experience.
Frigyes Karinthy, the “café Socrates” of Hungarian poetry, a rationalist-cum-sceptic, 
turned the aestheticism and post-romantic Weltschmerz of the Nyugat poets on its head. 
Men of logic and rationalism often possess a parodist’s spirit (suffice to recall Vinaver 
and Queneau), and this made it easy for Karinthy to discover the key to, and the 
mechanism of, a stylistic transposition of sentimentalism. Towards himself as well he 
was ironic and sceptical, and he abandoned his newly found form of lyrical expression; 
his explorations in prosody and metrics have enriched the modem poetic sensibility, for 
his poems are not lacking in verve or trouvaille. His most momentous work still remains 
his witty and ingenious így írtok ti (This is how you write), a collection of literary 
caricatures.
Lajos Kassák also tried his poetic wings under the aegis of Nyugat. He has a high 
reputation in Hungary, not least for luxuriant poetry in which are perambulated all the 
modem “isms” that were present in European poetry during the first decades of the 
century. This passionate explorer of form who, despite plunging into every trend, was 
able to preserve his individuality, created an authentic poetry, which he himself later 
described as constructivist. The path he followed was interesting and prolific, leading
**This Preface only mentions poets whose works have been included in the anthology.
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him from expressionism and unanimisme, through an acquaintanceship with Whitman, 
Cendrars and Apollinaire, from a profuse, rhetorical vers libre to a denuded and rational 
poetry that concentrates on nothing but the quintessence—denomination.
Milán Füst produced a volume of poetry that is far from bulky yet all the more 
significant; he is a poet whose greatness, unlike Kassák’s, lies in his consistency. Füst 
remained possessed with the thematic stock of time and eternity and proceeded along the 
path of Babits’s mythologizing, abounding in bold associations, without, however, 
abandoning the gloomy keynote of his classicist and biblical lyrical poems.
Lőrinc Szabó, the last representative of the great Nyugat generation, wrote Tücsökzene 
(Cricket Music) in the prime of his life. The volume, one of his most valuable works, is 
a synthesis created out of his life and poetry, a poetic autobiography, whose artistic 
qualities are enhanced by its outstanding value as a document, something unprecedented 
in Modem European poetry.
N aturally, the aestheticism of the Nyugat circle and the poetry which originated under the infamous “black sun”, sparked off the resistance of the school of populist 
writers, who have set the ideal of committed poetry against the Academicism of the 
Nyugat school, and championed the return to Petó'fi’s inheritance and folk poetry. 
Regarding form, they aimed at a primitive imagism, a poetry without any artificial 
ornaments. By the 1930s this created the separation of two schools in Hungarian 
literature; this division can be felt to the present day with the urbanists (or occidentals) 
on one side, and the populists on the other. To be sure, the differences are hardly 
discernible, even to Hungarians, in the works of many of the poets, and it is often only 
a question of personal decision which side they would join. In any event, the populists 
have also used their political activity to exert their influence, while in form, a certain 
consistency is apparent in their reaching back to the traditions of folk poetry and to the 
presentation of the village. In the 1930s, the populists did valuable sociological research 
and wrote documentary works on the misery of Hungarian agricultural labourers. The 
most prestigious representative of this school was Gyula Illyés, who proceeded along a 
consistent poetic path, leading from surrealismt to the populist school. Interestingly, 
Babits entrusted the editing of Nyugat to Illyés, and there was also a moment in the career 
of this populist poet when he was faced with the choice between writing in Hungarian or 
in French. Illyés finally decided to follow in the wake of PetóTi and Ady, remaining a 
Hungarian writer and Hungarian poet par excellence. His is an extreme example of the 
Hungarian poet’s obligation to make a choice, of a poetic vacillation which finally tilted 
towards concrete speech. He wrote on the most ancient and primordial emotions, the 
general questions of the human soul—love and death, but the greatest wonder in his 
poetry still springs from the scent and bitter idyll of the earth of the Hungarian village. 
Naturally, a commitment undertaken also calls for sacrifices; his carefully formed lyrics 
include quite a lot of shavings and silt, the prosaic sediment of his striving for plain talk, 
while his deliberate attempt to achieve distinctiveness causes unnecessary complica­
tions, leading to a narrative that is now obsolete in poetry.
A ttila József’s poetry makes up a separate chapter in Hungarian poetry: it is an affluent fountain, a whole movement by itself, with its significance rooted in its 
multiple and expansive effect. He was the proletarian Wunderkind of Hungarian poetry 
in the 1920s, the personification of humanism at a time of rapidly spreading civil strife, 
a genius in the writing of programme poems, and a great lyricist. He radically broke with 
the aestheticism of the urbanists to become, above all, a poet of the working class; yet his
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prolific poetry also remained faithful to the linguistic and prosodic traditions of Nyugat. 
As in Éluard and Aragon, his works assign a major role to surrealistic symbols, while the 
roots of his poetry reach back to Hungarian shepherds’ dances and folksongs.
This crystal clear, sparkling surrealist poetry, which also expresses social disillusion­
ment, began with the liveliness of a Villon, a facetious, youthful optimism, and came to 
a tragic conclusion, with a dreadful human cry for love and humanity. When he was 
repudiated by everybody, and even ostracised by the Party for having tried to reconcile 
Marx and Freud, he made an end of an extraordinary poetic opus that radiated Hölderlin ’ s 
lucidity.
Miklós Radnóti resembled Attila József in writing on humanism in jeopardy, under the 
shadow of fascism. His neo-classic lines give off a repressed dread, the eternal fear of the 
Jew which Tuwim also gave voice to. His youthful elegiac poems bear the marks of a 
presentiment of disaster; in his last eclogues his tone becomes prophetically tragic, his 
poetry a jeremiad. Razglednicas, which were discovered in a mass grave, were written 
in our country; they too reveal that Radnóti’s fate and poetry have many similarities with 
those of Ivan Goran Kovacic, the author of Mass Grave.
Sándor Weöres is a member of the third Nyugat generation, a perpetuator of Babits’s 
poetic cosmopolitanism. He is interested in everything, from the folk poetry of primitive 
peoples to oriental legends and to Momcilo Nastasijevic. The findings of these explora­
tions he discharges into his variegated poetry, a poetry in which a synthesis might only 
be achieved in a Heraclitean fire. The title of his latest volume— Tűzkút (Fire Well)—is 
therefore not merely a metaphor but a philosophy, the “psychoanalysis of fire”, as 
Bachelard would put it. Poetic automatism has set him off towards the realm of oneiric 
and metaphysical poetry, in which apparently the discipline of the soul prevails, but 
behind this semblance there rage superstition and suppressed primeval emotions, the 
dark divinations of a fatal enunciation.
P ost-war poetry has been marked by the resignation of eye witnesses and the swerve of those who, with youthful faith, wished to gain mastery over this resignation. 
Official theories and the Cold War have further sharpened the virulent divergence 
between the populist and urbanist writers. Representatives of one side withdrew even 
further into their ivory tower, while the spokesmen of the other, feeling themselves 
backed by the masses and themselves resolved in the mass, continued to sing folksong 
and render a “constructive” poetry of suspicious optimism and rhetoric pathos.
The populist trend includes István Simon, a follower of Illyés’s. A poet of the village, 
Simon adds fresher samples to the nostalgic pictures of the plains; these, however, are not 
lacking in sincere lyricism or freshness. László Nagy, under the wing of the populists, has 
gone through many metamorphoses, his poetry becoming ever richer under the influence 
of folk poetry and Lorca’s imagism. He is justly compared to Ferenc Juhász, undoubtedly 
the most gifted poet of the post-war generation. Juhász is fond of harsh words and 
powerful epithets, of a world without God, and of rebellion. He creates his own private 
myth out of explosive images and metaphors, the reconciliation of contrasting pictures 
and ideas, and an unbridled eloquence. His is a metaphysics which is “felt by the heart 
but shaped in poetic images”, as Brunetiére once defined poetry. His cosmic verbalism 
has no human barriers: the coupling of images, metaphors, nouns and adjectives, the 
concepts of the organic and the inorganic world, the lexigraphy of flora and fauna, the 
“idiom of plants”, the realm of minerals and planets, the traces of history, the fossils in 
Pannónia, the chronicles of the graveyards—all these are not sufficient for him to express 
the essence of the Promethean (Asian) fire in which he bums. “My Master, my Brother,
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my forebear, my Father”, he addresses Attila József, whose surrealist poetry was his point 
of departure and, in the wake of Bartók and Ady, he aims at conciliating the individual 
with the legend, the ancient Hungarian with the European.
A few years Juhász’s senior, János Pilinszky emerged from the war with stigmata that 
would not vanish, tight-lipped like the inmates of the camps. He condenses the bitter, 
meditative silence of the prisoners into stone-hard poems shot through with ascetic and 
religious mysticism. His biblical oratorios, written for choir and male voice, reveal the 
voice of apocalyptic visions. The name of Ágnes Nemes Nagy is most often mentioned 
together with Pilinszky. She is the most eminent urbanist, her lyrical poems showing 
distinguished restraint and contemplation, something noble and genteel, as in the poems 
of the Comptesse de Noailles. Her sensitive poetry sounds in the major key throughout, 
with a constant vibration between the emotional and the intellectual, yet never paddling 
in the tepid waters of “feminine romanticism”. Gábor Garai intends, for the most part 
successfully, to maintain an equilibrium between current content and poetic intellectu- 
alism; thus by liberating the topical from the emptiness of the report and the undertone 
of the feuilleton, he raises it to a place among the eternal issues. Contemporary men and 
the contemporary world in his poems take on mythical dimensions, surrounded by a 
mythical aura, in statu nascendi; his parallels with ancient motifs and myths deepen the 
conscience even more substantially, lending it a more profound meaning.
Sándor Csoóri is considered by the populists as one of their own. He grounds the realm 
of his poetry on Ferenc Juhász’s pantheism, but he sets discipline against Juhász’s verbal 
fury; more precisely, he throws away Juhász’s telescope and microscope and, relying on 
his own unaided vision, is content with the images and sensations perceivable through 
the organs of sense. His poetry slowly abandons naive imagism and, under the influence 
of Lorca and Éluard, begins to gravitate, revolving radiantly and splendidly round his 
two basic themes: love and solitude. Two themes which can hold the whole universe.
The history of modern Hungarian poetry shows that, under the pressure of their poetic 
duty and literary traditions, poets have often deprived themselves of the possibility of 
using attractive orchestration in their poems, that they could not always go in for the 
precious aesthetics of pure poetry, but instead had to take up daily duties. But it also 
reveals that Hungarian poetry, too, entertains ambitions aimed at oneirism, and these 
poets are less thoroughly aware than others of the dizzying ambiguity of the poetic idiom 
and the poetic essence. (They are encouraged in this by the very character of the 
Hungarian language). On the contrary: they often make use of the hidden meanings of the 
word—and this is an effort which bears out that they face up to every challenge.
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Sándor Kányádi
As Long as the Lamp Still Flickers
A t a time when in our towns, our shtetl, and even in the villages around Máramaros and Dés there were still Jews, the Rabbi, laying aside the Law and the Talmud, took 
a walk through the village. Day was breaking but as he passed he saw a light shining in 
the cobbler’s house. He went to scold him.
“Hey, Moishe, why do you keep your lamp burning, can’t you see day is breaking?” 
The cobbler looked up from his bench and all he said in answer was:
“Rebe, while the lamp flickers things can still be mended.”
I heard the story from my father and have not forgotten it all these years; I have made 
use of the cobbler’s wise and poetic saying in speech and perhaps even in writing. I 
believe in it unconditionally. But often I do not know how to interpret it.
Too many things that cannot be mended have happened in the past—one need not go 
back further than our own century. The sins of Cain are inexpiable. The substitution of 
compensation for expiation is abhorrent. It reminds one of pardons and indulgences sold 
in the Middle Ages.
The still waters of conscience, roughened and ruffled barely half a century ago, are 
turning smooth and still once again.
It is possible to write, after Auschwitz, though not to write better; and it is possible to 
live. Live better than ever before. We are beginning to realize—to get used to the fact— 
that concentration camps and costly, energy-intensive crematoria are not necessarily 
needed for the annihilation of an ethnic group, a linguistic community. It can be done j ust 
as easily at the school desk—humanely, one might say—by reprogramming children into 
machines that speak the desired language. Indeed the sterile conditions of the laying in 
ward offer the first—and gratuitous—opportunity of preventing the ethnical-linguistic 
chaos that might otherwise ensue. Parents must be obliged to stick to the recommended 
list of names and the official spelling rules when naming their offspring.
The time is out of joint, we may say, with Hamlet. The time is out of joint again. 
Perhaps it never kept to its proper tracks?
“The world is sinful, son”, sighed the last Rabbi of Kolozsvár at dusk on a beautiful 
summer evening, on the way to the synagogue, a good number of years ago. “Sinful, 
sinful”, he sighed as a farewell after checking whether a minyan—ten— , the required 
number of adult males, had assembled there for evening prayers. That evening, they had. 
(Today, there is not even a rabbi at the city of Kolozsvár.) So my services were not 
required.
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Minyan was the first Jewish word I learned. I learned it from my father, who often 
helped out to make up the minyan, either as a fraternal or as an occasional member, when 
the rabbi called in our village. Not one but two Jews lived in our village. That is to say, 
two Jewish families. One kept a store and liquor licence up-street from the co-operative, 
the other did the same down-street on the opposite side. Or rather, the store and the liquor 
licence kept them. Kept the up-street family, the Kohns, in comfort (true, they had but one 
child), and kept the other, Mr Nándor Schönfeld and his numerous offspring, after a 
fashion. The bell above the door would tinkle to announce the arrival of a customer and 
the smell of spices would waft out as the door opened to let them in. The oftener the bell 
tinkled, the more affable was Mr Nándor’s bow and the sunnier Uncle Elek Kolm’s smile. 
Though a customer did not necessarily mean money. The account-book was often 
produced, and the lead pencil from behind the store-keeper’s ear. But lack of money was 
never the cause of an unconcluded deal in either store. The furrows would grow deeper 
and closer now on the store-keeper’s, now on the customer’s brow, in sorrowful 
reckoning. And the voices would soften into a bashful whisper. But you could always pay 
the account with a couple of eggs, a hen or two, or a goose. Things were always 
straightened out somehow in the end. My father and Uncle Elek Kohn were on first name 
terms, they had been in the army together, boon companions; my father served as 
coachman to the community on festive occasions. We would plait the horses’ tails and 
put armchairs in the cart or the sleigh whenever they had to visit the nearby town for an 
important feast or celebration, or when a rabbi had to be fetched. Those were usually the 
times when my father was needed to make up the minyan. It was my father who took Mr 
Nándor to the village, as a bridegroom, on the sleigh, in the dead of winter, wrapped in 
a blanket from head to foot, because Mr Nándor did not own a warm overcoat. The 
retelling of that story always caused much merriment in the family whenever a new baby 
was bom. “It is all Miklós’ fault”, he would plead to softspoken Aunt Szeréna, “if he 
hadn’t wrapped me up in a blanket that time I wouldn’t be here now to do mischief’. But 
he was always happy to have “done mischief’. He loved children, and not only his own. 
No barefooted little customer ever left without at least a sweet “for the road”, even if they 
had shopped on credit. It was I who taught Uncle Elek’s one and only son Endre, tempered 
against the wind, my age exactly, to sit on a horse. Once we took a big cockerel to the 
shakier, riding one horse. It was then that he taught me the word kaporeth. It’s kaporeth 
for this one, he said, coming out of the shakters’s with the killed cockerel under his arm, 
and climbed up on the horse behind me. With Mr Nándor’s son Ernő, who was also my 
age, we would devour books, trashy novels, penny-dreadfuls. We used to choke together 
on the shared cigarette filched from the store, and to bathe together, the three of us, in the 
sweet smelling waters of the Küküllő. Bathed naked, of course, but usually towards 
evening—out of modesty, because of that little “difference”, which they did not have to 
hide from me. It was only later, when I was grown up, and had learned all that had 
happened, that I understood that it must have been the instinctive fear of humiliation 
already at work there on the banks of the Küküllő—even though it was summer then, 
wonderful summer, but the ominous clouds had begun to gather.
Then the times turned out of joint.
And the humiliation became perceptible—conspicuous.
The deportations began; Ernő and one of his sisters were the only ones to return of the 
two Jewish families. And even they stayed only long enough to bid farewell to the village 
and our childhood together.
It took my father two years to come back from the wars. He returned with one leg 
crippled for life. He was glad to see me grown and to learn that I had succeeded in
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guarding our horses—and all the horses of the village—hiding them from the soldiers, 
in the woods.
A few days after his return, when he had learned all there was to learn, he said to me, 
softly, as we passed before one of the stores, that it was a pity I had not managed to keep 
Mr Nándor’s and Elek Kohn ’ s family hidden in the woods, or at least the children. Horses 
could be bought, if one had need of them. He did not mention either family after that for 
many years; but every time he limped past one of the stores, he always raised his hat, 
shyly, when no one was looking.
Then, a good ten years or so ago, it happened that we went to the village with friends 
from abroad. The weather was terrible, night had fallen, and the rain would not stop. I was 
translating a selection of Transylvanian Saxon folk-poetry at the time, and recited some 
of the poems to help while away the time. The guests were getting anxious and the 
children listless. My father sounded curfew but our guests, knowing that we were not 
allowed to put up foreigners, did not want to expose us to later inconvenience. They 
insisted on pitching their tent on no-man’s-land between two villages, at the appointed 
place, despite the pouring rain. They agreed somehow to let the children spend the night 
in the house. My father stared out into the rain after them with a crushed look on his face. 
I could sense that he, like me, felt that rain like barbed wire around us.
“That I had to live to see this. At least you had enough guts not to chase the children 
out into the rain. He turned his wise, beautiful head towards me sadly.
“We never kept the dog on a chain. Sándor, Sándor, the Jewish cobbler’s lamp is but 
a feeble little flame in you”, he said reproachfully. And he went out into the pouring rain, 
splashing up to the old house so as not to violate the law by sleeping at his children’s.
The next day the weather cleared, and our spirits with it. We walked up to the garden. 
When we found ourselves in a comer, alone, I could see he had something to say.
“I am very glad, son, that you are translating the Saxons, I respect them myself. But 
couldn’t you spare the time and use your knowledge to translate Jewish poetry as well? 
They had their songs too. I knew a couple of them myself, Elek Kohn taught me when 
we were in the army together.” He thought a little, searching his memory, then began to 
recite, in his own special way, as he always could, and quoted from any language he had 
had the chance to dip into:
amol is geven a yidele 
a yidele, a yidele.
And immediately translated for me saying, that yidele meant Jew, in the diminutive, 
and that if he remembered right, that would make the first line “once there was a Jew.”
“There’s the title for you.”
“Shake on it!”—he was holding out his hardened, fine-boned hand.
And with that hand-shake I pledged that this book would be done. He did not live to 
see it published; my only consolation is that he heard some of the ballads and songs while 
I was working on them.
It must have been providence that sent Professor Mihály Eisikovits to me soon after 
I had made my promise to my father. He brought me two faded exercise-books that 
contained his collection of Yiddish folk poetry, the fruits of a 1938 tour of Máramaros, 
which he now offered to me for translation. His recollections of that tour, at once 
documentary and lyrical, published at Kolozsvár in the 1948 Jewish Calendar under the 
title “Among singing Hasidim”, find their reflection in this volume. The authenticity of 
the ear and eyewitness accounts of the life of the Jewish community of Máramaros—a
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life that seems exotic to us today—facilitates my task in that I need add only such in­
formation as will assist the reader in the better understanding of a collection that aims to 
popularise and does not claim to be scholarly. These recollections encouraged me to add 
my own childhood memories to the information to follow (instead of hiding them under 
a bushel—which would perhaps have been more seemly), as well as the incentives and 
promptings of family and friends to which the book owes its birth, and the anxieties that 
spring from our present situation, which so much resembles that of the Jews in the past.
Yiddish was the language of the ghetto. It came into being sometime around the year 
1000, spoken by Jews whom the anti-semitism, kindled by the Crusades and the 
subsequent pogroms, chased from German soil eastwards where they sought and took 
refuge, withdrawing into the seclusion of certain streets or urban districts. Yiddish was 
thus created out of a demotic Middle-High German dialect. With the addition of Hebrew, 
Aramean and Slav words, it became the vernacular of Eastern European Jewry, serving 
the everyday life of the Jewish community together with Hebrew, the language of 
worship, literature and poetry, which survived despite all adversities in the synagogues. 
Little by little Yiddish too developed into and independent literary language, indeed 
today, when Yiddish is on the wane, writers in Yiddish have been awarded of the Nobel 
prize. But Yiddish is primarily popular, not literary, and has produced its own folk 
literature. Tales, legends, ballads, bantering and matchmaking songs. It was undoubtedly 
public necessity and the environment—the products of German, Slav, Rumanian and 
perhaps even Hungarian folk literature—that inspired the talented story-tellers and 
singers of the Jewish communities, especially in villages, to create their own popular 
literature. I shall leave the processing of the similarities, concordances, and influences to 
others more competent and qualified. Their task will not be difficult, for the Jewish 
people are lettered by virtue of their faith, and in most of the anthologies the composers 
of both text and tune are listed in the case of many songs that have since become popular 
or folk literature. The majority of those anthologies have an international circulation. In 
our collection, we have endeavoured to give a sample of those who have remained 
nameless. A good third of this book contains pieces which—to judge by the Eastern 
European anthologies that were available to me—have never been published, not even 
in Yiddish. This was one of the reasons why this became a bilingual volume. Mihály 
Eisikovits’ battered exercise-books formed the basis. The songs were recorded in 
writing; knowing no Yiddish, Professor Eisikovits had to enlist helpers, and the bokhers 
in the villages around Máramaros at the time, were not too familiar with the Latin script. 
Their notes had to be decyphered and rewritten, and in the process misreadings and 
misinterpretations may have occurred. As a musician, Professor Eisikovits was primarily 
interested in the tunes, but given the opportunity, he recorded the words as well—acting 
upon a divine impulse, as he used to say, for not long after, there was no one to collect 
and no one to collect from any longer. It is sad enough that only the lyrics have survived. 
The original melodies exist only in the professor’s adaptation, and only one or two of 
those have survived—the rest are lost. But somewhere in the world there are perhaps 
people who used to dwell in Máramaros who can still hum the tune. Originally, the 
subtitle of the books was to be Yiddish Folk Poetry from Máramaros, despite the fact that 
two-thirds were selected from anthologies in common use. But those who helped me— 
and to whom I herewith give thanks, blessed be their memory: Dr Sándor Scheiber and 
Samu Schreiber: we once lived on the same street in Kolozsvár—all assured me that the 
majority of these poems were undoubtedly known to those living around Máramaros. 
This was confirmed by my friend László Grunea, to whom I owe almost as many thanks 
as to Mr Samu Schreiber for their assistance in the decyphering, translation and breaking
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into verses of the songs. Harry Majorovics, a composer from Kolozsvár, and László 
Jólesz, who, besides editing the Yiddish text and annotating the book expertly, did his 
utmost to ensure publication, are also of the same opinion. But given that the book cannot 
be published here in Rumania as we originally planned, Máramaros was changed to 
Eastern European, to avoid the suspicion of interference. But thanks are due to Géza 
Domokos, who kept my spirits up, and did his best to have the book published by 
Kriterion of Bucharest. It was no fault of his that he proved unsuccessful. Owing to the 
good offices of the late János Domonkos, our joint efforts were in the end published by 
Európa in Budapest. István Almási, who edited the musical material, corrected my 
mistakes with assiduous work, he was indeed a fellow author. I beg the reader’s pardon 
for writing of the makers of this book at such length: but they were part of its making and 
must take part in the rewards.
I hope that the reader, and perhaps the music-lover, will find pleasure in the poems and 
songs contained in the book, which, with the exception of two or three pieces, such as 
Sholem Aleichem’s lullaby and Mordechai Geirtig’s ghetto song “It bums, brothers, it 
bums”, which cannot be left out of any anthology, are all the poetry of nameless poor 
Eastern European Hasidim. Let the reader be the judge of the collection and the quality 
of the translation. I agree with Ármin Kecskeméti, the great historian, that contrary to 
prejudice, there is no such thing as Jewish facial features. An Ukrainian Jew resembles 
an Ukrainian more than he does a Spanish Jew, say, and the reverse is also true. There 
are no pure races left anywhere in the world, and especially not in our corner of it. But 
there is something that differentiates the Jewish face from all other faces, and that is the 
Jewish look—the veiled eyes that mirror the fear and dread of many centuries, a fear that 
is handed down by hereditary transmission even to those who are interbred. Yiddish folk 
poetry exhibits many similarities with the folk poetry of the country where its poets 
dwelled perhaps for centuries, but its look is always special, different; ranging from the 
tragically painful to the quizzical to the emotional, even to the sentimental, it contains 
something that is at once common and individual—something Jewish, if you like. This 
is what makes it especially valuable, in my eyes at least, and valuable to all. It is part of 
history, of the cultural history of this land. It is customary nowadays to investigate the 
historical continuity of a people, or of an ethnic group, and there is nothing in that to take 
exception to. Let every one of us learn their past, the data and the duration of their 
presence, but also its meaning. But let self-knowledge and the understanding of others 
guide them, not looking over their shoulders to the powers that be. It may sound strange, 
but it is the Jewish people who can prove their presence here, in our land, without the least 
shadow of doubt, as far back in time as the destruction of their synagogues. A job for 
scholars, that. All I wished to do was to meet my father’s wish. To recall, having accepted 
the responsibility of a humble scribe, the Psalmist’s warnings about forgetting.
The cemetery of Házsongárd in Kolozsvár is bounded in the east by the old Jewish 
cemetery, the Orthodox Jews being a little higher up. To the south, set apart by streets and 
rows of houses, isolated, as though exemplifying the great moral breach of the century, 
lies the new Jewish cemetery. But to the south, the Reform Jew’s cementery is part of 
Házsongárd, isolated merely by a fence that is falling apart. It is so in most of the villages 
and towns of Eastern Europe, in all the places where large Jewish communities once 
existed, where Jews, reduced in numbers, still live.
To bring joy to the living, and appeasement to the dead, I hold out to you this book, 
a precious, humble, flickering flame shielded in the hollow of my hand. Peace be with 
us. Shalom.
Translated by Eszter Molnár
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Mátyás Domokos
“My undeserved joy is my Doctor”
Unpublished letters by Pasternak
Gyula Illyés’s papers include two letters and a postcard from and in the hand of Boris Pasternak. All three are written in French; the two letters are dated August 7 and 
October 15,1956, and the postcard June 24,1958. The connection between the two poets 
went back more than twenty years earlier, in 1934, when Illyés, along with the novelist 
Lajos Nagy, received an invitation to the first Congress of Soviet writers in the Soviet 
Union. His account of the few weeks he spent there caused quite a stir at the time 
(Oroszország—Russia, 1934); in it, in a chapter headed “Art”, he described his first 
encounter with Pasternak.
“Both the initiated, the Western-type readers of poetry, and most writers, hold 
Pasternak in the highest esteem; he is a poet like Ady—without Ady’s revolutionary 
quality. I twice had the privilege of meeting, in the company of Ehrenburg, this eminent 
poet, who is said to have never written down the word ’Soviet’. His works are published 
by the state, the latest one appearing in an edition of twenty-five thousand.
“I was able to obtain a single copy of his works as a present. Your can hardly get hold 
of works of literature in Moscow.
“ ‘Yes,’ Pasternak told me, ‘everything is snapped up on the first day. There is an 
enormous number of libraries, and of readers too.’
“Between 1929 and 1933 Gorky’s works were published in 19,963,000 copies. They 
all were bought up at once.
“Readers criticise as well as read. A book newly out is discussed in the factories in the 
same way that government measures are.
“Sholokhov’s latest work, Virgin Soil Upturned, was discussed at a special meeting 
by delegates to the Soviet Congress.
“ ‘And what do they say about your books?’ I asked Pasternak. ‘No workers’ meeting 
so far has dealt with them?’
“Pasternak is a modest man. He answers haltingly.
“ ‘Last year the Cultural Committee of Samarkand applied for twenty thousand mouth- 
organs and my complete works...’ ”
To better understand Pasternak’s reply, which may even be taken as humorous, it 
should be said that the poet who, in the 1920s, together with Isaac Babel and Boris Pilniak, 
had founded a journal whose masthead bore a Bukharin quotation (“Literature cannot be 
captured by a cavalry charge like Perekob”), was at the time at the apogee of his official 
recognition. Due to a speech Bukharin made at the First Writers’ Congress, everybody
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thought that he would become the representative poet of the Soviet period. Stalin, 
however, presumably with the intention of destroying Bukharin, his political adversary 
in this as in other areas, said that Mayakovsky was and remained the greatest and most 
gifted poet of the period, even though, as Illyés noted in his description of the literary 
scene of the time, “Lenin—not without good reason—had a poor opinion” of May­
akovsky. Pasternak, however, for the rest of his life remained under a cloud and, more 
than once, a storm threatened.
Twenty-one years later, in November 1955, Illyés went to Moscow again and once 
again met Liubov Alexandrovna Vorontzova, “Liuba”. In 1934 she had been his guide 
and interpreter on his first trip to Russia. Their acquaintanceship began with the girl 
presenting him a genuine Siberian hunter’s fur-cap “whose ear-flaps reached down on 
both sides to the waist” (Russia); Illyés wrote two poems that enshrined her in all her 
kindness and warmth (“Nizhi”, 1934, and “Ode to Europe”, both of them published in 
1937 in the periodical Nyugat.) It was presumably Liuba who in 1934 gave him that copy 
of Pasternak’s 1917 book Poverh Barierov (Above the Barriers). On their second 
meeting in 1955, Illyés would have liked to get new Pasternak poems from Liuba but he 
did not manage to do so.
The following year a volume of Illyés’s selected poems was published in Paris (Gyula 
Illyés: Poémes. Autour du Monde, Pierre Seghers, Paris, 1956). In July of that year, he 
sent two copies, through the embassy, to Vorontzova in Moscow, one of them for 
Pasternak, bearing the dedication: “To the man who has done so much for Hungarian 
poetry—from the Hungarian translator of his poems”. (Illyés had published his transla­
tions of Pasternak in the literary periodical Nagyvilág 1956/1). From then on, Liuba 
Vorontzova did much to help renew the relationship between Pasternak and Illyés. First, 
she wrote to Pasternak (whom she did not know personally) and asked how she should 
pass on to him the Illyés volume. On July 19, 1956, Pasternak answered her in a fairly 
reserved tone, but Liuba replied in an “energetic tone” reminding him of Illyés’s 
significance (their personal meeting of 1934 had obviously slipped Pasternak’s mem­
ory). A few days later, on July 25, he wrote down his impressions on Illyés’s volume in 
a long letter to her, and on August 8, 1956, in his first letter addressed directly to Illyés, 
he thanked the Hungarian poet for the book.
Meanwhile, however, something else, too, had happened. Illyés, though living at a 
distance of 2,000 kilometres from Moscow, was perfectly aware of the fact that 
Pasternak, to put it mildly, was not one of the blue-eyed boys of the authorities. He sent 
a parcel to Pasternak through the daughter of Usiyevich Yelena Genrihovna, who was 
staying in Hungary: an art album, a fountain-pen and a suit-length of cloth. Pasternak did 
not want to accept the gift. “ ‘Can you imagine how I feel?” he asked Liuba Vorontzova, 
who made notes of their telephone conversation on the morning of September 19,1956, 
“in a tenor voice but with the high and fanciful intonation of an offended child. T don’t 
know what to do. This is very awkward for me. I’d like to ask your advice what to do.’” 
Liuba Vorontzova asked Pasternak not to offend Illyés, since, “the only thing he is to 
blame for is his affection for you.”
After this intermezzo, Pasternak thanked Illyés for the gifts in a letter of October 15, 
1956. The Wessely mentioned in the letter is László Wessely (1904-1978), a youthful 
friend of Illyés’s, with whom he took part in the revolutionary movement in the autumn 
of 1918 and who was his companion in exile in Paris; from 1932 to 1948, Wessely was 
on the staff of Za Rubezhom; during the Stalinist terror he spent several years in labour 
camps. At the time of Pasternak’s letter, he was an editor with the New Hungarian 
Publishing House, the legal predecessor of Európa publishers in Budapest—who wanted
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to publish a short volume by Pasternak using Illyés’ translations. The volume Pasternak 
refers to in the letter as about to come out in Moscow has remained a publisher’s promise 
and has never appeared.
Pasternak sent his most emotive message to Illyés, the one which deserves the greatest 
interest, on a postcard. This might have been partly for “conspiratorial considerations” 
(a supposition backed by the fact that Pasternak did not sign the card), since he wrote it 
just a few days after news of the execution of Imre Nagy and his companions on June 16, 
1958 had come through. The opening lines, though Aesopean in language, clearly refer 
to this, and they express Pasternak’s complete loss of hope that the 20th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party and Khmshchev’s “secret address” had brought change in the 
course and quality of life under socialism. This pessimism also explains something to 
which he returned to in all his letters: why he considered the portrayal of the Russian way 
of life in Zhivago the great achievement and the very essence of his work. (But the way 
in which he writes about the reception of his novel abroad clearly reflects the angelic 
naivety with which a poet “conspires”.)
Five years after the death of Boris Pasternak, in January 1965, Liuba Vorontzova asked 
Rita Arvale, who spoke excellent Hungarian, to take to Illyés copies of the two Pasternak 
letters of nine years earlier in which so much is said about the Hungarian poet. The letter 
she enclosed was the last message that came from this admirer of true literature. On 
reading the letters, Illyés said: “I didn’t even know that Liuba brought us so close 
together, made us friends...”
This story spans twenty-five years of acquaintanceship between the two poets, so well 
described by the opening of Pasternak’s “Hamlet”, which Illyés translated into Hungar­
ian: “The noise died down, I entered the Scene, / Leaning my shoulder against the 
doorpost / 1 hearkened what was happening in the bustling distance / during my life.”
Like the Babushka dolls, it still has another layer inside and this one is linked to 
Vladimir Ognyev, the Russian critic. What happened was that Vladimir Ognyev 
published in Literturnaia Gazeta an article on Illyés which had such an effect on Liubov 
Alexandrovna Vorontzova, by then incurably ill, that she presented her documents and 
notes relating to the relationship between Illyés and Pasternak to him. Ognyev summed 
up the Russian side of the story in the Hungarian daily Népszabadság, in “Pasternak and 
Illyés” (December 18, 1982). However, he had written fully to Illyés much earlier, in a 
letter dated May 24,1971. The present paper has made use of the main facts and figures 
in Ognyev’s article. Finally, I must express my gratitude to Mrs Gyula Illyés and Mária 
Illyés for allowing me to publish the letters themselves.
The two letters Boris Pasternak wrote to Liubov Alexandrovna Vorontzova and the letter Liubov Alexandrovna Vorontzova wrote to Gyula Illyés are in Russian; their 
Hungarian translations were found among Illyés’s papers without any translator’s name 
ascribed.
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TWO LETTERS FROM BORIS PASTERNAK 
TO LIUBOV ALEXANDROVNA VORONTZOVA
Moscow, July 19,1956
It is a pity that you have not revealed the initials of your Christian name and 
patronymic at least at the bottom of the envelope with your address; since I do not 
know them, I cannot call you by your Christian name and patronymic.
Thank you for your letter and the trouble you have taken. I think the local post 
can deliver the parcel if addressed to me, or else I shall send someone to you at nine 
in the morning on Tuesday, the 24th July, for the book.
I would be much obliged if you would first forward my sincere thanks to Illyés. 
Naturally, I shall also write to him, but not right now.
I have many things to do urgently, I am working on various things, in a permanent 
tension.
Thank you very much once again,
Yours, 
B. Pasternak
Moscow, July 25,1956
Dear Liubov Andreievna,*
Thank you very much for the book. Even if not at one sitting, I have started reading 
Illyés. I shall of course write to him, he is just the man you have described and I like 
him very much. Please do not let him know what I am going to tell you, which will 
surprise you too. Just imagine, even if I have heard his name—and I could have 
heard it, couldn’t I, possibly I have even seen it, as through my Petőfi translations 
I took part in the work for the Hungarian anthology—in short, even if I have heard 
his name, I either did not take note of it or have forgotten it; our translating projects 
include so much spurious flotsam, brought into existence only because of the ill- 
considered demands from a misconceived, superficial friendship with foreign 
lands, and there have been, and still are, so many individuals clutching only at 
political standpoints, that most of them offhand seemed unimportant. Thus I have 
harmed my own position, having made things worse myself, not just here at home, 
but also in the West by a fatal distribution of my rare sympathies and countless 
antipathies in disaccord with the requirements of the day.
Illyés is bright and it is charming of him to have taken the initiative himself and 
to have chosen such a sound way to acquaintanceship, through the Autour du Monde 
volume. I knew nothing of Nezval, the Bohemian poet, either, until he took a similar 
course (volume 17 of the same series).
I shall of course write to Illyés and sincerely hope that my letter will be of interest 
to him and will please him. But for certain reasons, I shall renew my correspondence 
with the West which I broke off long ago only late in the autumn— and the 
acknowledgment to Illyés will open it.
*Pastemak was mistaken in Vorontzova’s patronymic
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Just a few more words, to which you do not have to reply. I finished my first, 
really noteworthy work, my novel, Doctor Zhivago, only a year ago, and for the 
time being no-one has read it. I have always been filled with shame and confusion 
for being surrounded by some faint reflection of fame, for second-rate, contradic­
tory reasons which have no connection at all with the true value of the heart and the 
ideal. The novel is the first attempt to earn the confidence placed in me with 
something which all through is pertinent, true to life, worth the trouble, pithy, with 
every sentence in it well-considered, precise and new. But there is little hope that 
it will appear here soon.
But then what is it that may attract Illyés and other like-minded people to me? 
That real, creative and authentic social content which exists in him and is embodied 
in his person, in non-existent in me, or it has more or less withered away when this 
tone has become the expression of dreadful ambiguity so easy to be parroted.
And, as far as form is concerned, Illyés is the representative of the kind of avant- 
garde art which is developing in the same direction which was general here with us, 
too, in the ’twenties and from which I have turned sharply away to the right, led for 
my own reasons and not forced to by the fight against formalism, starting out from 
general Russian rather than the revolutionary premises, from the precedents of 
Tolstoy, rather than those of Gorky.
Please do not write to me, do not make me answer! But let me know somehow 
or other, possibly by a postcard, your phone number, if you do have a telephone. If 
necessary, I will give you a ring in due time.
Really, I really do thank you for everything, with all that heartfelt warmth that 
gratitude can hold.
Yours, 
B. Pasternak
THREE LETTERS BY BORIS PASTERNAK TO GYULA ILLYÉS
Moscow, August 7,1956
My Dear Illyés,
I reply to you in the language of your dedication, although I have forgotten even the 
little I once knew. Thank you for the good idea of sending me your poems in French. 
I have known Nezval for a long time personally. But I only came to know him as 
a poet when he sent me his poems in a similar series.
Your book is close to me and says a great deal to me in its entirety. But I like the 
poems at the beginning and those at the end the best: “Below Ground”, “The Sad 
Farm-hand”, “Like the Dew”, “Elegy”, “Poverty”, several passages from “The 
Wonder Castle”, “The Newborn”, “Flock” (of incomparable power), “Horror”, “In 
Plovdiv”, some very striking parts of “To the Builders” and “Two Hands”, “Wild- 
geese” and two other sections from the cycle From Tihany in the Autumn, and 
“Visitors”.**
**Pastemak uses the titles in the Seghers edition; here English translations of the original Hungarian 
titles are supplied.
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All are wonderful, unquestionably true and powerful. What fascinates me 
most—and which perhaps is something typical only of you—is the depth and 
precision of your thoughts, completely new regions in which rhetoric—whether red 
or white, leftist or rightist—is, particularly in poetry, so utterly justified and fitting. 
What adds to the richness of moral concepts and the treatment of formulae you 
yourself have discovered in such a natural, unsophisticated manner, is its being 
coupled by a completely different, if not contrary, quality: the immense graphic 
power which uses practically disconnected images, yet always hits the mark with 
the sweep of the images, and unerringly proceeds from victory to victory.
Let me congratulate you with all my heart. And not only for you being what you 
are, but also for having found such a good editor and translator. This book is a 
veritable feast. You are to be congratulated for it. My sincerest thanks for the fine 
present.
Yours, 
B. Pasternak
P. S. The last line of your touching dedication (“From his Hungarian translator”) has 
greatly touched me. What have you found in me worth translating? It is a long story, 
but I so utterly detest the imposed insufficiency of all that we have lived through, 
of our illusory activities, of our non-existent literature. What a complexity of things 
that we are told are this or that, and which are in fact just the opposite!
The only and the first work in which I have left nothing unsaid, in which I have 
said everything I think all through, in which I have included my whole philosophy, 
my sense of existence and my power to express its essence in my own fashion, is 
my novel Doctor Zhivago, which I finished last winter. It is my judgement on our 
life, the fate of our generation, on that singular experiment which wants to create 
human happiness in an inhuman way, with the help of a supercilious and blind 
machinery, removing the integrating part of individuality. Will we ever live to see 
it printed? I doubt it.
As above
Moscow, October 15,1956
My Dear Illyés,
Oh, what a swine I am for not having thanked you yet for the fine presents, for not 
having answered! What a lovely, kind letter! Under the pressure of the things that 
I am concerned with now, I am sorry that I cannot write you a real letter, a better and 
longer one than this one is to be.
As far as Wessely and the volume of poetry are concerned: let him be so kind as 
to await publication until the winter, when Goslitizdat is to issue my selected poems 
with my long biographical introduction and a supplement of my new poems. This 
will provide him with much useful material.
The manuscript of the novel has been read by many people, it passed from hand 
to hand, and somehow or other it reached the publisher G. Feltrinelli at Via 
Fatebenefratelli 15, in Milan. But the example of Gorky and the Artamanovs
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doesn’t apply here and I expect to be denounced for this involuntary fault of 
mine.
But, honestly, I have nothing to complain about, I have always been treated, and 
still am, with exceptional generosity.
I warned you that the letter would be empty and brief.
With warm, fraternal affection,
Your 
B. Pasternak
PASTERNAK’S UNSIGNED POSTCARD TO ILLYÉS
June 24,1958
My Dear Friend, forgive me for my heedlessness in writing to you in these mournful 
times. I know what great inconvenience it may cause you to receive a letter from me. 
But it is stronger than myself. Whom else could I tell how profoundly I am 
overwhelmed and dismayed by the renewal of the beastly cruelties which appeared 
to have been finally abolished for ever. Oh, how inexhaustible the sources of 
calumny, falsehood and cowardly servitude are! Oh, all the herds of base syco­
phants who will always do anything they are ordered to do! Will they ever 
disappear? How this omnipotence of evil, unlimited by good, humiliates me and 
weighs on my heart!
I have been ill twice during the long interval in which I did not write, and I made 
do with the comforting news about your health. I have a chronic ailment in my right 
leg, partly neuralgic but extremely intense when there is a fresh attack; it is due to 
old lesions (from childhood fractures, dislocation of the knee, etc.); it has been 
painless all my life, but a year and a half ago I suddenly began to feel it. I always 
reckon with the sudden return of these endless months in hospital, and I also have 
constantly hanging over me other difficulties, which are always threatening,
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making my present life uncertain and insecure.—My undeserved joy, surmounting 
all my pains and all my troubles, is my ‘doctor’, which is said to have gone through 
eleven editions in Italy (in altogether six months). As soon as he appears in Paris, 
do try to make his acquaintance, and then write to me, I beg you. I have always 
considered it my goal to expect the best and to inspire hope for it in those I love. And 
now, as I am writing to you, with great tiredness of spirit, I find no trace of it in 
myself. Obtain a French copy of the doctor, and be in good health.
LIUBOV ALEXANDROVNA VORONTZOVA’S LETTER 
TO GYULA ILLYÉS
Moscow, January 1965
Dear Gyula,
Don’t you feel it absurd in the century of nuclear submarines, sputniks and cosmic 
rockets that it took me nine (!!!) years to be able to pass to you Boris Pasternak’s 
letters concerning yourself? As is usual with mediocre people, in such cases I, too, 
am lacking in a beneficial sense of humour. And as a mediocrity branded “Made in 
the USSR”, I kiss with grateful respect the hand of “Master Chance” who has sent 
Rita to me. She can translate my letter directly into your native tongue. The originals 
I have handed over to Ilya Ehrenburg, for his archives, so that he may preserve them 
for history, as certificates of the poet’s intentions. Unfortunately, venerable history 
alone has the right to be impartial.
It is most lamentable that a wild witches’ Sabbath has cut short the life of this 
wonderful man, as nature creates such people only in a state of extra inspiration and 
beneficial spirit. And what a friendship could have united you two— outwardly so 
different, and so extraordinary. On receiving your parcel, he telephoned me. He said 
in his awkward child’s voice: “But why? But what can I send him that would make 
him see that I have taken a liking to him and he has moved into my heart as the 
kindest man? Such a wonderful poet, of course we shall meet. I shall write to him 
and I shall write good things to him. How fortunate to find such a man in life...”
You see, dear Gyula, even people like this stand in need of a stellar system of 
fixed light, of my polar star. Its light helps the exhausted wayfarer along the 
wearisome, dark roads of life, lest he should fall and lose his way. “How wonderful 
of you to exist,” Ilya Selvinsky wrote. And I humbly thank my fate for the light of 
the distant star which I have been seeing for thirty years. My soul, unprotected by 
an armour, would long have melted away in darkness, had this light not existed. I 
want you to exist for ever. May all the nymphs and water goblins of Balaton guard 
you. I am afraid that without my polar star my soul would die of hopelessness and 
despair. Only great talents are strong enough to stand on their own feet when 
everything gets confused. Those simply gifted are only granted the talent of 
perspicacity, which is killing them. Shine, you distant star of the mourners, Gyula.
Liuba
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P O E M S
Two Poets in Exile
László Baránszky
In Place of a Photo
So many decades, after all, the presence 
of so many decades, and it does not blurr 
this image of yours, o you are ugly (we are ugly) 
at this age anyway, I cannot explain it 
why, may be these very long legs which 
we somehow describe as a letter o, bow- 
legged, I think, is the proper expression, 
blue eyes a little bit bulgy, upturned 
nose (big, of course) and a strong chunky 
body. The hands, naturally, we should speak 
of the hands when discussing portraiture, 
but I cannot say anything about hands 
with any certainty, so they come blurred, 
just as right now you are, or as objects 
bodies—I correct myself: which appear 
blurred under water even though that would be 
clear. However, the water or waters in question 
here are those of the river Danube.
Attack
So much we could see that the final attack had started out and went on smooth and 
according to book. Actually it developed from the north-north-west, originating from 
the upper part of the Konigses’ garden, (see map i.-square 4 of local geography), and 
it rapidly enveloped the better portion of the playground, the soccer field. Lacking 
self-propelled artillery and assault guns, civilians were pressed into service, they (the 
neighbours) were pushing the long barrelled Russian cannons which were firing with
László Baránszky is a Budapest-born poet and art historian living in New York since 
1956. He has published two volumes o f poems in Hungarian.
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methodical accuracy at the corresponding windows, whose lower sections, together 
with their supporting walls, were demolished as a rule. The machine gun position, 
right across the street, in the Green House, soon fell silent, but not before obliterating 
the civilians (the neighbours) in one solid burst and they predictably piled up in a 
couple of concise heaps just around the penalty kick territory (sure, you can’t miss), 
where finally the attack has—temporarily, only for the time being—stalled. For a 
while it was quite difficult to see what was going on, because a cocoa coloured dust 
was swirling around the group, thick dust, only the black throat of a gun remaining 
visible, vortex of the storm. Then visibility improved and it became quite clear to me 
that the neighbours—most of them, anyway,—wore their regular overcoats on the 
job, as they would when going to put a day in at the office.
The Burial of the Horse
It flew over the sky, the big horse head, for a second it darkened the sun, dripping no 
longer blood but some kind of ooze, as it went leisurely on its way in its prescribed 
arc and left us just standing there, laughing wide and wet. It started innocent enough: 
we moved up to the location to dispose off and be done with the horse who died in 
the well, a shallow well collecting ground waters. It must have been mid-January that 
she collapsed in the hole, broke a leg, took days to die, and her frozen carcass, by 
now, had been beckoning to us for weeks. Of course, no one was willing to trek up to 
her, since she died in a rather well established line of fire. But now that the good 
weather came she swelled up and filled the well, she was an eyesore and became a 
health hazard as well. Having buried the neighbours in their garden proper (see map i, 
squares 2, 3, 5, and 6 respectively) and the Germans around the perimeter of our 
playground (see map i, square 4, follow the dotted line) and, finally, we came to her. 
She was a black horse with unusually thick hair that turned irrevocably moist in the 
sudden glare of the February sun we loved so much. We got the ropes and tied them 
to the appropriate places and heaved.
The Street
The street suddenly became a chasm, too deep, too narrow to hold the sudden flow of 
POWs that started to unwind in front of our has-been window as I was packing the 
library or whatever was left of it in the wicker basket. My father’s books were in a 
sorry shape, especially the soft cover series of the MODERN LIBRARY suffered 
badly, they were shot up and the horses loved them. The splinters of the window- 
frame slashed my view, still the line flowed, although irregular, frayed at the edges, 
but continuous nevertheless. Some uneven pulsating movement created little swirls 
soon to be smoothed out by the efficient horsemen who had a lifelong practice in 
herding. They rode up and down on the sidewalk, their small Mongolian ponies
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charging the line almost on their own. Some authors fared better than others. Goethe, 
for example, managed to go unscathed, Dostoyevski’s Crime and Punishment had it, I 
decided to leave it behind. Beyond rescue, to put it middly, was the large travel-book 
of Swen Hédin, it was about Tibet and Outer Mongolia, the Gobi. Basket half-full, I 
decided to look through the window or whatever was left of it, to see it for myself: 
the street in the afternoon metallic winter light.
Sin
The dead were dead and I was alive and 
that was that, there was nothing 
to be done about it, I knew somehow there 
was no need for elaborate explanations, the thing 
has presented itself so simply, so matter 
of fact that most of the teachings of religion 
class seemed to be superfluous and need­
lessly elaborate besides these 
tangible (wrong word, they were too far gone 
to be touched) bodies of evidence. Nothing 
mitigates the fact, of course, that I prayed like 
mad (in the real meaning of the word) that He 
should deliver me from the lion’s den-death, just 
this time o Sweet Jesus, whose heart I have hurt 
so much and I ’m sure that this son of god, the Village 
Rabbi, tried to do as much as he could and some 
more under the circumstances for some reason. 
Naturally, the minute the danger had passed I was 
sinning again; I yearned not 
for food, only for silence, a little 
silence and for warm, blazing hot 
female flesh in which I could im­
molate myself without further ado, 
guilt or whatever, you call it shame, which would 
make my sure escape of the radiating cold of 
these unclaimed bodies that spread all over the 
well played-in gardens.
Translated by the poet
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George Gömöri
Aerial View of a Developing Country
Something that wars (in these parts
everyday events) could not achieve
is now realized: huge craters mined-out,
half-demolished hills,
constantly smouldering rubbish-tips,
scrapheaps of ancient factories,
the most modem machines rusting in silent rain,
air polluted with special care
(for each square inch each labourer
can claim as much as a pound of dust!)
and the mild water of the lake which, at best,
gives you dysentery.
This is where we stand and I haven’t yet mentioned 
the clouds of lead billowing from exhausts, 
the theoretical sewage-works and the much-guaranteed 
nuclear plants (as to their safety you may swear to it 
provided the court won’t object to perjury).
Let’s not wait till the next earthquake: 
if nature won’t do it, man’s sure 
to do his utmost to create a country 
where life is no longer worth living.
Young Writer in Eastern Europe
Can one look toward distant things, 
slip free of the iron ring that is mere chance? 
Everywhere are the same old booby-traps, 
the same barbed-wire entanglements, 
the same elusive enemy,
mine-throwers disguised by protective colouring,
George Gömöri is a Budapest bom poet, translator, critic and scholar living in Britain 
since 1956 and teaching Polish and Hungarian literature at the U niversity o f Cambridge. 
He has published several volumes o f his poems in Hungarian as well as Hungarian 
translations o f Polish poetry and English translations o f Hungarian poems.
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and even on each horizon the same hillocks, 
their colours indefinable, 
with flowers that may or may not possess 
a vague odour.
To live differently. One could, perhaps... but how? 
Instead of indeterminate boundaries 
the mind needs a magnetic field, 
instead of the odd chance, certainty 
—weather conditions notwithstanding.
There is nothing to pour out with the bath water, 
and how do you lie on a bed made by another?
Not much remains: black anecdotes, maxims— 
occasional pieces done for the media. Taped music 
wafting faintly through rooms with drawn curtains 
and love made to nameless girls.
Christmas 1956
At this stage we suspect and yet should know 
there's no way back. The papers paint a bleak 
deserted city where sporadic rifles 
rattle against a snow swaddled night.
Here Regent Street is one vast jewellers 
and 'Silent Night' spills tinsel on bright pavements. 
We are invited, Andris and I, to Epping, 
to an English family. We're greeted with 
a crackling fire, roast turkey, and an ancient 
pudding like a shrunken head (preserved 
in brandy, edible). We dance in the vague darkness 
embrace the shapely daughters of the house 
(but sleep with rubber bottles, not with them.)
Back home there are no mass arrests as yet, 
the writers' union functions, but omens are bad, 
not knowing (though suspecting) what may follow: 
in our case Oxford, for friends who stayed behind 
the well known prisons, semi-skilled employment; 
a dark low Christmas this, the last we spend 
(or even partly spend) in Hungary.
Translated by the poet and Clive Wilmer; 
Christmas 1956 by George Szirtes
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Zsuzsa Forgács
Tango
(Short story)
I f I lose a couple more pounds, you might fall in love with me, and then I might get scared, and then you might get pushy, and I might get annoyed by that, and you might 
get angry at that, and you might try to do something drastic.
At that point I would try to calm you, which would slightly inconvenience you, and 
that will definitely ruffle my feathers.
This will arouse your mild curiosity, which might irritate me, and I might try to get 
physical, upon which you might commit selfdefence.
Now this would make me unabashfully restless, which would make you terribly 
impatient too, which in return would make me furious, which would really make you feel 
on top of the situation.
Inevitably, this will elicit my mortifying sarcasm, which might turn you into a blood­
thirsty animal, which could soothe my nerves and bring about my murderous laughter, 
and this in exchange, no doubt, will bring about your murderous laughter, which might 
make me feel a little embarrassad, so you could feel enthusiastic.
That, in return, would make me try to smash a few objects in your apartment, which 
in turn would make you try to make pulp out of my slender body. This would make me 
feel appreciated, which in return would make you feel humiliated, so I could feel 
motherly toward you, so you couldn’t help feeling fatherly toward me, which would 
make me feel sexual toward you, which would reinforce your urge to get rid of me.
Now that, in exchange, of course, will make me feel like a fool, so then you would feel 
happy, which would make me see that I should seriously try to look for another man.
This subtle initiative of mine would make you feel pathetic, which would make me feel 
relieved. So you, no doubt, will feel a strong urge to scratch my eyes out and that would 
put me back on the right track.
Upon that, you couldn’t help feeling insecure, so I would feel sorry for you, so you 
would want to retaliate immediately, and that will prove to me that I was right from the 
beginning to be afraid that you might take to liking me.
This would make you understand that there is nobody else but me, which in return 
would scare me to death, so you would laugh again, so I would shudder and shudder.
This would make you take pity on me, which would make me feel like an imbecile, so 
you would turn away from me and that would make me feel relieved.
If there was one thing that could make you feel lonely, this would definitely be it. I, 
of course, would understand that, however, you would not be able to tolerate this.
Which would make me see that I should give you up for good, which would make you 
see that you should get me back right away.
Zsuzsa Forgács was born in Budapest. Her short stories have been appearing in the 
newer Hungarian periodicals since the early eighties.
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This would make me eat a lot, and that would make me fat, which would make you 
resign for good, which would make me lose a lot of weight, but that would make no 
difference to you.
Which will make me understand that the game is over, so you will loosen up a little 
towards me, and that will force me to take to liking you again, which would make you 
revise your old views of me, which would make me revise my old views of you, and that 
would lead us to exchange views, which would make us see that we didn’t change a bit, 
either for the better, or for the good.
This would make me tired. Very very tired. And that would make you stroke my head, 
which I would like a lot. And this would make you stroke it again. And that would make 
me start to appreciate you. And this would wake you up and make you say that you have 
to go home. And that would make me enlighten you that you were actually home.
This fact would scare you a great deal. Which would make me want to caress you. This 
would make you say that I have to leave right away, becuase your dogs need a little 
solitude, and I was crowding them.
Now that would make me use my fist on the door-frame, which would infuriate you, 
which would force me to enlighten you that you were actually in my apartment, and that 
I would prefer you outside, because there was more space for your dogs.
So you would say that you’d had enough of me, which I would find natural.
Upon that, you would feel obligated to spring toward my door, like a sleek deer which 
would make me fling myself after you, and that would practically smear you on the knob.
This way you would be inadvertently smothered with my gleaming, white flesh, which 
would draw us so close that you would even notice fluff on my shoulder and could not 
resist blowing it off. This unfolding power-cut will give you the opportunity to submerge 
in my divine feminine smell, and that would force me to locate with my nostrils that warm, 
soft dimple you prefer to carry around right behind your left earlobe, while you would 
make an attempt to disentangle my taut, elastic, crosshearted brassiere, and I would very 
discreetly go for your shirt buttons, which would call forth your tact to nestle your 
enormous nose in my thirsty, hot armpit. This would, of course, agreeably surprise me, 
so I would try to locate the exact comer of your mouth with my greedy, somewhat 
unpolished tongue. Which would practically lead you to press your other ear on my 
feverishly heaving bosom, like an overwhelmed heart specialist. By which my loins 
would be tenderly stirred and would send tingling, undulating currents towards the 
universe. Accordingly, you would sort of slide down toward my navel, while I would try 
to hold you back and gently abandon my lips to your moist eyelids. Which you would let 
me do, but right after that, you would return to your own trail, and continue toward my 
luscious thighs, so I would clasp them around your wonderful steady head. At that point 
I would breathe heavily, and while intending to whisper some sultry, sweet nothing, I 
would accidentally let slip my ex-lover’s name. And that would sort of make you go 
numb. Very very numb.
Upon which I would let go a shrill and desperate scream. So you wold push by with 
bleak countenance, and plough away in a rage of steel. Which would make me leave a 
lot of messages on your tape, which would make you threaten me that I should get off your 
tape or else.
This would make me see that there is no God, or at least the existing one does not 
support this relationship. Which would make me finally retire. This would make us drift 
away from each other, which would make us meet accidentally on the street. That will 
tear my heart and make you emotional. So I would want to kiss you a little, which you 
wouldn’t be sure you would want to suffer.
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That might make me feel infinitely weak, which will make you despise me and you 
would leave me in the middle of the street.
Upon that I would make tears well up, and that would eventually make you turn back 
and make you lend me your handkerchief so I could blow my nose.
Which I would do and then run away.
Which would not do anything special to you, except you would pocket your fist in 
boredom. Thus I will be forced to yell at you from a graceful distance that you were an 
unfeeling pig. So you could not help saying that I had better zip it up.
I would snort at that and you would yelp at this. That will prompt me to state that you 
were a barking dog. Now this very well might shoot the blood into your eyes which, 
naturally, would make me see that I shouldn’t have met you in the first place.
This you would regard as the final stroke, and you would say that you were terribly 
hungry. That would make me cynical, which would spur you into spilling a lot of ketchup 
on your damn hamburger, and that would set off the irrepressible urge to speak my piece 
of mind.
All the above would prompt you to say that you haven ’ t got the vaguest idea what made 
me think that you had any plans on me ever.
So it would not come to you as a surprise that I would want to sink my kitten teeth into 
your big rough neck.
Actually, it would make you feel victorious.
And what would that do to me?
That would make me feel a slight tremor at my lips and a prickle at my nape, because 
I would look straight into your bottomless blue eyes, which would prove to be fresh brook 
water that sublimely gurgles toward the Milky Way at the dawn of eternity, and into 
which I could not resist to plunge myself, with relentless innocence, up to the hilt.
Translated by the author
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György Bolgár & Erzsébet Fazekas
Taking off Again
Milos Forman in Interview
Your new film  V almont didn't get very good re­
views in New York. However, critical reception 
and box-office receipts o f your films have al­
most always been good.
You can’t please everybody all the time, I 
guess. I don ’ t want to analyse, because of course 
I would tend to analyse in my favour, and that’s 
not objective. But some people, whom I listen 
to, say they were surprised by the criticisms. An 
American explained to me that this film doesn’t 
fit into a kind of American hypocritical puritan- 
ism, where everything has to be black and 
white, the bad must be indentified, labelled and 
punished. The other interpretation, Stephen 
Frear’s film, based on Chistopher Hampton’s 
adaptation of Les liaisons dangereuses, did 
exactly that, and that was it. Now I’m suddenly 
asking the people who saw the other film, and 
liked hating those characters, to love them.
I  didn ’ tfind the figures in your film  very attrac­
tive. They may not be hateful perhaps, but not 
the kind o f people you want to like. How do you 
see them?
The basic question is philosophical: whether 
human passion is the product of evil or the evil 
can be the product of human passion. And I 
believe in the latter. I believe that nobody is 
bom  evil, and if you make an effort to under­
stand, you can often explain certain very dark 
aspects of human behaviour. To understand is 
to forgive. In my film the people are doing 
awful things to each other, but I somehow can 
understand them, and I also understand that
György Bolgár is Hungarian Radio’s corre­
spondent in New York, Erzsébet Fazekas is his 
wife. The text o f the conversation, broadcast 
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abbreviated.
they can ’ t help it. The dark side of human nature 
sometimes starts to dominate us.
I  tend to agree with you, but the strongest 
criticism, in seveval reviews, was that the char­
acters in the film are like puppets without a 
human face. So if you wanted to portray real, 
flesh-and-bloodfigures in Valmont, how could 
the reviewers miss them altogether?
I wouldn’t like to answer that. I don’t think I 
have to defend the film. I loved making this 
film, I love it even now, that’s it. You see, 
Choderlos de Laclos is the father of the film. 
But I ’m the mother, and here we have the child, 
the film. Some critics judge a film like that on 
the merit of how much the child resembles the 
father. But a child very often resembles the 
mother. Now are these children so much worse? 
I don’t think so. And the most important thing 
is that the child has its own life.
The problem might have been that they com­
pared it with a brother, Dangerous Liaisons. 
Don’t you think that this hampered the under­
standing and the reception o f your film?
I didn’t see the other film, but I saw the stage 
adaptation, which is a very very faithful inter­
pretation of the novel. It resembles the father 
very much.
Did you avoid seeing the other film  so as not to 
be influenced by it in any way?
I don’t, and I didn’t want to get lured into some 
kind of a competition. It’s not fair for me to 
compare the two films, it’s not fair for Stephen 
Frears to compare the films. It is fair for any­
body else, but not for us.
By the way, do you often go to the cinema? Do 
you often see other directors’ films?
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When I ’m not working, yes. Now I ’m begin­
ning to seemovies again. But when I ’m in work, 
I don’t go.
What kind o f films do you like? We more or less 
know what sort o f films you like to make.
There’s not one genre or a certain style of films 
that I like. You can’t eat lamb every night, even 
if you like lamb very much. It depends on the 
mood you are in. One day you enjoy Indiana 
Jones and Star Wars, the next day you enjoy 
Rain Man or Sex, Lies and Videotape, the third 
day Lawrence o f Arabia or Roger and Me.
One had the impression in the eighties that 
there were no new and imaginativefilm-makers 
anywhere in the wold. Then last year I  saw some 
films which were really outstanding, like the 
one you mentioned, Sex, Lies and V ideotape, by 
Stephen Soderbergh, or Mystery Train, by Jim 
Jarmusch, or Women on the Verge of Nervous 
Breakdown, by Pedro Almodovar. Do you think 
that there may be a new “newwave" emerging?
It is an illusion that the cinema is in a deep crisis. 
Several hundred films are released each year, 
and though ninety per cent of them are medi­
ocre, plain stupid, or just commercial entertain­
ment, there are always ten or fifteen films that 
are meaningful, wonderful and powerful. And 
that’s a lot.
Do you ever go and see the films o f the Czech 
new wave o f the sixties?
Until now it was very difficult to find them here 
in America, but now I am going to see them for 
sentimental and nostalgic reasons.
Do you get the tapes here in New York?
No, from Prague.
Have you been in Prague since the vast 
changes there?
I was there last October, before anything was 
happening, and then I was there again in De­
cember, just in the middle of things. I was 
enormously impressed by the intelligence and 
elegance of the people who created these 
changes.
Who were the most elegant?
The students and the actors. The whole devel­
opment of course was amazing. The students 
went out into the streets to demonstrate against 
police brutality, and the same evening, when 
people were in the theatres, they suddenly found 
the actors standing on the stage, telling the 
audience we are not going to play for you 
tonight, you can get your money back, if you 
want to, but we are going to talk, we are going 
to discuss the events, we have some guests here, 
some students, who were on Wenceslas Square, 
we have some representatives of Civic Forum 
here. So there were discussions instead of shows. 
And the next day two hundred thousand people 
were on Wenceslas Square, the following day 
three hundred thousand, and when, a few days 
later, I went to Wenceslas Square, I didn’t 
believe my eyes, because not the tiniest branch 
of a tree was broken. It was not a crowd, it was 
three hundred thousand citizens. I was very 
happy to meet my friend from boarding school. 
When I was fifteen he was eleven, Vaclav 
Havel, I mean. We were in the same school, and 
we have been friends since. I tell you, Vaclav 
Havel is emerging as a major personality in 
international politics. He has such enormous in­
telligence, and the eloquence to formulate 
people’s desires and emotions, and he has such 
great moral authority. He is not saying what he 
is saying because he is running for political 
office, but because those are his convictions. 
People can take him for granted, and that gives 
him enormous power.
Why have writers taken over the role o f politi­
cians in Central and Eastern Europe?
Look at the history of Europe in this century. 
Very often, when a society got into crisis, 
people bypassed politicians, and reached some­
where beyond politics for a moral authority. 
This happened at the end of the Great War, 
when Tomas Masaryk became the first presi­
dent of Czechoslovakia.
How was your meeting with your old friend 
and schoolmate? What did you have to say to 
each other?
Oh, we were just talking about trivial things. At 
that moment it was much more interesting for
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me to find out how all this had happened, than 
the overall ideas and thoughts behind it.
Didn ’ I you feel sorry for not being part o f those 
events?
You know, you always win something and 
always lose something. I was very much ex­
cited about what was going on in Czechoslova­
kia, but, at the same time, I was surprised that I 
was watching it as an observer, not as a partici­
pant.
Did your friends try to entice you back to the 
country?
I was asked a few questions about that, but my 
answer was tentative because it would still be 
early for me to say how my own soul and heart 
would develop. Right now, however, I feel that 
twenty years is a long time. I have grown roots 
here and I don’t want to go through that pain 
again of being uprooted and replanted once 
more. But who knows what the future brings?
The example or, rather, the very different path 
o f life, o f you and Jirzi Menzel or o f Milan 
Kundera, who emigrated to Paris, or Vaclav 
Havel, who stayed, clearly shows what was 
open to an honest artist in Czechlovakia. Either 
to leave and work, or to stay and more or less 
give up one’s profession.
It was an individual decision, and everybody 
acted according to his or her own convictions. 
When I left Czechoslovakia, I was aware that I 
didn’t want to interrupt my career, my work, 
because I twice saw in my country how excel­
lent filmmakers, who started right after the war 
and made some remarkable films, like Alfred 
Radok, or Jiri Krejcik and others, were sud­
denly forbidden to make films after the commu­
nist takeover. And when a career is interrupted 
like this, something is broken. It was evident 
some years later, when they were allowed to 
work again, that something was missing. The 
same thing I noticed later, when the generation 
of Helge and Jasny started with wonderful 
films, and then, after the Hungarian events in 
1956, the hardliners won, and a lot of people 
were not able to work for several years. The 
same thing happened to them when they were 
allowed to work again, something was broken. 
So I wanted to avoid this kind of artifical
interruption in my work. That was the reason I 
left.
Several other outstanding filmmakers left 
Czeshoslovakia after the invasion in 1968. 
Prominent directors from Prague were dis­
persed all over the world. Some o f them came 
here to the US, others went to Western Europe. 
What happens now, when new possibilities are 
opening up in Czechoslovakia? Do you expect 
a new “new wave" in Czech cinema, now that 
those abroad can go home and those at home 
can work freely?
I ’m expecting a new wave, but from new people. 
I ’m afraid that the same fate which those people 
after the war or after 1956 met, will haunt those 
who were silenced after 1968, the Soviet inva­
sion. In fact when these people began to work 
some years ago, their films showed that they 
had not been able to work continuously. So I ’m 
expecting the new crop to come more or less 
from the newcomers and I know this is happen­
ing just now in Hungary. I haven’t seen the new 
Hungarian films, but I was told that the new 
generation is doing some remarkable work.
Where is the legendary generation o f the sixties 
now? As fa r  as I know, Ivan Passer is here.
Yes, Nemec was here, too, for several years, but 
he didn’t succeed in making any feature films, 
so he made some documentaries, and I think he 
is now back in Prague. I don’t know what 
happened to Masa or others, but Hynek Bocan 
or Jaromil Jires are still in Czechoslovakia, and 
they will surely be given the chance to make 
films. I wish them success with all my heart, but 
it will be tough for them.
Looking back to the sixties, what was the sig­
nificance o f the Czechoslovak new wave—apart 
from making good films? My impression, and 
perhaps not only mine, is that it was the films 
that created 1968, the Prague spring.
We all started in 1962-1963, about 10-15 of us, 
new directors, and could work for a short period 
until 1968. Our inspiration was not so much 
world cinema, the great examples, the inspira­
tion came from the stupid, idiotic films which 
had been made before us, when we were still at 
the film school. Those films were all lies in the 
worst sense. So all of us tried to put some truth
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on the screen about people and about life in 
Czechoslovakia.
Your inspiration was then more political than 
artistic, wasn't it?
You could say that, yes.
Did your and your friends’ films create a feel­
ing among young people and intellectuals that 
they were living among lies, and if  so, were the 
films the only means carrying this message?
People reacted very positively to our films, and 
a lot of films were banned in 1968, or even 
before they were relesead. Their effect was so 
long-lasting, by the way, that now, twenty years 
later— and twenty years for a film is a long time, 
because films age very quickly— they are being 
re-released in Czechoslovakia, and they are at­
tracting as large an audience as for new films. 
I t’s very encouraging to see that films may have 
their own life even after twenty years.
Were you not inspired to put a mirror in front o f 
the Americans? Just as you did with the Czechs. 
After twenty years, you probably know a lot 
about Americans and their lives. Haven’t you 
thought o f making films about them?
You don’t really speculate very much on such 
theoretical questions. You go after stories and 
characters. But I tried to make my first film in 
the United States, Taking Off, the same way I 
made films in Czechoslovakia. Whether I suc­
ceeded or not, it’s up to you to say. Anyway, I 
developed the screenplay with some of my 
friends, and I followed the practice I was used 
to in Czechoslovakia. But in doing that, I real­
ized that to function one hundred per cent as an 
original author of a film in a language and in a 
culture that I didn’t digest as a child and a 
teenager, is simply impossible. You can func­
tion, of course, sixty per cent, seventy per cent, 
whatever, but never one hundred, and that’s just 
not enough for me. So I decided consciously to 
turn to literary works, either novels or plays by 
English-speaking authors— to adapt them for 
films. That limits my choices. Also, talking 
about these slice-of-life type films on average 
Americans, to do this you have to have the most 
intimate knowledge of these people and their 
lives, mainly from your childhood and teenage
years. I lack this experience in this country, so 
I wouldn’t dare to do that.
The fact is that not even American filmmakers 
are inclined to do that.
There are a few people who are doing this. 
Woody Allen is one of them. Or the recent 
documentary, Roger and Me, and some others 
would satisfy your desire for this kind of film.
But o f course America cannot be identified with 
New York Jewish intellectuals, especially not 
with those brooding types obsessed by failure. 
And the more American films you see, the more 
uncertain you are whether this is America or 
not.
It ’ s a little confusing to talk about American life 
or about the American film. It is a huge conti­
nent. I t’s one country, but a huge continent. 
What is the European film? It doesn’t exist 
either. There is French film, Hungarian film, 
Italian film, Czech film but there isn’t European 
film as such. That’s the same here in the United 
States. There is not one America, there are thou­
sands of Americas. But, for example, in the 
films of Martin Scorsese or Francis Ford Cop­
pola, you have the smell of real life in the 
American-Italian community.
Hollywood, however, is generally stronger than 
even forceful personalities like Scorsese or 
Coppola. The Hollywood story, the Hollywood 
script, the Hollywood mechanism o f filmmak­
ing, too often breaks them or, at least, makes 
them compromise.
I wouldn’t call it a compromise. They only try 
to reach as many people as they can, because 
success in the US in not determined by success 
in New York or Los Angeles, but by the reaction 
of the audience in Kansas or Utah and else­
where. And the reaction can be so different, 
because the audience is so diverse, so many 
different races, religions, ethnic backgrounds. 
The film is always under pressure. I admit I 
prefer commercial pressure to ideological pres­
sure. Commercial pressure is after all the taste 
of millions of people, while ideological pres­
sure is very often the perverted opinion of one 
Dinosaur sitting in the Central Committee of 
the Party.
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The best films made during the Communist era 
could ward o ff ideological pressure. The more 
they were able to, the better they were. Is there 
something similar happening here? Can it be 
judged aesthetically how freely someone in­
tends to make his film? How much can one 
avoid commercial pressure here in America?
I don’t think you can, unless the state finances 
your film. But that would be even worse than 
commercial pressure, believe me. The moment 
somebody gives you money, he will impose on 
you his or her philosophy. The philosophy of a 
studio, however, is only to make money. But if 
the state provides money for your film, it ex­
pects you to return this favour by representing 
or expressing the philosophy or ideology of the 
government. Why should they give you money 
if you want to criticize them? Nobody likes that.
When you came here to the United States you 
began making films about present-day America. 
Taking Off was certainly a film  o f this type, but 
even One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest can be 
considered contemporary. Later, however, you 
turned to the past with Ragtime, Amadeus, and 
now, with Valmont. Why? You seem to know so 
well the people who you are living with, why do 
you go back centuries to show us heroes or anti- 
heroes?
I want to believe that it happened by accident. 
You choose your project because of a human 
story and because of the characters in it. Wher­
ever the story takes you, you go. I just fell in 
love with the story of M ozart and Salieri, as 
Peter Shaeffer wrote it in Amadeus, and then I 
fell in love with Choderlos de Laclos.
Is it always a question o f falling in love with a 
story?
Yes, I have to be in love with a story, because 
otherwise I couldn’t do it. Making a film takes 
two, sometimes three years of your life, so if 
you are not in love with that story, it’s torture.
/  always wondered why you didn’t choose one 
o f Milan Kundera's stories. Some years ago I 
saw quite a good film made from his novel, The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being. But I felt it 
could have been much better i f  Milos Forman 
had made it. Evidently, the American director
wasn’t very familiar with Czechoslovakia and 
its people, so some scenes looked a bit naive.
I t’s a psychological problem for me. I love 
Kundera, I think he is one of the greatest living 
writers, and I would have loved to make this 
film. But I would rather make a Hungarian story 
which takes place in Afghanistan, than a Czech 
story which I have to shoot outside Czechoslo­
vakia. I just can’t do that.
Now, after Valmont, are there any particular 
stories you are in love with?
I have just started to read different scripts and 
books, I ’ve begun to go to theatres. You know, 
different companies are asking me to consider 
a play as the basis for a film, but I haven’t found 
one yet.
Who gives you advice and who do you take 
advice from?
The people who usually send projects are pro­
ducers from major studios. But the only person 
I consult with, is my representative, Mr Lantz. 
I have known him for about twenty five years 
and he is a friend of mine. That’s all, because 
you have to read the stories yourself, and you 
have to fall in love with the project— not some­
body else.
Can you afford to read scripts for a year or 
more, and not decide on anything?
That ’ s about it, I think, at least this is the attitude 
I ’m trying to have. Usually, I take as much time 
as needed.
Does it matter in any way in choosing a new 
script how your previous work has been ac­
cepted by the public and the reviewers?
This matters very much when you are a begin­
ner. Success opens the doors for you and makes 
producers pay attention to you. But if you are 
lucky enough to make one or two critically or 
commercially successful films, it lasts for a 
while. You can afford to make three unsuccess­
ful ones.
What would happen if you were given the op­
portunity to go back to Czechoslovakia to shoot
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a promising story? Could you work there after 
a twenty-odd year absence? Could you make a 
film that is unmistakeably Czech ? Wouldn ’ tyou 
feel yourself constrained financially?
If I fell in love with a story which would take me 
back to Czechoslovakia, I could try, why not? 
Whether I could be successful after twenty 
years living elsewhere, remains to be seen. As 
for the second part of the question, when we 
were starting— and now I speak for every­
body— when we made our first films, we didn’t 
choose to make low-budget films because we 
wanted to make low-budget films. We just 
made them because nobody gave us more 
money. But if I want to tell a story, it doesn’t 
really matter to me how much money I have. If 
you give me one thousand dollars only, I’ll 
make a film on 8 mm, with no sound and with 
my friends. If you give me one million, it’s a 
little better, I ’ll make it with sound on 16 mm, 
still mostly with my friends. If you give me ten 
million, I ’ll do it on 35 mm, with professional, 
though unknown, actors, and if you give me 
twenty million dollars, I ’ll have a star in the 
film, and so on. Whatever money you give me, 
I’ll spend.
You have talked about falling in love with a 
story. Can a story become an obsession, just 
like a woman can be fo r  a man?
I think you can say that. It is a very reasonable 
parallel. Falling in love with a project is like 
falling in love with a person.
And then you throw away everything else, you 
forget everything, and begin to focus only on 
this one?
It becomes your obsession. You don’t think 
about anything else.
How long after finishing a film can you get rid 
o f it, and can you start something new?
I t’s again something like when the person you 
are in love with leaves you. For a while you feel 
that you are even more in love, you get desper­
ate and sad, but as in real life, time heals all 
wounds, and after a while you are ready to fall 
in love again. Filmmaking is a cruel business. 
Y ou devote yourself fully to what contributes to 
your work. But when it ends, when the film is 
ready, and you stop contributing to it, you 
suddenly turn cool. The end is the end, that’s it.
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Péter Nádas
Thomas Mann and his Public
Persona
The considerable, in many respects quite extraordinary, interest Thomas Mann’s life and works have inspired among Hungarian readers from the 1920s on never focused 
exclusively or even primarily on the purely literary achievements of this formidable 
figure—their interest had at least as much to do with the public role played by Thomas 
Mann, a created role that nevertheless sprang from basic attributes of his human and 
artistic character. Here was that rare specimen, the utterly accomplished, cultured and 
affluent burgher, modestly proud of his maturity, moderately tempted by his demons, 
quick to understand and condone, reassuringly familiar with things good and evil—a man 
who toiled daily in a most assiduous, exemplary manner, and then, with his work done, 
mingled easily, cheerfully in glittering company. Let’s face it: such a man is admirable 
indeed, unless of course he is merely enacting a role. During the course of a long and 
arduous life, Mann was able to play this role with taste and conviction, was able to carry 
off the act just about flawlessly (he did draw on elements of his own character, after all), 
proving himself to be not only a wonderful impersonator but the very incarnation of a 
self-imposed persona.
Perhaps I am not too wide off the mark in maintaining that it was the accessible, highly 
visible surface of this not very enviable, though in any case subtly refined, role that made 
for the relatively smooth, problem-free reception of Mann’s oeuvre in Hungary. In less 
special cases the literary works themselves have to be sampled and assimilated first, and 
only afterwards can unheralded and previously unmissed works assume their proper 
place in a culture. And all this could happen even before anything is learned about the 
personality concealed behind the work.
Thomas Mann’s writings did not have to undergo this tedious process: the author did 
not have to vie for the Hungarian readers’ attention, as did some of his contemporaries, 
writers like Gide, Hesse, Kafka, Joyce, Musil, all of them more important artists in some 
respects, who to this day are less well known, less accepted in Hungary. Perhaps if the 
Hungarian publication of Proust’s work had not ground to a halt after the first few 
volumes, or if only the Hungarian version of these first volumes had not turned out to be 
so mannered and precious, then he, too, might occupy a similarly important and 
respectable niche in our literary consciousness. But the real reason why the battle, in the 
case of Proust, has never really been won is that the literary life of that great modemist, 
along with that of the other authors mentioned, lacked this one peculiar trait: not one of 
them was inclined to develop the public persona so characteristic of Mann. But an Eastern
Péter Nádas’s latest novel, Évkönyv (Yearbook) was published in 1989. The book 
under discussion is Thomas Mann: Naplók (Diaries) I. 1918-1921: 1933-1939. 
Selected by Antal Mádl. Európa, 1988, 706 pp.
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European literary consciousness, still moved by ideals of national independence rather 
than those of personal, individual freedom, and seeking to champion even the latter in 
terms of the former, necessarily reacts more sensitively—and positively—to literary 
works in which the author’s figure seems to be conform to a recognizable, historically or 
sociologically validated image of the artist.
In his personal life Mann projected the very qualities he represented continuously in 
his fiction—in contrast with writers who actually remained more faithful to the traditions 
of the middle-class novel, trying hard to put across a picture of the artist that made no 
claim to being representative in any way. Proust’s approach was the very opposite of 
Mann’s: he dipped into the traditions of a hierarchically ordered, aristocratic culture, and 
passed off an exclusive, highly discriminating lifestyle as his own, without ever wishing 
to make this created self stand for anything. Proust treated his own perceptions as the only 
forms of tangible reality, and thus became the last great writer in the intellectual tradition 
of the enlightenment.
In a fictional world where no phenomenon has a single cause, where each randomly 
selected partial cause can imply, through a chain of myriad additional causes, yet a further 
series of causes and explanations: in a world where minute details are not causally related 
but are concealed, waiting to be uncovered and examined in turn—in such a world 
hierarchic structures are out of place. One thing may not represent another: one isolated 
element can not hope to represent the whole. Proust fashioned himself into an aristocrat 
so he could define the essence of his character without bourgeois constraints. Mann, on 
the other hand, still setting great store by a hierarchically structured world, parlayed his 
own habits of mind, his own way of life, into something grandly representative. He 
rekindled nostalgic yearnings for rational, utilitarian ideals to which Proust had already 
bid a painless farewell.
Let us not consider it a mere inadvertance, then, that Hungarian publishers, motivated 
by vaulting, if ill-conceived, ambition, have seen it fit to acquaint us with just about every 
facet of Mann’s oeuvre, while they have not been nearly as anxious to do the same for 
such modem masters as Gide, Hesse, Kafka, Joyce, Musil—or Proust. By saying this I 
do not mean to imply that the number of Hungarian Thomas Mann publications is 
excessive. I am even less inclined to make such a claim now, as the book before me is a 
barbarously chopped-up Hungarian version of Thomas Mann’s diaries.
The extant portions of the novelist’s journals began to appear in Germany ten years ago under the editorship of Peter de Mendelssohn, with the entire project undertaken 
by S. Fischer Verlag, the successor of Mann’s own publisher. These earlier volumes give 
a fairly clear picture of the total personality from which his lifelong public role was carved 
out, and enacted, it must be said, with great dignity. “My fears now center primarily, 
almost exclusively, on this criminal attempt on the best-kept secrets of my life, secrets 
both weighty and profound”, Mann wrote in April of that fateful year 1933. He was 
terrified that his private journals, which the family managed to retrieve from the Manns’ 
Munich home just as it was seized by the Nazis, may have been lost or stolen in a Swiss 
railroad station: “Dreadful things, murderous things could happen”.
In the end the notebooks, containing diary entries for the years up to 1933, were 
returned intact to their rightful owner. Still, it may have been the panic of those few days 
that prompted Mann, on May 24, 1945, to act on a decision, obviously years in the 
making, to bum almost all of his early notebooks in the garden of his California home. 
It was not the first time he resorted to such sacrificial incineration. At the age of 
twenty-one, he set flame to the diaries he had kept up to that point; it was the notebooks
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he had filled after that date that perished in the garden incinerator. He did spare, however, 
notes jotted down between 1918 and 1921, probably because he was just then writing 
Doctor Faustus, and could utilize these notes in his work—which in itself says a great 
deal about the nature of the journals. At any rate, after the expiration of the grace period 
stipulated in Mann’s will, only the early fragment, saved from destruction, and the diaries 
begun after 1933 and kept continuously almost to the end of his life in 1955, could finally 
be published.
Anyone familiar with the original German edition of these later diaries can only 
respond to the author’s terrified contemplation of his exposed secrets with an assenting 
nod: he didwell to bum portions of the diary, and acted even more wisely when he chose 
to deal differently with the segments he did spare from fire. For while the earlier 
notebooks give us a taste of secrets that had to be expunged, the much more cautiously 
kept later diaries suggest the truer dimensions of the character from which the public role 
was fashioned. In this way the diary provides at least the contours of the picture the author 
did not see fit to preserve in full.
Committing those notebooks to flames was without doubt the greatest act of Thomas 
Mann’s life. He singlehandedly obliterated every last trace of an intensely personal, 
indispensible process without which he would not have been able to achieve his work. 
What remained were the end products themselves, which dovetailed neatly with his 
carefully shaped public persona. Only brief hints, subtle allusions to the formative stages 
of this public role were allowed to survive. Yet the horror felt by the reader at this act of 
self-mutilation must not be moral revulsion. True, unless I am Perseus, I will freeze in 
horror upon seeing the Gorgon’s head, yet I have no right to pass judgement.
The most surprising thing about the text of the diaries is that it does not rely on— 
indeed, it deliberately eschews—the carefully crafted, leisurely, often exasperatingly 
detailed sentences: the abundantly complex, modifier-studded, fussily, self-indulgently 
elaborate constructions that are so characteristic of Mann’s literary style. His notes here 
are terse, to the point, and his reflections only slightly more detailed. He doesn’t try to 
relate recorded facts to the appropriate introspections—he assumes no doubt that these 
connections are self-evident. There is also no need to arrange his notes in any kind of 
stylistic order. He writes hurriedly, often using unsightly abbreviations. Incomplete 
sentences are common, and he allows himself the kind of colloquial or tritely idiomatic 
expressions he otherwise would not dream of using. Which is not to say that these notes 
therefore have an informal or improvised character, or that they are not controlled by the 
stylistic principles so rigorously applied in his “real” works. The diary’s style, markedly 
different from that of his other writings, could best be described by pointing out its gaps 
and holes, its deliberate scantiness.
It is possible of course that all we are dealing with are the consequences of a rather 
obvious technical difficulty. The author is exhausted by the time he turns to his diary: and 
it is in such a state that he must note down everything he considers important, indeed 
crucial, yet unrelated or only indirectly related to his work or his social obligations. After 
a workday filled with public duties, the man penning these graceless, scantily clad 
sentences is the same man who speaks at all other times in carefully dressed, even 
overdressed sentences, or assumes a role in public entirely consistent with his highflown 
diction. Yet in these looser, more makeshift texts, the diarist’s self-referential habits had 
to become even more pronounced—he had to forego those psychological and stylistic 
manoeuvres that transform the crude facts of daily life into something more elegant and 
distant. What is entirely missing in these texts is a staple of all his public utterances: his 
humour; and what is absent also is the famous Mannian irony. The conspicuous lack of
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stylistic refinements and embellishments makes it seem as though there were no 
qualitative difference between the various phenomena described—no difference at all 
between multifarious facts and events. In this relentless seriousness every event and 
occurrence seems to carry the same weight, and the only reason they are not uniformly 
insignificant is that the author considers his own person exceptionally significant. And, 
as a consequence, treats the minutiae of his own psychic and physical being as though 
they were so many insect specimens being pinned on a sheet of paper.
R egardless of what happens and how, I must maintain the proper distance—this is the single albeit endlessly multiplied psychic gesture that lies behind the diarist’s 
approach to his material. The distance created between the subject and the events related 
does vary of course: the attempt at total detachment either succeeds or fails. Still, the 
emotional range is rather narrow. The text is monotonous, nobly dull, one might say. The 
author is forever going over the same ground, but because of the lack of stylistic 
differentiation, repetition itself does not make his themes more emphatic. When someone 
describes a host of dissimilar things in a stylistically uninflected manner, his field of 
vision necessarily narrows. It is as though we discovered how flat and dull such a gigantic 
life can be. For what we get to see through the screen of his repetitions are not the true 
colours of the author’s personality—the narrowing of his horizon enables him to screen 
out that personality. All the same, the endless repetitions, the unrelieved monotony of 
personal information, do make it easy to identify and tabulate his perennial subjects.
To begin with, he tells us about the state of his health: about indispositions, real and 
imagined illness, sleeping patterns, appetite, digestion; we leam about the texture of his 
stool, the manner of ingesting medications, about stimulants and sedatives. He reports 
regularly on his physical and mental condition, on good and bad workdays, but also on 
the length of his walks, their location and duration. Notes abound on the particulars of 
eating, drinking, smoking, as well as on the nature and character of his sexual manipu­
lations. Always treated separately are his erotic fantasies involving boys and men: 
daydreams triggered by the sight of various epheboi, be they acquaintances or strangers. 
Also listed separately are domestic events, details about acquisitions, shopping needs, 
prices, as well as notes on his wife, children, finances, servants. Among other recurrent 
items of interest are weather reports, the political scene, and details of his social activity. 
We might have an entry, say, on sunshine and revolution, rainy weather and war. And 
then there are innumerable accounts of dinners, teas, luncheons, afternoon socials, visits, 
concerts, evenings in the theatre, formal conferences, friendly chats. And with similar 
regularity, he gives accounts of his travels, his reading and his correspondence. By 
arranging his perennial themes into these neat categories, we can discover the organizing 
principle behind his various foci of interest. Mechanical repetitions of content and 
stylistic monotony reveal the compulsive behaviour of an individual who, following 
these compulsive patterns, is by no means adhering to the dictates of his personality— 
rather, he is trying to make these patterns conform to the conventions of an impeccably 
respectable, bourgeois life. The notion that there may be other modes and perimeters 
doesn’t even seem to occur to him, not even when he can no longer equate his own way 
of life with what can generally be considered good or meaningful. On the rare occasions 
he does confront moments of truth, he displays quiet resignation, and yields even more 
completely to the force of his rigorously prescribed life conditions: “A life of luxury 
amidst pain.”
Ultimately, though, the writing style of the diarist Mann is no less self-consciously 
formal than that of the novelist Mann. He acts, he serves, he does his part, always
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cognizant of those self-imposed and pre-defined conditions. He may be the most upright 
child of his age, but the price he must pay for this distinction is the tragic obliteration of 
his personality. And to be able to pay this price, he must keep his immense tragedy from 
penetrating his consciousness. On his solitary walks he is often shaken by sobs: he is 
tormented by insomnia, nervous tension, depression. The glimpses we get in the diaries 
of the deepest layer of consciousness reveal a dark tangle of evasions and agonies. But 
the public role, cut out of the whole cloth of his personality, and implying never-ending 
duties and tasks, must be enacted with such conviction and eloquence that he must not 
entertain even the thought of rebellion. Never, not even once. And what better way to 
prevent himself from defying his synthetic persona than by indulging in his compulsions? 
Even as we read his diary we may get the feeling that after all is said and done, his life 
is the best of all possible lives. He suffers and, by way of escape, assumes the role of the 
uncommonly successful man. Now success can give meaning to suffering, but it doesn’t 
necessarily alleviate it—if anything, it can make the suffering more intense. That delicate 
equilibrium: the constant see-saw between success and suffering also has its price, and 
a heavy one at that: he must not give way to passions, to any intense emotion whatever. 
What is more, for wrathful words describing the gaps and failings in his life, he must find 
the vaguest, softest equivalents in his vocabulary. In employing super-refined techniques 
of sublimation, Mann is truly unique among his contemporaries—a hero of an appeal­
ingly liberal intellectual and behavioural posture. But of course he could never have 
hoped to become a hero without first refining and sublimating his own martyrdom—he 
must suffer for the sake of that very heroism.
(In order for us to dispel simplified impressions created by this kind of role-playing, 
we need not immediately refer to far more accessible and forthcoming literary self­
appraisals, products of different currents within the same cultural tradition—Gide’s 
diaries, for example, or Kafka’s letters. Yet we know that the utter failure of the liberal 
mindset, a tragedy of mythic proportions, is amply documented in many other works as 
well, in which the nature of omissions and abbreviations, the abrupt cuts and jumps, the 
sketchy and allusive mode of composition, do hark back to the style of Mann’s diaries.)
In an important sense, then, these diaries are but a means of reduction and sublimation. 
They are not meant for us, they are written reminders of necessary psychic work about 
to be done, or already completed, before the writing process itself could begin. Mann’s 
diaries are inlets, unstirring bodies of water locked between the promontories of his 
works and life. In them he reminds himself which of his raw experiences could and should 
be used in his works. His thought processes, his entire mode of life, are vaults between 
the pillars of his all-important work and public personality.
One could not imagine a single life function or sign, however trivial, that is not viewed 
from the vantage point of these massive supporting pillars. They are indeed the be-all and 
end-all: things gain or lose their value as they are weighed against the momentous work, 
the august personality. It’s quite true that in such a world every phenomenon of life, no 
matter how odd or curious, must be duly acknowledged: but everything that might disturb 
the carefully maintained balance must be eliminated. What must necessarily be absent 
from such a world are passions that are important in and of themselves: love, for instance, 
or compassion are not really usable emotions. And the fact is that we find trace of such 
sentiments in Mann’s diaries. (Perhaps the reason he must read so much Tolstoy is to 
make sure that things so conspicuously missing in his world should not be left out 
altogether.) Mann’s emotions are present not by virtue of their actual existence—their 
place in a preconceived scheme depends entirely on the degree of their usability or 
inutility. He harbours no feelings which he could not calmly acknowledge, and for that
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reason alone his artistic integrity can never be doubted. At the same time, he exhibits no 
feeling which he did not already embellish according to the needs of his all-important 
persona. Thus, the fact that he dons a dinner jacket one evening is not any more or less 
significant than the fact that he has a hard time stifling physical loathing every time he 
looks at his youngest child. The particular relevance of such feelings is invariably 
determined by their relative position in a hierarchy of perceptions leading to an 
affirmation of his own significance.
In a world where his own overriding importance endows everything with equal value, 
the intellect must also reject all extremes. Thus, while Mann’s abhorrence of fascism 
caused his political views to shift noticeably to the left during the years he kept a diary, 
his sensitivity to social issues at the same time remained non-existent. He has erotic 
urges, powerful attractions, but he feels devotion toward no one. We understand perfectly 
the essential and unique place Katia Pringsheim has in his life, but one would be hard put 
to see this as anything remotely resembling affection. Love is not something he cares to 
deal with, he rarely uses the word. The only vaguely similar and long-gone sentiment he 
does dredge up he describes with feeble equivalents. His paternal feelings for his children 
may be seen as unique, if false, displays. He seems to be at his insincere worst not when 
he ignores one of his many children, or indeed all of them, but on those occasions when 
towards one or the other he feels obligated to entertain feelings he could possibly 
experience but doesn’t because he happens to be otherwise engaged.
But a rational and liberal mind will not yield to negative passions, to hatreds, either. 
Such a mind must make good use of its lexicon of palliatives. There is, to be sure, 
abundant evidence of rejection, contempt, disdain, disparagement, and above all disgust 
in the diaries. These carefully noted, eagerly sampled emotional responses constitute a 
negative hierarchy, at the summit of which stands the antiseptic ideal of the author’s 
commanding personality or, more precisely, his success-inflated ego.
A metaphysical world view that might afford him the opportunity to think and speak in a way that is free of highminded stylization—such a view is completely missing 
in Mann, and the void is filled with a kind of humanistic spirit world. It is a miserably 
ranting Nietzsche that carries this humanistic spirit world on his back like a turtle. The 
world is populated with gods, demiurges and mortal heroes, in keeping with Richard 
Wagner’s overblown stylistic norms: and enthroned as the highest deity is a serene 
Goethe. I don’t intend to draw a caricature here. Not that Mann doesn’t have it coming 
to him, but such a treatment would be justified only if he had not been aware himself— 
more aware than I could ever be— of the tragic ramifications of his wholly unreal, idol­
worshipping mental construct.
Naturally, he is also aware of the terrible dangers inherent in a world view that is at the 
mercy of mere human intelligence—which is the other side of the coin, one that reflects 
his honesty as an artist. One of the most devastating notes to be found in the diaries, one 
that deals a death blow to his intellectual pretenses, is dated October 19,1937. In a review 
of one of Karl Jaspers’s books, he stumbles on the following comment on the Germans 
made by his favourite Nietzsche: “A people willing to submit to the intelligence of a 
Luther!” And then, after a momentary pause marked by a dash, an exclamation: “No, 
Hitler is not an accident, not a freakish mishap. He sheds retrospective Tight’ on Luther, 
and this must be fully recognized. He’s a genuine German phenomenon”. Yet there isn’t 
a single realization here, no matter how embarrassing or painful, that could block his 
obsessive urge to see himself, symbolically, in Goethe’s company. Of course this also 
means that he has to transform Goethe into the supreme arbiter of the human spirit on
52 The New Hungarian Quarterly
earth, an image more in keeping with Wagnerian turgidity than with the far more organic 
and reasonable character of Goethe, a clear-voiced poet who could enter worlds above 
and below him with the greatest of ease. Mann knows so very much, he knows everything, 
but in the highly stratified intellectual system he so painstakingly creates and obsessively 
insists in representing, he leaves no room for the critical spirit, the voice of protest, which 
ought to be the hallmark, the always rechargeable driving force of any system of thought. 
In Mann’s works the fallen idols and banned saints, in the guise of real people dead and 
alive, return to their place on carefully whitewashed walls.
From the vantage point of the diaries it’s easy to see how Mann fills the vacuum created 
by the absence of a coherent metaphysical world view with mere stylistic virtuosity: how 
unseemly, negative psychic phenomena are turned, with the aid of humour and irony, into 
positive attributes. He tames his despair but lets traces of it show. The diary is, in a way, 
a record of this hard mental labour. In it he deals with the deepest secrets of his life, but 
does so invariably from the standpoint of his work. Thus, he has no personal secrets which 
in some form do not appear in his works; but he also has no secrets which are preserved 
in their original and true form in the diaries.
In his works Mann appears in the role of the kindly, understanding, sweet-smelling 
father figure, unfailingly gentle, mature in his enlightenment, always conciliatory. Those 
boasting similar virtues could identify him as a kindred soul, but even those deprived of 
their personal freedom and seeking a fatherly guide could celebrate him. In the famous 
words of the poet Attila József, all of us Hungarians implored him to come to our bedside 
and tell us a story. But the diaries make it abundantly clear that the man who came was 
not eloquent Hermes but Kronos, who, as we know, gained world dominance by 
castrating his own father, Uranus (meaning the heavens!), and devouring his children.
But just as we cannot reprove Kronos for his dreadful deed, we must refrain from 
passing moral judgement on the story-telling Thomas Mann. It isn’t he who has deceived 
us, not in the least. He hasn’t told us a single enchanting tale that doesn’t contain his 
teasing warning signals. Watch out, I am not for real, I am working on you now, I ’m 
dazzling you! In our immaturity, we were the gullible ones, and neglected to notice what 
we in fact did not wish to notice... Among themselves his children called Mann “the 
magician”, which satisfied the powerful ambitions prevailing in that household, and it 
happened also to be true. There are people who know a very great deal, but—difficult 
though it may be to admit it—there are also those who know only what can be known. 
The diaries, documenting this kind of limited omniscience, shed new light on Mann’s 
presumably very familiar works and personality. By shifting our perspective, we may not 
see a wholly different oeuvre or a changed author figure. What does emerge, however, 
is a man destined to harbour the darkest, most carefully guarded secret of the liberal 
imagination—a quietly suffering man, in other words. This image proved to be 
eminently appropriate for generations of readers who rejected the Mannian style but who, 
ironically enough, adopted his intellectual stance and banished the very notion of 
suffering from their critical vocabulary.
I must emphasize again that the diaries, as edited by Peter de Mendelssohn, are not unexpurgated, though the editor claims in his foreword that he did not cut or abbreviate 
Mann’s journal entries. In the interest of complete editorial fairness, he adds, however, 
that out of respect for the most intimate of sensitivities, in “just a very few places”, he 
deleted “a few sentences or several words”, and indicated these omissions with bracketed 
ellipses. In the notes written in 1920, for example, we come upon two entries, portions 
of which (and we can’t tell just how extensive a portion) fell victim to the editorial
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squeamishness of the otherwise quite admirable and excellent Peter de Mendelssohn.
At this point the diarist is forty-five years old. At the end of an entry dated July 5, we 
read the following brief and surprising announcement: “In love with Klaus these days. 
Germ of a father-son novella.—Intellectual ferment”.* The boy Klaus, nicknamed Eissi 
by members of the family, was not yet fourteen at this time. The censored sentence, 
appearing in an entry made nine days later, cuts short a reference to a most intimate aspect 
of his relationship with his then thirty-seven year-old wife: we are privy only to the 
reflection on the excised note. Here Mann writes that he doesn’t know quite what to make 
of his condition, it could hardly be impotence, more likely the usual confusion, the 
unreliability of his “sex life”. He puts quotes around the phrase as if to suggest that he 
doesn’t seriously believe that the thing can exist as an isolated function apart from the 
overall personality, although what the quotation marks really convey is that he is 
distancing himself, his own person, from the event in question. There is no doubt in his 
mind, he continues in the next sentence, that it’s his irritable weakness that is taking him 
closer to desire “directed the other way.”* What would happen, he asks (again putting 
quotes around plainly suggestive and equivocal words), if a boy lay there, “at his 
disposal”? He need not spell out the answer to the rhetorical question. In that case, he 
could function, he would not be impotent. He concludes, though, that it wouldn’t make 
sense to allow this failure, whose cause is not exactly new to him, to depress him. “Far 
better to treat the matter lightly, with humour, detachment, and self-confidence, since 
these are the best “medicines” ”, And in the next few days, during which his work goes 
“very badly”, he does try to follow his own advice. Yet subsequent notes leave little doubt 
as to who that boy may be, and what sort of inversion of interest may have caused his 
impotence. He is “enraptured” with Klaus, who looks “terribly handsome in his 
swimming trunks”.
It would take superhuman strength to resolve such a crisis: and if he had lacked such 
strength, he’d have to be crushed by the tragedy. There are no other alternatives. If he 
submits to cultural dictates and does isolate his sexual functions from his personality, and 
winds up considering sexual potency as the sole yardstick of success, then he mustreckon 
with the possibility of failure—and the destruction of his carefully cultivated image of 
himself. If, on the other hand, he considers his attraction to his own son as an integral part 
of his psychic makeup, then he must reject the entire culture. He can’t choose the latter 
solution: his spirit of negation, kept always at bay, would simply overwhelm him.
“Find it quite natural that I should fall in love with my son”.* This sentence is an 
artistically valid rationalization of his attraction. If it’s natural it can’t be that extreme, 
and if it’s not extreme, one need not dread it. It’s the artistically successful evasion of the 
cultural taboo that will enable Mann to write his story. And surely enough, a few lines 
later we learn that he has taken the train to Munich, no longer perturbed but quite 
acquiescent. He carries on a brief conversation with an attractive young man in white 
trousers sitting next to him in the third class carriage. “Very pleasurable. It seems I am 
once and for all done with women?”* This question, intended more as a statement, echoes 
Goethe’s ideal of the eternal feminine, but in that very frivolous, whimsical style Mann 
bade himself to cultivate just before. His stylistic playfulness must end, however—he’s 
back in the house. “Greeted everyone after riding home by cab, for which I paid 20 marks.
*Passages marked with an * are quoted from the English translation of Mann’s Tagebücher (Diaries 
1918-1939, New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1982). All other translations from the Tagebücher are my own. 
(Translator)
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Eissi was lying tanned and shirtless on his bed, reading: I was disconcerted. Yesterday 
was Katia’s birthday. Gifts in the morning, including her new bicycle. Took Eissi along 
on a brief midday walk and talked with him about the essay question. Katia’s parents here 
for chocolate. In the evening a garden party at Dr. Mannheimer’s... [where I] spoke to 
a number of people, all of them men incidentally, including a creature who at the end “got 
to know” me. Came home on foot. To bed very late and tired.” The words, some of them 
placed in quotes in the original text, are not easy to interpret. But the context and the mode 
of expression lead one to believe that they refer to an erotic adventure about to be, or 
already, concluded.
The diarist calms down somewhat after this: he has managed to deflect his dangerous 
sentiments, thereby meeting the challenge he presented to himself. He bore witness to his 
own successes, and now the original attraction can be transferred to a different, more 
natural, sphere, and what’s more, the transfer can be accomplished without moral injury. 
All the same, two days later we read this: “Yesterday evening read a story of Eissi’s 
steeped in Weltschmerz, sat by his bed and commented on it, accompanying my criticisms 
with tenderness that I believe he took pleasure in.” In view of what we know took place 
beforehand, it’s not hard to imagine how far the diarist’s passion may have strayed, what 
critical limits it may have reached, during that display of tenderness. Perhaps it was the 
fatherly criticism based on artistic authority that saved the boy from whatever it was he 
had to be saved from. Appearances were preserved, but just barely.
From an entry made three months later, we find out how the forbidden passion was 
ultimately sorted out in the diarist’s mind: “I heard some noises in the boys’ room and 
came upon Eissi totally nude and up to some nonsense by Golo’s bed. Deeply struck by 
his radiant adolescent body: overwhelming”. At this point he looks down from the heights 
of paternal authority, though that may not cool his ardour. We are again forced to 
conjecture, for here, too, the German editor interrupts the text.'But from the closing 
sentences of this same entry we learn that, upon returning to the conjugal bed, the diarist 
can, as usual, count on his ability to suppress certain impulses, and he can also count on 
his wife’s understanding, but in his intimate relationship with her the wished-for 
readjustment does not take place.
The aforementioned notes, heavily censored in the Hungarian edition and subjected 
here only to cursory analysis, can be used to illustrate Thomas Mann’s profound 
knowledge of certain relationships about which Western literature and psychology has 
been profoundly silent up to now, and about which it will not likely remain silent in the 
future as well. The demonstrable fact that sons can be physically attracted to their fathers 
may be seen as a desirable, even necessary phenomenon in a culture that is based on the 
prowess of male gods. But the obverse side of this same love: the fathers’ attraction to 
sons mustremain shrouded in silence, if only to protect the fathers’ authority and prestige. 
It is at this point that our culture is subverted. The sons’ love for the fathers guarantees 
authority and inspires accomplishments, which are then mercilessly crushed by the 
fathers’ secret love for their sons. Mendelssohn’s red pencil begins its work just at the 
point when we are given detailed and dispassionate information about a stunning culture 
phenomenon that nevertheless has a direct bearing on all our lives.
The first volume of the Hungarian version of the diaries goes much further in butchering the text—by observing not only cultural taboos but much simpler 
expediences as well. More than individual sentences are missing from the daily entries: 
entire days, weeks are omitted. According to my own rough calculations, about two thirds 
of the original material is missing, and there is a similarly huge gap in the accompanying
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annotations, which makes it that much more difficult for the reader to find his bearing in 
the text. Indeed, one wonders if the use of the original title is justifiable at all. For what 
the unsuspecting Hungarian reader gets here is not the first volume of Thomas Mann’s 
diaries but a heavily edited selection made on the bases of criteria never really made clear.
I am certainly not the right person to give advice to literary scholars on how to prepare 
a carefully edited and faithful translation of such an important work. But I have given a 
great deal of thought to what may lie behind the baffling, totally unjustified truncation 
of the original. All the Hungarian editor, Antal Mádl, will tell us is that the selection 
“attempts, within the limits imposed by the overall length of the original material, to give 
a cross-section in digest form of the diaries’ major preoccupations”. His version does 
indeed offer a representative selection of the major themes—to readers already familiar 
with the original. It achieves a sense of proportion, but only because it adheres to the 
familiar, carefully-tended, inoffensive image of Thomas Mann: and because it selects its 
themes most tendentiously, basing them on traditionally accepted and acceptable criteria. 
It justifies its lack of faithfulness by remaining faithful to the author’s very public image. 
By so doing it deprives the Hungarian reader precisely of those revealing new insights 
which might enable him to reassess his distorted mental picture not only of the author but 
of the psychological and artistic strategies of an entire age. If I wished to be a little more 
censorious myself, I could say that whoever reads the Hungarian edition of Thomas 
Mann’s diaries has less right to claim to be familiar with them than one who has not read 
a line of either the original or the Hungarian version.
Translated by Ivan Sanders
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T H E  P O L IT IC A L  C L O C K
György Bence
Political Justice in Post-Communist 
Societies: The Case of Hungary
aclav Havel’s essay, “The Power of the Powerless”, written in the late seventies,
included a parable about the butcher who had to place a sign in the shopwindow, 
between the sausages and the meat: “Long Live the Great October Socialist Revolution!” 
The story illustrates how the average citizen, who only wanted to make a living, became 
involved in the Great Lie.
But there was always an alternative, according to Havel. It was completely within our 
power to renounce the game. If we decided not to lie anymore, we could attain the state 
of “living in the truth”.
I must admit that, back in the seventies, I felt that Havel was demanding too much of 
the poor butcher. Was it not enough if he played the game strictly according to the rules 
of his Communist bosses? If he did no more than hesyas absolutely required to do?
My former scepticism with regard to Havel’s position has evaporated in the first 
months of his presidency. He did not draw vindictive consequences from his exalted 
demand of “living in the truth”, a demand to which only exceptional people, like Havel 
himself, could live up. This lofty ideal has been, in fact, a source of tolerance and 
forgiveness on the part of Havel and his friends.1
Communism pressed the citizen into active complicity with the system, unless he was 
prepared to drop out of normal social life. It is, therefore, wrong to condemn him simply 
because he tried to survive. The former dissidents should be the first to understand this, 
and Havel in fact has.
Havel’s position implies either a blanket amnesty for representatives of the previous 
regime, or strict adherence to due process and rule of law, even in cases involving 
Communist bosses. Former leaders shall not be indicted simply because they filled high 
posts in the party or government. Charges should be based on specific acts, substantiated 
by evidence, not on membership or rank.
There is another story we should keep in mind when speaking of political justice in 
post-Communist societies. A real one we saw with our own eyes. In the great days of the 
Rumanian uprising in December 1989 the enraged crowd clamoured for the blood of the 
oppressors. Death to the tyrant! Death to the tyrant! Death to the Securitate men! and
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summary justice was done, and would be seen to be done, on television. These are the two 
extremes staking out the limits of political justice in post-Communist Eastern Europe. 
What is going to emerge as a more regular pattem will most likely fall between them. In 
Czecho-Slovakia, the fate of former Communist leaders will not depend solely on the 
high morality of Havel. As also in Rumania, it is to be hoped, it will not be the crowd that 
has the last say in these matters.
As could be expected, Hungary took the middle course in political justice. No blanket 
amnesty will be given, it would appear. But extreme sanctions will also be avoided.
Here, Communists or former Communists have undergone a sudden but understand­
able metamorphosis lately. They have become very fastidious in matters involving finer 
legal points and moral standards of political behaviour.
Some of the Hungarian press is full of laments about the illegitimate pressure exercised 
by the new parties, about the dangers of political discrimination in the professions and 
in the civil service, about the likelihood of a wholesale proscription of innocent people 
identified with the old regime, and many other alleged abuses.2
This indignation of the Communists is, obviously, hypocritical. Who exercised party 
dictatorship in the first place? Could a more thoroughgoing system of political discrimi­
nation be ever introduced than the infamous nomenclature? Were the handpicked civil 
servants, in a Communist country, so civil really?
There is, nevertheless, an element of justice in the Communists’ allegations. No, as of now there have not been actual cases of political discrimination, but yes, there is 
a flood of wild statements of intention coming from some new parties. They say a clean 
sweep has to be made, presumably by the new government. A campaign poster of the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum, the party that won the general elections, depicted an 
overflowing garbage container with a big broom, and the caption read ’’The spring 
cleaning is coming.” Other large parties, however, and even the Democratic Forum itself 
on other occasions, went out of their way to reassure the officials of the old regime.
All in all, the public mood does not seem to be excessively ugly in Hungary. True, the 
idea of a big purge has been mentioned repeatedly but public reaction was far from 
unanimous in support. Furthermore, majorpolitical leaders took care to still these voices, 
to allay the fears of those who may become the subjects of victimisation. There is, 
consequently, a fair chance that the transition process will be completed without 
excessive injustice and without excessively wasting human resources so much needed for 
rebuilding the country.
To minimise injustice, however, is not the same as to avoid it. There is a growing 
consensus among the more thoughtful political leaders in Hungary about the way to 
proceed. If one wanted to reduce injustice to an acceptable minimum—they say—the 
best way would be to apply political justice in a regulated form. Extraordinary measures 
are needed. This way some injustice would inevitably be done but, at least, not 
spontaneously and outside the bounds of rational control. Political justice would be 
dispensed by some kind of organized tribunal—with judicial powers, although outside 
the framework of ordinary courts— but not by the mob.
This is where the issue stands for today’s political leaders in Hungary. Therefore, to 
raise the question of political justice from a Civil Rights point of view is not necessarily 
a symptom of nostalgia for the bad old days of dissident purity. Back then, all injustice 
emanated from the powers that be, and their opponents could at least indulge in the moral 
comfort of innocence.
Political justice is already being applied in Hungary, although on a small scale and in
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a restricted way. A certain category of former political leaders are obliged to undergo 
parliamentary investigation, they have to reveal their assets and account for the way they 
obtained them. This is clearly a case of exceptional justice, it oversteps the boundaries 
of regular legal procedure, and there is a danger of serious Civil Rights abuses.
Moreover, the popular demand for political justice is gaining momentum. It is to be 
expected that more political justice will come. The danger of abuse is growing.
Last but not least, by raising the question of political justice we are also re-formulating 
the ultimate question about the current transition: Is a peaceful transition at all possible? 
Is there going to be a second revolution?
Let me, to start with, make some further comments on the distinction between ordinary 
justice and political justice.3 This distinction might ring rather old-fashioned to the 
refined ears of a Western audience. It is under fierce attack by the advanced legal minds 
of the Critical Legal Studies movement.4
Hungarian lawyers tend to stick, however, to the old style of thinking. For them, there 
is a clear distinction between proper legal reasoning on the one hand, and political 
rhetoric on the other. Once the basic legal principles were established, they maintain, 
there is a secure, although complicated, way to give authoritative answers to legal 
problems. The principles must be laid down by an act of constitution-making, or by a long 
tradition, or—preferably—by both. Legal reasoning, except in the most trivial cases, is 
more than classification and deduction, but it is still distinguished by a more determinate 
rationality from political argument.
Looked at from such a conservative perspective, political justice is almost a contradic­
tion in terms. It means, at its most extreme, that several legal principles are thrown 
overboard in a quasi-legal procedure. Judgments are then made by a direct appeal to 
general and indeterminate political considerations. In less extreme cases of political 
justice, only a few principles are given up, usually with some reluctance, as a concession 
to the exceptional character of a political situation.
Three basic types of political justice must be distinguished: restitutive political justice, punitive political justice, and the limiting case of political amnesty. 
Restitutive political justice is a burning political issue in the Eastern Europe of our 
days. It is being dispensed wholesale in Hungary too. Powerful lobbies have been 
organised by the former defendants in show trials, other political prisoners, camp 
inmates, their friends and relatives. They are represented by the best legal minds of the 
country. The aim is individual retrials, quashing the sentences of whole categories of 
people, e.g., participants in the uprising of 1956, and some financial compensation. These 
efforts have been largely successful.
Calls for revenge, tooth for tooth, are rarely heard. But these people, understandably, 
do not wish to see their tormentors—bestial interrogators, partisan judges, brutal 
jailers—remain unscathed to enjoy in safety the fruits of their labours. This feeling is, 
moreover, shared by a large section of the public, extending well beyond the victims 
themselves.
The young who, fortunately, did not share the experience of the last wave of Commun­
ist terror, are even more under the spell of the revelations. In this case, memoirs and 
historical accounts, published since the lifting of censorship, shattered many illusions.5 
They had believed in the possibility of an honest and relatively peaceful existence, while 
older people had never really managed to forget the skeletons in the cupboards.
Given these facts, it is no surprise that a demand for a political amnesty, covering the 
old regime, was not made by any important political force.
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The leaders of the reformist wing of the Communist Party, now members of the 
Hungarian Socialist Party, were so blinded by the glory of a successfully managed first 
stage of transition, that they felt themselves immune to future prosecution. They could 
not care less about the fate of their former comrades, now organized in the fundamentalist 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. Whether they committed a fatal mistake remains to 
be seen.
The new opposition parties, on the other hand, having no members or supporters 
actually in jail, were not interested in the question of amnesty, if the other side did not 
insist on it.
The Hungarian Communists might have had their reasons for not trying to insure 
themselves against legal proceedings which could be initiated against them by their 
victorious opponents, but my subject is political justice as such as applied against 
Communists, and not just the situation in Hungary.
Drawing on the available literature, I have outlined three types of punitive political justice, examining whether the East European cases fit any of the age old patterns. 
Numbers and names have been given to these types, to facilitate future reference, but I 
do not claim that either the order in which they are presented or their names have any 
particular importance.
Type 1: Prosecution for ordinary crimes with a political end in view.-—This is the least 
questionable version of political justice. If an ordinary crime was, in fact, committed, 
there is no need to stretch the law. It is enough to see a political opponent exposed as a 
thief, embezzler, or petty tyrant using his power for selfish and criminal purposes.
Type 2: Political trials based on state protection provisions of the Criminal Code.— 
Even the most liberal legal systems contain provisions explicitly aimed at protecting the 
state against subversion, treason, sedition, etc. Formally speaking there is nothing wrong 
in using these provisions against a political opponent. But in extreme situations, 
especially when the targeted opponent has some chance of starting violent action to 
prevent prosecution, there is a high chance that justice will be expedited by questionable 
means.6
Type 3: Revolutionary justice.—All the previous types of political justice involve a 
special risk that the bounds of legality, defined by acts of parliament, estalished legal 
principles and institutionalised legal tradition, may be overstepped. Here, this is openly 
accepted as a matter of practical necessity.7
Revolutionary justice, at its most extreme, is dispensed by lay tribunals, convoked ad 
hoc especially for that purpose, and is based directly on the will of the people, not limited 
by law, the spirit of the revolution or similar ideological constructs. Usually, however, 
some pretence of legality is kept up, there is some attempt to assimilate proceedings and 
the principles invoked to the normal course of justice.
This classification may help to classify acts of political justice in East European 
countries undergoing transition.
Type 1 proceedings already took place in several countries and, undoubtedly, we will 
see more of them. The differences between the individual East European countries will 
depend only on the degree of shamelessness of former Communist leaders in abusing 
their power for personal gain and advantage. The moral indignation of the public is 
justified, the legal means are there. The only danger is that the courts, having been 
compromised by their less than independent action under the old regime, might display 
undue haste and severity in creating show cases for public consumption.
The examples are, of course, tedious. Graft, corruption, nepotism everywhere. In this
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country, local bosses have been singled out first, probably because they were much more 
in the eye of their neighbours. One prominent figure was eliminated on a similar basis, 
the former Minister of Defence, General Czinege. His speciality was brutality toward 
subordinates, using them for private purposes, collecting prize pieces of real estate 
bought at a nominal price from local councils.
A typical Type 2 case was started in East Germany where treason charges were brought 
agains the former Communist leader, Erich Honecker. According to the latest reports 
from Czecho-Slovakia, treason proceeding have been initiated against Vasil Bilak and 
other high officials who called in the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968.
This latter seems to be an open and shut case, even according to the socialist legality 
of those days. Nonetheless, we must be aware of the potential dangers. Such precedents, 
if they were going to be followed, could lead to revolutionary—or, rather, counter­
revolutionary—-justice pure and simple, with all the dire consequences.
Such Type 2 cases will very likely come up in larger numbers in other East European 
countries too. They all raise the painful question of legal continuity in the process of 
transition.
In Rumania then, we saw a Type 3 case of revolutionary justice. What I have in mind 
is, of course, the so-called trial of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. Since then, according 
to the scant information available, a series of other strange cases of political justice have 
taken place in Rumania.
I had the opportunity to watch on Rumanian television, with the help of an interpreter, 
the first day of the Securitate Gang of Four Trial. The standard of the proceedings was 
not much above that of a classic show trial, with the minor difference, of course, that Bobu 
and his co-defendants were guilty as hell. In Hungary, political justice took a different 
course from that in Czecho-Slovakia, the GDR or Rumania.
Type 1 proceedings are not general, although a few of the former leaders have been 
charged with personal crimes, as we saw. The issue of treasonable activity by former 
leaders—either under the previous regime, or during the process of transition—was 
barely raised. Type 2 proceedings do not seem to be on the agenda of any important 
political group or party. As to Type 3 cases, revolutionary justice proper, I am certain that 
all the new political forces would vehemently deny that they have anything of that sort 
in mind.
There is, nevertheless, a public outcry asking for political justice aimed against 
prominent beneficiaries of the old regime. This outcry is only partly spontaneous, it is 
also instigated by demagogues. But the sentiment is truly shared by a large part of the 
public.
The country is on the verge of bankruptcy. The living standards of large sections of the population, especially of elderly, retired people, are already at an intolerably low 
level. More hardships are to be expected. In contrast, the former Communist leaders are 
living in considerable comfort, sometimes even opulently, on their exceptional pensions. 
They enjoy the fruits of their labours in the form of valuable real estate. And as they are 
those with financial resources, they are using the new economic freedom to turn 
themselves into capitalists.
This is what the less privileged part of the public thinks. And demagogues are ready 
to stir up more vindictiveness and to manipulate the innocent.
The legal consequences are obvious. Those who are responsible for the economic 
disaster should be pilloried. Their financial advantages should be curtailed by some 
extraordinary procedure. But if we want to understand the legal complexities involved
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in this special kind of political justice, it is better to delve, at some depth, into the 
discussion leading up to the present state of the matter.
I cannot, of course, present full details. Many facts are not yet available. The discussion 
of political justice has had both a popular and a more scholarly academic side: my account 
will be tilted to the latter. Confiscation of property, as a form of political justice, was first 
mentioned in the autumn of 1989.8 Interestingly, the more liberal of the two Communist 
successor parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party, officially joined the demand for a 
property test of former leaders.9 It nevertheless took a long time to transform the demand 
into an act of parliament.
Three points were quite hotly debated. The former Communists sided, of course, with 
the milder proposal on all three counts. First, how wide a circle of former leaders should 
be examined. Second, how far the investigation should extend into the past. Third, should 
the investigation cover matters of political responsibility, or should it be restricted to the 
financial transactions of former leaders.
The provisions of the bill, eventually adopted as Law iii of 1990,10 turned out to be 
quite narrow. Instead of 1968, proposed by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the 
investigation went back only to 1980. The circle of persons to be investigated was 
restricted to high party, state and local officials, like politburo members, ministers, 
county bosses. Matters of political responsibility were excluded from the scope of the 
investigation. The law moreover left open what should happen after the parliamentary 
commission entrusted with the investigation has reached its conclusions.11
It was, most probably, a consequence of this relative mildness of the law that, after one 
full working session, without dramatic results, the Commission eventually faded away. 
Summons were not served, the members did not turn up.12
These meagre results notwithstanding, a critical threshold had been crossed. Political 
justice was no longer merely a political slogan, it had become legislative reality.
T his was perceived as a challenge by some students of law and human rights.At extremely short notice, a conference was convened for January 14, 1990, at the 
Department of Social and Moral Philosphy of Budapest University. Historians, political 
scientists, philosophers, jurisprudents and practicing lawyers were invited to discuss 
“Political Justice by Fiat in Successor Regimes”.
The lawyers and philosophers, the groups best represented there, took different sides, 
although there were some notable exceptions.13 The first tended to warn against uncritical 
support for political justice.
Some philosophers insisted, under the impact of recent events in Rumania, on the 
difference between revolutionary and proper justice.14 Some other philosophers stressed 
the necessity for curbing moral indignation, even if justified, otherwise the rule of law 
cannot be maintained, let alone established, and it was the latter which had to be done in 
this country.15
Most lawyers, on the other hand, were convinced that the only practical question is 
how to dispense political justice, not whether it is appropriate to do so.
They started with the assumption that an extraordinary judicial procedure would be 
instituted with the aim of establishing political responsibility for the economic mess. But 
they wanted to mitigate the disturbing aspects of such an initiative, and therefore they 
stressed that priority should be given to establishing the truth, sanctions would be of a 
milder, non-criminal character.16
It was here that the idea of a moral or political pillory came up first in Hungary. 
Suppose that defendants were found guilty by a special tribunal trying them on ad hoc
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charges, not provided for by legislation, like gross negligence or irresponsibility in 
government. In such a case no criminal charges would be brought against them. They will 
only have to suffer the consequences of publicity given to their offences. They would be 
confronted with the results of the investigation on television, in the papers, and posted 
on the walls.17
The problems connected with ex post facto legislation or, in the language of the US 
Constitution, with a bill of attainder were, of course, also discussed by several partici­
pants of the conference. So too were the checks a statute of limitations imposed on 
political justice.18
The next contribution to the public debate on political justice so far, both on the 
political and more scholarly side, was the proposal of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum, 
the professional group which initiated the Opposition Round Table (EKA) talks last 
year.19 The Independent Lawyers presented a draft bill with appropriate explanations 
which will, undoubtedly, constitute an important stepping stone in the work of the new 
Parliament and Ministry of Justice.
The Independent Lawyers took over the principle of collective indictment from Law 
iii of 1990, discussed above. But they insisted on the analogy of objective responsibility 
in the Hungarian law of torts. The driver of a car is expected to drive carefully, and not 
to cause harm to anybody, similarly the managers of the national economy should have 
taken care to avoid the present mess.
Such an approach would undermine the autonomy of the executive branch of 
government. Any policies which were considered disastrous could give rise to special 
proceedings against the ministers responsible.
The sanctions envisaged by the proposal include measures which are, clearly, of a 
confiscatory character.
At this point, therefore, the analogy with the law of torts breaks down. The economy 
would not be compensated by the confiscation of property accumulated by former 
ministers. This would clearly be a punitive measure.
The Independent Lawyers wanted to extend the time limits of the investigation as far 
back as the first Communist constitution of 1949. The statute of limitations, as they 
argued, should not be operative for that period of time, since the courts were not 
independent and, therefore, there was no real likelihood of prosecution.
This argument did not take into account the rationale behind statutes of limitations and 
related provisions. This is an enormous subject, but two aspects stand out. One is the 
difficulty of proof after a long time, the other is connected with the inherent conservatism 
of law, and as such is particualrly relevant to the present subject.
In the course of time all kinds of consequences, good or bad, accrue to an original 
action starting the whole process, however evil it might have been in the first place. The 
law is, therefore, always reluctant to overturn long-established conditions of the private 
lives of people.20
All this is a matter of degree, of course, depending on how obnoxious the original act 
was. There is, obviously, a difference in this respect between criminal acts, like murder 
and torture, and the kind of irrationality which the Communists displayed in their 
management of national resources.
The discussion of political justice in Hungary has a weakness, and that is excessive 
reliance on legal procedure and state action in general.
If the main purpose, as was claimed by many lawyers arguing for political justice, is 
to reveal the truth, to establish responsibility, to give moral satisfaction to the nation, and 
not to punish those who are responsible, why could not this be done without judicial
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powers? Are historians and economic analysts, with adequate access to the relevant data 
and documents, less effective than prosecutors, judges and parliamentary commissions, 
when it comes to establising responsibility? If one prefers tribunals, all kinds of private 
commissions could be formed, consisting of distinguished experts and moral authorities.
There are, of course, advantages and disadvantages on both sides. The court can 
summon witnesses, can force them to tell the truth under the threat of contempt and 
perjury proceedings, but it is bound by the rules of evidence. A social tribunal on the other 
hand has no hold over its living sources, but is not restricted in its quest for truth by 
technicalities.
Looking at it from the aspect of the rule of law, however, there is an overwhelming 
advantage on the side of a private investigation. There is no need, then, to tinker with the 
statute of limitations, or to invent ex post facto provisions or to make use of other dubious 
devices of political justice.
It is hard to escape the suspicion that the temptation to use legal procedures to cope with 
the legacy of the past, is part of the problem rather than its solution.
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of each issue. The “Independent Democratic Maga­
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Starts with the photograph of a former Olympic gold 
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retire, to start business ventures, etc.
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Vera Pécsi, a historian.
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on Kircheimer, 1961, ch. 3 and Schmitt, 1928, para 
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in Népszabadság of February 28, 1990. Note the 
adjective “European”!
10 Magyar Közlöny, February 12, 1990
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published in Magyar Közlöny, ibid. Proposals to 
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6, 1990.
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László Csaba
Gearing Up for the Economic Future
I n Eastern Central and Southeastern Europe the state socialist system has failed in one 
country after another. Neo-Stalinist regimes 
have collapsed and gradually given way to 
pluralist democracy. The countries of the re­
gion have put behind their planned economies 
and aim to create genuine market economies. 
Autarchic economic policies followed for dec­
ades are being replaced by adjustment to the 
world economy. Efforts are made to join once 
more the technological, social and intellectual 
mainstream. With the con­
tinuing thaw in relations be­
tween the two superpow­
ers, with the pull-back from 
military confrontation, with 
the accelerated withdrawal 
of troops stationed abroad, 
the creation of European 
unity has again become a 
real possibility. Under the 
impact of the new Soviet 
foreign policy, and with the 
effective help of the West, 
the divided continent of 
postwar years has radically 
changed. Today it is already 
possible, and even necessary, to establish new 
relations going beyond alliances. This is what 
Hungary also aims at by consistently imple­
menting agreements with the European Com­
munity, by preparing for association with the 
Community, as well as by giving notice of her 
intention to join in the foreseeable future, for­
mally and with full rights, the European inte­
gration.
László Csaba w ork s f o r  a  la rg e  bu sin ess con ­
su ltan cy  in B u dapest. H is b r ie f  is  co m p a ra tive  
econ om ic  sy stem s a n d  in tern a tion a l p o lic y  is ­
sues. H is  Eastern Europe in the World Econ­
omy w a s p u b lish ed  in the S o v ie t a n d  E astern  
E uropean  m on ograph  se r ie s  o f  C am bridge  
U n iversity  P re ss  in 1990.
President F ra n c is  M itterand’s notion of a 
European confederation intended to create a 
unified economic area is worthy of attention 
and Hungarian support. The Hungarian people, 
a third of whom live outside the state frontiers, 
are particularly interested to see that European 
economic and political unity is created as soon 
as possible on the basis of Western values, i.e., 
recognition of individual and collective rights, 
and that frontiers in the central and eastern parts 
of the continent should become spiritualised.
Even when speaking of 
European integration one 
cannot forget that what had 
been the countries of state 
socialism were of many 
kinds— in historical, eco­
nomic, political, ideologi­
cal and cultural terms— dur­
ing the period of their arti­
ficial unity and coordinated 
foreign policy. W iththedis- 
integration of state social­
ism, these differences tend 
to grow and will not dimin­
ish. That is why an ap­
proach, manifest in the press 
and in financial circles, which considers these 
countries, of differing origins and developing 
in various directions, as a uniform— though 
reformed— Eastern bloc has its dangers.
Reality and development courses differ 
widely. A common feature is that we have to 
cope through our own strength in the first place, 
although it is desirable that we should not be left 
to our own devices. Another common feature, 
at least from the Western point of view, is that 
it is in the direct interest, not only of the particu­
lar countries but also of the larger European 
community, that none of the countries that have 
shaken off dictatorships should go the way of 
the Weimar Republic, none should find itself in 
an impasse.
The conditions are essentially different from 
those encountered earlier by the Mediterranean 
countries of the European Community or, re­
l f o n ly  becau se  o f  the nature  
a n d  in itia l c o s ts  o f  the errors  
o f  a  p lu ra lis t  dem o cra cy  in 
the m aking, it is  im possib le  
in H un gary to d a y  o r  to m o r­
ro w  to  take a ll  th ose  d ra stic  
m easu res w hich the self- 
co n ta in ed  lo g ic  o f  a  one- 
s id e d ly  m on eta ris t-in sp ired  
p o lic y  o f  ad ju stm en t w ou ld  
th eo re tica lly  im pose.
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cently, by South Korea. In those states authori­
tarian political regimes pursued enlightened 
economic policies: they furthered economic 
progress and modernisation, including an open­
ing to the world economy. Political democracy 
there can rely on an essentially pluralist market 
economy, which in turn called for an appropri­
ate political superstructure. The collapse of 
socialism, on the other hand, was due to its 
bankruptcy. The economic and political prob­
lems, the business-cycle and structural crises, 
the break-up of the economic system and the 
system of planned international economic rela­
tions that had earlier been taken for granted, 
coincided.
The democratic changes of 1989-90 were 
therefore generated by the economic impracti­
cability of the previous systems. Political change 
will at long last make it possible to put the 
relevant questions. It is up to the new gov­
ernments to answer them, coordinating the 
requirements o f differently motivated and not 
even congruent measures to avert the crisis. 
This democratic state, however, has inherited 
an economic and social structure and efficiency 
standards which will hardly produce, through 
organic self-improvement, the results that ad­
justment to the world economy requires. It is 
therefore necessary that governments play a 
more active part than the US-inspired theory of 
mainstream economic theory postulates, not 
only within the particular ex-socialist countries 
but in international relations as well. In Eastern 
Central Europe the challenge is precisely that 
the pluralist systems established in the 1990s 
should create their own stable economic found­
ations and at the same time make up for the 
mistakes of the past. The countries of the region 
are hardly in a position to do this on their own.
Some have therefore wondered whether it 
would not be possible to set Eastern Europe on 
its feet in the manner that West Europe was after 
1948, analogous to the Marshall Plan and the 
European Payments Union. Reconstruction 
needs capital injection; the net outflow of re­
sources characteristic of recent years has to be 
stopped. A less expensive way of creating 
convertibility, both for the societies o f the 
countries concerned and for their foreign credi­
tors, would involve the concerted strategy of 
the whole region and not of each country acting 
separately. (17)
This is difficult to dispute in broad outline; 
when it comes to details, however, matters
stand differently. To start with, the problems of 
Eastern Central Europe differ from those of 
Southeastern Europe, and the problems of both 
from those of the Soviet Union, but those of 
individual countries and their concrete condi­
tions do so to such an extent that there is no 
justification for tackling them in the same 
manner— nor can this be done. It is this that is 
decisive for economic policy on both the na­
tional and the international plane.
The rescheduling of debts at the start and the 
suspension of a part of the payments of interest 
worked in the consolidation programme of 
Poland which some economists thought worthy 
of imitation. In the past decade, Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia and Rumania also resorted to re­
scheduling. Hungary, in spite of many difficul­
ties, has always met its international commit­
ments. Demands for debt relief were expressed 
during the election campaign in the spring of 
1990, but the present Hungarian government 
and the coalition parties did not act in those 
terms. Last year, the country’s debt service 
burden exceeded 40 per cent of export earnings 
and it will be no less in the coming years either. 
Nevertheless, this level of servicing can be met, 
though not easily; indeed, under adverse condi­
tions in other years, (thus in 1982 and 1986) it 
was even higher (more than 60 per cent) than 
last year, and still Hungary did not reschedule. 
There is no economic emergency, no financing 
crisis, especially since, with the passing of pre­
election uncertainty, the larger part of the de­
posits withdrawn in the first three months have 
again been placed in the National Bank. The 
debts of Poland are due mostly to foreign gov­
ernments or to government encouraged big 
banks, which have already written off most of 
the credits they had issued in the 1970s as 
regards their own books (though not for Po­
land); but Hungary is indebted to private bank­
ers and raises a good part of its loan on the cheap 
and modem bond market. Thus, as regards 
immediate foreign capital investment, Hungary 
and Poland are not in the same category, nor 
will they be in the foreseeable future.
In Czecho-Slovakia, the dismantling of the 
system of central plan directives, the monetari- 
sation of the economy, and the privatisation 
have only started this year. In Hungary, on the 
other hand, reforms in progress for two decades 
now— however half-hearted they may have 
been— have created the foundation of financial 
management and marketing for thousands of
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business executives and the state administra­
tion. The most important institutions of a mar­
ket economy have also come into being: their 
sphere of operation must be enlarged, that’s all. 
In the course of 1990, the Hungarian govern­
ment will transfer entire sectors to private 
ownership. A stock exchange is functioning, 
and the Hungarian currency, the forint, is con­
vertible for the foreign investor, since he is free 
to transfer 100 per cent of his profits. He may 
establish a company of 100 per cent foreign 
ownership, and can freely acquire any factor of 
production or property within the country, 
except— for the time being— land. About 80 
per cent of Hungarian prices fall under the 
category of free prices. Western imports are 80 
per cent liberalised. The policy of liberalising 
imports has been going on for two years now 
and has not upset the balance of trade (the 1989 
disequlibrium of the current account can be 
explained by mistakes committed in the tourist 
trade and in the short-term regulation of trade in 
roubles, mistakes which have been succesfully 
eliminated in 1990). While some members of 
the government of Czecho-Slovakia made 
monetarist-inspired statements, (12) that same 
government responds to the economic difficul­
ties with typical measures of bureaucratic con­
trol: thus the introduction of petrol coupons at 
differentiated prices for foreigners, with bans 
on purchases and exports and similar provi­
sions. In Hungary, on the other hand, the gov­
ernment has so far refrained from coping with 
difficulties by administrative action which is 
not in conformity with the market. In a number 
of other countries, only the dissolution of the 
socialist system of large-scale organisation is 
on the agenda but in Hungary recent decades 
have seen the emergence of tens of thousands of 
entrepreneurs, involving about 20 to 25 percent 
of the undertakings. This is no longer mere 
simulation of competition but its reality. The 
privatisation of large state firms, spontaneous 
and also state-guided, has started. Despite some 
difficulties1 a result has been the transfer of 
impersonal state property to concrete owners 
interested in increasing their assets. Foreign 
capital has played a (16) positive role in this 
process. True, the establishment of one or an­
other company has led to public protest in cases 
when the action, by taking advantage of con­
spicuous gaps in previous Hungarian regula­
tions, (7) became so to speak excessively prof­
itable. Such gaps must be closed off for the very
reason that the country reckons with the partici­
pation of foreign capital as a strategic factor of 
economic development in the long run. And 
this can be well established only if it is in 
accordance with European norms of fair trad­
ing, and not if tax evasion and dishonestly 
acquired property are the rule. Thus, the ma­
noeuvres of the Axel Springer Group, which 
bought only furnishings of offices but simply 
“forgot” to pay for the newspaper itself—the 
title, established circulation, etc. i.e., its true 
capital value— obviously do not create confi­
dence in the capital-recipient country, and no 
one can interpret the prevention of such deals as 
populist-nationalist rabble rousing.
Accelerated privatisation, based on the in­
tensive and organic participation of foreign 
capital, is at the focus of a three-year economic 
programme to be drawn up by the new govern­
ment. This programme avoids the shock thera­
py employed in Poland and Yugoslavia. The 
objective is to create a socially controlled mar­
ket economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft). This 
programme is designed not for an economy in 
utter chaos, where most people have become 
passive and indifferent, but for an economy 
already in process of transformation, in which a 
great many people have a stake and hence 
something to lose. In Hungary neither the eco­
nomic nor the social situation requires govern­
ment-generated shocks. (8)
An essential feature of the present situation 
is that the nature of gradualism has radically 
changed. Arrangements called progressive 
changes in 1990 go far beyond even the most 
radical objectives of the preceding decade, and 
political change makes this a matter of course. 
The economic situation no longer permits half­
hearted measures. The shock situation— for 
business-cycle policy— is already present: in­
dustrial production has drastically declined, to 
an extent expressed by a two-digit percentage 
figure in 1990. The number of unemployed may 
already in 1990 reach 100,000 which, by West­
ern standards, is not really high as yet (only 2 to 
3 per cent), but nevertheless a ten to twelve-fold 
growth in a year compared to 1989.
Singular developments of particular impor­
tance among the factors inducing the recession 
are the effects produced by the dwindling of the 
Comecon market and by the collapse of the 
long-standing organisation of integration. A 
favourable development from the point of view 
of system dynamics is that the state-controlled
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trade system, institutionalised in Comecon, has 
collapsed. In recent years all attempts at re­
form— or progressive transformation— ended 
in failure. Declarations could not induce any 
change in commercial practice. This interna­
tional extension of planning by directives, which 
had for years been an obstacle to experiments 
with the market in Hungary, is no more. At the 
same time the abruptness of change— for the 
most part the result of government decisions 
being deferred in previous years— is now a 
heavy burden on the country. In respect of 
business-cycle policy, the reason is that the 
decline by a quarter in Hungarian external trade 
with Comecon countries is difficult to handle as 
regards production and employment policy as 
well as income policy. This is true if Hungary 
will be able to meet the current account targets 
agreed with the IMF at the beginning of the 
year. As to the cost of evacuating the Soviet 
Army: Hungary does not accept liabality for 
this but may well have to bear a proportion of 
the total in the end.
This is probably going to amount to a billion 
dollars. In respect of structural and employ­
ment policy, Hungary has got into a difficult po­
sition. The range of firms operating on a single 
market— i.e., capable of selling only within 
Comecon— largely overlaps that of non-com­
petitive enterprises in the crisis sectors which 
are grappling with liquidity problems. These 
unstable companies have to be surveyed, reor­
ganised and transformed into private and joint 
undertakings. To do so, it is necessary to map 
out a programme of consolidation in which the 
government would only assure blanket condi­
tions, while know-how and some working capital 
would be provided by foreign entrepreneurs. A 
World Bank structural adjustment loan is avail­
able for this purpose.
The Comecon crisis, however, gives rise to 
difficulties not only in the business sector. From 
the economic point of view it is welcome that 
trade based on obligatory quotas will be re­
placed by settlement in free-currency, based on 
the firms assuming the necessary risks. Feath­
ers will fly as feather-bedding is eliminated. 
The difficulties encountered by the makers of 
non-competitive products, or industrial prod­
ucts not wanted by Soviet central planning 
agencies, and firms selling in the West— after 
minimal processing— raw materials purchased 
from Comecon are in the long run to be consid­
ered manifestations of desired structural adap­
tation. In the short term, however, such difficul­
ties add up to a considerable deterioration in 
terms of trade and to a gap in the balance of 
payments with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, 
the position of Hungarian agriculture, which 
had earlier pursued a lop-sided technocratic 
development course and is still specialised in 
mass produce, was not improved by the intro­
duction of true world-market prices. Without 
exaggerating difficulties, it is therefore easy to 
see that in the course of 1991-1993 changes 
favourable in the long run will entail a switch­
over loss of $600 to $800 million for Hungary 
(more pessimistic economists provide even 
higher estimates). In that period Hungary will 
have to confront major liquidity problems, that 
being the time when the loans which financed 
the delaying policy of the second half of the 
1980s will mature— credits which originally 
could hardly have been expected to be remu­
nerative. The country has a close interest in 
exploiting possibilities inherent in international 
banking practice. The abolition of state trade is 
a declared objective of the International Mone­
tary Fund. It is usually ready to grant bridging 
credits to member countries for this purpose. 
These indispensable credits granted by the Fund 
are necessary but not adequate conditions for 
satisfying the real financing demand of the 
switch-over.
With regard to the demand for financing, or 
in respect of assistance to Eastern Central Eu­
rope, we have to keep our feet on the ground. 
There is a certain anxiety, for example, that 
support for this region could be at the expense 
of aid to developing countries. Such anxieties 
appear to be unfounded in view of the effective 
amount of capital flowing into the countries of 
Eastern Central Europe. There appears to be an 
inverse relationship between the amount of 
writing devoted to the subject and the amount of 
capital— especially foreign direct investment 
in the region. Thus, according to a table pub­
lished on page 221 of the latest report (for 1989/ 
90) of the UN Economic Commission for Eu­
rope, Hungary has already received $2.7 billion 
in aid from the West. By examining the figure 
more closely, however, one can see that this 
aggregate figure includes the credits granted in 
1989 by Bavaria and Baden-Wiirttenberg, to­
talling DM 500 million (increased by a further 
DM 100 million during József Antall’s visit to 
Germany), of which about DM 12 million could 
thus far be utilised.2 Half or three-quarters of
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the credits of hundreds of millions of dollars 
offered by governments and international or­
ganisations are often left unused. This is why 
Hungary will be in sore need— in addition to the 
revolving financial credits it needs for its debt 
service— of three kinds of external resources: 
a) Non-recurrent long-term credits for the pur­
pose of bridging the switch-over losses of the 
abolition of state trade through 1991-93; b) 
Credits for restructuring and infrastructural 
development where the money-market consid­
erations of profitability cannot always be em­
ployed. (It is of paramount importance that in 
May 1990 the European Bank for Reconstruc­
tion and Development was established with a 
nominal capital of 10 billion ECU, and that the 
highly important Soviet credit and aid pro­
gramme is treated separately.) c) In comparison 
to the export credit lines, and even government 
credits in general— as appears also from the 
above examples, it is evidently more important 
to speed up the earlier insignificant influx of 
working capital. This is where business risk and 
financing are most closely connected. On the 
basis of this year’s developments, it seems 
conceivable that the foreign direct investment 
flowing into Hungary will increase, from the 
earlier years’ ridiculously low $200-$300 
million to a magnitude of $600 to $800 million, 
climb to double that in the course of 1992-9, and 
come close to the amount typical of South 
European recipient countries about the size of 
Hungary. A condition is that the government 
should consistently put into practice the sug­
gestions of economists translating pro-market 
slogans into unpopular but necessary package 
deals. Since the Hungarian government does 
not wish to undertake basically business-type 
decisions, one cannot expect W est European 
governments to do so. It would therefore be 
important and useful, in contrast to the inter­
governmental transactions of the 1970s, for the 
governments of Common Market countries to 
provide, in a greater measure than during previ­
ous years, investment and credit guarantees 
with a view to backing private investors who 
still hold the political risk to be excessive, or 
who are scared off by the temporary recession 
which is inevitable in the Hungarian economy.
The European Community is not merely an 
inspiration for Hungary but also the country’s 
most important trading partner. The programmes 
aimed at opening to the world economy and 
modernising the national economy make it
particularly important for Hungary to have 
access to the single market of the post-1992 
Community. The generous actions which the 
Community and its member countries have 
lately undertaken are highly valuable, includ­
ing the one-year suspension of quantitative 
restrictions, the extension to Hungary of the 
general system of preferences (GSP), and an 
ending to discrimination to which countries 
which engage in state trade are subjected. Since 
the Hungarian economy is in a mess, and its 
adaptation can be successful only after a proc­
ess lasting several years, it could be helped by 
the extension of these facilities over a number 
of years. In keeping with the nature of a market 
economy, Hungarian enterprises have not been 
condemned in any anti-dumping proceedings, 
for several decades now, which is indicative of 
their fair business practices. In agriculture as 
well, which rates as the most sensitive eco­
nomic sector, the Hungarian share of 1.9 per 
cent, characteristic of the early 1970s among 
the suppliers of the Community, fell to 1 per 
cent by 1989, i.e., by half, and the current share 
is considerably lower in other sectors, includ­
ing the sensitive ones. There is thus no cause to 
feel anxiety about West European jobs as a 
consquence of the removal of obstacles to 
Hungarian trade, or to be afraid of an invasion 
of the market, if only because of the scale of the 
operations involved.
Hungary wishes to adapt itself to the EEC 
system also in respect of trading infrastructure. 
As regards standardisation, legislation, account­
ing and statistical systems, the uniform Com­
munity norms will prevail. The whole of educa­
tion and training, but particularly management 
skills, the exchange of specialists and students—  
an exchange unbalanced by its very nature—  
may become an essential building stone of the 
common house of a united Europe in the mak­
ing. Within this scheme Hungary counts on the 
opportunities offered to it by the European 
community— the Tempus, Phare, Lingua and 
ACE programmes, possibly participation in the 
Erasmus programme that furthers in practice 
the integration of European universities. The 
internationalisation of knowledge and human 
capital, becoming possible right at the outset, 
can lay the foundation of European integration 
in the long run.
An important recent development has been 
the rendering of financial assistance by the 24 
industrially developped countries, including the
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Community of Twelve, to help Hungary’s re­
structuring and reform policy, especially the 
granting of credit of one billion ECU. At the 
same time the Hungarian economy will be 
characterised by a transfer of resources nega­
tive in the aggregate in the period between 1990 
and 1993, in as much as Hungary can satisfy 
IMF requirements regarding short-term adjust­
ment. In Western economic literature, how­
ever, it is a commonplace— and the Brady Plan 
recognises this, with regard to the developing 
countries— that the requirements of short-term 
adjustment of the balance of payments and that 
of long-term adjustment of the economic struc­
ture are far from identical. In Hungary all this 
coincides with the radical but peaceful transfor­
mation of the political and economic system. 
Experience has shown that a period of a change 
of system is not really the most appropriate time 
for insisting on balance-of-payments surpluses; 
moreover, material sacrifices are usually also 
justified in the interest of the peaceful character 
of this transition. The point is therefore that, if 
only because of the nature and initial costs of 
the errors of a pluralist democracy in the mak­
ing, it is impossible in Hungary today or tomor­
row to take all those drastic measures which the 
self-contained logic of a one-sidedly monetar­
ist-inspired policy of adjustment would theo­
retically impose. What has to be striven for is 
the politically feasible and socially sustainable; 
otherwise capitalist pluralist change cannot be 
maintained for long neither politically nor 
economically.
Finally, as regards the broadest correlations 
of contacts between Hungary and the Common 
Market, it is worth keeping in mind not only the 
North-South but also the East-West direction. 
The fate o f the whole of Eastern Central Eu­
rope, and of Hungary in particular, a country 
that has excelled in implementing peaceful 
transition, will be of exemplary value not only 
for those taking an interest in the issues, but—  
in the foreseeable future— to all those countries 
which, in one form or another, have been, or are 
still, going through the experience of state 
socialism and of the confrontation of two mili­
tary alliances. Opening to the outside world, 
renewal, the forces of Europeanism on the one 
hand, and the conservative isolationist, autoch­
thonous line not averse to military solutions on 
the other, are characteristic parallel trends in the 
entire history of the most populous state of the 
continent, the Soviet Union. The conflict be­
tween these trends has become overt and direct. 
It is not a matter of indifference from the point 
of view of the smaller nations in the Soviet 
Union, nor from that of the Russian nation, 
what practical results will follow from the 
democratic experiment in Eastern Central Eu­
rope. As regards the immediate future, the 
question also arises whether there is any justifi­
cation for permanently counting on an acquies­
cent external policy recognising the conditions 
of dependence and interdependence in the world, 
and on a general line of democracy at home, at 
a time when the countries of what used to be 
called “peace camp” receive, as part of their 
new liberty, only poverty and the chance of 
joining the far from short queue for credits and 
aid.
The democratic experiment in Eastern Cen­
tral Europe is not bound to succeed. But if chaos 
replaces it, then it will not remain the domestic 
business of the small nations of the region, 
something which the welfare states of the West 
can simply ignore, relying on their armed forces 
and immigration controls. The game will not be 
over for a long time, the stakes are high. It is thus 
worth emphasising, besides the short-term 
conflicts, the longer-term but quite real com­
munity of strategic interests between European 
nations, East and West alike, who have again 
met in a common political and cultural choice.
NOTES
1 In some cases a state-owned enterprise has been 
organised into a company by manoeuvres aimed at 
avoiding transfer to genuine private ownership (with 
a view to ensuring the survival of the executives in 
place); at such times the modern form has become the 
obstacle to subsequent—genuine—privatisation. (19)
2 Source: Világgazdaság, 19 June 1990. According 
to the official (20) in charge of managing the Hungar­
ian side of the credit line, it is possible in the most 
favourable case to disbourse an additional sum of 
DM 50-70 million (18); utilisation may be as high as 
10 per cent. Veronika Pásztori drew my attention to 
this.
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Kálmán Mizsei
Shock or Therapy
Poland, Y u goslav ia , H ungary
I n Eastern Central Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet type political system— and a 
consequent weakening of direct Soviet eco­
nomic influence— has in principle largely in­
creased the elbowroom of the national eco­
nomic policies. A considerable part of the ear­
lier constraints due to ideo­
logical and Soviet great 
power interests have been 
eliminated. This is at a time 
when crisis phenomena 
have become acute in the 
economic domain. After 
1986 the external balance 
has deteriorated spectacu­
larly in the countries of the 
region; as a result of this, as 
well as of the decomposi­
tion tendencies of the sys­
tem, inflation has gathered 
momentum. The economies 
are, to put it mildly, stagnating. The opportuni­
ties for the economy to function according to 
the old routine have become narrow and the 
compulsion for change is becoming more ur­
gent. In this process the dependence of the 
former socialist countries on the international 
financial world is growing and this limits their 
elbowroom in another direction.
It is under such political and economic con­
ditions that the new non-communist regimes 
have been trying to run their crisis manage­
ment, which is also intended to set into motion 
a systemic change. Before passing to this ques­
tion, let me note that as the economic crisis 
grows, those countries which are most in debt 
and struggled against the largest inflation have
Kálmán Mizsei is  D ep u ty  D ire c to r  o f  the In sti­
tu te  f o r  W o rld  E con om ics o f  the H un garian  
A ca d em y o f  S cien ces.
drawn up successive stabilisation programmes 
with increasing frequency; owing to the earlier 
political barrriers these programmes have proved 
inadequate. The problems occurred most acutely 
first in countries which had earlier started on 
some sort of reform. Poland and Yugoslavia 
spent the whole 1980s strug­
gling with external liquid­
ity difficulties, and in both 
countries inflationary pres­
sure, gathering strength 
over the decade, finally 
erupted ina hyper-inflation.
Although Hungary was 
more successful than the 
above two countries, her 
liquidity difficulties be­
came acute, first in 1982 
and, again, in recent 
months. At the beginning 
of 1990, the political hys­
teria surrounding price rises for a short time 
raised the spectre of an unbridled inflation. For 
the time being the hysteria has abated, but the 
causes have not ceased. Recently open inflation 
has grown in the countries which have kept to 
the established socialist economic system while 
shortages have continued; Bulgaria suspended 
the servicing of debts just in this year. The 
Soviet Union has similar liquidity difficulties.
In this article— referring to János Komái— I 
wish to put under a magnifying glass a certain 
philosophy of the surgery for stabilisation and 
of the change of system. Such a change—  
relying on shock therapy— became official 
policy in Poland and Yugoslavia at the end of 
1989. Since the beginning o f 1990 they have 
been trying to implement a stabilisation pro­
gramme of this type. A major contribution to 
such plans was made by Jeffrey Sachs, a young 
professor from Harvard University, who in the 
preceding years has achieved deserved interna­
tional recognition through his active coopera-
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tion, leading to spectacular results in alleviating 
the hyperinflation and crisis-ridden economy 
of Bolivia.
The intellectual attraction of Sachs’s phi­
losophy is considerable. It may suffice to refer 
to the circumstance that the ideas of the young 
American economist influenced János Komai’s, 
and even the treatment of Eastern Europe by the 
IMF and the World Bank. They had not fa­
voured Sachs earlier because of his views on 
debts. In the past year however, there have been 
definite signs of a change in doctrine, elements 
of which approach Sachs’s therapy.
There is more to it than the influence of a 
persuasive economist. The belief is attractive 
that the operational logic of an economy can be 
suddenly switched by changing the rules. This 
is the substance of Sachs’s philosophy. This 
premise became dominant in also the last stage 
of the work of the Blue Ribbon Committee, not 
least on account of the position taken up by 
foreign participants. (Action programme for  
Hungary in transformation to freedom and 
prosperity, April 1990).
There is nevertheless a fundamental differ­ence between the two approaches. Sachs is 
clear in his mind that his proposals for a change 
of system are of such an order of magnitude that 
they have no chance without effective outside 
help. He wants not only to influence the eco­
nomic policy of the country to be assisted, but 
also the international financial world’s attitude 
to the given country. In other words, he wants to 
support the programme package of change by 
ensuring debt relief and new credits. In the case 
of some foreign participants of the Blue Ribbon 
Commission, less was involved. They did not 
try to open up a dialogue with the other side, the 
foreign creditors, but offered advice to a future 
Hungarian government on the basis of the old 
Central European adage: “the stakes are never 
too high for the one who watches the poker 
game”.
The Polish and Yugoslav stabilisation the­
rapy deserves special attention on the part of 
Hungarians, not least because in the first months 
of the tenure of the new Hungarian government 
the international financial community is likely 
to entertain expectations of similar radical sur­
gery. Consequently, we must be completely 
clear about the probable consequences of such 
action.
In Poland the first government based on an
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end to the power monopoly of the Polish com­
munists was formed in September 1989.
The pro-market economist Leszek Bal- 
cerowicz became Minister for Finance and 
Deputy Premier. He is held to be responsible for 
the stabilisation package plan on which Sachs 
had great influence. Yet, in the international 
press, the programme is almost exclusively 
identified with the Harvard professor, although 
Balcerowicz’s Polish staff and such “foreign” 
economists as Jacek Rostowski, who moved 
home from London, also took part in its elabo­
ration and managemenet. Balcerowicz first 
announced his ambitious stabilisation plan in 
the autumn of 1989 at the general meeting of the 
IMF. It was not modified in its basic features in 
the ensuing three months of detailed elabora­
tion.
The programme focussed on the linking of 
the price rise tendency, which was already on 
the scale of hyperinflation, and a radical change 
of system. The government based its plan on 
radical market economy deregulation combined 
with monetarism. Prices have been almost 
completely liberalised, and according to what 
has been said, price hikes should have been 
limited by the strict regulation of the quantity of 
money in circulation.
Restrictions on foreign trade were also 
completely abolished in essence. The balance 
of payments governed foreign exchange policy. 
The Solidamosc government gradually deval­
ued the zloty after taking power, but on January 
1,1990 it carried out a devaluation so huge that 
it was designed to allow the new exchange rate 
to be left unchanged in the first few months of 
the stabilisation action. In the fast changing 
environment the exchange rate should have 
played the role of a nominal anchor. Regulation 
by the exchange rate was considered sufficient 
to permit the convertibility of the zloty for the 
domestic ecomic agents in Poland. In other 
words, the government decreed that the bank­
ing system was obliged to sell convertible cur­
rency against zlotys for imports at the official 
exchange rate. The starting exchange rate was 
9,500 zloty = 1 US dollar.
On imports the government felt confidence 
in the power of monetary policy; in wages 
policy they were not so certain concerning the 
financial discipline of enterprises. Strict regula­
tions of wages were issued. The administrative 
restriction on wages also has the function of 
rendering the limitation of demand much more
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conspicuous on the consumer market in the first 
months of the shock therapy.
The regulation is relatively simple and de­
clares the degree of inflation to which the enter­
prises can raise wages month by month, irre­
spective of performance. According to expecta­
tions, the corrective inflation should have been 
considerable in January. Then a 0.3 multiplier 
was applied to wage rises. The authors thought 
that, in the next three months, inflation would 
be moderated gradually and they set a more 
rigorous 0,2 multiplier for that period. The idea 
was that the tendency and expectation of rising 
prices would stop by May, and then a 0,6 
multiplier would be sufficient to control infla­
tion.
In the earlier inflationary period interest 
rates far from kept abreast with prices; thus 
real interest rates turned negative. One conse­
quence of this was that the liquidity crisis which 
occurs everywhere in the reform-socialist econo­
mies, was transferred from the enterprise sector 
to the banking sector, and the relative value of 
the debts of the enterprises was reduced by in­
flation. The other consequence was the almost 
complete end to saving by the public and enter­
prises, as saving entailed real losses. The new 
government faced this situation and declared 
its intention to set incentive real interest 
rates.
The anti-inflationary policy was also helped 
by an extraodinarily severe budgetary policy. 
Expenditure was heavily cut, subsidies for 
enterprises or prices were almost entirely elimi­
nated, and taxes were not reduced. No tax 
preferences of any kind were accorded the 
private sector, although the government has 
been in favour o f privatisation from the start.
Balcerowicz reckoned with rapid and radical 
privatisation at the beginning of his tenure of 
office. The expected effects fed the hopes of 
stabilisation. The process of privatisation was 
expected to help balance the budget and to 
change the behaviour of enterprises.
The otherwise similar programme of the Y u- goslav government was different in this 
respect although in the course of realisation 
these differences diminished. The Poles, con­
trary to their expectations, were unable to initi­
ate considerable privatisation. In Yugoslavia 
the political changes are different, or at least 
they were delayed; the stabilisation programme 
however was already started by a Yugoslav
Communist Federation government. True, a 
relatively large autonomy on the part of the 
government was made possible by the fact that 
the Communist Party was weakened by internal 
struggles. Nevertheless, privatisation was not 
yet part of government policy when the pro­
gramme was initiated. At this point they also 
came into conflict with Sachs, who otherwise 
had a much more direct influence on Yugoslav 
than on Polish economic policy.
I believe that it was primarily the Polish 
experience that induced the Yugoslavs to resort 
to a strict freezing of wages, although free wage 
bargaining had been long established there. The 
autonomy enjoyed by the republics made a 
central wages policy difficult. The programme 
which was proposed in mid-December 1989, 
and introduced in January 1990, prescribed the 
freezing of wages. This was circumvented by 
some republics right at the start, but neverthe­
less the freeze was not entirely ineffective. The 
Yugoslav government also undertook to bal­
ance the budget and almost fully liberalised 
prices. Therefore a great burden was placed on 
monetary policy there as well. Thus the govern­
ment promised the International Monetary Fund 
that the quantity of money in circulation would 
be expanded only in keeping with the growth of 
foreign exchange reserves. In Yugoslavia, the 
enterprise liquidity crisis had also largely shifted 
to the banking sphere by the negative real 
interests of the earlier period of high inflation.
Domestic convertibility of the currency came 
to pass, and an undertaking was given that the 
exchange rate would be tied to the Deutsche 
Mark.
The external debt of the two countries shows 
many differences. Not only is the total and per 
capita debt of Yugoslavia lower than that of 
Poland, but its capacity to produce foreign 
exchange income is also substantially higher. 
In Poland total annual convertible currency 
income— including the non-registered sphere—  
is under ten billion dollars; in the case of Yugo­
slavia, tourism, transfers home, and other invis­
ibles cause receipts to exceed 20 billion dollars. 
Yugoslavia rescheduled its debts in 1988 on 
excellent terms, and thus its debt servicing rate 
sank to considerably under 20 per cent. On this 
account, the point of the Sachs prescription 
concerning debt relief is hard to interpret. It is 
all the more important in the case of Poland. The 
Western governments proved generous in the 
rescheduling of Poland's debts and in granting
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new credits, as well as in supporting the inter­
ests of Poland in international organisations.
The result of the concerted international action 
is that within a year or two, counted from 1990, 
Poland will undoubtedly be a net importer of 
capital as opposed to being a considerable net 
capital exporter owing to the need to service the 
debts o f earlier years. This will happen irre­
spective of whether Poland will succeed in 
becoming a beneficiary of the Brady plan or 
will in some other way achieve the abolition of 
some of its debts.
A s this article is being written, the data of the first three months of the programme 
are already known, and these make possible the 
drawing of some conclusions. In both coun­
tries, after the early weeks of the corrective 
inflation, price rises came up against the barrier 
of reduced demand. Owing to the severity of 
wages regulation, this happened primarily in 
the consumer goods manufacturing industries. 
In neither country did the rate of price rises 
exceed five per cent per month in the third 
month o f the programme. This, in an annual 
projection (80 per cent), lags considerably 
behind the rate of inflation of earlier years. 
Since there were no significant shortages in 
Yugoslavia, the rate of the corrective inflation 
was lower. On the other hand, in Poland the 
intensity o f shortages rapidly declined, i.e. 
supplies on the market improved to a dramatic 
extent in these three months.
It is a further success in both countries that 
the convertibility of the currency and the main­
tenance of a stable exchange rate did not cause 
any particular problems. In Poland the 9,500 
zloty dollar rate proved to be so stable that the 
free exchange rate of the private market also 
adjusted to it, without major fluctuations or 
central intervention. The balance of trade has 
improved in both countries. It is true, of course, 
that the strong decline in domestic demand is 
largely responsible. In order to maintain their 
liquidity they are forced to export more vigor­
ously against convertible currency. In the case 
of Poland, there is no great pressure on the 
exchange rate at present either, since some 
reserves were built into the initial devaluation. 
This does not apply to Yugoslavia, where on 
account of inflation, the dinar is extraordinarily 
overvalued at the present exchange rate (1 DM 
= 7 dinars). For this reason the government has 
already deviated at several points from the rules
of the game. Thus incoming economic or shop­
ping travel has been severely restricted, as has 
also the exchange of foreign currency by Yugo- 
slav citizens. But the situation is better in the 
sense that much higher foreign exchange re­
serves were built up in the first period, and for 
a few months the exchange rate could be main­
tained without risking the balance of payments, 
with corresponding beneficial effects on the 
domestic price level.
In connection with the external economic 
effects of the stabilisation programme it is worth 
drawing attention to the fact that, in the early 
months, when domestic demand was drasti­
cally reduced and shortages ceased, the enter­
prises reduced their exaggerated input stocks 
which characterised the earlier stage of the 
shortage economy. They are induced to do so 
also by monetarist restrictions. However, thanks 
to the scarcity of money at home it proved 
possible to reduce stocks mainly through ex­
porting them. But this effect is only transitory, 
lasting three to six months, until a normal level 
of stocks corresponding to the new situation is 
reached.
The export offensive of the first few months 
is in some contradiction with the request for 
external assistance, since in the awareness of 
the considerable improvement in the balance of 
current payments, external partners are likely to 
harden their negotiating positions. It can be 
imagined however that later, when the relative 
undervaluation of the national currency be­
comes less marked, or it becomes overvalued, 
as in the Yugoslav case, this contradiction will 
be resolved in a specific way.
Looking at wages regulation, we have to note 
that here the role of political constraints is large. 
In the case of Poland, making use of Solidar- 
nosc’s political capital, a tough wages policy 
could be maintained in essence, although politi­
cal resistance is growing. The populist trade 
union Solidamosc cannot really be reckoned as 
a reliable supporter for a liberal economic pol­
icy; consequently in the longer run the govern­
ment is probably vulnerable. Paradoxically, its 
position appears to be stable as long as the 
economy is in a bad shape, there being no 
alternative to the Balcerowicz team when it 
comes to technocratic competence.
In Yugoslavia, the outlook is even less fa­
vourable in the area of wages policy. The Ser­
bian leadership’s interests concerning the stabi­
lisation programme are ambiguous, since suc-
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cess would strengthen the position of Prime 
Minister Markovié. The republics would most 
easily be able to scuttle Markovic’s programme 
by rejecting wages discipline, and signs of this 
can already be seen. If wages spiral upwards, 
this would increase domestic demand— which 
would again heat up inflation.
But I see the greatest problem in that the 
stabilisation programmes expect that in both 
countries the state-owned (or in the Yugoslav 
case the self-governing) enterprises should 
adjust to the market to an extent which is 
entirely unrealistic, owing to the hierarchy of 
interest due to the nature of ownership, which 
differs altogether from market motivation. This 
is evident in the fall of production, which is 
much larger than had been surmised by the plan. 
This gives rise to anxiety, especially in Poland, 
where in the first quarter the drop in industrial 
production amounted to 27 per cent. Within this 
figure the drop was around 40 per cent for the 
consumer goods industries. In heavy industry, 
the bastion of socialist production, the drop was 
smaller, and thus these industries may find it 
relatively easier to survive.
The question is to what extent this extreme 
and unprecedented drop in production will be 
moderated in the coming months. If the ability 
of the state-owned companies to adj ust remains 
limited, then great improvements cannot be 
expected; one is justified in asking whether the 
suppression of inflation is worth the price that 
has to be paid.
A further problem is that the liquidity of 
firms did not deteriorate overmuch despite such 
unused capacities, and thus they have not been 
induced to restructure. The reduction in man­
power is also proceeding slowly, although in 
Poland unemployment has appeared for the 
first time in many decades. The extent has not 
yet exceeded the minimum considered as fric­
tional unemployment by economists.
It can be expected that if a tough monetarist 
policy is maintained, in the way customary in 
the earlier periods, in both countries, the size of 
delayed payments to each other and to the banks 
will grow among the state-owned enterprises 
and their level of liquidity will drop. According 
to the logic of the programme, bankruptcy 
proceedings must be rigorously taken against 
insolvent enterprises. This however raises those 
political questions on which I have already 
touched in connection with wages regulation. 
Will the system be able to resist the political
pressure generated by the rapid growth of un­
employment caused by bankruptcies? In addi­
tion, the question also arises whether the system 
is technically able to cope with a large number 
of bankruptcy cases.
The Yugoslav government had not planned 
to make privatisation part of its programme but 
it was urged to do so by the World Bank in the 
course of subsequent negotiations. It has, 
however, been discovered in the case of both 
countries that the problem of timing, i.e. that the 
institutional and legal conditions of privatisa­
tion were not set up prior to the starting of the 
programme, delayed preparatory work to such 
an extent that the privatisation of the state- 
owned and the self-governing companies is no 
longer able to contribute to the success o f the 
programme. New private enterprises are being 
founded at a steady rate, although in Poland 
taxation severely inhibits the starting up of 
enterprises. Here, in my opinion, one could 
easily make exceptions, and more incentives 
could be provided for private enterprises. Nev­
ertheless, given the end of the interest coalitions 
characterising the earlier system, a dynamic 
wave of privatisation is under way, especially 
in retail trade.
The real problems occur around the privati­
sation of existing enterprises. For political rea­
sons both countries have abstained from the 
kind of managerial (or spontaneous) privati­
sation which caused storms in Hungary in 
1989. In Poland legislative work on the Priva­
tisation Act has been extremely long lasting. 
The Sejm accepted the bill in July 13 after 
almost 10 months of preparation and 15 sub­
sequent amendments. Even the recent bill does 
not promise rapid privatisation since it em­
phasises mainly “privatisation by the state” 
instead of some decentralised forms as well as 
because it cuts the potential demand for Polish 
capital goods by restricting the foreign engage­
ment to 10 per cent of the privatised enterprises. 
In Yugoslavia, stubbornly surviving collectiv- 
istic notions, as well as the diverging interests 
of the republics, impede large-scale privatisa­
tion.
The extreme difficulties of privatisation of the countries abandoning socialism are 
well-known; either they speed up the process 
and that means ad hoc action of often doubtful 
legality at the expense of economic efficency, 
or they base privatisation on more solid prin-
The Political Clock 77
ciples— but then things take an inordinately 
long time. No ideal solution appears in sight and 
it is not likely that there exists one in principle 
which promises favourable results in respect of 
the economic and moral substance and of the 
time scale as well.
But if this is so the longer term prospects of 
the above described stabilisation programmes 
can indeed be questioned. In my opinion the 
breach is just about inevitable within a few 
months as the above described tensions accu­
mulate. One cannot assume a lasting major 
change in the attitude of state enterprises. Of 
course, I do not claim that radical steps were 
unnecessary in the Yugoslav and the Polish 
situation. The circumstances of hyperinflation 
justify dramatic intervention. But conditions 
must be created at the beginning of the surgery 
permitting privatisation over a wide range, and 
this should influence the attitude of the manag­
ers of state enterprises. It is thus likely that the 
cumulation of domestic tension will at one 
point lead to a new price hike.
In my opinion corvertibility before its time is 
not sound. I believe that with the growth of 
tension a declared or tacit U-turn becomes 
inevitable. This has a worse effect on economic 
agents than the more gradual but better-founded 
introduction of convertibility.
As I mentioned early on, I am afraid that the 
euphoria associated with the shock therapy will 
have as a consequence that some will insist on 
such a programme in Hungary as well. The 
situation in Hungary differs from that of the two 
other countries at two essential points: so far 
Hungary has not been forced to reschedule 
debts, and the rate of inflation is substantially 
below that in Poland or Yugoslavia before the 
stabilisation programme. Consequently, and also 
on account of the doubts expressed above, it 
would appear that Hungary needs an economic 
policy which relies on a slower but perhaps 
more tenacious fight against inflation, one which 
introduces convertibility more gradually. This
must be based on more resolute privatisation 
than that in Poland or Yugoslavia.
My biggest problem concerns priorities. The 
general view is that the time horizons of stabi­
lisation and of radical institutional reform dif­
fer, and consequently coordinating them is a 
vain hope. On the contrary, I am inclined to 
argue that stabilisation can only be temporarily 
successful in the established institutional envi­
ronment. This, o f course, does not mean that 
hyperinflation in Poland and Yugoslavia did 
not call for drastic measures. But it is wrong to 
call this a reform of the system while so little is 
being done regarding privatisation, the most 
important area of the reform.
The relative advantages of Hungary are pre­
cisely that radical institutional reform is already 
more advanced while inflation still runs at a 
mere 26 per cent. A radical and tough pro­
gramme of inflation-management is needed, 
the success of which will however depend on 
how strong will be the accompanying privatisa­
tion process— including the tapping of foreign 
equity capital resources. The experience of many 
countries has shown that without some sort of 
decentralisation rapid privatisation is impos­
sible. Czecho-Slovak economic policy makers 
have considered the distribution of property 
vouchers as a right o f citizenship, or the delega­
tion of entitlements concerning privatisation to 
future boards of management. Many options 
are on the cards and western methods relying on 
central action alone must be ruled out.
True enough, spontaneous privatisation 
means opening the gates wide to carpet baggers 
out to make a fast buck (this is inevitable), but 
the squaring of the circle must be attempted. 
The instruments of the law must be given some 
clout as soon as possible to persuade people to 
take the rules of the economic game seriously. 
It is questions such as these that will decide 
whether Hungary and the rest of the region will 
avoid sinking into a Third World bog before 
the century is out.
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H IS T O R Y
John Lukacs
Fifty Years Ago: The Eighty Day Duel
E xactly fifty years ago—to be precise, from 10 May to 31 July 1940—the destiny of the world (perhaps more than the outcome of the war) depended on a duel between 
two men: Adolf Hitler and Winston Churchill. Both the beginning and the end of their 
duel was marked by extraodinary coincidences. After fifty years, a lengthening perspec­
tive as well as all kinds of accumulated research material allow us to reconstruct some 
of the extraodinary conditions of their duel. Hitler, it would appear, had come closer to 
winning the war and Churchill’s position—within England—was more fragile than we 
have been accustomed to think.
In 1940 the 10th of May was a Friday. Hitler had left the Neue Reichskanzlei the 
previous evening, in great secrecy. He and his staff boarded his special train (code-named 
“Amerika”) at a station outside Berlin. He wanted to give the impression that he was 
going north, perpaps to Hamburg, on his way to Norway. A few minutes after midnight 
the train changed course, so efficiently and silently that hardly any of its occupants woke 
to notice that it began to move in a different direction, to the west. Four hours later it hissed 
to a stop. The passengers pulled up their shades and they glimpsed a station building 
without a sign. All place signs had been removed. What they could see all around were 
the yellow signboards of the Wehrmacht. Presently they learned that they were in 
Wuskirchen, between Bonn and Aachen. Then they were driven to barracks up the hill 
from the village of Rodert in the Muenstereifel, that would be their headquarters for the 
next twenty-three days. Its code-name was “Felsennest”.
The “C hef’ (this was how his staff referred to Hitler) was fresh, determined, nervous. 
His appearance at that hour was unusual for him. Customarily he would not rise and make 
his toilet until after eleven. He made a gesture to his staff, who quickly gathered around 
him, anxious to hear what the Fuehrer was about to say. “Gentlemen”, he said, “the 
offensive against the Western Powers has begun.” They could hear from the distance the 
dim thud of artillery.
The greatest adventure in Adolf Hitler’s career had now started. It would unfold at a 
rate unimagined by everyone, including himself. In less than forty days he would be the 
master of Europe. His flag would fly from the North Cape to the Pyrenees. His armies 
would conquer Western Europe at a cost of men and equipment that was less than what 
the Imperial German army had spent over a comparable period of time for the sake of a 
few miles across the trenches in the Great War.
Late in the afternoon of 10 May, in London, Winston Churchill became the Prime 
Minister of Great Britain. That was the first coincidence. These two events had no
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connection with each other. For almost a week a parliamentary storm had been brewing 
in London. The House of Commons had grown restive, impatient, dissatisfied with 
Chamberlain’s feeble conduct of the war, and with the failure of the British in Norway. 
It is an ironic paradox that Churchill, in his capacity as First Lord of the Admiralty, had 
been responsible for much of the failure in Norway. He did not deny that; during the 
increasingly dramatic debates he stood loyally by Chamberlain. But it was now the 
gathering belief, also among many of Chamberlain’s supporters, that a government of 
national unity was needed. All of that crystallized in the days before that fatal Tenth of 
May. Chamberlain (and perhaps the King, too) wanted Halifax. As late as the morning 
of the 10th, Chamberlain thought he should not resign. Yet the decision was no longer 
his; the Labour leaders would not serve in a national government under him. The news 
of Churchill’s appointment was broadcast to the people of England at nine that night.
When Churchill drove up to Downing Street next day, a small crowd cheered him. 
“Poor people”, he said to his companion, General Ismay, “I can give them nothing but 
disaster for quite a long time”. When the entered they building, his eyes were rimmed with 
tears. Two days later he made his famous speech: “I have nothing to offer but blood, tears, 
toil and sweat.”
We do not know what Hitler thought of the news from London when he retired for the 
night on the tenth of May. He may not have been surprised. He had once before remarked 
that one day Chamberlain might be gone and the British then would give Churchill a try. 
A try: but not much more. He knew that Churchill was one of the bitterest of his enemies. 
For this, but also for other reasons, Hitler despised him.
He was wrong to do so. It is dangerous for a man to underestimate a determined 
opponent. It seems that he did not yet wholly comprehend how, beneath and beyond the 
great war of armies and navies and entire peoples that he had started in Western Europe, 
he would be involved in something like a duel with Churchill.
This is not a reconstruction of the dramatic summer of 1940. It is a summary of the 
reciprocal perceptions of Hitler and Churchill on which the entire outcome of the war then 
depended. The essence of the story is that Churchill “read” Hitler better than Hitler “read” 
Churchill. This had nothing to do with intelligence information, or with code-breaking 
or “Ultras” or “Enigmas” then. It had very much to do with the insight that the two 
participants had into each other’s character.
At least since early 1938 Hitler knew that Churchill was a determined enemy of 
Chamberlain’s appeasement policy. At the same time he knew that Churchill’s influence 
and reputation in England were not firm. The year 1938 was the most successful in 
Hitler’s political career, it was the least successful in Churchill’s. Hitler knew that 
Churchill was almost censured by his own constituents for having attacked Chamberlain 
in the Commons after Munich. Beginning in October 1938, Hitler (and Goebbels) began 
to attack Churchill by name, in the German press and radio. By the summer of 1939 these 
personal attacks were intensified. Yet Hitler felt little more than contempt for Churchill. 
He knew that Churchill was a heavy drinker. He knew that, at least on one occasion, 
Churchill received money from a Jewish supporter for his personal finances. All of this 
contributed to Hitler’s disdain for someone whom he often referred to as a “Dilettant”. 
All of it crystallised within his larger, ideological view. He, Hitler, was a radical 
nationalist; Churchill was a reactionary of the most hopeless kind. Often Hitler referred 
to Churchill privately (and not only in his speeches) as someone who represented the 16th 
century, someone whose very ideas and personality were unsuited to leading a nation in 
the 20th.
To this we may add a personal hypothesis. Hitler’s knowledge of men was very
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peculiar though also very acute. The peculiarity resided in something like a sixth sense 
that he possessed: the instinctive ability to size up someone through his weaknesses, 
perhaps something akin to the instinct with which a dog smells human fears. In 1932 he 
had a chance to meet Churchill, which he missed. Motoring through Germany, working 
on the biography of his ancestor Marlborough, Churchill was in Munich for a few days 
that summer. Hitler’s social secretary Hanfstaengl came to a party. Churchill said that he 
would like to meet Hitler. Hanfstaengl reported this to Hitler next morning. Hitler—who 
did not at all refrain from meeting English polticians at the time, and who had no reason 
to particularly dislike Churchill then—for some reason refused to do so. I have öfter 
thought that he may have missed a chance then. Had he met Churchill in person he would 
have understood him better.
At the same time Churchill’s understanding of Hitler was phenomenal. He never 
underestimated him. As early as October 1930(1), at a dinner at the German Embassy in 
London, he expressed his anxiety about what Hitler might achieve, that it might perhaps 
lead to a new war. Throughout the 1930s he warned the English people about Hitler. As 
late as 1937 he expressed his respect for Hitler’s genius in leading his nation out of its 
humiliation, adding that he wished that England would find such a leader if she ever found 
herself in such abject circumstances. He understood something, too, that goes against the 
still largely accepted view: that Hitler’s world view had crystallized in Munich in 1918- 
1919, and not earlier in Vienna. During their duel in 1940, there was an unusual reversion 
of their customary habits. Hitler, who read relatively little intelligence material (at that 
time presented to him by Walther Hewel, Ribbentrop’s representative at Hitler’s 
headquarters, and by the Braune Blaetter—brown because of the papers on which they 
were typed) read assiduously all kinds of fragmentary reports about what was going on 
in London. Churchill, who, unlike Hitler, was a writer rather than an orator (all of his 
famous 1940 speeches notwithstanding), had an intuitive comprehension of what Hitler 
might or might not do; he relied on his own judgment even more than whatever 
intelligence had reached him about Hitler’s decisions or movements; and during those 
crucial eighty days of their duel he was almost always right.
In 1940 this was of great help to Churchill; but it was not decisive. To comprehend 
one’s opponent’s strategy in a duel is a great plus; but it will not necessarily decide the 
outcome. During those eighty days at least Hitler was much the stronger of the two. Hitler 
thought that Churchill’s position was weak. In this he was largely right. It explains much 
(though not all) of his fatal decision, on the morning of May 24, to halt temporarily the 
advance of the German armoured column towards Dunkirk. This is not the place to 
examine the circumstances and the details of that often discussed decision. Military 
considerations, including Hitler’s anxiety about the terrain in Flanders, undoubtedly 
played a part in it. But there was, too, the information that reached Hitler that morning, 
to the effect that the British were abandoning Calais (a wireless instruction from London 
that the German services had intercepted and which Churchill countermanded later). 
Hitler though that the English were leaving the continent. He was inclined to let them go. 
When two days later the German advance on Dunkirk resumed, Hitler had already agreed 
to Goering’s plan that the hindering of the British evacuation from Dunkirk would be 
principally the task of the Luftwaffe.
What we know now—mostly from British documents—is something else that is 
important. Even before the Dunkirk evacuation, Churchill’s position in London had 
become unsure. Within the secrecy of the War Cabinet, the usually cautious Lord Halifax 
had decided to oppose him. Halifax said that Hitler’s conditions for a possible settlement 
ought at least to be ascertained. Churchill said no: that even the slightest attempt to make
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such an inquiry would put Britain onto “a slippery slope”. This confrontation between 
them, often couched in different terms, arose again and again over three days. Halifax was 
on the verge of resigning. That would have shown a dangerous break in British unity. In 
the end Churchill had his way. Yet we must understand that at that time—the last week 
of May in 1940—Churchill had been Prime Minister for hardly more than two weeks. The 
national relief over the successful evacuation from Dunkirk had not yet occurred. British 
public opinion was not yet galvanised by Churchill’s famous speeches. More important, 
the reputation for impetuosity, for rhetorical grandiloquence and warmongering still 
clung to Churchill ’ s image—especially within the dominant Conservative Party, most of 
whose members of parliament were Chamberlainites and not Churchillians. The war­
monger had been given his chance; now one catastrophe followed another. In sum, there 
were influential people in London who thought that Churchill’s leadership was question­
able, to say the least. He had been put into the saddle on May 10 because people had 
understood that he had been right about Hitler in the past: but was that enough now, when 
England had to face the awful question of its own survival?
Churchill survived that challenge. His position was also fortified by the relative 
success of Dunkirk. But, as he himself knew and said, that success was relative: “Wars 
are not won by evacuations”. Hitler did not understand that situation well enough. He was 
more and more convinced that the British would make peace—especially as he began to 
state that he did not wish to destroy the British Empire. He (and also Goebbels) often 
thought that the war was but a repetition, on a larger scale, of the struggle he had fought 
and won within Germany in 1930-1933. So far as Britain went, he saw British politics in 
much the same light in which he saw the German conservatives eight or ten years before. 
It was in their interest to reconcile themselves to the stronger power—as long as their own 
survival was not threatened by it, and as long as that power was anti-Communist. Two 
months had to pass until Hitler, reluctantly, realized that the peace party in England was 
not as strong as he thought. It was then that his earlier respect for the racial qualities of 
the British people began to vanish, and that he felt compelled to make another move, in 
a different direction, to which we will turn in a moment.
Meanwhile, he had conquered France. There was another flurry in London. On June 18, 
the day after the French request for an armistice, R. A. Butler, a junior Foreign Office 
minister, who disliked Churchill, told the Swedish ambassador in London that “no 
opportunity would be neglected for concluding a compromise peace if the chance were 
offered on reasonable conditions. The so-called die-hards (meaning Churchill) would not 
be allowed to stand in the way of negotiations”. That piece of information was 
exaggerated and misinterpreted by the Italian Minister in Stockholm (and a week later 
Butler recanted, through Halifax, to Churchill); however it reached Hitler and Mussolini 
when they met in Munich that day. Mussolini and his Foreign Minister, Ciano, were 
impressed by Hitler’s moderation that day. Hitler now wanted peace with the English, 
Ciano saw. That was largely correct. Throughout the month of June Hitler kept telling his 
generals that the war might end soon, because the English would have to make peace. But 
there was now a subtle change in his mind. Until that time he took the eventual British 
inclination to give up the war almost as granted. Now he began to speculate, often openly, 
why they did not do so. He recognized, albeit unwillingly, that Churchill’s leadership was 
not as temporary, nor as vulnerable, as he had thought. He now began to pay even more 
attention to fragments of information from London, including fragments from Spanish 
agents working for the Abwehr who, among other trivialities, attempted to ascertain the 
extent of Churchill’s alcoholic consumption (in one instance trying to look through the 
garbage of 10 Downing Street, it is said.)
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H itler knew of Churchill’s American connections. For more than a year he saw that situation clearly—according to his lights, that is. Behind Churchill stood Roosevelt; 
and behind Roosevelt, the Jews. (He made this clear in a speech on 30 January 1939, in 
retrospect his first ominous suggestion of the extermination of Jews in Europe, if they and 
their American coreligionists were to bring about a world war.) It is a mistake to believe 
that Hitler was ignorant about the United States. His interest in America was of long 
standing. In June 1940 he paid much attention to American politics, reading with especial 
interest the reports of General Boetticher, the German military attaché in Washington. 
(“He is able to see what happens backstage...”) Roosevelt was up for an unprecedented 
third term. Hitler was very well aware of the importance of American isolationists (whom 
he, correctly, called American “radical nationalists”). Two days before Paris fell, he gave 
an extraordinary two-hour interview to Karl von Wiegand, the American correspondent 
of a New York isolationist paper of the Hearst chain. He had him invited to his then 
headquarters, the “Wolfsschanze” where he usually saw no journalists at all, German or 
foreign. He refrained from saying a bad word about Roosevelt. He said that he admired 
and respected the Monroe Doctrine. He added that he did not want to destroy the British 
Empire. He went to the unusual trouble of going through the interview word by word next 
day. The interview had a considerable influence among American opponents of Roose­
velt; but its public resonance was impaired by the news of the fall of Paris on the day 
of its publication.
It must not be thought that Churchill’s relationship to Roosevelt was especially close 
during his duel with Hitler. They had initiated a confidential correspondence in Septem­
ber 1939. But Roosevelt could not, or would not, commit the United States to the British 
side. At least through June, the general opinion of the American military was the Britain 
might not hold out. More important was one essential difference between Roosevelt and 
Churchill. Churchill knew where the sympathies of the American President lay, but 
Roosevelt insisted that American help to Britain must be subordinated to a British 
commitment that in the case of a British defeat the British Fleet would would come over 
to America. Churchill—who foresaw the terms Hitler would offer to the French in June— 
also foresaw the possibility that he might be replaced by another British government, 
whose sole asset in a settlement with a victorious Hitler would be the British Fleet. He 
wrote Roosevelt that he would never surrender; but that he could not commit his country 
in such a future eventuality. His last strenuous attempt to request that Roosevelt 
undertake a decisive move departing from American neutrality, transferring obsolete 
American destroyers to Britain, was made on June 15. For the next six weeks no important 
messages passed between the two of them.
In the meantime, Hitler hesitated. An entire month passed from the French request for 
capitulation and his great speech on July 19. During that month he waited for a signal from 
London. Churchill ordered every possible preparation for the threat of a coming German 
invasion; but, as some of his private statements since revealed, he was doubtful whether 
Hitler would attempt an invasion at all. He also knew that, for once, it was now he, not 
Hitler, who was pressed for time to rearm. There is some evidence that Churchill tacitly 
allowed a few British representatives in neutral capitals to engage in conversation—or, 
rather, listenings—with German agents, especially Prinz Max von Hohenlohe in Swit­
zerland, for the sake of gaining time. While Hitler was hesitant and waiting, he also 
took—unusually for him—a few sidetrip vacations: to Paris, to the Great War battlefields 
in Alsace, to Linz and Weis. On 6 July he returned from his last military headquarters in 
the West (“Tannenberg”, near Kniebis) to Berlin. There was a military parade, and much 
jubilation. For once, the avidity of the German people ran ahead of Hitler’s. As was noted
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by Goebbels, by the SD-Bericht and other testimonies, people asked: “When will things 
start against England?” On 7 July the Deutsche Rundfunk for the first time played “Wir 
fahren gegen Engelland” (what later a few Berliners dared to call the “Niegelungenlied”). 
Hitler first planned to make his great speech on the 8th, then postponed it to the 13th, and 
then finally to the 19th of July. For the first time in months he went off the Berghof, where 
he preferred to ponder his great decisions. There, with his military commanders, he issued 
his Weisung No. 16, “Operation Sealion”, for the eventual landing in England. 
Meanwhile, he worked over his coming speech, weighing every word. He discussed it 
with a number of people whom he habitually had not consulted on his speeches in the past.
That speech, on July 19, lasted 2 hours and 17 minutes. His voice was less shrill than 
usual. He devoted a large part of it to an account of the recent German victories in the field. 
He said not a single word about the United States. He repeatedly expressed his 
satisfaction with Russia. The German-Russian relationship has been finally arranged. 
The climax came in the last five minutes. He offered peace to “a worldwide empire I never 
had the intention of destroying or even damaging”. It was only when he began to mention 
the name of Churchill that his voice rose to a shriek. It was evident that he now saw the 
fate of the entire world and of the war hinge on his duel with Churchill. In this he may 
have made a mistake. Had he said most of the above without mentioning Churchill, his 
offer to Britain might have evoked a different echo. In speaking as he did, Hitler achieved 
nothing of his main aim, which was to separate Churchill from the English people. To this 
we may add his intemperate language. That was perhaps somewhat less frequent in this 
speech than in many of his other orations: but there it was, in his habitual phrases of “das 
internationale juedische Voelkergift” (the international Jewish poison of the peoples), in 
his reference to Poland: “ein aufgeblasener Popanz” (an inflated scarecrow), “diese von 
Dummheit and Hochmut aufgeblaehte Blase” (this bladder inflated by stupidity and 
arrogance), and especially about Churchill: “Luegner” (liar), “Hetzer und Antreiber” 
(inciter and instigator), “blutiger Dilettant” (bleeding dilettante), etc. More than thirty 
years later a respectable German historian of German-British relations of that period 
wrote that in this speech Hitler “used a restrained vocabulary”—not to English ears, to 
be sure.
Churchill knew what was going on. The day before Hitler’s speech, German diplomat­
ists in Washington attempted to make contact with the British Ambassador there, 
through an American Quaker intermediary, alerting the British about the important 
matter of a coming peace proposal. Churchill refrained from answering Hitler’s speech. 
(He said privately: “I am not on speaking terms with that man.”) Behind that was his 
concern with British morale: not too much should be made of Hitler’s peace offer. That 
was dismissed in a brief statement by Halifax, approved by Churchill. Hitler’s—and 
especially Goebbels’s—expectations were now dashed. On the eve of the speech 
Goebbels wrote: “Tonight the fate of England will be decided.” On 24 July the headline 
of the Voelkischer Beobachter proclaimed: ENGLAND HAS CHOSEN WAR.
A ll of this happened before the Battle of Britain was to begin; even before Goering’s air offensive against Britain would begin. Hitler was still undecided. He spoke to 
his generals on 21 July, convoking them for 31 July again. On the 23rd he went to 
Bayreuth, listening in deep, sombre silence to Goetterdaemmerung on a summer 
afternoon. Then to the Berghof again. And now we arrive at the second coincidence— 
indeed, to the turning-point of the duel between Hitler and Churchill, perhaps to the 
turning point of the entire war.
On the cool, cloudy Berghof on 31 July, Hitler declared his decision to invade Russia;
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in the White House on a muggy summer day in Washington Roosevelt made his decision 
to tack and beat out of the harbour of American neutrality, skirting the barrier reefs of 
constitutional and Congressional opposition. Hitler’s decision on Russia crystallized 
during the last ten days of July; so did Roosevelt’s. (His acceptance speech of his third- 
term nomination was made in Washington on July 19, at the same hour as Hitler spoke 
in Berlin.)
On July 31, on the Berghof, Hitler spoke to Jodi, Haider and Brauchitsch. (Admiral 
Raeder, whom he saw earlier that day, discussing the potentialities of invading England, 
was excluded from that conference.) He had dropped remarks about the eventual 
necessity of a war against Russia before; he mentioned his irritation with Stalin to Jodi 
two days before. But now he said hardly anything about those anxieties. He spoke about 
England. He may have found a way to win the war without having to invade England. The 
air offensive against England was now beginning: but “if results of the air war are not 
satisfactory, (invasion) preparations will be halted.” Then he went on;
England’s hope is Russia and America. I f  hope in Russia is eliminated, America 
is also eliminated, because an enormous increase in the influence of Japan in the 
Far East will result from the elimination of Russia.
Russia the factor on which England is mainly betting. Something has happened 
in London! The English were already quite “down” (This word is in English in 
Haider’s typescript), now they have got back on their feet again a bit. We have 
tapped their telephone conversations... However, should Russia be smashed, then 
England’s last hope is extinguished...
Decision: In the course o f this contest, Russia must be disposed of. Spring ’41. 
The quicker we smash Russia the better. Operation only makes sense if we smash 
the state with one hard blow. Winning a certain amount of territory does not suffice. 
A standstill during the winter hazardous. Therefore better to wait, but decision 
definite to dispose of Russia. ... Aim: Annihilation of Russia’s Lebenskraft.
There was more to Hitler’s reasoning than megalomania or ideology. This was not a return to the main objective of his life that he had set forth in Mein Kampf, the 
winning of the European East for the German people and their Reich. That may have been 
his main objective once. But not in 1940. Lebensraum would be the secondary, perhaps 
the long-range, benefit, to be organised after the conquest of Russia. His primary aim now 
was to win the war against England: to eliminate Russia, in order to eliminate Churchill. 
There was more than geopolitical calculation in that. Churchill, as Hitler thought, had two 
hopes: America and Russia. Against America he could do little or nothing. But with 
Russian power destroyed, his power on the continent would be supreme. Then Chur­
chill—and Roosevelt—could do nothing to defeat him. There would be people in 
Britain—and, as he thought, many in America—who would then take some comfort from 
the defeat of Communist Russia. The British and the American people would then realise 
the futility of Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s policy, of persisting with a protracted and 
unwinnable war.
On 1 August Goebbels wrote in his diary: “Ballons d ’essai from here to England had 
no result. Even over Spain. London wants a catastrophe... The Fuehrer can now see no 
possibility other than war”. But that was no longer a duel between Hitler and Churchill. 
In a few days the Battle of Britain began, involving dozens of duels each day between 
British and German pilots, over the conduct and the outcome of which neither Hitler nor 
Churchill had much direct control. It may be even said that the daring German pilots were
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more inspired by Hitler’s ideas of German greatness than were the brave pilots of the RAF 
by Churchill’s rhetoric; but that did not matter much. What mattered was the willingness 
of the British people to trust Churchill’s leadership; and by August 1940 there was more 
to that than the inspiration of his rhetoric. He was steadfast and he was bringing the 
Americans in.
It took a month until the Lend-Lease Agreement between Britain and the United States 
on transferring fifty old American destroyers in exchange for the British grant of bases 
to the United States in the Western Atlantic and the Caribbean was negotiated and signed. 
By that time the destroyers themselves hardly mattered. (Only nine of them reached 
Britain by the end of the year.) What mattered was that American neutrality was gone; 
the Anglo-American alliance against Hitler had begun to function. When the destroyer- 
bases agreement was signed in Washington in the evening of 2 September, it was already 
the 3rd in Europe. This was exactly a year after Britain and France had declared war on 
Germany. During that first year it was a European war. Now it had broadened into a world 
war. The decisions that led to this had been taken on the Obersalzberg and in Washington, 
on 31 July. Churchill did not know what Hitler said about Russia to his generals that day. 
Neither did Roosevelt or Stalin. But Churchill had suspected something like that for some 
time. As early as 27 June he wrote to Field Marshal Smuts: “If Hitler fails to beat us here 
he will probably recoil eastward. Indeed he may do this even without trying invasion...”
Hitler said later that he needed “great spiritual strength” for his decision to turn against 
Russia. Yet his decision to reveal it to the generals and to order preparations on 31 July 
gave him a sense of relief. He faced the difficult question whether the English would or 
would not give up the struggle against him in Europe. He faced the consequent question 
whether to risk an invasion of England or not. Now there was an answer to these 
questions, and a third option. Once he destroyed Russian power, Churchill would have 
to give up. Of course Hitler’s decision of 31 July to prepare the invasion of Russia was 
not unalterable. He did not issue his definite Weisung No. 18: “Operation Barbarossa”, 
until 18 December, the target date then being fixed for 15 May; it would be set ahead by 
another five weeks. But these delays were due to military and material contingencies, 
not—as when he had been confronting England—due to his hesitations. He did not allow 
himself to be influenced by Stalin’s attempts at ingratiation, attempts that became more 
and more extraordinary as signs of a German attack increased.
After 31 July 1940 the struggle between Hitler and Churchill was not over. They would 
remain fierce opponents, principal figures of the Second World War. But it was no longer 
their duel. Yet the eighty days of their duel had been decisive—not only for the outcome 
of the Second World War, but for the next fifty years in the history of the world.
T here remains a last question that perhaps has some significance to us fifty years later.The principal, and most detailed, history of the planning of the German invasion of 
Britain is by Karl Klee who wrote in the Introduction of his massive two volumes: “It is 
the tragedy of further events that British policy, with fighting the present opponent as its 
sole aim, was ready to accept every partner—including the Soviet Union—for this 
purpose. They did not anticipate that, as a result of such action, an all-powerful Russia 
would replace a strong Germany, and that the issues of world policy would merely be 
shifted and become more acute.” This argument appeals to some people now, and not 
only in Germany. I am compelled to correct it here. It was not only without that “partner” 
the British could not expect to win. The “partner” was forced into an alliance with 
Britain by Hitler himself. It is also true that Churchill saw the choice clearly: either all 
of Europe dominated by Germany, or—at worst—the eastern portion of Europe domi­
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nated by Russia; and half of Europe, especially Western Europe, was better than none.
In November 1944 Churchill agreed with de Gaulle, worried by the seeming American 
indifference to the Russians pouring all over Eastern Europe, that yes, Russia was like 
a hungry wolf among the sheep, devouring them one by one: ’’But after the meal comes 
the digestion period”. The Russians would not be able to digest them permanently. This 
was common sense, and not the reaction of a war leader half-blinded by his hatred for 
Hitler. It was Hitler, whose vision was at times extraordinary, who was half-blinded 
because of his hatred for Churchill.
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Tibor Fényi
Hungarians in Slovakia. I.
E ver since the conclusion of the peace trea­ties at the end of the Great War, almost all 
the countries of East Central Europe have tried 
to create ethnically homogeneous nation-states 
of their own. This desire has inspired govern­
ments of diverse ideologies, moderately liberal 
democratic systems as well as fascist or Com­
munist regimes. The recent bloody events at 
Marosvásárhely, the growing popularity of the 
neo-fascist organization Vatra Romaneasca, the 
problem in Turks in Bulgaria, the Albanian 
question in Kosovo, and growing Slovak sepa­
ratism give rise to pessimism regarding the 
effect of the fall of Communist dictatorships 
and the emergence of political pluralism on the 
situation of national minorities. In the course of 
democratisation, even ultra-nationalist groups 
have gathered strength and, by resorting to 
demagoguery, have won considerable support 
and wield no negligible political influence. 
Consequently, they are able to force their ideas 
on politicians who were originally far from 
nationalist or chauvinist.
At the time when the treaties of peace were 
concluded after the Great War, greed for terri­
tory was stronger than the desire for ethnic 
homogeneity. The new states rising from the 
ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were not 
satisfied with ethnic frontiers. They produced a 
variety of reasons for laying claim to considera­
bly larger areas, inhabited either by a mixed 
population or even by a homogeneous alien 
population. They supported their claims by 
historical myths or they clamoured for natural 
frontiers, i.e., for a river or a mountain chain to 
become the border regardless of the population 
so enclosed. The new states refused to recog­
nise the local population’s right to self-determi­
nation and, except for a single case concerning 
a town and its environs, no objection could be
Tibor Fényi, a  h istorian , has been  pro m in en t 
in the d em o c ra tic  o p p o sitio n . H is m ain in teres t 
is  in the theory  a n d  h isto ry  o f  na tionalism .
raised against the given decision either by plebi­
scite or in any other fashion. (The only excep­
tion was the case of Sopron (Ödenburg), in 
which a plebiscite was to decide between Aus­
tria and Hungary, two of the vanquished.) Thus 
the entire region saw the rise o f states (Hungary 
excepted) with large national minorities.
The situation was complicated by the fact 
that most of the minorities had lived as the 
dominant ethnic group in the given territory for 
many, many centuries, possibly for a thousand 
years. The terms of the peace treaty unexpect­
edly brought them under the political rule of a 
different nation that, within the immediate 
environment could well be in a minority.
From that time on, the new states took the 
view that the compact mass of m inorities, settled 
mostly along their borders on territory contigu­
ous to countries the ethnic group dominated, 
jeopardised the integrity of the new state. They 
presumed that the demand for the right to self- 
determination involved the danger of territorial 
revision. They tried to avoid this by isolating 
the minorities. To this end they resorted to all 
sorts of means, including resettlement and forced 
assimilation. Then, after the Second World 
War, they put the blame precisely on these 
minorities, as Hitler had often mentioned that 
“those needed protection”. (I think nobody 
believes any longer that this was a genuine 
sentiment, or even that members o f the minori­
ties could have prevented a war by adopting 
some other attitude.) Antiminority feelings, 
however, came in handy for the victors, allow­
ing them to get rid of millions of those who were 
members of minorities. Indicative of the com­
plexity of the problem is that, all the same, 
ethnic minorities numbered in millions remained 
in place.
The treaties of peace closing the Great War 
had provided legal guarantees and international 
protection for minorities, but no such provision 
was included after the Second World War. It is 
as if the peace-makers had closed their eyes to 
assimilation, as if they too consented to homo­
geneous nation-states being created by far from
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A multinational heritage
From the ninth century until 1918, the history of the Slovak part of the Czech 
and Slovak Republic was identical with the 
history of N orthem Hungary. After the Battle 
of Bánhida (898), the Hungarians extended 
their influence over the territory between 
the Danube and the Carpathians, which from 
the early times onwards had been inhabited 
by a mixed population, in addition to the 
Slavs and the Hungarians, and later, as a 
result of the policies of the kings of the 
Houses of Árpád and Anjou, of large num­
bers of Germans. The Bavarians, Styrians, 
Tyrolians, Saxons, Alsatians, and Swabians 
mainly lived in Sáros, Gömör, Szepes and 
Liptó counties. The settlers’ main occupa­
tion was mining and forestry and, later, 
manufacturing and commerce.
The ethnic mixture was rapidly enhanced 
by people moving north following the Tar­
tar incursions after 1240, and later still, in 
the 150 years of Turkish occupation after 
the lost Battle of Mohács (1526). In the 
Middle Ages the towns in Northern Hun­
gary, particularly those settled by Germans 
in Szepes County, were the cultural and 
economic centres of these regions with 
Slovak and Hungarian inhabitants. Indeed, 
their influence was felt over the whole of 
pre-Great-War Hungary. They played an 
important part in mining, printing, com­
merce, coinage and, through their burgher 
way of life, liberal ideas. These lent particu­
lar significance to the region at a time when 
much of the country was under Turkish 
occupation.
The more nationalist Slovak historians 
incline to project the political borders of 
1918 back to the past and present them as 
ethnic and cultural borders as well. Since 
this is only possible through a cavalier treat­
ment of historical facts, they do not talk of 
the fertile cultural and economic co-opera­
tion of many nations but prefer to speak of 
a thousand years of Hungarian oppres­
sion— an argument that owes more to the 
exigencies of politics than to historical evi­
dence.
fair methods. Looking back to the past forty 
years, we have to accept that the Communist 
dictatorships did much to this end. Communist 
regimes are, from the start, intolerant of differ­
ences, but the main reason lies in their dubious 
legitimacy. In the economic, political, military 
and other fields, they primarily acted in the 
“internationalist” interests o f Moscow and the 
“world Communist movement”; the assimila­
tion of minorities, however, was the sphere of 
activity where they tried to demonstrate their 
own patriotism and thereby to establish their 
national legitimacy. Nationalism was the point 
of contact between Communist leaderships 
intolerant of minorities and nationalists who 
were both anti-minority and anti-Soviet. (In its 
purest form this appears in Rumania, in Il­
iescu’s Front of National Salvation and Vatra 
Romaneasca. But similar conclusions can be 
drawn from consideration of the relationship 
between Husak-type orthodox Marxists and 
Slovak nationalists.)
It is barely conceivable that the Eastern bloc
countries could by one great leap forward be­
come part of Europe, if what is meant by Europe 
is the development of a market economy, the 
creation of a civil society and the attainment of 
political tolerance. The absence of democracy 
for decades, the considerable backwardness of 
too many of the Iron Curtain countries in com­
parison with Western Europe, and the ensuing 
provincialism, the hasty and forced reprivatisa­
tion as a belated primitive accumulation of 
capital, will not result in a rapid generation of 
tolerance. The present writer would be only too 
happy if history were suddenly and plainly to 
disprove his pessimism. But I think that, until 
this desired situation occurs, we must familiar­
ise ourselves as closely as possible with the 
national conflicts of the region. This could well 
be the first step towards understanding the 
problem, towards settling differences.
Here I am writing on the situation of the 
Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. My 
main reason for doing so is that there appears to 
be a serious chance that mutual tolerance will
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secure success, perhaps not tomorrow, but at 
least within a foreseable future.
A fter the Great War the defeated Austro- Hungarian Empire was broken up. Of its 
two constituent states, it was Hungary that had 
to suffer the more serious consequences: she 
lost more than two-thirds of her territory and 
more than half of her population. At the same 
time, it is impossible to say, even with the best 
of intentions, that the parts taken from Hungary 
were merely ethnically different regions or ex­
clusively territories inhabited by a majority of 
non-Hungarians. Thus one-third of the ten 
million ethnic Hungarians became subjects of 
foreign states. A million and a half lived in areas 
close to the Hungarian border, mostly in territo­
ries with a Hungarian majority.
Czechoslovak political leaders strove from 
the outset to induce the Peace Conference to 
make their country larger than warranted by 
ethnic conditions. Arguing on the basis o f his­
tory, strategy and geography, they wished (and 
were able) to include territories with an over­
whelmingly Hungarian population. Their plan 
included a corridor running through today’s 
Western Hungary down to Yugoslavia, but this 
was rejected by the Peace Conference. (We 
know that the decisive objection came not from 
Hungary but Yugoslavia.)
When Czechoslovakia was created, the terri­
tory to be called Slovakia was incomparably 
larger than the parts inhabited by Slovaks. Earlier 
the whole of that territory had been part of 
Hungary and, at the census taken in 1910, the 
population consisted o f nearly two million 
Slovaks, one million Hungarians and smaller 
Ruthenian, German, Polish, Jewish, and Gypsy 
populations. Slovakia’s ethnic heterogeneity 
was not unique inside the new state either. 
Czechoslovakia had a population of 13.5 mil­
lion, of which the minorities numbered 4.5 
million, mainly Germans.
Here I cannot dwell on the difference, obvi­
ous from the very beginning, between the two 
state-creating nations, the Czech and the Slo­
vak. All I can here point out is that leading 
Czech politicians challenged even the exis­
tence of the Slovak nation as such, that many 
regarded Slovak as a Czech dialect, and consid­
ered the Slovak people as still unfit in effect to 
govern their part of the country. For this very 
reason Czech settlers and officials moved there 
right away: the police and customs officers
were also Czech. All this offended the Hungari­
ans as well as the Slovaks. The Czech newcom­
ers were settled on lands taken from Hungari­
ans, and it was because of them that, during the 
land reform in the 1920s, the Magyar day- 
labourers and poor peasants, in their effort to 
obtain land, suffered considerable discrimina­
tion which was censured also by world opinion. 
But the creation of the Czech, or Czechoslovak, 
official apparatus was detrimental to Hungari­
ans in other respects as well. The local authori­
ties did everything possible to sabotage legally 
sanctioned schools using national tongues as 
the language of instruction, they reorganized 
the administration so as to reduce the number of 
counties with a Magyar majority to a minimum, 
using amalgamations to create as many units as 
possible with a Hungarian population of less 
than 20 per cent (in which case Hungarian 
would not be an official language). Hungarian 
schools were altogether abolished in areas with 
a Slovak majority, but even in purely Hungar­
ian regions their functioning was subjected to 
obstructions.
Since the former Hungarian officials and 
professional class could not find employment 
for many years, more and more people of 
Hungarian birth felt compelled to declare them­
selves Slovak or “Czechoslovak”. Others were 
unable to do so and, since they had no private 
property to ensure their livelihood, they moved 
to Hungary. In two years from the autumn of 
1918, more than a hundred thousand Hungarian 
public servants from Slovakia settled in Hun­
gary. At the same time, a process of natural 
assimilation, the Slovakisation of persons of 
dual roots, also began on the fringe of the 
Magyar language area. Thus the 1921 census 
figures were: 3,000,870 Slovaks and 650,597 
Hungarians (21.7 per cent). The downward 
trend continued so that the returns of the 1930 
census showed 585,434 Hungarians (17.6 per 
cent) against 3,324,111 Slovaks.
Although the ruling classes, composed of 
Czechs in the first place, were intent on as fast 
and as spectacular a process of assimilation as 
possible, not even the Hungarians could be 
deprived of the democratic rights established 
by the political system of the first Czechoslovak 
Republic. Thus they were in a position to build 
up their own political organizations within a 
few years. The leaders of these associations 
proclaimed that the autochthonous inhabitants 
(Magyars, Slovaks, Ruthenes, Germans) should
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join forces against the Czech interests that were 
oppressing the southern part of the country. 
They demanded autonomy for Slovakia and 
Ruthenia. The situation became acute during 
the world depression. As a result of Hungary’s 
official revanchist policy on the one hand, and 
of the rather strained international relations, of 
the aggravated differences between Czechs and 
Slovaks as well as between Czechs and Ger­
mans, on the other, the Hungarians also ex­
pressed increasingly radical demands. The 
Czechoslovak government paid no heed to them. 
After a long delay, in the summer of 1938, it 
started to take Hungarian demands seriously 
and then offered the Magyars considerable 
autonomy. This was a few weeks before 29 
September 1938, when, with the Munich Agree­
ment, the West European Great Powers handed 
over to Germany the German-inhabited parts of 
Bohemia and Moravia and, as an added rider, 
proposed that Hungary and Poland should open 
bilateral negotiations with Czechoslovakia over 
disputed territories. Since these talks proved 
inconclusive, an international court of arbitra­
tion was convened (in accordance with the 
original Czechoslovak intentions). Great Brit­
ain and France declared disinterest in the case, 
so the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy, 
meeting in Vienna on 2 November, awarded 
Hungary 12,000 square kilometres of her for­
mer northern territories, where 80 per cent of 
the population declared themselves to be Hun­
garians.
H itler’s Germany made the minority ques­tion a pretext for the total annihilation of 
Czechoslovakia. On 14 March 1939, when the 
fascist leaders of Slovakia (following a previ­
ous agreement with the German Reich), se­
ceded from the Republic, German troops occu­
pied Prague within 24 hours. The Czechs had 
been abandoned by their allies and by some of 
their leaders.
Czechoslovak politicians in exile saw clearly 
that no small part was played in the dissolution 
of their state by the unsolved question of na­
tional minorities. In making plans for a post­
war settlement, they intended to alter matters by 
devising a scheme that would rid the country of 
them. They thought it essential to keep the 1938 
frontiers intact and, to this end, they wished to 
expel those— Germans and Hungarians— who 
might endanger the establishment o f an ethni­
cally homogeneous Slav state.
In 1941 the Allies recognized the govern­
ment-in-exile in Fondon of Eduard Benes, ex- 
President of the Republic, as the legitimate 
government of Czechoslovakia and also agreed 
to the restoration of the frontiers. In 1942 the 
British government also agreeed that after the 
war the Germans should be forcefully expelled 
from Czechoslavak territory; at that time, 
however, expulsion of Hungarians was not 
discussed. It was only during his visit to Moscow 
in 1943, that Benes managed to secure the 
agreement of Molotov and Stalin that, follow­
ing an allied victory, the Soviet Union would 
obtain Ruthenia and Czechoslovakia would be 
allowed to expel the Hungarians. Details were 
left to the leader of the Czechoslovak Commu­
nists in Moscow, Klement Gottwald, who may 
have had Stalinist relocation in mind as a para­
digm. In the meantime the Czechoslovak exiles 
were pressing Soviet troops during their ad­
vance in 1944 to attack Hungary from the north 
(i.e. from Slovakia). This would make it likely 
that the Red Army would subject the Hungarian 
civilian population to atrocities of the sort which 
had caused the Germans in the East to flee in 
terror and then the Hungarians there (in Slova­
kia) would make their escape southwards i.e., to 
Hungary. The Rumanian about-face of August 
23, however, aborted the plan as the main 
Soviet thrust went in a westerly and north­
westerly direction.
Up to the summer of 1944 the Czech and 
Slovak Communists at home had no inkling of 
the scheme to get rid of the Magyar population. 
Their attitude to the Hungarian role in war was 
still objective. Thus, in early summer, the Central 
Committee of the underground Communist 
Party of Slovakia sent, through Karol Smidke, 
the following situation report to Moscow: “One 
might well say that the Hungarians, unlike the 
Germans, behave properly in Slovakia, most of 
them are democrats, and many more are left­
ists.” (It is characteristic of both the Communist 
and the nationalist view of history that this 
report could be first published in Czechoslova­
kia only a quarter of a century later, in 1969, 
since its contents did not tally with the prevail­
ing official position, that the Hungarians were 
ruthless fascists.) In order to get rid of the 
Hungarian minority, a moral basis had to be 
found, and the most easily acceptable argument 
for this was, in w ar-tom  Europe, the charge of 
fascism or collaboration. This charge was ex­
pressed against all Hungarians in Czechoslova-
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kia, in a resolution signed by President Benes 
on September 4,1944 (but only made public, at 
British request, after the war, as late as 2 August 
1945). The logic of the resolution is easy to 
follow: the Hungarians are H itler’s allies and 
helpers, they are guilty of carving up Czecho­
slovakia, therefore they must be deprived of all 
their rights. Two days later one of the first 
decrees of the Slovak National Council (No.6/ 
1944) ordered all Hungarian schools closed, the 
Hungarian associations dissolved, the use of 
the Hungarian language prohibited in all fields 
of life. Later decrees ordering the confiscation 
of all property owned by the Hungarian minor­
ity were added.
On 5 April 1945, the leaders of the new Czechoslovak state proclaimed what came 
to be called the Kosice (Kassa) programme, a 
plan for postwar social, economic and political 
rehabilitation. Chapter VIII of this document 
dealt with the national minorities. (It was drafted 
by the Communist Klement Gottwald.) It stated 
that, except for those who had taken an active 
part in the resistance movement, all Hungarians 
of Czechoslovakia must assume collective re­
sponsibility for war crimes and will therefore be 
deprived of their Czechoslovak citizenship. This 
chapter also mapped out a programme for the 
expulsion of the minorities; for tactical reasons 
the plan was not published at that time. The 
Western powers were still reluctant to agree to 
a general expulsion, only Molotov assured the 
Czechoslovak Communists that the Soviet 
Union would consider the “exchange of popu­
lations” as a condition for the armistice to be 
concluded with Hungary. At the Potsdam con­
ference, the U.S.A. vetoed the plan for the 
expulsion of Hungarians, in spite of Soviet 
pressure to the contrary. The conference, how­
ever, obliged Hungary to expel from its terri­
tory the Germans living there. The Hungarian 
government did not ask for that, actually it tried 
to protest with reference to the absence of 
similar obligations in the case of other van­
quished countries (Italy, Bulgaria and Rumania).
It was clear to contemporary observers that 
the reason why Czechoslovakia insisted on the 
expulsion of Germans from Hungary was that it 
wanted to expel Hungarians from Czechoslo­
vakia. Since the Czechoslovak authorities at 
first failed in their efforts to liquidate the Hun­
garian minority, they changed tactics. They 
declared that the number of Slovaks was
roughly the same as that of Hungarians in 
Slovakia, and thus peace could be established 
by a simple exchange of populations. They 
tried to mislead world opinion by the use of 
falsified statistics. Czechoslovak nationalists 
alleged that about 600,000 Slovaks lived in 
Hungary. On 21 February 1946, Hungary 
signed, under pressure from the Great Powers, 
a population exchange agreement which had 
been drawn up by Czechoslovakia. Hungary 
was bound to receive persons who were de­
clared war criminals (because the Hungarian 
minority of Slovakia was collectively guilty) 
and this was sufficient legal ground for expul­
sion. Hungary also had to acquiesce in a spe­
cially appointed Czechoslovak government 
commission carrying out an unrestricted cam­
paign to persuade the Slovaks of Hungary to 
resettle. The commission was free to hold 
meetings, publish newspapers, and make use of 
Hungarian Radio without special permission. 
In exchange for Slovaks volunteering to be 
transferred, Czechoslovakia was entitled to 
select a corresponding number of the Hungari­
ans of Slovakia for compulsory resettlement 
in Hungary.
The agreement was thus a dictate which 
Hungary, as one of the vanquished, was forced 
to accept from one of the victors. The Czecho­
slovak Transfer Commission started its propa­
ganda in Hungary on 4 March 1946. There is 
documentary evidence that it warned the Slo­
vaks unwilling to be transferred from Hungary 
that the Hungarian authorities would confiscate 
all their property and prohibit them from using 
the Slovak language. At the same time these 
Slovaks who accepted relocation were prom­
ised houses and lands of higher value than those 
they would leave behind in Hungary, out of the 
property of the Hungarians to be expelled from 
Slovakia. The population exchange scheme, 
however, fell short of the Slovak nationalists’ 
expectations: only 62,440 applied for resettle­
ment. (The documents issued by the Slovak 
authorities contained more names, 92,390 in 
all, but 29,950 persons registered themselves 
several times, some people died during that 
period, and many others could not be identi­
fied.)
Faced with fiasco, the Slovak nationalists 
made another attempt to reduce, at least on 
paper, the number of Magyars living in their 
country. They wished to demonstrate that the 
people involved were so few in number that, for
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their sake, it would not be worth stipulating the 
enforcement of minority rights in the treaty of 
peace to be concluded. On 17 June 1946, there­
fore, a decree on re-Slovakisation was promul­
gated. This allowed “the Magyarised masses of 
Southern Slovakia to return to their mother na­
tion”, which meant that if a Hungarian was 
willing to declare that he was a Magyarised 
Slovak, he would not be subjected to confisca­
tion of property or to expulsion. For two years 
Hungarians had been persecuted and recruited 
for forced labour, while tens of thousands had 
been taken to the Soviet Union (as part of 
reparations), from where those people, civil­
ians, were allowed to return home three and a 
half years later— if they survived.
Children of Hungarians could not attend 
school. Teaching in Hungarian was forbidden, 
and the majority of Hungarian children had 
never learnt Slovak, or they had forgotten their 
Slovak because from 1939 to 1945 the territory 
had again been part of Hungary; moreover, a 
considerable number of the people threatened 
with compulsory relocation did not think it was 
worth trying to learn the new official language. 
In that situation, out of 600,000 Hungarians as 
many as 327,000 asked to be registered as 
Slovaks, since they saw this as the only way out 
of a state of constant jeopardy. But even in such 
circumstances, when posters called on Slovaks 
to inform against hostile elements who spoke 
Hungarian, more than two hundred thousand 
people maintained on paper their affiliation 
with the Hungarian national minority.
The Hungarian question was taken up at the Paris Peace Conference on 14August 1946. 
Taking the floor on the 15 th. Foreign Minister 
Jan Masaryk of Czechoslovakia called for the 
expulsion of all Hungarians from his country. 
The Czechoslovak Communist Clementis spoke 
in a similar vein. His anti-Hungarian outbursts 
were repeated by A. Y. Vyshinsky on 20 Octo­
ber. The Soviet Union was of the opinion that 
the “Hungarian transfer”, i.e., one-sided expul­
sion, had to be put into effect. This was thought 
inevitable despite the fact that the U.S. repre­
sentative, on 20 September, and the delegate of 
the United Kingdom on the 23rd, said the action 
was unacceptable. Ultimately the two Western 
powers succeeded in thwarting the expulsion 
plan. The related clause was left out of the Peace 
Treaty, signed on 10 February 1947. (It is 
conceivable, however, that a compromise was
made behind the scenes to the effect that, prac­
tically in exchange for that omission, guaran­
tees for the protection of minorities would not 
be included either. From that time on, the ques­
tion of minorities would be regarded as an 
internal matter of the states concerned. This 
provision affected Hungarians particularly 
painfully, since more than three million persons 
of Hungarian ethnicity ended up as citizens of 
the neighbouring states.)
The way Czechoslovakia interpreted sover­
eign treatmant of minorities could be seen, as 
early as 19 November 1946, from the pressure 
put on participants at the peace conference still 
in session. At that time, by virtue of Presidential 
Decree No. 88/1945, more than 60,000 Hun­
garians were deported on the pretext of man­
power recruitment. Hungarian-inhabited vil­
lages were surrounded by military vehicles, 
usually at dawn, and Hungarians were called on 
to pick up their belongings and be ready to 
embark. (The movable and immovable prop­
erty they abandoned was confiscated and taken 
into national trusteeship. To this day no-one has 
accounted for this property.) Afterwards the 
families were taken, in livestock cars, to places 
left empty by expelled Sudeten Germans. There 
they were forced to work for token wages under 
the supervision of Czech farmers. “The ex­
pellees were treated practically as war crimi­
nals”, Juraj Zvara, a Slovak historian, stated 
twenty years later.
The implementation of the population ex­
change agreement began on 12 April 1947. It 
was celebrated as a great national victory by the 
Slovak political parties and by the press. Selec­
tion aimed at depriving the community of its 
leaders. Thus it was first the intelligentsia, 
teachers, priests and upper grade public ser­
vants, who were compelled to leave their homes. 
They were followed by the propertied middle 
class as well as the wealthier farmers, and 
finally artisans with workshops of their own. 
The situation was somewhat more regulated 
than in the case of the tens of thousands ex­
pelled earlier; they had been allowed to take 
only 50 kgs of luggage with them. Those who 
left Czechoslovakia under the terms of the 
population exchange agreement, were permit­
ted to take their furniture with them. Those who 
moved from Hungary to Slovakia could also do 
this. But the Hungarians received no compen­
sation for abandoned immovable property and 
had no right to claim damages. Owing to con­
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siderable differences in their financial standing, 
the immovable property left by Slovaks in 
Hungary did not constitute full compensation. 
(As a rule relatively poorer Slovaks applied for 
transfer to Slovakia in the hope of getting pos­
session of the houses and workshops left behind 
by wealthier Hungarians there.)
Under this scheme, all in all 68,407 Hungari­
ans were forced to leave Czechoslovakia. To­
gether with those expelled earlier, and with 
those who had fled at the end of war, or at the 
time of the first wave of persecution of Hun­
garians, the number of persons who moved into 
Hungary can be estimated at approximately
200,000. As a consequence of ousting the 
Magyars and settling them in remote places, at 
least 150 towns and villages, formerly inhab­
ited almost exclusively by Hungarians, turned 
into places with a mixed population. Nearly 
the entire Hungarian minority was left without 
intellectuals, and hundreds of thousands con­
tinued to live in a state of anxiety, having 
been terrorised into declaring themselves to be 
Slovak.
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Tamás Stark
A Wartime Inventory
Demographic figures 1941-7
The census taken in January 1941 put the population of Hungary at 9.32 million. In 
the period from 1941 to 1948 this figure ought 
to have risen, in consequence of the natural in­
crease somewhat influenced by war. to 9.65 
million by the end of 1948. The 1949 census, 
however, found only 9.2 million Hungarians 
within the borders of the 
country. Thus, in January 
1949, 112,000 fewer peo­
ple lived in the same area 
than had done so eight years 
before. This decrease cov­
ered a tremendous loss of 
lives, in spite of the rela­
tively favourable wartime 
and postwar rise in popula­
tion. H ungary’s demo­
graphic balance, however, 
was made worse not only 
by war and genocide, but it became decidedly 
negative owing to the wave, especially after the 
fighting was over, of refugees and those re­
cently settled in the country. From 1941 to 1949 
the population of Hungary not only decreased 
markedly but even underwent some change in 
composition as a consequence of the mostly 
forced movement of migration.
We have relatively accurate information 
about the casualties suffered by the military. 
The data issued in 1944/45 by the casualties 
section of the Ministry of Defence (and later 
recognised as reliable) show that, up to 31 
October 1944, the Hungarian Army had lost as 
many as 256,431 men. On the strength of the 
identification tags collected and evidence given
Tamás Stark is the author of a book on Hun­
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by eyewitnesses, it can be established that 37,490 
of them were killed in action, 5,755 became 
prisoners o f war, and nearly 90,000 were 
wounded, while— in default of precise official 
information— about 125,000 had to be declared 
missing in action. According to the literature, 
half of those missing had died in action while 
those who survived added 
to the number of prisoners 
of war. Taking these figures 
as a basis, therefore, we have 
to allow for a loss of a total 
of nearly one hundred thou­
sand Hungarian soldiers by 
the autumn of 1944. In fur­
ther fighting to the end of 
war, at least 10 to 15,000 
more Hungarian service­
men lost their lives.
The civilian population 
suffered greatly as a consequence of the hostili­
ties. The Central Statistical Office’s survey of 
July 1945 stated that the death of almost 45,000 
Hungarian nationals was due to actual combat 
and the extremely hard immediate postwar 
conditions led to additional losses. Considering 
this, the number of civilians who died within the 
present day borders of the country was about
80.000.
The decrease in Hungary’s population, 
however, was caused largely by the genocide of 
the period between 1941 and 1949. War was 
waged not only on countries but, in accordance 
with a National Socialist ideology, on “races” 
as well. Since there is contradictory data pub­
lished on the number of Jewish victims who 
were forcefully removed from Hungary or killed 
in Hungary, we can get an approximately cor­
rect picture of the situation only if we take into 
account the categories of casualties one by one.
In the autumn of 1941, about 15 to 20,000 
Jews of non-Hungarian nationality who lived in 
this country were deported, for the most part, to
The wartime mobility, in­
clusive of losses, affected by 
and large one and a half 
million people here in the 
centre of the Carpathian 
Basin. All this is statistics, 
but every figure involves hu­
man destinies and tragedies.
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Galicia. The majority of them were killed in the 
environs of Kamenets-Podolsk. In the Újvidék 
(Novi Sad) massacre of January 1942, one 
thousand Jews lost their lives. But the system­
atic extermination of Hungarian Jewry began 
only after 19 March 1944, the date of Hungary’s 
occupation by the Germans. Reports by Ed­
mund Veesenmayer, the Reich’s plenipotenti­
ary in Hungary, and by Gendarme Colonel 
László Ferenczy, who took a direct part in the 
action, stated that, up to August 1944, nearly 
450,000 Hungarian Jews had been deported 
from the country.
Upon protest from the Vatican and from 
some foreign diplomatic missions, all that the 
Regent, Horthy, could do was put off the depor­
tation of the Jews of Budapest. But deportation 
was resumed after the Arrow-Cross (Hungarian 
Nazi) take-over on 15 October 1944. By the 
terms of a Hungarian-German compact (made 
in the second half of October 1944) approxi­
mately 40,000 Budapest Jews were sent off— 
on foot— towards the West. At the same time 
several thousand more fell victim to the Arrow- 
Cross reign of terror. The loss of Jews pressed 
into the forced labour battalions can be esti­
mated at 20,000, according to information from 
the Ministry of Defence.
As part of the deportations carried out in the 
autumn of 1944, about 500,000 Hungarians, 
who came within the scope of the anti-Jewish 
laws, were removed to the territory of the Ger­
man Reich. As stated by the National Commis­
sion for Deportees, only 140,000 of them 
managed to return home: 80,000 of them moved 
to places within the present-day borders of 
Hungary, and 60,000 to the Sub-Carpathian 
Ukraine and Northern Transylvania. The over­
whelming majority of those who did not return 
had been killed in the gas-chambers. It is impos­
sible to determine exactly, but one may put at a 
couple of thousands the number of those who, 
surviving the concentration camps, made their 
way direct to Palestine, the United States or 
other parts of the world. Together with those 
killed in Galicia, and with the victims of the 
forced labour service and of the Arrow-Cross
terror, the total loss to Hungarian Jewry may 
have amounted to about 400,000.
With the war coming to an end, however, the 
decline in the population did not cease. During 
the course of the Second World War, both 
Germany and the Soviet Union sought not only 
to defeat their enemies militarily but also to 
hold them to material and demographic ran­
som. An object of the genocide perpetrated by 
Nazism was the physical extinction of some 
peoples, primarily the Jews. On the other hand, 
the Soviet attitude was characterised more by 
intimidation and massive retaliation. In the 
course of the war and in the postwar years— as 
contemporary reports of the Central Statistical 
Office and the Ministry of Defence tell us—  
Hungarian nationals in PoW camps or in forced 
labour camps of the Soviet Union totalled up to
600,000. Not even half of this huge mass of 
people were prisoners of war properly speak­
ing. A great part of the Hungarian victims were 
carried off from Sub-Carpathia and the Tisza 
Highlands, from Csanád, Békés and Baranya 
counties and from Budapest. At least 200,000 
of them never got back home.
Hungary’s loses suffered in the course of war 
or in consequence of it may be estimated, in the 
aggregate, at 800,000 people all told. The loss 
of lives counted within the present-day borders 
of the country can be supposed to have amounted 
to half a million. But we must likewise not 
forget about the forced migrations affecting 
hundreds of thousands of people. Hungary 
admitted into its post-warterritory some 120,000 
people from Czechoslovakia, 100,000 from 
Rumania, 10,000 from the Sub-Carpathian 
Ukraine and 65,000 from Yugoslavia. At the 
same time, nearly 60,000 Slovaks left Hungary, 
and 190,000 ethnic Germans were expelled, 
while those who found permanent shelter in the 
West between 1944 and 1947 numbered more 
than 200,000.
The wartime mobility, inclusive of losses, 
affected by and large one and a half million 
people here in the centre of the Carpathian 
Basin. All this is statistics, but every figure 
involves human destinies and tragedies.
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Sándor Tóth
Plenary Interruptus
An extraordinary CC session in Bucharest and its background
Great attention throughout the world was aroused when the April 1964 resolution of 
the Central Committee of the Rumanian Work­
ers’ Party (as it was then officially called) 
snapped its fingers at Moscow and proudly re­
jected the Soviet Union’s tutelage and its un­
warranted interference with Rumania’s inter­
nal affairs. This was the beginning of the 
Bucharest policy that advocated control over 
the fate of the nation and which frequently criti­
cised both the Warsaw Pact and CMEA with 
surprising openness and vehemence. These 
gestures charmed western powers to such an 
extent that Rumania was for many years their 
favoured country, distinguished by their good­
will and heaped with benefits. The West has 
since been cured of this credulity, but inRumania 
it was, up to the end of the Ceausescu regime, a 
widely held view that the party resolution of 
1964 was a document which asserted state 
sovereignity and the principle of non-interfer­
ence in internal affairs, the document of a 
Rumanian Communist Party that had attained 
maturity and its emancipation from Soviet tute­
lage, and the taking on of the responsibility of 
representing Rumanian national interests.
But the truth is that this step to which the 
leadership of the Rumanian party braced itself 
in Spring 1964 was dictated— as every impor­
tant step since 1956— by fear of the conse­
quences of the Twentieth Congress of the 
CPSU, of Khrushchev’s reform endeavours 
and by fear for its own power.
Georghiu-Dej and his team decided on this 
final and risky step only when all their efforts to 
turn the course of things in Moscow had failed 
and they judged that this situation was going to 
continue.
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teaches History at the University of Budapest.
One attempt by Gheorghiu-Dej— which 
ended in failure— left its imprint also in the 
Rumanian press. The traces are conspicuous 
and smell no less of scandal; thus it seems 
incomprehensible today how the affair could 
have been forgotten or, when forgotten, why 
nobody was there to rediscover it. What is 
involved was the role the Rumanian party lead­
ership took in the failed conspiracy to over­
throw Khrushchev in the summer of 1957.
What has since then been well-known in in­
formed circles is that the Moscow events started 
by the Political Committe of the CC of the 
CPSU removing Krushchev in his absence (he 
was on an official visit to Helsinki). However, 
on his unexpected return, Khrushchev did not 
resign himself to his dismissal but called an 
extraordinary plenary session of the Central 
Committee, for which the crucial technical as­
sistance was provided by Marshall Zhukov, the 
Commander in Chief of the Army, who trans­
ported from all comers of the empire members 
o f the CC to Moscow on air force planes, thus 
ensuring a quorum for the Committee. This ex­
traordinary plenary session of the CC called the 
Political Committee to account, then removed 
and elected a new committee. It returned and 
confirmed Khrushchev in his position of Secre­
tary General and expelled from the party the 
main conspirators, M alenkov, M olotov, 
Kaganovich and Shepilov.
W hat was the Rumanian citizen able to read of these Moscow events in his ac­
customed newspapers? These newspapers—  
both in the capital and in the provinces— were 
all made to the pattem of the central party organ 
Scinteia. Consequently, everybody who read 
newspapers, even anticommunists, preferred 
Scinteia. What then was he able to read on the 
struggle in Moscow? Nothing for four full days 
after it had ended, and then, on the fifth day, 
came word.
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On the first page of the July 4, 1957 number 
of Scinteia appeared a short communiqué— not 
on what happened in Moscow, but— on the 
plenary session of the CC of the Rumanian 
Communist Party held on June 28-29 and July 
1-3 (Communicat cu privire la yedintdplenard 
alCC al PMR care s-a intrunit [...] in zilele de 
28-29 iunie si 1-3 iulie 1957). The only signifi­
cant communication in the few lines was that at 
this session the CC expelled from the political 
committe for their anti-party activities Iosif 
Chisinevschi and Miron Constantinescu.
What was extraordinary was that a short 
communiqué reported the result of a CC ses­
sion, one of such length normally given to the 
announcement of the summoning of the CC or 
of the beginning of its work. Before then, and 
since then, on the day after such a session a 
lengthly and voluminous resolution, and sev­
eral approved documents were published in the 
newspapers. (The secret o f this fast and imme­
diate publication was that these texts were al­
ready written and edited when the session was 
convoked, and waited only for the gathered 
members of the CC to nod and clap. The print­
ing works could have typeset the whole text in 
advance.) Another extraordinary feature was 
that such a session never lasted more than two 
days. But now— as if this had been a genuine 
party congress— they sat for over five full days. 
And what should certainly attract the attention 
of the reader: the day following the first two 
days (June 30) was missed (did they rest?), and 
they only continued the session from July 1 
over three further days. Such an— interrupted—  
plenary session had certainly not appeared in 
Scinteia— at least not since the paper had been 
first published openly in September 1944.
The last page of the same issue, reserved for 
foreign policy news, was devoted to a further 
“informative communiqué.” This deals with 
the plenary session of the CC of the CPSU held 
between June 22 and 29 (Communicat informa­
tiv cu privire la plenara al CC al PCUS din 22- 
29 iunie). We learn that the “anti-party group” 
formed by Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, 
and Shepilov had been unmasked and expelled 
from the party (after— though this information 
is not published in Scinteia— their attempt to 
overthrow Khruhschev had failed). Paying 
closer attention to this communiqué, the reader 
can ponder the following peculiarities: 1. The 
Moscow session was even longer than that in 
Bucharest, a marathon lasting eight days; 2. In
an unprecedented way, Scinteia reported it 
with a delay of four days; 3. The Bucharest 
plenum suspended its work— for a day— ex­
actly when the Moscow session ended and its 
outcome became known.
I s it possible that such a strange coincidence of two events would be mere chance? The 
extraordinary features of the communiqués 
almost excluded this. What is given, on the 
other hand, is the well-known aversion of 
Gheorghiu-Dej and his friends towards 
Khrushchev’s policies, fed by fears for their 
own position of power. Looking at it from this 
angle, the key question is the interpretation of 
June 29 and 30. Can a connection be assumed 
between the conclusion of the plenary session 
in Moscow (and what it involved: the knowl­
edge of its outcome) and the suspension of the 
Bucharest conference (and its continuation af­
ter an interruption of one day)? If yes, then there 
is a single explanation: that Bucharest was 
confused, its plans were muddled by the out­
come in Moscow, that it had expected some­
thing else from Moscow (had prepared for 
something else?). It awaited (could have 
awaited) something from Moscow, and some­
thing else came. (Its opposite?)
If Gheorghiu-Dej expected something dif­
ferent, in what state of readiness could he have 
expected it? What could he prepare for? Could 
he have got wind that the Stalinists in Moscow 
were preparing for a removal, and did he start 
out to be first among the claque? Or, did his 
Moscow patrons pick him as the most reliable 
bit player— and even partner— for a role? In 
this case we must assume concerted closer 
cooperation between the Stalinsts in Moscow 
and in Bucharest. Whether it was a concept 
worked out in Moscow, or the well-informed 
reflex of the good pupil in Bucharest, if it came 
through, its function was unequivocal: the re­
moval of Khrushchev would have been sup­
ported immediately by the approving claque of 
a fraternal party, even constituting an example 
to be followed by the other parties, and in a 
strengthened position against them! The 
Rumanian W orkers’ Party would had entered 
the scene almost simultaneosly with the CPSU, 
by promptly making order in its own quarters, 
and expelling from its ranks the disruptive 
Khrushchev agents. Then Chisinevschi and Con­
stantinescu would not have got away with merely 
being accused of certain character flaws: they
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would have been labelled as a revisionist anti­
party fraction. These are much graver things in 
the Stalinist scheme of things. In any case, if 
the plot had succeeded, Gheorghiu-Dej and his 
party, as second only to the first, would have put 
themselves into an exceptional position 
against— and at the expense of—the other fra­
ternal parties and allies.
However, the game was lost in Moscow.This unexpected turn forced Bucharest to 
improvise. In its confusion, and due to lack of 
information, it suspended its own plenary ses­
sion in order to collect its breath and win time 
in order to change horses in mid-stream. What 
it had started three days before, counting on 
something entirely different, it tried to con­
clude in the next three days by adjusting to the 
new situation. Until this was done it embargoed 
the news of the CC session in Moscow so as to 
avoid any unpleasant effects. Nevetheless, when 
it had to go public with the new concept so 
hurriedly invented, the pre-written resolution 
that was dependent on the overthrow of 
Khrushchev proved to be unusable. Adjusting it 
to the new concept— indeed radically revamp­
ing and editing it— required further days. This 
was why only a short communiqué could be 
published in Sdnteia on July 4 on the plenary 
session of the CC of the Rumanian W orkers’ 
Party. And if only a few lines could be pub­
lished about this, then the news about the ple­
nary session of the CPSU could no longer be 
delayed but could be presented only equally 
briefly. (Probably a full or at least somewhat 
more detailed publication of the Moscow reso­
lution was undertaken for thorough political 
reasons and not for considerations of prestige, 
although in Bucharest prestige always counts as 
a substantial political consideration.) By then 
the press of the entire “socialist camp”, and 
even the western press was full of the unmask­
ing of the “antiparty group”, and of news from 
Moscow, commentaries and documents. The 
Rumanian newspaper accounts were conspicu­
ously late and short.
The propaganda apparatus in Bucharest tried 
first to counteract this being out of step, then did 
its best to ensure that it be forgotten, but even 
this betrayed the confusion and inconsistency 
of the Rumanian party leadership.
We learn from the two numbers o f Sdnteia 
following on the publication of the commu- 
niqués that, on the day after the conslusion of
the Bucharest plenary session, all members of 
the Political Committee were organizing and 
directing demonstrations of party unity at 
meetings of party functionaries called at pro­
vincial headquarters. In the July 5 issue of 
Sdnteia reports appeared under the summary 
title “Huge manifestations of party unity” 
(Puternica manifestare a unitátii partidului), 
and in the July 6 issue under the title “Enthusi­
astic manifestations of the unity and loyalty of 
the party (Insufletite manifestari ale coeziunii si 
unitápi partidului), of the meetings of party 
functionaries held in the provincial centres) in 
the presence everywhere of a member of the 
Political Committee or of some other high- 
ranking leader). Under the pretext of a critique 
of the Chisinevschi-Constantinescu pair, these 
meetings are described as manifestations of the 
“unshakable loyalty” to Gheorghiu-Dej and to 
the “CC united behind him by a firm will.”
The alleged deviation of Chisinevschi and 
Constantinescu was, of course, only a pretext. 
In the given constellation, they would have 
been unable to weaken the position of Ghreor- 
ghiu-Dej and of the Central Committee, even if 
they had wanted to. In the Rumanian context 
this huge demonstration of unity made no sense. 
It was intended for the outside world and was 
directed at Khrushchev. Let him know that an 
entire country stood behind Gheorghiu-Dej. 
He should not be encouraged to present the bill 
to Gheorghiu-Dej for having been an accom­
plice in the plot against him.
Two further numbers of Sdnteia are worth 
mentioning. The July 9 issue finally contained 
the resolution of the ominous Bucharest CC 
plenary session— with a delay of five days, for 
it took this long to work over the resolution and 
adjust it to the new situation. One noteworthy 
formal peculiarity of this communiqué was 
that, in contrast to the communiqué of July 4, 
here no mention was made of the suspension of 
the session for a day on June 30. This was how 
the title inferred the time span of the session: 
Rezolutia plenarie alCCal PMR din 28 iunie— 
3 iulie. For that matter, the resolution did not 
undertake the usual political description of the 
“anti-party activities” of Chisinevschi and Con­
stantinescu. Instead, it reproached them for 
flaws o f character: careerism, conceit, etc. This 
is also understandable: if at first they wanted to 
unveil them as agents of the revisionist 
Khrushchev— and this must obviously have 
been so during the first two days of the plenary
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session— then, later, it would have been going 
too far to apply the opposite label of ‘sectarian 
dogmatism’, which would have corresponded 
to the new situation.
And finally, in the July 13 issue of Scinteia, 
a document conceived in Byzantine style: a 
telegramme. Its text is a declaration of loyalty to 
the CPSU led by Khushchev and its wise po­
licies, and the grave condemnation of the 
“antiparty group” of Malenkov, Molotov, 
Kaganovich, and Shepilov. The addressee of 
the telegramme is the Central Committee of the 
CPSU, and its signatory the Central Committee 
of the Rumanian W orkers’ Party. The tele­
gramme was dated July 12, 1957. This was a 
day when the CC of the Rumanian Party was not 
even together in order to pass a resolution on 
such a telegramme. But it had been together 
between July 1 and 3. Then it forgot to swear 
loyalty.
A fter what had happened, Gheorghiu-Dej could not expect much good from further 
cooperation with Khrushchev. What was left 
him as the only way of maintaining his power 
was loyalty to the spirit of orthodox Stalinism, 
at the expense of his loyalty to Moscow. So he 
set his party off on the road which led to the 
decisive step of April 1964. Such was the step 
that, when after six months Khrushchev was 
overthrown, it could no longer be reversed. The 
post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership treated, ac­
cording to all signs, the— then still rather fresh—  
separate road of Gheorghiu-Dej and his group 
as a course they had to take and with a lot of 
understanding. It took note that in such circum­
stances, in its new role, Rumania would not be
an easy partner in CMEA and in the Warsaw 
Pact, and would often be an expressly uncom­
fortable partner. There were three considera­
tions for treating this predictable (and actual) 
rebel attitude of Rumania with patience: 1. The 
Rumanian party leadership had earlier under­
taken a risk for the common cause, the over­
throw of Khrushchev, thereby getting into a 
handicapped position, from which it was flee­
ing, and thus went onto a forced path; 2. They 
did not have to fear the danger that the rebellion 
of the Rumanians would exceed the critical 
point (this was guaranteed by the political will 
of the Rumanian leaders and by the fact that the 
country was encircled); 3. For their rebellious 
behaviour the Rumanians could get western 
benefits from which even Moscow could profit.
Finally, considering the above, the question 
becomes justified whether if Khrushchev had 
been overthrown not in October 1964 but at the 
beginning of the year, let us say before March, 
Rumania would have undertaken the step of 
April 1964, which could no longer be reversed? 
It seems that it would not have done so. At least 
not as long as the policies of the Soviet Union 
were not hallmarked by a reform politician of 
the Gorbachev mould.
(Incidentally, numerous views have been 
published in connection with the April 1964 
resolution of the Rumanian W orkers’ Party, 
some in agreement and some in conflict with 
each other. Among these I recommed Kenneth 
Jowitt’s: “The Rumanian Communist Party and 
the World Socialist System. A Redefinition of 
Unity.” In: World Politics, Volume XXIII, 
Number 1, October 1970.)
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László Varga
Kádár’s Safe Conduct to Imre Nagy
Contemporary Hungarian and Yugoslav diplomatic papers
I n the evening of 2 November 1956 a Soviet IL -14 landed in Pula. The two passengers—  
N.S. Khrushchev, General Secretary of the 
CPSU, andG.M . Malenkov, Stalin’s successor 
who had almost been dismissed a year and a half 
earlier— had reached the town on the Yugoslav 
seaboard after a tiring, unpleasant flight. The 
turbulent air trip was then followed by a sea 
voyage, not a bit more pleasant, to Brioni, the 
residence of President Tito of Yugoslavia. The 
hardships endured, however, were compen­
sated by the results of the negotiations that 
lasted till the following dawn.
It was there that Khrushchev informed the 
Yugoslavs of the plan to crush the Hungarian 
revolt. The Yugoslavs had no major objection 
to the intervention. They were anxious lest 
unreserved acquiescence in the Soviet decision 
should prejudice relatively problem-free Yu­
goslav-American relations (Yugoslavia had 
signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the 
United States a few days earlier) or that it might 
damage the prestige which the Yugoslav lead­
ership enjoyed amongst the non-aligned na­
tions thanks to its war record and its resistance 
to Stalin.
Tito and his advisers argued against the Soviet 
plan on one point only. They opposed the Soviet 
choice of Ferenc Miinnich (a former exile in 
Moscow), as head of the new Hungarian Gov­
ernment and recommended János Kádár who, 
with Miinnich, was on Soviet territory at that 
time. Khrushchev unhesitatingly gave way and 
asked for something in return. They no longer 
had any influence on Prime Minister Imre Nagy
László Varga is a research fellow at the Insti­
tute of History of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, specialising in modern Hungarian 
history.
and the Hungarian Government. It would there­
fore be up to the Yugoslavs to ensure that Nagy 
and his associates be prevented from interfering 
with the future course of events.
Prim e M inister A lexander R ankovic 
promptly responded with a possible solution. 
He said that Zoltán Szántó, member of the 
Executive Committee of the recently formed 
HSWP, and also a former exile in Moscow had, 
before the Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations, made 
enquiries about the possibility of obtaining 
political asylum.
At the time of the Soviet military interven­
tion in Hungary on 4 November Dalibor 
Soldatic, the Yugoslav Ambassador in B udapest, 
had, therefore, acting on instructions received 
from Belgrade, offered political asylum to Prime 
Minister Imre Nagy and a number of his close 
associates. The second Soviet intervention was 
certainly not unexpected; Imre Nagy and his 
associates, in a state of shock, walked into the 
trap.
At the Yugoslav Embassy a message from 
Tito had awaited Imre Nagy. He did not simply 
offer the Prime Minister asylum but demanded 
his resignation. Since this attempt to induce 
Nagy to resign failed, the Soviet note of 7 
November addressed to Tito made the Imre 
Nagy affair a central issue of the relations 
between the two countries. Continuing the 
granting of asylum, the note stated, would 
make it obvious that Nagy had already earlier 
followed instructions from Yugoslavia.
Impossible as it had thus become for Yugo­
slavia to try and save face by neglecting to 
mention the agreement with the Soviet Union, 
it strove by all manner of means to improve the 
international standing of the Kádár Govern­
ment and thus dissipate the anxieties of the 
Soviet leadership. It was, however, easy to see 
that Yugoslavia was caught between two fires.
Earlier anti-Yugoslav accusations of 1948
195 6 101
were first rehashed by the Albanian leader, 
Enver Hoxha, when he argued against ques­
tioning the Soviet, the only road to salvation, 
and called upon the Yugoslavs to act in accor­
dance with a true proletarian spirit. It boded ill 
that the polemic by the Albanian party boss 
appeared in Pravda. Still graver accusations 
were expressed by French Communists who 
had labelled Yugoslavia a “perfidious agent of 
Western imperialism”. On the other hand the 
West accused Yugoslavia of giving up its anti­
interventionist position. On 8 November, in the 
midst of recurring attacks, Tito sent Khrushchev 
a message in which he showed readiness to 
settle the Imre Nagy business. The CPSU 
Central Committee approved a Soviet reply 
dated the day after, in which Khruschev et al. 
proposed that Nagy and his associates (and 
especially Géza Losonczy) should be trans­
ported to Rumania, pointing out at the same 
time that the Rumanian leaders had already 
agreed to this.
On 11th November Tito addressed Istrian party militants in Pula. Tito, in harmony 
with the official Hungarian position of that 
time, said that it was a tragedy that owing to the 
errors of Rákosi’s Stalinist regime “the work­
ing class and a great number of progressive- 
minded people had fought the Soviet armed 
forces” and that “reactionaries, since they found 
extremely fertile ground there”, had tried to 
exploit justified popular anger.
He also severely criticised Ernő Gerő, the 
former Hungarian party chief, especially for his 
radio address of 23 October: “Gerő got himself 
into a fix and showed his fangs again. He called 
a crowd of a hundred thousand a rabble, when 
all they did was to demonstrate, and he thus 
offended the whole Hungarian people”. Tito 
said it was a serious mistake to call on the army 
or to ask Soviet troops to help: “A spontaneous 
uprising followed, in which Communists found 
themselves, against their will, acting together 
with various reactionary elements... General 
indignation and an uprising against the rule of 
a clique turned into a revolt against Socialism 
and the Soviet Union”. What is more, even the 
Communists, fighting in the ranks of the people 
in revolt were, involuntarily, “clamouring for 
the return of the ancien regime”.
The logic o f this argument inevitably led to 
the denunciation of Imre Nagy, who had for a 
week already enjoyed Yugoslav asylum. Tito,
too, was inclined to interpret legitimacy in a 
peculiar way, arguing: “Nagy has run away and 
a new government has been formed”. Though 
Tito censured the first Soviet intervention, yet 
he called the second one, which took place on 
the 4th of November, a necessary measure, 
designed to prevent the outbreak of a new world 
war. Tito listed arguments employed in Hun­
gary as well (the form of address “comrade” 
was suppressed, Red Stars had been tom down), 
and he referred to lynching: “Had they been 
sporadic, and if one or another policeman with 
a bad reputation had been strung up, one might 
say it happened as a consequence of spontane­
ous indignation. But is was a wholesale mas­
sacre. In Sopron twenty Communists were 
hanged”.
This speech gave the first vague hint of secret 
negotiations between the Soviet and the Yugo­
slav leadership. But Tito (who said that the 
Soviet leaders had promised to withdraw their 
troops in due time) categorically denied the 
rumour that Belgrade had advised that these 
troops march in.
The essential flaw in the Yugoslav party 
ch ie f s train of thought was not that nobody had 
been hanged in Sopron, but that such tight rope 
walking had to end in a fall. Tito was of course 
discomfited by the instability o f János Kádár’s 
Hungarian leadership. The climax was his say­
ing “even though we oppose intervention, it 
must be said that Soviet interference was neces­
sary”.
At the time of T ito’s speech Micunovic, the 
Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, called on 
Khrushchev. During an unusually long conver­
sation Khrushchev— without, of course, know­
ing about the speech Tito was delivering prac­
tically at the same time— sharply criticised 
Yugoslavia and pointed out its inconsistency. 
He emphasised that, outside the West, it was the 
Yugoslavs alone that talked about Stalinism 
and de-Stalinisation and mentioned democracy 
and freedom of the press, albeit it was not 
difficult to see that the Yugoslav press was also 
under central control. Khrushchev mentioned 
the case of Milo van Djilas as a commendable 
limitation on freedom of speech. (To the greater 
glory of Yugoslav democracy, Djilas was ar­
rested eight days later.) Kádár in Budapest 
correctly interpreted the Tito speech as support­
ing him.
Owing to the delayed publication of Tito’s 
Pula speech, its substance did not become known
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in Moscow until the 17th of November and, it 
seems, took the Soviet leaders by surprise. 
T ito’s earlier message, in which he expressed 
his consent to the “peaceful” settlement of the 
Imre Nagy affair, deluded the Soviets into be­
lieving they might succeed in what Stalin had 
failed to achieve eight or nine years earlier. The 
Yugoslav leadership might be forced to throw 
in the towel to Moscow.
The 19th November issue of Pravda com­
mented on the speech with apparent irritation, 
and it was known in Yugoslavia that the anony­
mous journalist spoke in the name of the Presid­
ium of the CPSU. The article included every 
argument that would be used to back Soviet 
intervention, but it was extremely critical of 
people who directly or indirectly criticised the 
Soviet leadership or any other “friendly” coun­
try or Party. The Soviet Party paper, in inter­
preting Tito, took the side of those who argued 
that the Yugoslavs had played a crucial back­
ground role in the Polish and Hungarian events.
Despite all this, on 16 November (the very day of the publication of the Pula speech) 
an agreement was reached between the Y ugo- 
slav and the Hungarian Governments, repre­
sented by Soldatic and Kádár. The Yugoslav 
Ambassador saw two ways of resolving the in­
creasingly intolerable situation. The Hungarian 
Government must guarantee the safety of those 
at the Embassy or consent to their leaving for 
Yugoslavia. Although the Hungarian authori­
ties would rather have Imre Nagy and his group 
go to Rumania, it was nevertheless agreed ulti­
mately that the persons in the Embassy should 
return home as early as next day. Kádár, Chair­
man of the Revolutionary W orkers’ and Peas­
ants’ Government, committed himself to con­
firming in writing the assurance given to Imre 
Nagy and his associates. Though Kádár pointed 
out to the Yugoslav Ambassador that, for the 
time being, this was only his personal opinion, 
it was evident that Khrushchev, at least tacitly, 
had likewise accepted this solution.
According to the Yugoslavs, it was probably 
due to a more thorough analysis of Tito’s Pula 
speech in Moscow that on the day after, the 
Hungarian Government unexpectedly set new 
conditions, demanding essentially that Nagy 
and Losonczy should resign their ministerial 
office and declare that they would join the 
Hungarian Government in its struggle against 
the Counter-Revolution, exercise self-criticism
and undertake not to do anything hostile to the 
Hungarian Government. The conditions stipu­
lated by the Kádár Government also included 
that Nagy, Losonczy and the others should seek 
asylum in one of the Socialist countries until the 
situation in Hungary was settled.
The Imre Nagy group refused to accept these 
conditions.
The next day the Yugoslav Government sent 
the Kádár Government a note requesting settle­
ment of the issue (see Document 1). This note 
was personally presented to János Kádár in 
Budapest, by Deputy Under Secretary for For­
eign Affairs Dobrivoje Vidic. In the meantime 
three of the persons least concerned (György 
Lukács, Zoltán Szántó and Zoltán Vas) and 
their wives left the Embassy but, as it turned 
out, did not reach their homes. They were 
arrested by the Russians in the vicinity of the 
Embassy. The Yugoslav Government stated in 
the aforesaid note that it had had no part in any 
of the activities of the “Nagy group” or with 
events in Hungary. It was interested only in “an 
agreed friendly solution regarding the issue of 
asylum”.
The Yugoslav Government refused to take 
up a position regarding the new demands of 
November 17, stating in the note that this was 
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of 
Hungary: “What is left for us to do under these 
circumstances is only to repeat our proposal 
that your Government shall give our Govern­
ment a written guarantee for the personal safety 
of Imre Nagy and his associates... to the effect 
that they may freely leave the Embassy of the 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and 
return to their respective homes”.
After his arrival at Budapest, Deputy Under 
Secretary Vidic talked to Kádár on three occa­
sions (see Documents 2-4). He tried to make 
Kádár understand that Yugoslavia had from the 
beginning endeavoured to help him, and it was 
for this very reason that Imre Nagy and his 
associates had been granted asylum at the 
Y ugoslav Embassy. On the other hand, Kádár—  
like the leader of every puppet government in 
history— felt aggrieved at the fact that the 
Yugoslavs were bargaining with the Soviets 
behind his back, although he had such bargain­
ing to thank for is own position.
Kádár was extremely worried about the New 
York activity of Anna Kéthly (the Imre Nagy 
Government’s Social Democrat Minister of 
State). Anna Kéthly, who could not return to
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Budapest from the Vienna meeting of the So­
cialist International because of the Soviet inter­
vention, intended to represent the legitimate 
Imre Nagy Government in the United Nations. 
This was precisely why Kádár insisted— to no 
avail— on the resignation of Imre Nagy. Such a 
resignation would have made it impossible for 
Anna Kéthly to represent Hungary at the U.N.
In his reply dated 21 November (see Docu­
ment 5) János Kádár finally clearly gave his 
assent: “With a view to closing the affair the 
Hungarian Government— going along with the 
Yugoslav Government’s suggestion made in 
the eighth paragraph on page 3 of its note 
addressed to me on 18 November— hereby 
repeats in writing its repeated verbal declara­
tion that it does not wish to punish Imre Nagy 
and members of his group for acts they commit­
ted in the past. We understand that in this way 
the asylum offered to the group will come to an 
end, that they themselves will leave the Yugo­
slav Embassy and be free to go home”. In his 
letter, however, Kádár rejected the Yugoslav 
Government’s position that asylum had been 
granted only to private individuals. In his opin­
ion “Imre Nagy and his associates had asked for 
asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest 
with a political purpose”.
O n hearing of the agreement, Ambassador Micunovic in Moscow heaved a sigh of 
relief in the hope that it might put a stop to the 
worsening of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. It 
cannot be altogether clarified whether Yugo­
slav politicians, better informed than Micunovic, 
gave credence to the Hungarian Government’s 
promise. In Budapest Imre Nagy and his asso­
ciates were shown the letter containing the 
agreement the very same day and told they 
would be taken home the day after. On the other 
hand, nothing was said about the fact that three 
days earlier György Lukács and others had been 
arrested by the Russians. A number of small 
signs also pointed to serious doubts. Miklós 
Vásárhelyi, who had been unable to get to the 
Embassy on the 4th of November and thus 
found refuge at the home of two Yugoslav 
diplomats, talked to Vidic after the agreement 
had been reached and was not reassured by the 
words of the Deputy Under Secretary. On the 
following day he also was taken quite unrea­
sonably not to his own home but to the Yugo­
slav Embassy. There, however, according to 
those who were present, neither Ambassador
Soldatic nor Imre Nagy had any illusions about 
the future. (See Box.) Soldatic offered Imre 
Nagy an opportunity of staying on at the Em­
bassy, but Nagy said he wished to share the fate 
of his associates.
The bus which was to take the group home 
took on its passengers on 22 November at 6.30 
p.m. in front of the Yugoslav Embassy build­
ing. Soviet soldiers seized the vehicle and, after 
ordering the Yugoslav journalists and diplo­
mats who had intended to accompany the group 
to leave, took the Hungarian politicians and 
their families to the Soviet military base at 
Mátyásföld on the outskirts of Budapest. There 
they met the three men and their wives who had 
supposedly returned home earlier. Later Ferenc 
Miinnich showed up there, but his offer of a 
compromise was rejected by Imre Nagy. Thus, 
on the next day, 23 November, all of them were 
transported by plane to Rumania.
At midnight on the 22nd of November the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade an­
nounced that an agreement had been made with 
the Hungarian Government and published the 
list of those who “had left” the Embassy in 
Budapest. The next day Assistant Secretary 
Vidic in Belgrade summoned the Hungarian 
Chargé d ’Affairs Kuti and handed him a Yugo­
slav note asking for immediate information 
about the fate of the abducted persons demand­
ing the fulfilment of the agreement, and empha­
sising that the abduction had a negative effect 
on relations between the two countries and was 
contrary to the norms of international law. The 
same day Ambassador Soldatic handed János 
Kádár a protest note of identical purport (see 
Document 6).
On 22-23 November the avalanche rolled 
on. On the 23rd the Kádár Government issued 
an official communiqué asserting that two 
weeks earlier Imre Nagy had asked to be al­
lowed to leave the country. In spite of the 
deceitful communiqué the abduction gave rise 
to indignation all over the country. The Central 
W orkers’ Council of Greater Budapest de­
manded an explanation personally from János 
Kádár— without an effective result.
On 24 November the Yugoslav press re­
ported in detail on the abduction of Imre Nagy 
and his group and on the stir it created in 
Budapest. Belying T ito’s Pula speech, the 
newspapers wrote that “Imre Nagy is undoubt­
edly the most popular political figure in the 
country, he enjoys high prestige as well as the
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The Coach-Ride
A crowd had gathered around Imre Nagy. They stood there in the embassy hall and listened to his argument with the Ambassador. I think they spoke 
half in French, and half in Russian. The trouble was that the Ambassador’s Russian 
was not very good, nor was Imre Nagy’s French, which made the argument a long, 
drawn out one. Many got bored, me too; I took the two children by the hand, and 
went out into the street. There I boarded the curtained coach that was parked there. 
The two children ran ahead and found a place. I bent down to the driver and asked 
him if he knew his way around Budapest. He just sat there, as if he were carved 
out of stone and did not answer. I got suspicious and peered below his helmet— 
he was wearing the sort of helmet that motorcyclists do now, and I saw a typically 
Russian face.
In my fright I dragged the children off the coach and rushed back inside where 
the argument was still going on. I pushed through the crowd and said: “Let’s not 
go out, Uncle Imre. They will kidnap us.” He answered: “I know dear, the 
Ambassador knows it too, that is why he is urging us not to go out. But it is my 
opinion that we must confront our fate now. You know best”—me and Julia had 
busied ourselves in the kitchen, helping the woman to look after all these people, 
cooking, washing up, laying the table—“how we stand when it comes to food. The 
children are in danger of going hungry, we’ll have to go out.”
With that the discussion had come to an end. Everyone picked up the small 
parcel the cook had prepared for every single family. Of course all there was in 
them was tins, so we’d have tinned food at least, wherever we might get to.
We boarded the coach. At the gate I was surprised that Miklós Vásárhelyi was 
there too, whom we had not seen in all the time we were there. We all got in. Jóska 
had another try, he took out the list someone had given him inside, with all the 
addresses on it, and then my husband asked the driver, ’’Are you familiar with 
Budapest?” Losonczy spoke to him: “Jóska, can’t you see he’s a Russian?” A 
Hungarian soldier armed with a submachine-gun was there in the coach too, 
making it obvious that we were being abducted.
The coach with us inside was off at full speed. Me and my children were in the 
back seat, Szilárd Újhelyi was next to me and said: “Ella, turn round!” I drew the 
curtain and faced the following scene: a Russian armoured car was approaching 
from the Park, and another from the Nefelelejts or the Damjanich utca, I cannot 
remember which. They stopped on the carriageway, facing each other, and cut us 
off from the two Embassy cars that had been following us. They could no longer 
do so and could no longer see where they were taking us.
Ella Szilágyi is widow o f József Szilágyi, co-defendant in the Imre Nagy trial, who 
was sentenced to death and executed in April 1958. She remembers in Judit 
Ember’s documentary film, Menedékjog— 1956 (The right to asylum—1956).
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sympathies of even those who blame him for 
one or another step he took in the days beween 
24 October and 4 November... The passengers 
on that notorious bus were exclusively Com­
munists, mostly militant opponents of Rákosi’s.”
There is no doubt that the Imre Nagy affair 
grew in importance and became a sort of touch­
stone by which Yugoslav-Soviet relations could 
be judged. Khrushchev and his advisors reck­
oned that the trap called asylum would force 
Yugoslavia to return to the fold. On the other 
hand, Tito and his comrades would have been 
disposed to comply only if the Soviet Union 
granted in return a kind of autonomous status 
within the Peace Camp. During the following 
one and a half to two years both sides made 
several attempts to attain their original goals, 
but the results were temporary at best. Relations 
between the two countries were to reach a new 
all-time low— and this can even be considered 
symbolic— precisely after the execution of Imre 
Nagy and his associates.
Since the Kádár Government was fighting 
for its mere existence, Yugoslav support had an 
extraordinarily positive role to play in this re­
spect. When forced to choose however, there 
was no doubt that Kádár would give up Tito. 
Over and above this, of course, the Imre Nagy 
affair also had serious domestic political impli­
cations. Of the two governments— that of Imre 
Nagy and that of Kádár— only one could be 
legitimate, and Imre Nagy’s popularity sur­
passing that any one had enjoyed earlier, im­
plied a threat to Kádár’s Revolutionary Work­
ers’ and Peasants’ Government. János Kádár, in 
an odd way, tried to extract political mileage out 
of the peculiar way in which the Imre Nagy 
affair was settled.
“We have succeeded in proving”, Kádár told 
Western journalists a few days after the abduc­
tion, “that it was not us who had discarded Imre 
Nagy and his group, with whom we had coop­
erated earlier, but it was they who initiated the 
break with us, actually in a highly unpopular 
way: they washed their hands of Hungary by 
expressing the desire to leave the country— not 
for ever but till the situation was settled”.
These last words of Kádár’s proved to be 
true.
G yula Horn, Foreign Minister in the Német Government, when on a visit to Belgrade 
in 1989, and while the political changes leading 
to democracy in Hungary were in full flow, 
asked that the 1956 Yugoslav documents relat­
ing to Hungary be made available. The Yugo­
slav Government partly compiled with the rather 
unusual— though no longer unique— request, 
and handed over some of the papers.
The documents include some of the reports 
of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest, the 
texts of diplomatic notes, as well as Yugoslav 
aide mémoires related to Hungarian-Yugoslav 
negotiations. The Hungarian Ministry of For­
eign Affairs placed the papers received from 
Belgrade at the disposal of the Institute for 
History of the Hungarian Academy of Sci­
ences. Three historians, József Kis, István Vida 
and myself, intend to arrange the publication 
of the whole documentary material, com­
plete with obtainable Hungarian diplomatic 
sources.
Anticipating the Hungarian publication we 
now publish six documents of particular rele­
vance which were to determine eventually the 
fate of Prime Minister Imre Nagy and his asso­
ciates.
The first and the last two documents come 
from Hungarian archives, while the other three 
are Y ugoslav aide mémoires of the negotiations 
conducted by the two Governments between 
the 19th and 21 st November 1956, and thus are 
among the papers delivered by the Yugoslav 
Government.
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Hungarian-Yugoslav Negotiations, November 1956
Six docum ents
On 16 November the Yugoslav Ambassador, Dalibor Soldatic, and Prime Minister János Kádár 
made an agreement to the effect that Imre Nagy and his associates should be allowed to leave the 
Yugoslav Embassy in safety. On 17 November, however, János Kádár demanded, as a condition 
for the agreement, the resignation of Imre Nagy. It was under these circumstances that Yugoslav 
Deputy Prime Minister Edward Kardelj wrote the following letter which the Deputy Under 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Dobrivoje Vidic handed to Kádár personally in Budapest on 19 
November 1956.
Belgrade, 18 November 1956
Revolutionary W orkers’ and Peasants’ Gov­
ernment of the Hungarian People’s Republic 
Budapest
Comrade Prime Minister,
We have been informed by Comrade Dalibor 
Soldatic, our Ambassador in Budapest that, on 
17 November this year, you had summoned him 
and stated your position on a possible solution 
of the question of granting asylum to Imre 
Nagy, and another 15 persons, as well as their 
families, in the building of our Embassy in 
Budapest:
Nagy and Losonczy must resign the offices 
they hold in the Government, they must make a 
statement to the effect that they agree with the 
fight waged by your Government against the 
Counter-Revolution. They must exercise self- 
criticism with regard totheir earlier actions, and 
undertake not to engage in any action hostile to 
your Government.
At the same time you expressed your view 
and request that, until the situation in your 
country is settled, Nagy, Losonczy, Haraszti, 
Donáth, Jánossy, Tánczos, Szilágyi and Júlia 
Rajk should seek asylum in one of the socialist 
countries.
Bearing in mind that the government of the 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia has 
had no part in any of the activities of the Imre 
Nagy group, or in what has happened in your 
country, and since it is interested only in an 
agreed friendly solution regarding the issue of 
asylum, the present note aims to set out the
whole case in some detail as well as to formu­
late certain proposals.
On 2 November, Zoltán Szántó had a conver­
sation with the head of our diplomatic mission 
in Budapest. On that occasion Zoltán Szántó 
expressed the desire that he and a number of 
other Communists should, if possible, leave the 
buildings of the Government and the Central 
Committee and seek asylum at our Embassy, in 
case reactionary gangs with a pogrom in mind 
endangered their lives. In the afternoon of 3 
November, our diplomatic representative re­
plied to Szántó that we were ready to grant 
asylum on condition that it would be taken up 
right away. We expected him to answer by 
Sunday, 4 November. By that time, however, 
operations by the Soviet Army had already 
begun, and talks about the granting of asylum 
could not be concluded. Instead, early in the 
morning of the same day, in accordance with 
previous talks, Nagy, Szántó as well as 14 other 
Government and Party leaders, together with 
their families, went to the Embassy.
In the meantime your Revolutionary Work­
ers’ and Peasants’ Government was formed. 
We supported it right from the beginning in the 
conviction that the continued progress of so­
cialism in the Hungarian People’s Republic 
was of great impotance to peace in this part of 
the world as well as for the international work­
ing-class movement. This and the explicit sup­
port which Josip Broz Tito, President of the 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 
pledged to your Government in his speech at 
Pula on 11 November of this year clearly indi­
cates that the granting of asylum to Imre Nagy 
and his group means that our Government wishes 
to keep its word, and fulfil its obligations under 
international law.
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Being aware of your interest conceived in the 
best sense that the question of asylum should be 
solved with a view to the consolidation of 
conditions in Hungary; moreover bearing in 
mind that it is not a matter of indifference for us 
either in what way that situation in the Hungar­
ian People’s Republic will be consolidated, and 
in order that friendly relations between our 
countries are maintained and developed fur­
ther— we have forwarded your various propos­
als to Nagy, Losonczy and the others.
We have explained to them that asylum and 
exile are not a genuine solution.
They have informed us that they now con­
sider certain points in the programme of the 
former Imre Nagy Government to have been 
unreasonable and damaging to Hungary. 
(Neutrality, immediate withdrawal from the 
Warsaw Pact, immediate evacuation of Soviet 
troops from Hungary, a multiparty system, etc.)
Imre Nagy and the group staying at our 
Embassy also take the view that the settling of 
the situation in Hungary requires that they res­
ume normal life. They have expressed their 
wish and readiness— provided their personal 
safety is guaranteed— to live in Hungary and to 
return to their homes after leaving the Yugoslav 
Embassy in Budapest.
On Friday, the 16th of November, our 
Ambassador, Comrade Soldatic, informed you 
of the views of Imre Nagy and his associates. At 
the same time he repeated our proposal that 
your Government give the Yugoslav Govern­
ment an assurance that Imre Nagy, and the 
others, might leave our Embassy and freely 
return, with a guarantee of their personal safety, 
to their respective homes.
Upon concluding the talks with Soldatic you 
agreed on giving the Government of the Federal 
People ’ s Republic of Yugoslavia a guarantee in 
writing for the personal safety of Imre N agy and 
his associates; you stated at the same time that, 
in your opinion, they would be in a position to 
leave our Embassy probably as early as the 
morning of 17 November. What remained to be 
done was for you to forward the promised 
written assurance to the Yugoslav Government.
Our Ambassador informed his Government, 
Imre Nagy and the others, of your position. 
Thus, on 16 November of this year, we were 
under the impression that the question of asy­
lum granted to the said group had been dealt 
with definitively and favourably in accordance 
with the interests of both the Federal People’s
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Hungarian 
People’s Republic.
On 17 November of this year, however, you 
summoned Ambassador Soldatic and informed 
him of the new conditions mentioned in the 
introduction of this note.
We must state with profound regret that your 
new conditions have put further difficulties in 
the way of a solution.
As we have already observed by way of 
introduction, the Government of the Federal 
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia had no part in 
the activities of the Imre Nagy group or in 
events in your country; this means that the only 
interest it has is to achieve an agreed friendly 
solution exclusively regarding the issue of 
asylum. Consequently the conditions which 
you have stipulated cannot concern the Govern­
ment of the Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Our Government is in no position 
to exercise any further influence on Imre Nagy 
and his associates. In its view the questions 
raised by you when talking to Soldatic on 17 
November concern your mutual relationship 
and matters exclusively within the domestic 
jurisdiction of Hungary.
What is left for us to do under such circum­
stances is only to repeat our proposal that your 
Government give our Government a written 
guarantee regarding the personal safety of Imre 
Nagy and his associates, to the effect that they 
may freely leave the Embassy of the Federal 
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and return to 
their respective homes.
As regards the statements which you ask of 
Imre Nagy and Losonczy, this is a matter within 
the discretion of the persons in question and is, 
we repeat, exclusively your business.
We request you to advise us of your deci­
sions on our aforementioned proposals.
In connection with the above issue we wish 
to inform you that, on 16 No vember of this year, 
the First Secretary to the Central Committee of 
the Rumanian W orkers’ Party, Comrade Ghe- 
orghe Gheorghiu-Dej, had a conversation with 
N ikola V ujanovic, our A m bassador in 
Bucharest, whom he requested on that occas- 
sion to inform President Tito that on Monday, 
19 November, or on Tuesday, 20 November, he 
would go to B udapest and try to help to reach an 
agreed solution. Gheorghiu-Dej is of the view 
that it would be best;
a) if Nagy and a few members of his group 
were given asylum and stayed in the Rumanian
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People’s Republic until the situation in Hun­
gary had settled. They will be assured an un­
hampered life and all kinds of assistance, con­
cerning which the Government of the People’s 
Republic o f Rumania is willing to give our 
Government a written guarantee; or
b) if Imre Nagy exercised self-criticism in 
the form of a statement which expressed sup­
port for your Government and then continued to 
stay in your country.
Gheorghiu-Dej expressed the opinion at the 
same time that the first solution was the better 
and he asked our Government to give him an 
urgent reply.
On 17 November of this year, the govern­
ment of the Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia despatched, through Ambassador 
Vujanovic, its reply informing Gheorghiu-Dej 
on the circumstances under which asylum was 
granted; then it notified him of the following:
a) The Government of the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia has no objection to 
Imre Nagy and the others leaving for Rumania. 
It is up to them to decide.
b) It is willing to agree that, subject to your
Government’s approval, Gheorghiu-Dej, or 
members of his delegation, should meet Nagy.
c) This is to inform you as well concerning 
our readines, o f which we have informed 
Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej.
d) Comrade Gomulka, the First Secretary of 
the Polish United W orkers’ Party, told Mila- 
tovic, our Ambassador in Warsaw, that it would 
be best for you to come to an agreement with 
Nagy. Should this not be feasible it would still 
be right to enable him and the others to live as 
free men in Hungary; we herewith inform you 
about this as well.
The Government of the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia, attaching particular 
importance to the matter, has instructed 
Dobrivoje Vidic, Deputy Undersecretary of 
State in the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, to 
hand over this note, furnish all necessary sup­
plementary information and receive your reply.
Federal Executive Council 
of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugosla­
via
Yours respectfully 
(signed): Edvard Kardelj
2.
Vidic presented Kardelj’s letter to Kádár on the day of his arrival. István Dobi, Chairman of the 
Presidential Council which functioned as a collective head of State, took part in the negotiations, 
on behalf of Hungary. He was not a Party member and formerly had been a member of the 
Smallholders’ Party. He had played a major part in the Communist takeover of 1947/48. A similar 
role had been played also by György Marosán, earlier a Social Democrat, who likewise participated 
in the negotiations. Notwithstanding the services he had rendered the Communists he had been 
imprisoned from 1951 to 1956. After his release he again joined the Communist leadership, in 
which he was renowned as a fanatical hard liner. At the time of the negotiations in question he was 
a member of the Hungarian Revolutionary W orkers’ and Peasants’ Government. Deputy Foreign 
Minister István Sebes, also a Communist politician of long standing, represented Foreign Minister 
Imre Horváth at the talks.
Aide memoire
concerning a conversation between Comrade 
Dobrivoje Vidic, Deputy Undersecretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, and János Kádár, 
Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary 
W orkers’ and Peasants’ Government, held in 
Budapest on 19 November 1956.
Also present, with the consent of Comrade 
Vidic, were István Dobi, President of the Presi­
dential Council of the Hungarian People’s
Republic; Minister of State Marosán, on behalf 
of the Government; Deputy Foreign Minister 
Sebes (Hungary) and Dalibor Soldatic, Ambas­
sador to Hungary of the Federal People’s Re­
public of Yugoslavia, and Secretary M. 
Zigmund, as interpreter (Yugoslavia).
Comrade Vidic handed Kádár the Yugoslav 
Government’s note concerning the request of 
Imre Nagy and associates for asylum, and stated
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that he was in a position to offer all the neces­
sary information in connection with the note 
and that he was at the service of Comrade Kádár 
and his Government in the interest of a solution 
of the matter. His duties include, if possible, to 
receive the Hungarian Government’s reply to 
the Yugoslav Government.
Kádár then read out aloud the Hungarian 
translation of the Yugoslav Government note. 
In connection with that note Kádár had only one 
remark to make: in the course of his talk with 
Soldatic on the 16th inst., when Soldatic ac­
quainted him with the proposal of the Yugoslav 
Government, he (Kádár) pointed out that he 
was pleased with the stated position and thought 
that in this way it would become possible to 
solve the question. But he had also mentioned 
that this was his personal opinion, and he was 
still considering it, he would talk it over with 
others as well, and thought he would be in a 
position to answer in a very short time. But he 
was able to give his answer only on the occasion 
of their next talk, when he likewise raised 
questions contained in the note, too. For this 
reason he remarked right away that it was only 
during a later talk with Soldatic that he became 
aware that the Ambassador had informed his 
Government of his (Kádár’s) acceptance of the 
Yugoslav Government’s proposal. Kádár said 
that he parted with Soldatic on the understand­
ing that he would give a definitive answer only 
after having consulted his comrades. This has 
led to a misunderstanding.
When resuming their conversation, Kádár 
had stated that the second issue was the follow­
ing: a prompt solution was of particular impor­
tance to Hungary for certain reasons of domes­
tic politics, which he had earlier explained to 
Comrade Soldatic. While wrestling with seri­
ous issues in the present, grave stituation, they 
were compelled to spend one third of their 
working time on the solution of this problem. 
With respect to Hungarian-Yugoslav relations, 
this problem was of secondary importance, but 
it was a troublesome one which hindered coop­
eration. As regards the reply to the Yugoslav 
Government’s note, Kádár asked Yugoslavia to 
agree that he should consult other members of 
his Government first, and reply later.
Comrade Vidic spoke next. He said he was 
fully aware of the problem, he was familiar with 
the views of all Yugoslav comrades; he wished, 
in a frank and friendly conversation, to express 
his regret that this case has become a problem
for Hungary and for them, especially for them: 
“Comrade Kádár and the other comrades can be 
assured by my declaration that we received 
Imre Nagy and his associates into our Embassy, 
and granted them asylum, because we thought 
this was the way we could help them in the 
situation that existed in Hungary at that time. 
This was our only motive, since we have no 
other ideas or aims, we only wished to over­
come the predicament that had come about 
around the 4th of November.”
Comrade Vidic conveyed to Comrade Kádár 
and the others the opinion of all leading Yugo­
slav comrades. They categorically rejected any 
possible suspicion and doubt concerning the 
keeping of Imre Nagy at their Embassy as 
something like a Government in reserve. 
(Marosán interrupted by saying that nobody 
had ever thought that.) Comrade Vidic contin­
ued by pointing out that the highest-ranking 
Soviet comrades knew well the motives under­
lying the Yugoslav act of granting Nagy asy­
lum. On the night from the 2nd to the 3rd of 
November they held the same opinion, namely 
that, with a view to strengthening the Kádár 
Government it might be as well to have Imre 
Nagy removed in one way or another. Comrade 
Vidic supposed that Comrade Kádár and the 
others knew that. That this is really so can be 
shown by a number of facts.
To Kádár’s question, what the term “re­
moved” meant, Comrade Vidic replied as fol­
lows: “If Imre Nagy stood aside and vacated his 
post, this would facilitate the formation of the 
new Revolutionary W orkers’ and Peasants’ 
Government in order to prevent the existence of 
two governments.” (Marosán interjected that in 
reality there are two governments, but Kádár 
maintains that this is not true.) Vidic went on 
and said he agreed with Kádár. The fact is that 
Kádár’s Government took an oath of office 
before the Presidential Council, it is acting 
legally and there can be no doubt in this respect. 
(Marosán again interrupted to point out that this 
is legally true.) Vidic continued and stated that, 
according to international law, this was the 
fundamental issue, the rest is domestic busi­
ness.
Kádár asked to make a comment: he declared 
that there is a government of which it is said that 
it has fallen apart. This view has been taken by 
the countries which recognise his Government, 
those which want socialism to continue. Ac­
cording to Hungarian law, only one govern-
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ment existed. The fact was, however, that the 
former head of government, who is staying at 
the Yugoslav Embassy, at the diplomatic mis­
sion of a friendly country, has not yet declared 
that he had ceased to be Prime Minister. This is 
why Anna Kéthly had risen to speak at the 
United Nations claiming that Foreign Minister 
Imre Horváth was not authorised to represent 
the Hungarian Government, since Imre Nagy 
had recalled him; she, on the other hand, was 
entitled to represent that Government because 
she had received authorisation from Imre Nagy; 
she regarded Imre Nagy as the legitimate head 
of the Hungarian Government, etc. Kádár now 
proceeded to state that Comrade Marosán was 
wrong to claim that there were two govern­
ments because according to Hungarian law 
only one government existed. Kádár stressed: 
“Those who do not sympathise with Hungary 
have a chance of doubting this, therefore this 
matter is also of foreign policy significance. W e 
might suitably refute these arguments and repel 
such intrigues. Our hands, however, are tied 
since Imre Nagy is at the Yugoslav Embassy. 
Such things being unknown inside the country 
they are particularly damaging, since it is im­
possible to do anything about them.”
Comrade Vidic said he was not fully ac­
quainted with Hungarian law, but he tried to 
give a Yugoslav interpretation as regards the 
situation of the former Imre Nagy Government: 
that Government existed no longer. The new 
Government set up by the Presidential Council 
had taken the oath of office before that Council. 
It is this administration that the Government of 
the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
recognises as the legitimate Hungarian Gov­
ernment, and this Government is recognised by 
all friendly countries. As regards those who are 
out to take advantage of this situation— and it is 
presumed that they do so since they assume a 
hostile attitude towards Hungary— this matter 
can be settled by issuing a decree of the Presi­
dential Council on the Imre Nagy Govern­
ment’s dismissal from office and on the ap­
pointment of the new Government. From the 
legal position this is a simple affair, since it is 
the truth. As far as those different elements are 
concerned who, according to Kádár, would 
misuse this situation, the Yugoslav Govern­
ment will not join them in any respect. The 
Yugoslav Government’s note has been moti­
vated by its search for a solution. It is anxious to 
get out of this predicament, and so is the other
side, therefore it has to examine what could be 
done in the interest of both sides. Comrade 
Vidic added that he must revert to what he had 
already said, namely that the reasons for grant­
ing asylum to Imre Nagy and his associates are 
clear, and he expects the (Hungarian) comrades 
to believe him that Yugoslavia does not con­
template leaving any aspect of the question 
unsolved. This is demonstrated also by the 
following: on the night between the 2nd and the 
3rd of November, when the Soviet comrades 
had a talk with the Yugoslav leaders, it was the 
Yugoslav comrades who suggested that Imre 
Nagy’s Government should be removed and 
thus excluded— of course, in the interest of the 
formation of the new Government; on this point 
the Yugoslav and the Soviet comrades fully 
agreed. Vidic said he did not wish to be misun­
derstood, but it is a fact that the leading Yugo­
slav comrades had given as their opinion that in 
these difficult days the best solution would be 
for Comrade Kádár to form the new Hungarian 
Government. The Soviet comrades know this 
full well. Thus our relation to Kádár and his 
Government, just as to Imre Nagy, is quite 
clear.
Kádár stated that he had earlier told Comrade 
Soldatic that the Yugoslav comrades’ opinion 
on the situation in Hungary had been known on 
the 3rd of November in view of the fact that, 
when the suggestion was made that a new 
government should be formed in Hungary, the 
position adopted by the friendly parties and 
countries was not indifferent to him (Kádár) 
and to the other comrades who had taken the 
initiative, thus his personal determination and 
decision were influenced by the fact that the 
Soviet and Yugoslav Communists as well as the 
Communists of other socialist countries were of 
one mind about this matter. In this way they had 
got into a still more awkward position owing to 
a fact unknown to them: it had surprised them 
that the Imre Nagy group had gone to the 
Yugoslav Embassy and was then staying there. 
This created a situation whose implications had 
very unpleasant and alarming effects both in 
Hungary and abroad.
Comrade Dobi mentioned the well-known 
activity displayed by different parties when the 
establishment of a multi-party system had been 
announced. The Smallholders Party had been 
so active that it seemed to sweep away all other 
political parties. The leader of the Smallhold­
ers, Tildy, who was a member of the Imre Nagy
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cabinet, had been with him (Dobi) and Imre 
Nagy on the morning when they had gone down 
to the upper ground floor of the Parliament 
building. Imre Nagy had gripped his suitcase 
and had started after them. When Tildy had 
turned round and looked back, he no longer saw 
Imre Nagy, who had vanished down a passage. 
Tildy was left alone with his wife and— though 
noted for his piety— he had cursed furiously, 
practically beside himself, in Dobi’s presence 
and had even wept, crying out what kind of man 
Imre Nagy was to abandon him in this way. This 
was important because rumours were circulat­
ing everywhere on how and in what way Imre 
Nagy had made his escape to the Yugoslav 
Embassy.
Comrade Vidic stated that Comrade Tito 
also maintained that Imre Nagy had fled, and, as 
far as he (Vidic) knew, Nagy was exasperated 
by Comrade T ito’s opinion. He referred to 
Comrade Kádár’s statement that he had gained 
moral strength from, and that his personal deci­
sions had been influenced by, his awareness of 
being supported by the Communist Parties. 
Since it was understood that there was no prob­
lem between the Hungarian and the Yugoslav 
comrades, Vidic thought that this issue had 
been clarified.
As to the issue raised by Comrade Dobi, who 
had vividly discussed the growing role and 
ambitions of the Smallholders Party, Comrade 
Vidic presumed that the Hungarian comrades 
knew that the Yugoslav leadership had never 
agreed to, and (in respect of lending assistance) 
had never approved of, a multi-party system in 
the sense that Imre Nagy restored it. In Yugo­
slavia it was felt at once that this might put an 
end to socialism in Hungary and would let loose 
the bourgeois and reactionary forces in the 
country.
Kádár interposed that this precisely would 
have been the case if a secret ballot had brought 
back capitalism. Marosán remarked: it would 
have been a come-back not only for capitalism 
but also for nationalism and chauvinism, which 
might become dangerous to all neighbouring 
countries.
Comrade Vidic added that this would have 
happened, and the bourgeois parties, through a 
secret ballot envisaged by Imre Nagy, would 
have swept away both Imre Nagy and the 
Communists in Hungary. He also shared 
Comrade M arosán’s view that it would have 
been highly likely for nationalist passions to
have been freed and he went on: “We in Yugo­
slavia can understand this clearly since, as neigh­
bours and as Communists, we are interested in 
protecting socialist and friendly Hungary, just 
as we are certain that the Hungarian people and 
their Government are interested in maintaining 
friendly relations with Yugoslavia. For this 
reason I think the Imre Nagy affair, because of 
which I have travelled here, is something we 
can and must deal with, for the above reason as 
well, as soon as possible.
Vidic asked the comrades, however, to un­
derstand that the Imre Nagy business was an 
issue of high moral significance to Yugoslavia. 
A promise relating to asylum is an obligation 
that derives from international law. He has 
every understanding for the question raised by 
Comrade Kádár as to the aspect concerning the 
possible resignation of Imre Nagy and Los- 
onczy and the statements to be made by them, 
but these cannot concern the Yugoslav Govern­
ment. It is unable to compel Imre Nagy to make 
such a statement. Comrade Kádár must be aware 
of this, as he had already been informed by 
Soldatic, who told him that everything possible 
had been done by the Yugoslavs to convince 
Imre Nagy, Losonczy and the others that at the 
time when they were members of the Govern­
ment, their ideas had not been reasonable, they 
had damaged the interests of Hungarian social­
ism in respect of questions such as, e.g., free 
elections, the senseless requirement of solving 
within 24 hours questions of such great 
consquence to the balance of forces in Europe 
as neutrality, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact 
and the immediate evacuation of Soviet troops 
from Hungary.
The Yugoslavs have endeavoured to per­
suade those persons to understand this, and are 
pleased to be able to inform Comrade Kádár 
that Nagy, Losonczy and the others— having 
been concvinced during those talks— had 
admitted the unreasonableness and damaging 
effects of their ideas. “When w enoticed”, Vidic 
continues, “that Imre Nagy and his group began 
to look more realistically at the problem of the 
concrete interests of socialism in Hungary, we 
thought it would be easy to solve those ques­
tions which did not concern Yugoslavia, i. e. the 
relationship between Nagy, Losonczy and as­
sociates and the Government of Comrade Kádár, 
and vice versa. The only problem left to us has 
been to find a solution to those people leaving 
the Embassy in accordance with the moral and
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legal obligations o f Yugoslavia. This is why 
we, as a state, cannot deal with what Imre Nagy 
is ready to do in respect of supporting the Kádár 
Government, of making public statements, etc. 
We think this is entirely an internal matter 
which the Hungarian comrades must deal with 
themselves. Of course, it would serve the inter­
ests of stabilization and Socialism if they were 
ready in this situation to render assistance in 
one form or another, but this is their own affair. 
The impressions and the opinion of the leading 
Yugoslav comrades are, however, that Nagy, 
Losonczy and their associates are, according to 
every indication and their intentions, honest 
Communists. We have to suppose that some­
time soon— upon leaving the Embassy and when 
returning to normal life, and having been con­
fronted with the real problems of the country—  
they will come down to earth and understand 
that they must aid Comrade Kádár’s Govern­
ment in order to strengthen Socialism in Hun­
gary. The Yugoslav comrades sincerely think 
that, in this situation, it is necessary to do their 
utmost in order to save these men for Socialism, 
to show patience and perseverance, to see this 
whole affair in a broader perspective, and to 
believe that there are many people who can be 
won over to support the Kádár Government”. 
Vidic pointed out that this problem must be 
solved in a simple manner that is to the credit of 
the Kádár Government and the Yugoslav Gov­
ernment as well; that is, the proposals of the 
Yugoslav Government should be accepted.
In the view of Vidic, all that has been said 
before makes it possible to reduce the problem 
to the following: Imre Nagy and associates 
must be allowed to leave the Embassy, to return 
home with guarantees for their safety, which 
the Yugoslav Government should be given to 
allow it to keep its given word. Later, after those 
persons have returned to normal life, it might be 
necessary to try and save them for Socialism, to 
unite the Socialist forces in the interest of the 
stabilization of the country, etc. But the Yugo­
slavs do not meddle in this, since it is the 
internal affair of Hungary. In so far as he (Vidic) 
talked at all about prospects, he did so exclu­
sively from the point of view of friendly rela­
tions between the two countries, in the interest 
of socialism in Hungary and in these parts of the 
world, where they live together and have to help 
each other. In this tragedy that has befallen 
Hungary, other Communist countries also try 
their best to help. Yugoslavia is frankly willing
to do so, it will do everything in its power to this 
end. In stressing this he conveyed a message of 
the leading Yugoslav comrades in a sincere 
effort to contribute as far as possible to the 
victory and triumph of Socialism in Hungary. 
The Yugoslav comrades wish Comrade Kádár 
and all his colleagues much success in their 
difficult work to save the cause of Socialism in 
friendly Hungary and to develop the immense 
strength of the Hungarian working class and the 
Hungarian people, and to attain their goal, which 
Yugoslavia fully supports.
Comrade Kádár wished to explain that at the 
time he himself also had voted with deep con­
viction in support of the decisions of the Imre 
Nagy Government. He must say candidly, 
however, that he had had unfavourable experi­
ences, and he will not forget these. He had 
found out that members o f the group— except 
for Imre Nagy— were persons who would give 
him much more trouble if he cooperated with 
them than if he contended against them. He 
added that he had found it very difficult to ask 
for the intervention of Soviet troops both in the 
first and in the second instance. He was of the 
opinion that it did not suit the Soviet Union 
either. He pointed out that Imre Nagy had taken 
part in all the Party and Government discus­
sions where these issues were decided upon. He 
knew that Comrade Tito was convinced that on 
the first occasion there was no need for the 
intervention of Soviet troops; this was so, and 
Imre Nagy as a Communist took part in all 
conferences and voted as he (Kádár) had done. 
But Imre Nagy went as far as to put an end to 
what he had voted for by ordering fire to be 
opened on the Soviet troops. Here, strictly 
speaking, there arises also the question of 
Communist morality.
Comrade Vidic mentioned that Comrade Tito 
had clearly denounced Imre Nagy ’s order to fire 
on the Soviet troops.
Comrade Kádár went on and declared that it 
is not that simple to try and save Imre Nagy and 
his associates for Socialism, if his experience of 
them so far is taken into consideration.
Comrade Vidic replied to Comrade Kádár’s 
comment on that passage of the Yugoslav 
Government’s note which concerns the talk 
between Comrade Kádár and Ambassador 
Soldatic on 16 November. He was able to say 
that Soldatic informed the Yugoslav Govern­
ment precisely in the same terms as Comrade 
Kádár had done; i. e. it was Comrade Kádár’s
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personal opinion that the solution had to be 
sought on this basis. Comrade Soldatic had 
informed his Government, that the definitive 
answer was still to come, but the Government, 
relying on the conversation and on Comrade 
Kádár’s declaration, thought that the affair could 
be considered more or less settled. This was so 
formulated, in the note, as well.
Comrade Marosán declared that Comrade 
Tito has been correctly informed on the situ­
ation in Hungary, and was thus familiar with the 
details. He said the Hungarians thought that 
what Comrade Tito had said was very positive, 
but at the same time they in Budapest found it 
strange that Imre Nagy and his group were 
staying at the Yugoslav Embassy, and this state 
of affairs caused them great concern.
Comrade Vidic replied to the point raised by 
Comrade Marosán saying that, in his opinion 
the present discussions have proved the Yugo­
slavs had always made every effort to deal with 
this matter; and now it is the business of the 
Hungarian side to clarify the situation in order 
to find a common solution. He underlines that 
hypocrisy of any kind on the part of Comrade 
Tito is out of the question. Only one practical 
question is open: how Imre Nagy is to leave the 
Embassy. The Yugoslav Government has made 
a concrete proposal in this matter. It is con­
vinced that Comrade Kádár and his Govern­
ment are also interested in settling the problem 
as soon as possible.
(The conversation lasted 1 hour and 45 
minutes.)
(Documents 3-6 will appear in the next issue.)
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Júlia Váradi
A Danish Witness
Nina Bang-Jensen was sent by the Democratic 
Party of the United States to give advice to the 
Hungarian opposition on the election campaign 
and party organization. Part of her brief was to 
keep a close eye on the referendum in Novem­
ber 1989. During her wanderings in Budapest, 
however, she heard a strange piece of news.
How did you hear about the memorial?
I was walking down Miinnich Ferenc utca with 
my interpreter at a quarter to six one Sunday 
morning, since I was supposed to cover as many 
polling stations as possible. I was just trying to 
explain how my name is spelt when someone in 
our group asked me: “Are you of Danish ori­
gin?” Yes, I said, my father was Danish. At 
which he said: “Good God, a memorial was 
raised to a man by that name the day before 
yesterday on Lot 301..
In Hungary, you know, few people know the 
name Paul Beng-Jensen, so I think we'd better 
start the story from the beginning.
My father was very young when he left Den­
mark to go to university in the United States. He 
studied economics before the war, and he was 
stranded there when the Germans marched into 
Denmark on April 9,1940. As far as I know he 
was in the process of writing a book commis­
sioned by the Danish government, so right 
away he became an employee of the Danish 
Embassy. Perhaps you know that after the Nazis 
occupied Denmark, the provisional, but only 
legitimate, Danish government was formed in 
the Danish Embassy in Washington.
I gather your father had a significant role in 
that.
Being an energetic young man, he was the 
person who announced the formation of the 
government— with the consent of the Ambas-
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sador of course. He soon met my mother, who, 
at the time, was working for a federal organiza­
tion which was trying to convince the United 
States government to provide support for Eu­
rope in the fight against Fascism. There was a 
huge debate going on in America as to whether 
they should intervene in the war or not. Any­
way, my mother was on Europe’s side. They got 
together and they were married during the war. 
When the war came to an end and the United 
Nations was set up, my father was given a good 
position.
Do you know what his job was at the time?
I ’m afraid I don’t. I wasn’t bom then, just my 
two brothers and two sisters. I was bom in 1955. 
All I know is that after the 1956 Revolution he 
was asked to study the Hungarian affair, as it 
was called, and to write an accurate account 
of it.
So he came here in 1957?
Yes, he spent a long time in Hungary talking to 
a great number of people whom he questioned 
on what they had been through. He was looking 
for witnesses, and he did what any right-minded 
person would do: he promised that he would not 
reveal the names of any of the Hungarians he 
had spoken to. He gave his word. W hen he 
returned to the United States and handed in his 
report to the appropriate UN authority, he was 
asked to give names. He naturally refused to do 
this.
He must have been acutely aware of the dan­
gers involved for those people.
Of course. After all, by then at least one execu­
tion had taken place and he was well aware of 
the repression. Not only did he know that a 
brutal wave of terror was sweeping Hungary, 
but also that some of the people working for the 
UN were unfortunately under strong Soviet 
influence, and therefore it was impossible to 
predict how they would act. I ’m sorry to say his 
colleagues did not take his side. They were 
afraid.
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Those must have been difficult times in America 
too. That was the period immediately after the 
notorious McCarthy era, wasn’t it?
Yes, at the end of 1950s the world was on a 
razor’s edge, so one had to watch one’s every 
step in America too. Everyone was afraid of the 
Soviet Union— scaretnongering was behind this 
of course, plus a big dose of naivety.
What happened to your father next? Do you 
know?
However much they worked on him, he would 
not give a list of names to the UN. In fact 
eventually he went up to the roof of the UN 
Building in New York and burnt all the infor­
mation.
What was the result?
He was discredited and deprived of all his rights 
in the UN. The Soviet Union was naturally very 
angry with him. They forced that UN depart­
ment to dismiss my father.
Was he thrown out without notice?
Yes. I was told that without any prior notice he 
was literally turned out of his office. Everything 
was taken away from him and he found himself 
in the street.
Didn't anyone try to help him?
Yes, of course they did. Some of the represen­
tatives of the Western Allies tried to take up his 
case, but they weren’t strong enough, faced 
with a propaganda campaign of that sort.
Could he get another job?
After much trouble he managed to find work as 
a social worker. He tried to help people who had 
come to the States from the developing coun­
tries. But it was not easy for him to support five 
children. Then, in the autumn of 1959, in 
November, at the time of Thanksgiving, he 
disappeared. After a two or three day search he 
was found dead in a New York park, on Novem­
ber 25,1959. Beside him was a note saying that 
he had committed suicide. No one believed it of 
course, and since then we are more and more 
convinced that he was murdered.
Do you know exactly what the note said?
Something like: “I underestimated the strength 
of those I was trying to fight”. The writing was 
obviously not his. And it wasn’t in his style. 
And another thing: there was a number on the 
note, in tiny figures. It was the number of the 
house in Budapest where the talks had taken 
place.
I imagine there are various theories as to what 
really happened to him?
One of them— which is shared by most people 
in the United States today— is based on the fact 
that shortly before his death a Soviet officer 
came to see him with some information. We 
don’t know whether the officer or the informa­
tion he brought played any role in his death, but 
it was very probable the KGB were behind the 
whole business.
Was there any investigation?
Yes, the police tried to work on it, but it was not 
the sort of crime the New York police could 
cope with. Congress didn’t get far either.
Does that mean there is still no result?
No, nothing so far. I don’t think it matters so 
much who pulled the trigger. The reasons are 
what count, and the fact that an innocent man 
was killed. So, I was walking down Miinnich 
Ferenc utca at a quarter to six on Sunday morn­
ing with my interpreter, because part of my job 
was to go around as many polling stations as 
possible. I was just trying to explain how my 
name is spelt when someone asked me: “Are 
you of Danish origin?” Yes, I said, my father 
was Danish. At which he said: “Good God, a 
memorial was raised to a man by that name the 
day before yesterday, on Lot 301”. I could not 
believe it, I said, he was my father, Paul Bang- 
Jensen. It was fantastic. Then— since one of the 
polling stations was very close to the cemetery 
— at around noon my interpreter took me to 
the memorial, and the most amazing thing was 
that up till then I had no clue about the whole 
thing. That such a significant memorial had 
been erected here, and especially that it hap­
pened to be on Lot 301. It’s marvellous.
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P E R S O N A L
Géza Perneczky
New Utopias and Times of Trouble
O ne of the speakers at the Catholic Days held in Munich late in May 1989 was Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, elder brother of the present West German President. I 
came upon his lecture while listening to a radio programme, broadcast as usual at half past 
eight on a Sunday morning.
This half-hour talk differed from the customary sermons transmitted at that time. On 
the one hand, the day was not a Sunday but a Thursday or, more exactly, it was Ascension 
Day. On the other hand, the speech did not fall under any religious subject. The eminent 
physicist and philosopher used a tone that would have better fitted a discourse in which 
physicists had been represented by Heisenberg and Schrödinger, economists by Ludwig 
Erhard and Karl Schiller and artists by Franz Kafka, Paul Klee and Glenn Gould (yes, 
approximately in this arrangement!), and he had intended to convince these people of 
something else. In fact he spoke about simple things, in fairly plain language, from an 
absolutely intelligible and yet absolutely unusual point of view. The disquieting content 
of the lecture could only be compared with the great avant-garde manifestos. Perhaps 
that’s why it had such a profound effect on me, an art historian who is on the periphery 
of ecological problems. I feel I won’t find it easy to digest this manifesto.
This is partly because Carl Friedrich Weizsäcker did not use the language of modem 
science (or of the arts, literature or music), but the ticklish idiom of postmodern utopias. 
After all, this is understandable if we come to think that we are no longer living in the days 
of quantum physics but in the decade of megabits and digital rock-music recordings, 
when it would be outmoded to extravagate on nuclear energy. In fact, it is rather the 
strangely novel prospects of ridding ourselves of the threatening power of such energies 
and the almost democratic mannerism of refraining from loud speech which are in vogue. 
That is to say, we are in every respect most (neo-) restrained.
I myself am writing this article on a word processor, whose thesaurus of 30,000 words 
is its smallest accomplishment. This, too, is so strangely new, small and soft that it in no 
way befits the usual dynamism of a typewriter or the press articles intended to have a 
public life. The lettuce I can buy in the supermarket is also so pale that I rather expect it 
to come with a label calling for it to be flavoured with vinegar, oil, salt and sugar—and 
then thrown away. Perhaps from tomorrow on, I will find enclosed with my salary a little 
slip giving the account number to which I can remit my money to support the chemical 
neutralisation of the dying forests, seas and poorer nations (or those who, despite all 
changes, have remained captive) in various parts of the world. They call on me to lead 
a more economical life, allowing the utilisation of wind-power between the hall and the 
living-room. In short, that I, too, should turn into a tiny microprocessor, to become 
digitally resolved. I should communicate in a positive way with the environment, I
Géza Perneczky is a Budapest born art historian, painter and critic, living in Cologne.
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should become a waste-retrieving force, in short, I should be excessively calm, attrac­
tively cheap and well-balanced.
But what was really striking in Weizsäcker’s talk was that he outlined a postmodern 
ecology which would mean the radicalisation of this velvety, delicate disillusionment. 
For the operative word of his speech was far from being “cheap”. He spoke about 
expensive energy, that was what he praised. He used incredibly convincing examples (for 
Japan, South Korea, Singapore), to prove that the really ecological national economies 
were all built on very little raw material and very expensive energy. But those highly 
developed industrial countries which, unfortunately for them, have preserved relatively 
low twentieth century price levels—including West Germany—will develop, let us say, 
a car whose petrol consumption is three litres per 100 kilometres (which in fact they 
developed long ago) in vain, since with the current low price of petrol the technology of 
these cheap cars would be too costly: in short, these cars are prohibitively costly. The 
same applies in all fields of life. The modernity of various machines and equipment, for 
instance, lies not only in that they are small, light and inexpensive—no, a really up-to- 
date technology is, beyond this and amongst other things, also fault-friendly (meaning 
that, just like living organisms, it is able to automatically avoid faults occurring during 
its operation, that is to say, it can mend). But fault-friendly technologies are extremely 
expensive technologies... and so on and so forth.
Weizsäcker’s sequence of thought was based on simple calculations, easy to check. 
The advantage of such expensive technologies is that they could be put to use even at long 
range here on Earth. This is not the case with the current West German or American 
technologies, which will exhaust the Earth within one or, at best, two decades. With 
humorous spontaneity, Weizsäcker used the term dinosaur techniques for the current 
civilisation of these countries. The momentary cheapness of these awkward techniques, 
and their consequential wasteful use is the greatest enemy of mankind, as this can cause 
truly irreparable destruction. Only very expensive technologies can (some time in the 
future) be so cheap and forbearing that their use should be really profitable.
The audience—as one could hear over the air—repeatedly interrupted this irregular 
Ascension Day speech with applause. But I was sitting with a somewhat ricked back in 
the armchair of my Cologne flat and could not help starting to take stock of the (West 
German) dinosaur technology around me, on which one of Europe’s greatest physicists 
and ecologists had just passed the death sentence. The speech left no doubt on the fact that 
a profitable rise in energy prices would mean not the doubling of petrol prices (for which 
in fact there has already been an example) but a minimum of fivehold, possibly tenfold 
increase of energy costs. The cost of things that can be expressed in square metres and 
cubic metres must rise at a similar rate—living space and working space, arable land, 
grass, trees, and the air, not to mention articles such as cut flowers or animal protein. 
Equally tight was the calculation concerning the amount of time we have at best at our 
disposal. According to Weizsäcker, we must have the new technologies at our disposal 
at the latest by the decade beginning in the year 2000.
I was wondering whether this urbane, kindly and learned, mild-eyed gentleman, every 
inch a European, was aware of the scathing grim humour with which he presented all this? 
Was he aware of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the world was equipped, at 
the very best, with the technology of the 1950s, and right now was in its death agony 
precisely because this equipment has made it absolutely impossible to raise the energy 
prices and financial conditions of 1990?
As it turned out from his talk, the aged physicist was aware of all this. He said simply 
and kindly, as befits a Catholic holiday, that only the very rich countries will be alple to
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produce the ecological technology with the help of which they will manage, somehow 
or other, very poorly, to muddle through the troubles that are imminent. This part of his 
speech was not accompanied by applause. I think most people thought of the same thing 
as I did. Reacting to the silence, as it were, Weizsäcker did not go on to dwell on the 
prospects of the poor countries, that is of the larger part of the world. He felt that with a 
tactful silence he might perhaps achieve more than by opening out his humanist’s soul 
to the audience and bathing them in the shoreless sea of a sense of responsibility. Anyway, 
what will solidarity be worth, what will the helping hands be able to do in the given case? 
With this in mind. I first went out quickly for some fresh air. Of course, to little avail: one 
can feel when one assumes—at least inwardly—a face like a Shakespearian character 
who has just been stabbed in the guts.
I was thinking, among other things, of a controversy that an American historian had 
started, echoes of which reached Hungarian periodicals in the first months of the year. 
The title of his book was The End o f History?—question mark included; but not in the 
sense I was feeling now, with the dagger in my belly. On the contrary, the author started 
out from the situation which had developed around the Christmas of 1989: thus he 
postulated the final overthrow of fascist and communist ideologies and the full victory 
of bourgeois liberalism. His main problem was that in such aperfectly resolved world one 
can only go on to vegetate happily, and so human life, interspersed with struggles and 
romantic events, known as history, would become something of the past.
What a mercy that the few months that have passed since have proved that these 
ideologies and all the ills and sufferings they involve have still not disappeared for good, 
and that the victory of liberalism cannot be taken to be as complete as that. To top it all, 
here now comes this new apocalypse, with a five-fold or ten-fold rise in energy prices just 
announced, a technology softer and dearer even than software and, in the midst of 
approaching annihilation, the portended and scientifically proved chance of survival of 
the rich countries.
Can the whole thing again be a mere utopia, which we may be able to successfully 
neutralise with counter-utopias? Possibly. But who would feel reassured by this prospect 
if, on the other hand, one knows—the debate among historians started out from this 
supposition—that it is precisely the mortal vortex of utopias, an endless apocalypse, this 
threatening embrace, that makes up prevailing history.
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János Komái
My Days as a Naive Reformer
T hirty-three years ago, in the autumn of 1956,1 submitted the manuscript of this book to the Economic and Legal Publishing House. Now, the preface to a new edition 
offers a choice as to what to discuss from a variety of issues that come to mind. Personal 
reminiscences might be in order, invoking the tempestuous times of first publication. 
Another possibility might be to take inspiration from Frigyes Karinthy’s classic short 
story “Meeting a young man” and to ask to what extent I fulfilled the plans of my youth. 
But no matter how attractive these approaches are, I propose to discuss a different 
question: to what extent do I still consider the message of this small book valid and in what 
respect has my opinion changed since.
Given that I chose this to be the subject of the new preface, I would like to implement 
this task objectively, as objectively as I can. False modesty will not prompt me to gloss 
over points that I still consider timely and instructive, but I shall also discuss the 
weaknesses and the problematic features of the work. This does not, however, preempt 
criticism of the second edition. Critics will certainly find in this work things to which they 
take exception, and perhaps also merits, of which I do not speak here and now.
Let me quote the preface of the first edition: “The first necessary step is a description of the situation as it is. This, it may be thought, should already be available in dozens 
of books. Unfortunately this is not the case. There are, of course, dozens of textbooks and 
collections of notes for use at universities which describe our methods of economic 
administration and planning, our pricing and wage systems, etc. However, all these have 
a serious fault in common: instead of telling us how our economic mechanism really 
works, they merely describe how it would work if it worked as their authors would wish. 
.. .For this reason a coherent description of how the mechanism of our economy really 
does work represents a new task, not hitherto performed in the economic literature of our 
country.” Or: “These methods of running the economy were increasingly beginning to 
show the disadvantages attached to them. The task set for the present study lies in just this 
sphere. It is to reveal these faults, the contradictions within the economic mechanism we 
have used.”
This is still my aim. I have considered it the principal objective of my research activity 
ever since. This is not a self-evident pledge. It is frequent that the committed partisans 
of some system, political current or party feel that they must primarily and above all
János Kornai is Professor o f Economics at Harvard University and the author o f 
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New York, 1980. This is the preface the new edition o f to Overcentralisation in the 
Economy, which was first published in 1957.
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emphasise in all their works, written and oral presentations, whatever serves the interests 
of the system, current, or party supported by them, keeping silent as far as possible about 
what could damage these interests. The conviction ripened in my mind in the 1954—1955 
period to play a different role: I would no longer be the propagandist of the socialist or 
any other system, but become a researcher. Before I commit pen to paper, I ask first of 
all whether what I want to say is true, and not to which cause it does harm or benefit. To 
use an almost forgotten but nowadays again timely expression, I have no wish to practise 
partisan science. To avoid any misunderstanding: I have no desire to eliminate from the 
public sphere and the sphere of ideas the desire by political actors to be in the company 
of their fellows, serve a common cause and identify themselves with a party or 
movement. I respect those who choose this approach to life, although I do not believe that 
this is the only morally acceptable attitude. Partisanship and political commitment are 
values of a high order, but their place is outside science. Scholarship begins whenever 
somebody tries to rise above his commitments and to apply the criteria of scientific truth. 
It is clear to me, and I shall deal with this in detail below, that those active in the social 
sciences never entirely succeed in this, but I believe that they are at least obliged to strive 
to do so. I do not only accept this view but even wish to suggest it, although I know that 
in the West and in the East, at home and abroad, numerous “antipositivist” intellectual 
currents reject this as obsolete.
The researcher is neither prosecutor, nor counsel for the defence, nor presiding judge, 
but his role, to stay with the legal metaphor, is akin to that of the juge d’ instruction of the 
continental system who, before the trial, collects all possible facts, questions witnesses, 
but does not himself pass any judgement. In this respect, it is in good conscience that I 
pass this small work to the reader for the second time: even today I think that what I wrote 
then was a correct report on the classical socialist system prior to the reforms.
The concrete system itself, about which this book speaks, no longer exists in Hungary; 
today it will be of interest primarily to students of economic history. But this past left such 
a deep imprint that we still feel its effects. It is impossible to understand truly the 
Hungarian economy of 1989 and 1990 and the problems of transformation, if we are not 
familiar with the initial conditions. In addition, numerous relics of the overcentralised, 
bureaucratic economy, relying on instructions and other administrative measures, are 
still alive and kicking. Not to mention that what already belongs to the more remote past 
in the Hungarian economy, is more recent in the Soviet Union or Poland, and is the present 
in East Germany, Rumania, North Korea and Cuba. (Since I wrote the present Preface, 
East Germany has ceased to exist, and the situation in Rumania has also changed although 
the future system of its economy is uncertain.)
T t is not only an emphasis on a descriptive-explanatory approach in scientific analyses that I consider a timely requirement; the book makes a contribution to scientific 
philosophy and methodology on numerous other questions as well. These I still fully 
accept. Here I shall mention but one range of questions: the relationship of the book to 
Marxist political economy.
I ask the reader to place himself back into the intellectual atmosphere of the time. 
Abroad, the socialist economy was of course much discussed employing a non-Marxist 
approach. In Hungary, however, just as in the other socialist countries, Marxist political 
economy enjoyed an officially proclaimed monopoly. Not only blind supporters of the 
existing system, but its sharp-eyed critics as well relied on this apparatus. Reformers 
demanded respect for the Law of Value, and among other things, debated whether the 
means of production or labour were commodities. The method, conceptual apparatus and
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terminology of overcentralization are not part of the above. As I was writing, I was not 
only convinced that Stalinist innovations in political economy (Basic Law, The Law of 
Planned Proportionate Development, etc.) were unusable and misleading, but also that 
the conceptual apparatus of the Marxist theory of labour value was unworkable. It 
provided no constructive help in the analysis of the reality of the socialist system. I did 
not argue against it, but simply ignored it. I have been doing so ever since.
I wished to suggest to the readers that they could reach noteworthy and substantial 
conclusions if they avoided the texts and jargon of the anointed priests of Marxist political 
economy and did not get bogged down in their arguments. Instead they should try to 
observe reality directly and from a pragmatic perspective and then draw generalising 
conclusions. What makes a work theoretical is not the number of references to Das 
Kapital or the repetition of the term “Law of Values” but generalisation based on the 
observation of reality. In numerous other disciplines (thus, philosophy festering in the 
shadow of György Lukács) not only dogmatic Stalinist social scientists but others critical 
of the classical socialist system were still caught for a long time in the tight chambers of 
Marxist doctrine, or tried to expand its walls by cautiously exchanging a brick or two. In 
other socialist countries (for instance in the Soviet Union under the influence of 
Kantorovich and Novozhilov) a similar situation prevailed over a long time in econom­
ics, too. Perhaps I may say without appearing immodest that it was also due to this book 
that the profession of economics in Hungary was freed of these shackles earlier.
At the same time it is worth stressing that the influence of Marxism can still be felt in 
several aspects of the book, and that in these aspects I have remained loyal to this 
understanding of Marxist method since. I think, for instance, it is a fertile approach to 
consider that if something appears on a large scale, and goes on for some time, one should 
not be satisfied with a superficial explanation which seeks the explanation in individual 
mistakes, in policy errors, or in the personal characteristics of the man in power. Let us 
examine whether it is not the system which is the principal or at least one of the principal 
factors in the explanation of the problems.
Socialism, whether in its classical pre-reform shape or in the variant which came about 
in the course of the reforms, is not a coincidental agglomeration of individual phenom­
ena. Regularities, general tendencies, ingrained patterns of behaviour came into being. 
In the fully-formed system, characteristic situations occur repeatedly and this gives rise 
to characteristic attitudes. The basic duty of the social scientist is the study and 
description of these regularities, tendencies, patterns of behaviour, and response func­
tions, as well as synthesising them into a theory. I am now aware that this approach is not 
particular to Marxist social science. Not all schools of thought may accept them; yet it 
is true all the same that such methodological principles form part of several respectable 
non-Marxist, or institutionalist research strategies.
An example of this approach in the book is the examination of how a particular system 
of planning, control, and financial incentives induces certain reactions in the manage­
ment of firms, against the will of the allegedly almighty centre. Chapter III describes 
seven regularities. While the standard textbook at the time taught that the ever higher 
level of consumption or the planned nature of all activities were “laws” of socialism, I 
tried to present what the real laws were, that is more precisely and more modestly, the 
real regularities: making a fetish of the plan, plan-speculation, plan bargaining and the 
rush at the end of plan period, among others. Not a pretty sight but inevitable under the 
given conditions.
Others may have learned this from other sources but in my case it was Marxism which 
taught me that things occur on different levels. There are chains of causality and at the
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same time more superficial and deeper regularities. Overcentralisation made several 
attempts at applying this approach. In fact, this first book of mine already raised all the 
important questions that were to torment me throughout my life as a scholar. To what 
degree can human action be planned? To what extent does uncertainty govern society? 
What is the relationship between bureaucratic control, forced growth, and chronic 
shortages? To what extent can the selection and behaviour of bureaucrats according to 
certain criteria (uncritical obedience, lack of initiative, etc.) be explained by the 
characteristics of the political and social system? Why does the huge bureaucratic 
apparatus tenaciously recreate itself? Now that, after more than thirty years, I re-read my 
first book, I became aware that the questions which I asked were drafted in my mind as 
I took my first tentative steps. What has changed in my later works was the answer to these 
questions. On some problems I changed my views more than once. I cannot provide 
infallibility retrospectively either, nor for the future. All I have done was to try and 
establish the truth and I will do that in the future as well.
O ne of the sources of the weaknesses in the book was ignorance, or perhaps I should call it knowing things by half. I was twenty-eight when I wrote it. I knew a thing or 
two about the way the system I examined worked, I was a trained Marxist-Leninist, 
familiar with the debate in Hungary. Yet this was about all. The book was my dissertation 
for a Candidate’s Degree, comparable to the thesis a graduate student has to submit to 
obtain a Ph.D. in a university in an English-speaking country. I knew just about nothing 
of the literature and ideas which a student at a good university has to be familiar with if 
he wishes to graduate in Economics. What skills I acquired in this area, I obtained after 
the publication of Overcentralisation, in the years when I found myself on the fringes of 
the Hungarian academic community and thus had the time to spend all my waking hours 
reading. Those years were my “Universities”, when I learned, with considerable effort 
and by teaching myself many things which students at western universities are spoonfed 
by their lecturers and tutors.
The book refers to some Hungarian authors, primarily to György Péter, whose ideas 
influenced me very much. On the other hand, there is no reference in it to the western 
literature, or in general to contemporary foreign literature on economics. This was not 
done to steal the ideas of other men or to hide my sources for tactical reasons, but simply 
because I was unfamiliar with these writings. I look at the man I was then with a certain 
astonishment and hair-raising respect: how could I attempt such neck-breaking heights 
with such poor equipment? And yet, I had no illusions about my knowledge at that time 
either. It was clear to me that I did my work almost instinctively: my only instrument was 
the interpretation of elementary statistics, the observation of individual cases and the 
questioning of persons taking part in economic events, as well as comparing the pieces 
of information thus obtained. In this respect my work resembled the practice of the 
Hungarian rural sociologists of the 1930s and made no use of the advanced methodology 
of western empirical surveys. Aside from lacking methodological skills, I knew little 
about the results achieved by Western economists in clarifying the general problems of 
the working of an economic system, such as prices and markets, the behaviour of firms, 
risk and uncertainty, or the theory of conflicts. I was aware neither of the debate between 
Ludwig von Mises, Oskar Lange, Friedrich von Hayek and others concerning the nature 
of socialism and planning nor of the work done by western students on the economic 
system of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.
Perhaps I even benefited from this situation. Ignorance sometimes acts as the midwife 
in the birth of original ideas. Take an example: section IV.4. describes the “model” of the
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old economic mechanism, differentiating between vertical and horizontal links, and 
stressing the dominant role of the former. As far as I know, this kind of differentiation 
was introduced by Overcentralisation and has become part of common knowledge to 
such a degree that no one now remembers the source. It is possible that if when writing 
the book, I had known about what economists today call a model, I would not even have 
dared to write these few pages.
B ut I do not want to make avirtue out of necessity after the deed either. I have overcome this phase, as have many other Hungarian economists. From the time that 
I began to become familiar with the world economic literature and its conceptual and 
analytical apparatus, I felt it indispensable that I too should join the blood circulation of 
the international professional community. I felt that we had to break out of narrow 
provincialism. There is no obligation to agree with the methods or theories of this or that 
foreign school of thought. I myself have engaged in numerous disputes. But I believe it 
is imperative that we familiarise ourselves with the scientific results of the time; that we 
take over everything that can be adapted, and reject only what, on the basis of thorough 
argument and not of prejudice, we do not consider workable under our circumstances. I 
would therefore advise readers of this second edition, and especially students and young 
scholars that they transcend the methodological standards of the book. What was perhaps 
a forgivable weakness, a pardonable sin, on the part of the early pioneers several decades 
ago, is an unpardonable omission today.
Regarding the length of the text, approximately 95 per cent is descriptive, positive 
analysis, and at the most five per cent falls into the category of normative theory. In my 
later works I strove to keep the two clearly apart, even if they appeared within a single 
study. At that time, however, I had not yet formulated this goal, and consequently 
normative arguments appear here and there, sometimes in a sentence or two, condensed 
into a requirement or recommendation, in various places, mainly in the second half of the 
book. Nevertheless, the normative arguments hang together and together suggest a 
certain notion of reform.
The book influenced the Hungarian reform process. Among other factors this book 
also shares responsibility for its virtues and shortcomings—even if nobody mentioned 
this influence at the time. Its influence was, of course, indirect. It manifested itself as an 
influence on the thinking of the intellectual leaders of the Hungarian reform process.
Although at the time it was not really formulated in my mind in a sharp manner, but 
I felt—and this was also expressed in the book—that the purpose of the reform was not 
only to improve economic efficiency but also to give more scope to other things valued 
by human beings, such as intitiative, spontaneous action, a life free of fear and reprisals 
by the authorities, the opportunity to make autonomous decisions. On the level of 
practical economic tasks the reform here outlined is linked to the principles that in the 
Hungarian literature were first formulated by György Péter: greater autonomy for the 
firms, prices ensuring equilibrium between supply and demand, the central role of 
profitability in the material and moral incentives offered to management. In addition, in 
some more specific proposals, Overcentralisation contributed another substantial idea to 
this system of thoughts: one should not be satisfied with partial measures, the whole of 
the economic mechanism had to be changed radically, and at one stroke.
I well remember that when the manuscript was first discussed in the Institute of 
Economics it was precisely this message that irritated some, they objected that my book 
argued as follows: If we changed the mechanism this way, then this would be bad, and 
if we changed it that way, then that would cause trouble as well. What then did I want?
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Did nothing please me? A couple of years later the same objection called the tune in a 
hostile official press campaign against Overcentralisation, alleging that it rejected the 
entire existing economic mechanism of the socialist economy.
The principle of a package of measures became one of the distinguishing features of 
the Hungarian reform process. The reform of 1968 was the first and so far the only action 
which produced substantial changes in almost all areas of the socialist economy at one 
full sweep. Overcentralisation had pointed out many years earlier that the introduction 
of the profit incentive might produce scant results and might even do damage, without 
a simultaneous radical change in the pricing system, i.e. without introducing market­
clearing prices. It is hopeless to reduce the size of the apparatus without changing the 
mechanism. New ratios must be established between production and consumption, and 
between supply and demand; chronic shortages have to be put an end to so that the market 
and horizontal inter-firm contacts can function successfully. There is a close relationship 
between forced growth and overcentralisation; consequently the growth policy and the 
economic mechanism must be changed concurrently. On all these questions the book was 
much more consistent and unequivocal than later “neither-fish-nor-fowl” Hungarian 
(and Soviet, Chinese, Polish, etc.) practice. Within the limitations to be mentioned it 
proposed that uniform and complete change should take place. Truly comprehensive 
changes were needed in the domain of prices, financial incentives,growth policy, power 
positions in the market
The book reflects the recognition that much had to be included in a package of 
simultaneous measures so that detailed measures should not run counter to each other but 
should have a beneficial joint effect. But as the years passed and experience was gathered, 
it became more and more obvious that much had been missing in the package, not only 
in the reform plan sketched in Overcentralisation, but also in the points debated in later 
years, as well as in the practical measures of the 1968 reform. These shortcomings were 
exactly what I had in mind when I mentioned that Overcentralisation shared responsi­
bility for weaknesses which became more and more distressing in later years.
Already in the beginning of the 1970s the discussions about the reform in Hungary 
revealed that those who had theoretically prepared the first wave of reform and those who 
later carried it out in practice had thought that the “division of labour” between plan and 
market would be very simple to achieve. The idea was to entrust short-term regulation, 
the input-output flow necessary for current production and consumption, to the autono­
mous decisions of profit motivated firms, while leaving long-term regulation, primarily 
investment decisions, in the hands of centralised planning authorities. The error is now 
obvious. As long the truly vital decisions, such as entry and exit contraction and 
expansion of output, the changing of the product pattern, decisions concerning technical 
development and investment in general are left mostly in the hands of the central 
authorities, it is a self-deception to speak of a genuine autonomy of firms.
Overcentralisation had a position on this question, though it was mistaken. But what 
was not even mentioned, not even in the form of a hint is even worthier of attention. Not 
only this book, but all those who participated in the discussions taking place in the 
economic journals and the economic and business institutions of the existing system', 
neglected to deal with the fundamental issues of ownership, political power, and socialist 
ideology.
In more recent writing I have called that type of reform economist, to which I also 
belonged between 1954 and 1956, the naive reformers. At that time in Hungary this group 
included György Péter and Tibor Liska. In the 1950s and 1960s Wlodzimierz Brus in 
Poland, Sun Ye-fang in China, and Ota Sik in Czechoslovakia could be included with
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them. If we were naive then Évsei Lieberman who was the first apostle of the profit 
motive in the Soviet Union in the 1950s was ultranaive. (It is essential to give dates 
because most of the reform economists still alive have changed at least some of their 
views since.)
The word naive is not pejorative. Used in its original sense, it refers to a peculiar well- intentioned childlike attitude, the stage of development of the mind in which some­
body courageously engages in a task because he does not even suspect how difficult it is. 
He puts his hand into the fire without hesitation because he has never burnt himself. In 
addition naivité is not merely a state of mind but also a form of behaviour. A naive person 
is completely outspoken, since he feels he has nothing to hide and he cannot yet evaluate 
the consequences of what was said. It is of course easy to be wise after the event. It is not 
my aim to point out old errors, including mine at the time, knowing what I know now. 
But it is worth asking why we were not interested in the depths of the problems.
Before trying to answer, I must seek to eliminate in advance a possible misunderstand­
ing. Naive reformers did not keep silent about difficult and delicate questions of this sort 
because they exercised self-censorship. It does not mean that I condemn self-censorship. 
In a system in which legal publication and public lectures are subjected to formal or 
informal censorship, self-censorship is unavoidable if one wishes to propagate ideas in 
a legal way that transcend officially set limits. Those who speak and write can decide to 
give up legality. This choice implies much gain in speaking without self-imposed limits 
and at the same time loss of influence, not to speak of other gains and losses. If a scholar 
chooses legal publication, he faces thousands of further concrete dilemmas: how far to 
go in self-censorship; what to say out loud and what to throttle; how to suggest to readers 
implicitly what cannot be communicated explicitly. An enlightened and far from naive 
critic of the existing system usually holds back a great deal. He consciously or half- 
instictively suppresses much of his message. Compared to him the naive reformer is 
refreshingly outspoken, since he does not even understand the grave implications of the 
problems he tackles. When, in later decades, there were debates among the various 
schools of reformers, the naive ones were always in a more favourable psychological 
position. They could easily answer the questions put to them, because they simply said 
what they thought. Every major question confronted the “enlightened” with complicated 
intellectual and moral dilemmas and forced them to decide how far they might be able 
to go, and how far they wanted to go, in providing an answer.
Looking back at the evolution of my own ideas, I can say that Overcentralisation was 
not only my first book but also the last which I wrote as a naive reformer. Back then the 
reason I omitted one or the other difficult question was not because I recognised after 
much brooding and fretting that it made sense to draw the limits at that point. I omitted 
them, because at the time of gathering material for the book and of writing it, I simply did 
not sense the importance of numerous major problems. Now is the time to ask why not?
One reason has already been mentioned, and that was my incomplete knowledge. My 
impression is that this was of secondary importance. By that time those listed above, and 
numerous other economists who thought along the same lines, already had the chance to 
read as much western literature as they wanted to. There were certainly a few amongst 
them who then knew more economics than I did. The problem at such times is not that 
there is no broadcast but that the set is unable to receive it.
Anybody who tries to think about social issues on a theoretical level, takes certain 
axioms as given, or adheres to the declared axioms of some school of thought. There are 
some whose minds are governed by an implicit system of axioms, and unaware that a few
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final principles, postulates and taboos limit their thinking. What distinguished the naive 
reformers from their successors was that their axioms had not yet been questioned by 
anybody. These axioms ceased to function as such for the later generation of reformers.
Let me mention a single, though very important question, that of ownership. It is the 
most important aspect of the Hungarian economic reform that the formal and informal 
private sector gained as much ground as it did. Compared to that it is of secondary 
importance that in some respects changes occurred in the state sector as well. But if I think 
back to conversations at the time of working on Overcentralisation, I have to say that the 
problem did not even arise. The desirability of state ownership was an axiom that was not 
questioned either by myself or by those I talked to.
The system of axioms of a social scientist does not usually take shape on the basis of 
an individual intellectual choice. It can, of course, be imagined that an individual chooses 
amongst different possible systems of axioms, just as he chooses amongst TV-sets or 
suits in a store, and then fits into his mind the one which he finds most attractive. It can 
be imagined, but I do not believe that this is the typical course. The system of axioms is 
already predetermined by metarational values, which are largely linked to feelings, 
passions, and prejudices. Those who detest private property do not compare the 
advantages and disadvantages of public property and private property with an open mind. 
They only think of how the operation of public property should be organized. Usually a 
trauma, a shock or some stirring historic experience are needed for an axiom or an entire 
system of axioms to be suddenly shaken, for the internal taboo to disappear, and for 
thinking suddenly to become open to rational argument and comparative analysis. The 
part of the Hungarian intelligentsia which started out with a belief in socialism can be 
divided into many groups, according to the following criteria: when and under the 
influence of what experience they suffered such a trauma, how thorough the catharsis 
was, and which axioms or group of axioms it destroyed. Perception and understanding 
is selective. It is ready to expel certain impressions and ideas, and the selection is also 
subordinate to the system of axioms. Starting with the lifting of one or two internal 
barriers and the expansion of the receptivity of thinking, numerous questions which were 
considered uninteresting before suddenly become important. Men of science suffer 
shocks of recognition: all of a sudden they realise how clearly this or that author had seen 
the essence of the problem twenty or one hundred years earlier.
A comparison of the reform process in the different socialist countries offers important 
indirect evidence for this argument. It seems that no country ever learned anything 
important from the experience of another. It is possible that one or the other partial 
measure is adopted; let us say that in the Soviet Union they copy the bad Hungarian 
personal income tax. But did the first naive group of Soviet reform economists pay 
attention to what the second, third, fourth generations of no longer naive but enlightened, 
disillusioned, sharply critical and radical Hungarian economists disclosed of the failures 
of the first attempts? No. They start all over again. No matter how many intelligent people 
there may be among them, the received axioms stop up their ears. The voice of Hungarian 
social scientists cannot reach them.
The work of social scientists is seriously limited by their inhibitions. These blunt and 
narrow the influence which a man can have on his colleagues, let alone on the wider 
public. A bitter recognition, which should at least serve as a sign of caution against 
immodesty.
Nevertheless, without exaggerated illusions as to possible influence, or exaggerated 
expectations as to political impact, there is great need for more research in the social 
sciences. We are taking part in unique and important events in the socialist world; many
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kinds of duties await the economist. There is great need for what Americans call 
monitoring: presenting in detail on the screen of scientific works the events and processes 
of the immediate past and of the present. This can also provide useful help to active 
participants in political struggles. Researchers can help to clarify what can be realised in 
a given situation and what is impossible; what the options are among which we can 
choose, and what are the expected consequences of alternative political and economic 
actions. In other words, the researchers, although they do not remove responsibility from 
the shoulders of those who make the political decisions and who govern the country, can 
help make sure that their decisions and their governing in general serve the progress of 
the country. And they can further this aim indirectly as well, through educating, through 
adding a ferment to intellectual life.
But however many-sided the duties of the scientific researcher may be, his task is 
always conditioned by the fact that he has to take positive perception and thorough 
analysis of reality as his point of departure. This lends credibility to his words; this is the 
particular job that nobody can do in his place. These days everybody is busy preparing 
programmes and proposals, arguing. It is good that many do so. But I believe that it would 
be desirable that there should continue to be some whose main activity continues to be 
research, the honest, the more complete exploration of reality.
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B O O K S  &  A U T H O R S
Gergely Hajdú
On Law and Disorder
László Krasznahorkai: Az ellenállás melankóliája (The Melancholy of Resistance), 
Magvető', 1989, 386 pp.; Miklós Mészöly: Wimbledoni jácint (Wimbledon Hyacinth), 
Szépirodalmi, 1990, 116 pp.; György Konrád: Agenda 1. Kerti mulatság (Agenda 1. 
The Garden Party,), Magvető', 1989, 676 pp; Péter Esterházy: Hrabal könyve 
(The Book of Hrabal), Magvető', 1990, 190 pp.
László Krasznahorkai’s first novel, Sátán­tangó (Satan’s Tango, 1985; NHQ 100 
contains an extract) was about hope, his second 
one is about hopelessness. The characters in the 
first were demoralised paupers, who ultimately 
served the regime as informers; the rebels in the 
new novel overthrow those in control and (in­
voluntarily) raise a more corrupt set to power. 
The world in Satan's Tango lived in a state of 
apocalyptic expectation; in The Melancholy o f 
Resistance there is chaos rather than a story, 
vegetation rather than expectation.
It would be an error to believe from the 
typical, distressing atmosphere thatmarks all of 
Krasznahorkai’s works, that the author always 
keeps reformulating the same experience. It 
would be an error, too, to look for the reason of 
the change in historical circumstances instead 
of the author’s way of seeing. For Kraszna­
horkai history has ended much earlier, and the 
political crisis that has taken place in recent 
years in Hungary means nothing to him. Most 
of his characters’ thoughts are narrow, making 
use of newspaper clichés; among them is a 
demagogue, who often uses the word “evolve- 
ment”, which was used in 1988 as the Hungar­
ian equivalent of perestroika. Despite all this, 
the work is far from being a political satire. The 
story starts with the arrival of strange, dumb 
peasants from the neighbourhood into a small 
town. (No name is supplied, but it is easy to 
recognize Gyula, the author’s home town in the 
south-east of the country.) Their appearance 
prompts the sceptical comment: “Nobody
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among the local onlookers would have believed 
so far that after the high-falutin’ plans of na­
tional flourishing announced every thirty years, 
there were still so many of these frightfully 
shifty, destitute good-for-nothings.” Later on, 
these hordes nearly destroy the town— the like 
of which has occurred in the Soviet Union or in 
Rumania over the last year, but the novel is not 
a premonition of this. Real events do have their 
rational, even if diabolically evil, explanation; 
here, however, there is no question of any 
political struggle, any religious, ethnic or social 
tension. These assailants resemble football fans 
in Western Europe, they are hypnotised zom­
bies. They are like the human-faced locusts of 
the Apocalypse. They represent the force of 
Chaos, the “rebellion of the parts” discovering 
that the whole does not exist.
Satan’s Tango showed Krasznahorkai as a 
mystic with an intimate knowledge not of God 
but of His absence. His approach was pro­
foundly influenced by the Rumanian Matei 
Calinescu’s The Life and Views o f Zacharias 
Lichter, which appeared in Hungarian in 1971 
in a translation by the tragically-fated Transyl­
vanian poet, Domokos Szilágyi. It had been 
very popular with some Hungarian writers. 
This is a sober mysticism, which is not so much 
interested in divinity as in the possibility o f how 
to live in harmony with the world. In the present 
novel this goal is caricatured, together with its 
means, intuitive thinking— but this is not done 
in the name of logic, faith, or even despair. In 
the novel all these possible attitudes meet with 
minutely analyised failure when confronted by 
the power of chaos.
The novel consists— at first sight in the most 
traditional manner— of three parts. The intro­
duction bears the title “States of Emergency”. It
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depicts a chaotic, disintegrating world, in which 
nothing is predictable any longer, a world of 
catastrophe, turbulence and tiny signs, none of 
which is significant in itself. The thermometer 
stands at 20 degrees below zero in November (a 
temperature rare in Hungary even in winter), a 
huge tree is rooted up, electricity services break 
down, the rubbish has not been removed for 
quite some time— taken together, they may 
indicate the imminent end of an aeon. Mrs 
Pflaum is an 58-year-old widow, a veritable 
Madame Homais in her obtuseness. She does 
not even try to understand the perplexing world, 
whenever possible she shuts herself up in her 
flat furnished after tasteless magazine tips, entry 
into which she refuses even to her only son. She 
can barely get home from a distance of fifty 
kilometres, since the train services are irregu­
lar. She first encounters the silent hordes on the 
train, and becomes aware of their aggressive­
ness, as she can scarcely escape a man in a cloth 
overcoat who molests her with his improper 
advances. On her way home from the station, a 
frightening route, as there is no street lighting, 
no petrol, and law and order is non-existent, she 
encounters a strange van: it belongs to a travel­
ling circus, displaying a huge whale. A suspi­
cious crowd follows them, from station to sta­
tion.
Mrs Eszter, an evil and aggresssive middle- 
aged woman, tries in vain to involve Mrs Pflaum 
in her intrigues. Mr Eszter, the retired head of 
the local music school, does not want to set eyes 
on his wife any more. She, however, as the mis­
tress of the police chief and the president of the 
Municipal W omen’s Committee, thinks the 
general respect in which her husband is held 
would be useful to her career. She tries to 
convince him to lend his name to an anti-litter 
campaign, sending a message through Mrs 
Pflaum’s son, Valuska, a hard-drinking post­
man, the only person (apart from his house­
keeper) whom the music teacher is willing to 
see.
The longest section, the “discussion” is en­
titled “The Werckmeister Harmonies”. Here 
the reader is given the two possible answers to 
the question of the order of the world.
Intellectual effort is represented by Mr Eszter. 
He has been living for decades in the belief that 
musical harmony provides proof for the sub­
lime order of the universe. During a conversa­
tion with a piano-tuner he realises that this 
harmony is only a human artifact, an illusion.
He retires from all activity (scarcely getting out 
of his bed) and reaches the conclusion that 
tempered sound (first described by Andreas 
Werckmeister in the 17th century) in fact is a 
deceit but that there does exist another, divine 
harmony, as the Pythagoreans believed. He has 
his piano retuned and plays on it the Wohltem­
periertes Klavier, which sounds dreadful. He 
tries to accustom himself to this order hostile to 
man and feels bitter satisfaction in hearing news 
of decline.
Valuska, the holy fool enchanted by the 
starlit sky, is in fact in the Lichter-stage of 
Calinescu’s novel. He is convinced of the 
magnificence of cosmic order and does not let 
his impressions confuse him. He carries on 
conversations with Eszter day after day: each of 
them— the resigned and the enthusiastic—  
speaking in an endless monologue.
The town is terrified by the circus and its 
attendants, who are obviously interested not in 
the whale but a mysterious artist, the three-eyed 
monster called the Prince. Nobody has seen him 
except his two Felliniesque escorts. The au­
thorities want to expel them from the town, but 
Mrs Eszter prevents them from doing so. Now 
comes the catastrophe: the Prince commands 
his followers to destroy the town. They spend a 
whole night looting and raping, murdering 
anyone who gets in their way. One of their 
groups kidnaps Valuska; their leader, the Man 
in the Cloth-Overcoat, rapes and strangles Mrs 
Pflaum. Mrs Eszter sets up a crisis committee, 
which calls for military help: the attackers are 
shot down or imprisoned, but no explanation 
can be got out of them for their acts. The Man in 
the Cloth-Overcoat and the Prince escape and 
there is no evidence against the circus director.
As a result of the events, both friends have to 
change their views. Eszter is forced to take 
practical action. While he is boarding up his 
window, he suddenly sees the light: this time it 
is he who is granted intuitive knowledge. He 
realises he has been mistaken: only details have 
their order, the world as a whole never had one. 
It was an error to seek it, exaggerating the 
validity of logic, and to solace himself with 
amorfati. The dignity of the thinking reed does 
not exist. The only thing to do is love, which—  
had he been interested in things other than his 
theories— he could have learned from Valuska.
Valuska, too, comes in for a share of seeing 
the light, but in a negative sense. When he is 
surrounded in the street by a squad armed with
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iron bars, he suddenly feels that “there is noth­
ing in the place of heaven”. He thinks Eszter has 
been right and that the decline has reached its 
goal. Half-conscious, he lets himself be dragged 
away by the peasants. He tries to think logi­
cally: he dismisses the models of a macrocosm 
and a microcosm, and feels he must accept the 
law of bellum omnium contra omnes, but he still 
believes it possible to achieve victory in the 
struggle. At dawn, escaping from the soldiers, 
he understands that everyone can only be a vic­
tim. Finally he is caught and taken to a lunatic 
asylum. Mr Eszter visits him every day, they sit 
there holding hands and never say a word.
The third part, the ’’deduction”, bears the 
Latin title of the earliest Hungarian literary text 
(1192): Sermo super sepulchrum. The reader 
here comes on a number of surprises. The first 
among these is the humour which up till now 
has mostly remained hidden. Mrs Eszter, the 
“resistance fighter”, becomes the mayor, with 
the help of her new lover, the commanding 
officer of the soldiers. The pitiable efforts she 
makes in building up her new power are ex­
tremely funny, particularly the way in which 
she sets up a new police force loyal to her, out 
of the “warriors” who have proved their strength 
during the night of destruction and avoided 
subsequent prosecution.
At last she can carry out her anti-litter cam­
paign— and here comes the second surprise. 
She succeeds in having the streets cleaned and 
the damaged houses repaired, and improves 
public supplies. This corrupt, illegitimate power, 
it seems, is able to restore order. Collapse does 
not occur and decline continues from an earlier 
stage. Melancholy remains justified, as the new 
situation is obviously temporary. The Prince, 
the ideologue of destruction, has seemingly 
lost, but Mrs Eszter honours similar values. Her 
slogans are strength, order (by which she means 
her own power) and fight. She organizes a 
hero’s funeral for Mrs Pflaum and delivers the 
funeral oration of the title.
The last pages portray the decomposition of 
the corpse, in sentences of artistic beauty that 
carry pathological precision. This is a reduced 
repetition of the whole theme, like the mirror in 
a Flemish painting: the process in which an 
organic whole has been “ground by the infinite 
sweep of the chaos that holds the crystals of 
order”.
The picture of a world pulsating between 
decay and uplift corresponds with everyday
experience, but the initial sections have pre­
sented final disintegration so forcefully that the 
postponement of catastrophe leaves the reader 
with a sense of disappointment. Thus the clos­
ing section is not at one with those that preceed 
it. The structure of the novel is by no means as 
strictly symmetrical as one would think.
This inconsistency seems to contradict the 
courage with which the author carries through 
even the cruelest thought. In fact the explana­
tion lies precisely in his thoroughness. 
Krasznahorkai is not attracted by an open work, 
but he does not leave the challenges in the 
technique of the novel unanswered either. The 
doubtful identity of the narrator at the end of 
Satan’s Tango did in fact lend another dimen­
sion to the story. His new experiment with a 
double ending (one optimistic, the other pessi­
mistic) rather invalidates the effect already 
achieved. The Melancholy o f Resistance does 
not come up to the standard of his first novel; 
nonetheless it has many virtues which an out­
line of the plot cannot possibly bring out.
Krasznahorkai’s long, sophisticated sen­
tences are a bold innovation in Hungarian prose. 
A carefully elaborated style provides a detailed 
analysis of the events, often from several points 
o f view. The important characters are all “re­
flectors” (in the sense Henry James used the 
word), but their observations are much more 
delicate, and their thinking (despite the many 
platitudes) more methodical than would be 
credible. In spite of the descriptive elements, 
the author cannot be considered a traditional 
realist nor, as he has been often referred to, as 
the Solzhenitsyn of the present. Although his 
writing undoubtedly has a certain Russian 
character, it rather resembles Bulgakov, not 
only by featuring diabolic powers but also in the 
ethics of compassion.
The other novelist close to him is Beckett, 
(nor should one forget Thomas Bernhard) but 
presumably he owes much to the genius loci as 
well.
The supposition that the absence of any real 
basis of human dignity and of a firm scale of 
values can more easily be observed in Eastern 
Europe, where the dictatorships have to a large 
extent destroyed these illusions, features in the 
works of all the authors discussed here. The 
significance of this view is often exaggerated; 
they are sometimes sceptical on the issue, but 
none of them says “no” to it. Perhaps all this 
amounts to no more than the legend of St Kafka.
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If the Holy Grail does not exist, it can still have 
its knights.
Miklós Mészöly is one of those who have created a Central European mythology 
all of their own. He has his recurring themes, 
always presented in a new light. Every book by 
this sixty-nine year old writer is a surprise, a 
new experiment. If one tried to divide contem­
porary Hungarian literature into generations, he 
would fit into all of them, including the young­
e s t . '^
His career came to a turning point with his 
Film (1976, German translation: Rückblenden, 
Hanser, Munich, 1980). In this chef-d'oeuvre, 
he arrived at the peak of a way of writing akin 
to the nouveau roman: impersonal objectivity 
and the abolition of a plot. Right away he set out 
to rehabilitate plot, which appeared in a specific 
form, as the story of the scene. He himself calls 
his procedure “present perfect” (a grammatical 
form that does not exist in the Hungarian lan­
guage), by it he means a montage of events 
without any logical relations, taking place at 
different times.
In this manner he seeks both historical deter­
minants and the archetypes of the Central Euro­
pean past. “I have sought for, and found, not 
merely abstracted human comedies”, he said in 
one interview, “but comedies most definitely 
embedded in fates, in historical fates— those of 
individuals, families and peoples. It is my firm 
belief that this, in most cases tragical, dynami­
cally heroic tissue has— and can have— a my­
thology of at least as real a value as has, let’s 
say, the intellectual South America, now in the 
process of taking shape.” The similarity be­
tween the works of Mészöly and Garcia 
Márquez or Juan Rulfo is no accident. This 
intention of creating mythologies calls for the 
description of long processes, and this is why 
his stories include several miniature family 
novels. His characters also include the Or- 
lando-type, immortal protagonist. (Virginia 
W oolf is Mészöly’s favourite author, whose 
influence is felt most strongly in his essays.)
In structure, M észöly’s works over the last 
fifteen years definitely differ from those of the 
writers just mentioned. He does not “narrate” in 
a calm, protracted manner. Most usually he puts 
down “pictures”, which he then sets together 
according to their mood. Of the six stories in his 
latest volume, Wimbledon Hyacinth, one is of 
this type (“Lock-gate”), with another two con­
sisting only of one picture with one character. 
The longer stories once again are of a more tra­
ditional type, showing a return to the anecdote 
form— though not in its naive use.
“Wimbledon Hyacinth”, perhaps the best 
piece in the volume, plays an interesting game 
with time. The motto, “In memóriám 1949- 
1989” indicates that the subject is the downfall 
of communist dictatorship. The story, as in the 
case of the author’s first novel, Az atléta halála, 
(The Death of the Athlete), which still betrays 
the influence of Camus, is set among sports­
men, in a tennis club of the most elegant Budapest 
district, the “smart ghetto”. The members are 
young people of the privileged Djilas-type new 
class. They give a wild party to celebrate the 
55th birthday of their coach. The mood more 
and more resembles a dance of death, but only 
ends with an unpleasant incident: food poison­
ing. Two of the guests, Dalkó andZsizel (Giselle) 
escape the humiliating diarrhoea and end the 
day with a romantic, naked, moonlit tennis 
game— but they are too tired to make love. The 
boy can only speak about his nightmare (a game 
with an eerie automaton at Wimbledon); three 
days later he commits suicide, which, without 
the atmosphere the story creates, would seem to 
be an action gratuite.
T o present the system in the process of drown­
ing in its excreta would by itself be no more than 
a piece of rather rough humour. Nor would it be 
particularly original: it might have easily been 
written, for instance, by Kundera. Mészöly uses 
a great deal of anachronism or, more exactly, 
elements that may be anachronistic. The action 
takes place not only in the mid-1950s (before 
the 1956 revolution, the first collapse of the 
system), but also in the 1980s (before the sec­
ond collapse). In a deeper sense, it portrays the 
decadence of all the parties of a period, some­
what like Thomas Pynchon’s Entropy.
In a witty manner, Mészöly finds many small 
similarities between the mid-1950s and thirty 
years later. (For example, swing music was in 
fashion in both periods.) At first reading, his 
beautiful but unsentimental style almost hides 
the differences, yet they do have their signifi­
cance. To throw an extravagant party, to have 
scent from Vienna and American videotapes, to 
get hyacinth bulbs from Lisbon and to know 
Swiss diplomats (in the usual, or as Panka, the 
Lesbian character, does, in the Biblical sense of 
the term) is nothing special in the 1980s. In the 
pillaged, almost starving country of the ’50s,
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fenced in by barbed wire, all this practically 
counted as a sin. The young people do nothing 
illicit, unlike their fathers who even get away 
with shooting down the forester at a battue, but 
unconsciously they feel the food poisoning to 
be a well-deserved punishment. This self-re­
proach is a telling metaphor for the sentiments 
similar social gatherings were marked by in the 
1980s, of what those deprived of any possibility 
of sensible action felt over the time that was 
being frittered away.
“ Wimbledon Hyacinth” obviously exhibits 
little nostalgia, but Mészöly is a humanist rather 
than a moralist, and he does not deny that even 
such a memory can become prettified. The con­
clusion he adds to the twenty-five page story is 
typical of the 19th century novel: a listing of 
who of the characters has died, who has emi­
grated, who has became an embezzler and who 
an apparatchik. The trainer dies in a public 
hospital, and all that remains of him is the 
Beethoven casette he was listening to that eve­
ning.
“Oh, ehe bella nőtte!” is in part a hommage 
ä Jonathan Swift. It takes place around 1960, 
when it was already possible to travel as a 
private person “in the other circle of Europe, 
shut off by minefields, bloodhounds and search­
lights”. The protagonist is a historian in an 
institute whose task is to falsify history. He 
decides to spend a holiday in Naples. On the 
train he meets Mary, an Irish girl, whose eccen­
tricities he takes as a manifestation of the fa­
mous Celtic imagination. The daughter of the 
victim of an IRA outrage, she claims to be 
descended from Laetitia Pilkington, the maid­
servant of Swift. Listening to her enthusiastic 
stories, the historian confronts the moral cour­
age which alloved Swift to support the Irish 
(whom he did not even like). The girl slowly 
changes the attitudes of the historian as well. In 
Pompeii, among the indisputable facts of the 
past, he swears to kill Tiberius— meaning that 
he will make a break with lying. Returning to 
Budapest, he proves too weak and carries on 
with his research. Seven years later he learns 
from a letter that Mary has really become de­
ranged. The law of the state has turned out 
stronger than the law of morality, and biology 
stronger than mythology.
“At the Deportation Squad” is the most tra­
ditional short-story, it could even be termed 
non-fiction. As a “state purchase commissioner 
o f potato stocks”, the writer in fact took part in
the expatriation of tens of thousands of ethnic 
Germans to Germany, to which Hungary had 
been compelled by the Potsdam Conference. 
Now he shows that this injustice not only ruined 
the peasants chased off their land but even the 
soldiers who had survived the war if unable to 
think cynically enough. Though of cathartic 
affect, this story cannot be called really origi­
nal. It proves once again that good literature 
calls not so much for personal as for adequately 
shaped experience.
György Konrad’s novel is in fact not new.The first version appeared in German, 
way back in 1986 (Geisterfest, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt M.), and a year later it was illegally 
published in Hungarian by the AAB publishers, 
naturally in a small edition. At the time the 
author, a political dissident, was under a pub­
lishing ban and he even had to reckon with a 
search of his home and the confiscation of 
manuscripts. This position and the road that led 
to it make one of the important subjects of this 
partly autobiographical novel. Now that condi­
tions have changed, the work has come into 
wide circulation in an enlarged edition, and the 
title Agenda 1 seems to indicate that further 
augmentations can still be expected. (The work 
does hint at a trilogy under way.)
The imaginary party is held by Dávid Kobra 
in his garden, but actually it takes place in his 
consciousness. He recalls (like a “medieval 
man about to die”) all those he had once known, 
the quick and the dead alike. They can become 
acquainted with each other, carry on conversa­
tions, they can narrate and can publish their 
diaries. All of them continue the story, which in 
this way remains always open. It is modern 
picaresque, or, as Raymond Federman calls it, 
surfiction. “In this book the independence of 
the parts is an important rule. Every paragraph, 
every chapter forms a unit worth reading by 
itself too.” Or at least they are intended as such.
The author is aware of the unperceived de­
formation of memory and thus of the con­
structed nature of his own personality. He also 
feels the temptation to attribute reality to this 
fiction. He has hinted at this temptation, he 
writes, in calling the protagonist (autobiogra­
phically inspired) Kobra (Cobra). Sometimes 
he merely refers to him as K, which points to his 
Central European nature and the Kafkaesque 
character of his experiences; the Christian name 
David refers to Jewish origins. K ’s biographi­
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cal data mostly coincide with what is known 
about Konrad. His family were ironmongers in 
the north-eastern part of the country, in a village 
“of an unutterable name”. As a boy he lived 
through the war there and in Budapest; the 
holocaust robbed him of many of his relatives. 
By mid-century, this part of the liberal Jewish 
middle-class had become assimilated, and 
considered itself Hungarian (of Jewish relig­
ion). So the holocaust, which reached the coun­
try after the 1944 German occupation, and was 
actively assisted by the Hungarian authorities, 
was not simply an external assault but a painful 
crisis of identity as well. The young Kobra saw 
how many “Christians” became accomplices 
simply by abiding by the law, and that among 
the victims those who resptected the law started 
with much less chances. Neutrality was a crime, 
and so was avoiding resistance.
These experiences saved him from being 
manipulated during his secondary school years. 
For him and his friends to find their bearings in 
European culture was neither a simple nor a 
safe proposition in the cold war years. The 
intellectual autobiography (Chapter 9) forms a 
most interesting part, even if it may place the 
development of some of his views at a time 
earlier than it in fact took place. Detours and 
errors very rarely occur in this Bildungsroman.
In the office where he is working (half­
heartedly) as town planner, he is again sur­
rounded by the kind of people who carry out 
even the most senseless orders. Next come the 
1970s, the years of literary work, politics for the 
opposition and lecturing abroad. The first half 
of the 1980s brings a lessening of the peril 
involved in his position, he has no more worries 
about earning a living— and he is no longer as 
dissatisfied as many would expect him to be. He 
arrives at a calm wisdom, ready for a summa­
tion “before death”.
The central figures among the numerous 
charcters are his old schoolmates, Antal and 
Dragoman and their women, Melinda and 
Regina. Autobiographical elements are plenti­
ful in the figure o f János Dragoman as well. 
Their fates run along mostly parallel lines, but 
they differ in their practical philosophy. Drago­
man, (Turkish for interpreter) is a true cosmo­
politan, calling himself a “wandering Jew ”. It 
was not merely his prison sentence after the 
revolution that prompted him in 1966 to leave 
the country to set off on adventurous paths— he 
feels at home in the wide world. He is a success­
ful critic and university professor in the States, 
spending a sabbatical year in B udapest. Here he 
falls in love with Melinda, the wife of Antal, a 
film director. Melinda clings to her roots and to 
tradition. (The author calls her a Catholic, though 
this is not obvious in her style.) She has kept her 
father’s house, which is no small accomplish­
ment in Budapest, at any time in the last 45 
years. She holds together her “wider family”, 
consisting of the family members and regular 
guests. “I ’m sitting at centre, like a spider that 
weaves the little flies into its own slow tapes­
try”, she says of herself. She would like to keep 
Dragoman too, whose forte is not fidelity, being 
a Don Juan always on the move. By the end of 
the story, she does in fact succeed. Dragoman 
falls into a depression, and Antal, the husband, 
suffers a stroke. They both seek salvation in 
Melinda, “because, my dear ones, no will in the 
world is more tyrannical than the will of love.” 
In the author’s “picaresque” conception, the 
story can have no ending whatever, it can only 
be left off somewhere; this chapter is entitled 
“Provisional End Game”. In fact it is an effec­
tive ending, leaving no feeling of temporar­
iness.
In another striking inconsistency, Kobra 
appears both as the counterpart of Dragoman 
and as his counterpoint. In his love he fights a 
struggle similar to that of M elinda’s to be able 
to keep the other cosmopolitan, Regina. He 
often argues with Dragoman, defending the 
clinging to one’s home, one’s identity, to the 
community one belongs to. He criticises the 
western conforming to the intellectual market 
and fashionable trends. “My dear Kobra, you 
with your faithfulness, are a dolt behind your 
times”, Dragoman replies, “ ...you people take 
these European questions of who and what we 
are much too seriously. In America this is really 
not so exciting ...” (p. 504). It is rather confus­
ing to collate these with statements about K. 
who “is not committed to any tradition of think­
ing and action” (p. 653), or about Dragoman 
about whom we are told that if he were a 
Dutchman, less than a quarter of the dilemmas 
burdening his mind would survive (p. 345). 
Even in the 20th century one would expect 
more coherence than this from a literary charac­
ter.
Dragoman, of course, is not right in arguing 
that roots are a non-issue in America. This is in 
fact a frequent subject of Jewish writing on the 
East Coast. There are also examples for the idea
134 The New Hungarian Quarterly
of two parallel fates— one European and one 
American (by Philip Roth). Konrád shows a 
close kinship with this— unfortunately even to 
the extent of borrowing its clichés.
The novel (like all Konrád novels, with the 
exception of The Case Worker) contains 
much essayistic and journalistic material, and 
not always harmoniously. The aphorisms on lit­
erature, politics, or the ultimate reality may be 
of no small interest, but unfortunately they are 
devoid of originality. Even the fictitious parts 
are marked by a wearying verbosity, and this is 
only partly counterbalanced by the elegance of 
the prose.
The question of fidelity and order appears in Péter Esterházy’s new novel as well. The 
author has long been concerned with the order 
of writing. His first major success Termelési 
regény (Production Novel, 1979) was a parody 
of the “well constructed” Novel as much as of 
literature exploited in agitprop. No one só far 
has been able to decide whether his most impor­
tant work, Bevezetés a szépirodalomba (Intro­
duction to Belles Letters, 1986) is a composed 
whole or a jum ble of haphazardly collected 
parts. The Book o f Hrabal is an admixture of 
two genres: the first chapter being a traditional 
novel and the third more of an essay on the 
metaphysical goal of human creation. The pro­
tagonists are “The W riter” (easily recognizable 
as Esterházy himself) and his wife, Anna. She 
forms part of the author’sprivate mythology; he 
used her photograph to “disguise” one of his 
(not particularly successful) novels, which three 
years ago he published under a pseudonym. 
This time the reader sees their life in an idyllic 
presentation, until the arrival of troubles. Anna 
realizes that she is pregnant and she is hesitating 
whether or not to keep her fourth child. At the 
same time The Writer would like to write an 
essay on the 75th birthday of Bohumil Hrabal, 
but despite all his efforts he does not get on with 
the work. He sits at his desk all day, becomig 
more and more irritable, with his favourite 
Hrabal book, Postriziny on his knees.
Of Hrabal’s novels, this is the most popular 
in Hungary; but this popularity, like that of 
Czech culture as a whole, is somewhat ambiva­
lent. He is liked but not considered a really 
serious writer, since his scintillating humour 
conceals his darker tones.
In general, the value accorded to a human life 
in Europe constantly decreases as one moves
from the north southwards. Polish culture is an 
exception in this respect, being rather “south­
ern”, but the borderline between two mentali­
ties can clearly be observed between Bohemia 
and Hungary, and also between Hungary and 
Serbia. The Hungarian tradition is much more 
heroic, and joie de vivre is more closely related 
to self-destruction. A great many Hungarians 
consider the behaviour patterns of the nobility 
as a model. Although the historical experiences 
of the two peoples are very similar, and the 
milieu presented by Hrabal is well known to 
Hungarian readers, they have no eye for the 
apotheosis of small things. They consider cau­
tion and willingness to compromise, together 
with frugality and other Victorian virtues, as 
petty. In the common mind the Czech is a petty 
bourgeois par excellence. (This opinion is 
backed by the unfortunate coincidence that 
some frequent endings to Czech words coincide 
with Hungarian diminutive suffixes, and so to 
Hungarian ears the language sounds comically 
childish.) Esterházy, who is a member of one of 
the most illustrious families of the country, is in 
opposition to his compatriots on this issue, and 
he holds the Czech way of tolerating difficulties 
in high esteem.
Besides having a high opinion of Hrabal’s 
literary talent, and considering him a “giant”, 
Esterházy also seeks a philosophy in him, a kind 
of a “plebeian” tradition, which Hungarian lit­
erature has allowed to perish. On the other 
hand, he is also interested in the similarity 
between Hrabal on the one hand, and Kafka and 
Paul Celan on the other, who had an utterly 
different vision about the same Central Europe. 
The question arises whether a Central Euro­
pean, at the mercy of the state, would more 
easily understand the position of people subor­
dinated to natural and supernatural forces than 
do others? This would be the subject of the 
essay which The W riter is unable to write.
With the pasage of time, the figure of Hrabal 
appears more and more often in the couple’s 
imagination, almost becoming a member of the 
family. Anna at last falls in love with Bohumil; 
the usual end of family idylls. The “Chapter of 
Fidelity” is followed by “The Chapter of Infi­
delity”: a long letter which has never been 
written and posted, in which Anna tells the 
Czech writer about her experiences, desires and 
fears.
She is not only afraid of childbirth and of 
becoming ugly, but she also feels that she is
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being observed. She thinks that the two men in 
a Lada (with the familiar registration number of 
state-owned cars) can only be secret agents, but 
she is mistaken: they are the angels of God. God 
has sent them to prevent the planned abortion, 
but they have been given conflicting directives. 
This God is a shilly-shallying police chief in the 
last but one year of the regime: He would like to 
intervene but holds free will in respect— in the 
same way as the officials of the liberalised 
dictatorship have paid heed to sham legality. 
Conversation with the angels is carried on in the 
dreadfully faulty language of neo-barbarism, 
packed with platitudes and awful jokes. Only 
those who have followed the secret service 
scandal in Budapest last spring can fully appre­
ciate the splendily satirical characterisation of 
the angels— poorly qualified, rather dim, east­
ern James Bonds. One of them is a latent homo­
sexual, cherishing an unrequited love for his 
younger colleague. (It should be said that 
Esterházy’s book was already in press when the 
scandal broke out.)
Finally the angels succeed in fulfilling their 
task— in the same way as they had once saved 
Anna, when her father wanted to have her 
virginity verified. One of them “stands in for” 
the old gynaecologist whom she visits and, 
pretending to be hard of hearing, persuades her 
to change her decision. In a rather sentimental 
scene, the couple decide to bring up their fourth 
child.
This is much too good to be true, the critic 
must say. Several critics consider the book a 
failure, but they are not surprised by the success 
it has had among readers. Esterházy uses easily 
identifiable pseudonyms by which he features 
the must eminent Hungarian critics, hinting 
somewhat unfairly that they are finding it hard 
to shake off the influence of György Lukács. At 
the appearance of Production Novel, one of 
them, Sándor Radnóti, already called attention 
to the fact that neither the stability o f traditional 
values and family ties nor the protagonist’s 
ability to cut free from his threatening environ­
ment follow from the novel. All this is not 
essential artistically, but an ideological preju­
dice. It is a consequence of the author’s excep­
tionally fortunate mental constitution.
This time the same prejudice prevails even 
more rigorously. One does not feel domestic 
harmony to be under any real threat. Most of the 
anecdotes, which are meant to depict the enor­
mities of history through a few ruined lives, are
banal (as the deportation of The W riter’s fa­
ther), or else much too singular to be general­
ised (as the portrayal of the eccentric Aunt 
Georgina). At the end of the letter, Anna sus­
pects Hrabal of having devised Central European 
joie de vivre, which only exists “in his head”, 
but the basic tone of the chapter is nostalgia for 
a region “in working order”. In her vision she 
sees Prague and Budapest on the coast of the 
infinite ocean— not the actual cities themselves 
but even more realistic ones. It is difficult to put 
into words what this desirable change would 
consist of: people would decide their own des­
tinies, they could sincerely carry the burden of 
decision, and all this would also enliven the 
culture of the cities. It is nothing extraordinary, 
“only” a normal state— one which, however, 
has not existed in this part of the world since 
1914. “Our presence would not be something 
like the light, rather like a veil, soft, drizzling, 
mildly unfriendly weather, in which the cities 
would flash without loosing their well-earned 
sorrow that has been inculcated in them ... Our 
presence would urge others too to be present... 
All those who are, would also be!”
The third and briefest chapter sharply differs 
from the foregoing. It opens with a blasphe­
mous scene in which God wakes up with bleary 
eyes one morning. Having breakfast, He skims 
through the report from the angels. He quarrels 
with his mother, who has reached her change of 
life— as if one were to view Max Ernst’s Ma­
donna with Child, only a few decades older. 
(The Son nostalgically remembers Euclid and 
Newton, and therefore His mother teases Him 
with Heisenberg.) When He runs out of argu­
ments, He turns to watch the Earth— and sees 
Anna praying and The Writer working instead 
of praying, because “he thought he would any­
way be serving the Lord through his work”. 
This view is not without its dangers: one might 
finally become fonder of one’s own abilities 
than of the Lord. Is a work that has been created 
out of haughtiness suitable to praise God with? 
The parable which answers this question is the 
story of the builder of a cathedral (as in Golding ’ s 
The Spire). Jacob Steiger fell from the Ulm 
spire, with a face “of disillusionment, of empti­
ness and hate”. Art does not save the artist, but 
the following section assigns him another meta­
physical goal.
God, like all living beings, feels the desire to 
outdo Himself. The only thing He knows noth­
ing about is art, as the scene in which He learns
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to play the saxophone from Charlie Parker 
shows. This “invalid angel” is a philosophical 
variant of the musician as seen by Julio Cor- 
tazar. He proves that art springs from the fight 
fought against time.“ ...w hat is principally 
needed for music is time. And eternity is not 
time.” In vain does the Lord try to compensate 
himself for the “sublime and wretched” soli­
tude by playing on B ird’s saxophone, the dread­
fully off-key sound by which “the whole cre­
ated world became saturated” in the last sen­
tence of the book, only demonstrates his failure.
The last chapter allows for the second inter­
pretation of the title: The Book ofHrahal as one 
of the Apocrypha. It includes an— unsuccess­
ful— dialogue between the Lord and Hrabal, 
who is feeding his cat and whom He mistakes 
for Kafka. Imitating a “rigid” translation, and 
then adding a carefully wrought sentence that 
runs over two pages, Esterházy displays the full 
power of his style.
The idea of human dignity derived from the 
knowledge of transience shows the influence of 
Pascal. Esterházy nevertheless does not refer to 
Pascal in his reflections, but to fictitious au­
thors. He usually does so humorously, though 
sometimes seems to forget the advice of the 
French philosopher: “If you want others to say 
nice things about you, never say nice things 
about yourself’. The W riter appears more often 
than seems necessary, in the course of his work 
or while bringing up his children, conversing 
with his friends about the decline of European 
culture and so on. He not only indiscreetly 
features critics, he also refers to many writers, 
using anagrams or knowledge that is private. 
This is a game, like crossword puzzles, which 
Esterházy himself calls the surrogate of great 
mysteries, the contraption of Satan. As always, 
the devil must have been diligent indeed— for 
annoying intimacies such as these have greatly 
proliferated in recent times.
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Nicholas W. Balabkins
An Introduction 
to Transit Economics
János Kornai: The Road to a Free Economy. Shiftining from a Socialist System. 
The Example o f Hungary. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1990, 224 pp.
I n 1989, a tidal wave swept away the so- called socialist states of Central and Eastern 
Eurpe. The satellite countries, as they were 
known for more than four decades, were cre­
ated after the end of World War II with the 
assistance of the Red Army. The ideological 
foundation upon which they were built was 
Marxism, which called for the elimination of 
the privately owned means of production, sub­
stitution of quantitative-output planning for the 
market economy, and giving all political power 
to the communists. All these changes were to 
produce a material Nirvana, a worker’s para­
dise. They did not.
According to the author, this volume is an 
“economic policy pamphlet” (p. 212) written 
by a “specialist of comparative systems theory 
and the socialist economy” (fn. 49, p. 145). The 
book sets out to address the following problem: 
The Hungarian economy is in deep economic 
crisis and Kornai wants to indicate the policy 
contours which would create order out o f chaos 
(p. 190). The vast majority o f Hungarians feel 
that they live “in a state of upheaval, disorgani­
zation, and disorder” (p. 191). Kornai offers a 
“third alternative” between the barrack-room 
discipline and chaos. The basic policy question 
is as follows: How do you reform the Hungarian 
economy with its vast state sector? Economic 
rationality without an economic market is 
impossible, so Kornai has the difficult task of 
transforming the Hungarian bureaucratic struc­
ture, without private means of production, into 
a market economy with parliamentary democ-
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racy and privately owned means of production. 
It is a Herculean task and the author knows it. 
Kornai also makes the important point that the 
successful currency and economic reform of 
the British, American, and French zones of 
occupation in Germany of 1948 is not relevant 
for Hungary today. The removal of the wartime 
direct controls and the introduction of a new 
currency, the Deutsche Mark, was done “in a 
fundamentally private economy” (p. 177). What 
this means is that in the Third Reich the means 
of production, for the most part, were in private 
hands. For this reason, Kornai ’ s economic policy 
pamphlet deals with the re-making of the three 
dimensions of the Hungarian social order: first, 
how to revamp the property ownership and 
create favorable conditions for the emergence 
of privately-owned means of production; sec­
ond, how to move the economy from a highly 
centralized and bureaucratic system of control 
to a market economy; third, Kornai assumes 
that Hungarian parliamentary democracy is 
already in place and the monopoly power of the 
communist party has been broken.
His book consists of three chapters: the first 
is called “Ownership” (pp. 34— 101) and deals 
with the indispensable institutional change. The 
second chapter outlines the step-by-step policy 
issues and is called “The Surgery for Stabiliza­
tion” (pp. 102— 178). Introduction to this chap­
ter and Sections 2.1 and 2.6 appeared in NHQ 
117. The third chapter, “Tasks of the Economic 
Transition from a Political Viewpoint” (pp. 
179— 209), discusses the interdependence be­
tween politics and economics and the art of 
policymaking.
In the first chapter, Kornai notes that private 
initiative and private property had almost fallen 
victim to post-war nationalization, collectivi­
zation, and confiscation (p. 36). Yet the small
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Hungarian private sector today is the only part 
of the economy that is healthy and growing. To 
make sure that bureaucracy does not choke the 
private sector in the future, Komái spells out six 
sharply worded requirements or “ought to be’s” 
for the future development of the private sector 
(pp. 38— 47). They are: 1) The private sector 
must be wholly and truly liberalized; 2) The 
enforcement of private contracts must be guar­
anteed by law (p. 45); 3) The absolute security 
of private property should be emphatically 
declared; 4) The tax system should not restrain 
private investment (p. 46); 5) Private invest­
ment as well as the formation and growth of 
private capital must be promoted through credit; 
and 6) Social respect must be developed toward 
the private sector (pp. 49— 51). Komái knows 
from bitter personal experience that “the criti­
cal deficiency of socialist state property con­
sists in the impersonalization of ownership” (p. 
51). State property belongs to everyone and to 
no one. He stresses that the communists have 
liquidated the private sector by state fiat, and 
that it is impossible to develop the private 
sector by similar means (p. 52). Kornai notes 
that, in many ways, the current production 
methods of the private sector “fall far behind 
those that characterized Hungary ’ s private sector 
in the late nineteenth century” (p. 53). Since 
state ownership permanently recreates bureauc­
racy (p. 58), even when reforms dismantle the 
quantitative-output plan economy, direct bu­
reaucratic regulation is replaced by indirect 
bureaucratic regulation (p. 59) He cautions the 
reformers against fake illusory changes, prac­
tices of simulation and plastic facades (p. 72). 
He calls for the setting up of an office to manage 
the privatization of state property, but believes 
that if his six “ought to be’s” are put in place, 
Hungary will have a chance for successful 
economic reforms.
The second chapter, dealing with the imple­
mentation of the reform policy, calls for simul­
taneous measures (p. 105), designed to elimi­
nate the existing open and repressed inflation 
because in conditions of inflationary expecta­
tions rational economic calculation becomes 
impossible (p. 109). Restoration of the budget­
ary equilibrium is the next major policy item on 
Kornai’s agenda. He calls for the immediate 
elimination of subsidies (pp. 116 and 135) and 
the revamping of the entire tax structure. Kor­
nai pleads for the nonprogresive tax system for 
the period of the reform for reasons of incen­
tives (p. 125). He suggests linear consumption 
tax, single linear payroll tax, and single linear 
profit tax (pp. 127— 28). He also argues that the 
production subsidies ought to disappear. For­
mation of rational prices (pp. 145— 154) is the 
most important task of the reform. Kornai also 
wants to introduce a uniform exchange rate of 
the convertibility of the forint as part of the 
reform package. And, again, Kornai does not 
want to have the reform process drawn out over 
many months, but he insists on a “single, radical 
shock” (p. 161). In the third chapter, Kornai 
makes it clear that his pragmatism is geared to 
the generation of incentives to produce more 
goods and thus to increase the national income 
in Adam Smith’s fashion. He wants to undo the 
damage done by years o f socialism which has 
sapped personal initiative (p. 183). He also 
makes clear that his programme does not aim at 
the creation of Adam Smith’s “laissez-faire” 
type of capitalism. He pleads for an on-going 
capitalist welfare state (p. 200), but he prefers 
the French version of the capitalist welfare state 
to the Swedish type capitalist welfare state (p. 
205).
The major shortcoming of this “economic 
policy pamphlet” (212) is Kom ái’s omission or 
unwillingness to spell out what the existing 
direct controls still are and how to cope with the 
remnants of repressed inflation. He talks re­
peatedly about the shortage economy, but never 
quite tells why it lingers. The great attraction of 
K om ai’s volume consists in having made the 
Hungarian social order, consisting of three 
dimensions, the focal point of the analysis. 
Western economists forever relegate the insti­
tutional and political dimension to the ceteris 
paribus cage, and deal exclusively with house­
holds, firms, inflationary and deflationary gaps. 
The second point is that Komái writes very 
much like Gunnar Myrdal who was never afraid 
of spelling out his explicit value premises. For 
virtually all Anglo-Saxon economists such a 
stance is not scientific enough. But Kornai 
knows that esoteric classroom economics and 
economic policy making are two different things.
At the end of the book, Komái appends the 
relevant Hungarian literature, most of which, 
for many years, has been ably translated by Dr 
Tamás Felvinczi in his Abstracts. In addition, 
many policy reform issues have been ably ar­
ticulated in The New Hungarian Quarterly, 
also many years ahead of all the satellite coun­
tries. The author of this review saw the ad-
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vanced version of perestroika in action in 
Budapest in April of 1990. Upon return to West 
Germany, the author saw in the Frankfurt/M. 
area a few posters with a huge portrait of Karl 
Marx and the inscription in German read: Prole­
tarier aller Länder vergebt mir, which in Eng­
lish translation would mean: ’’Proletarians of all 
countries, forgive me.” Forgiveness apart, 
Kornai has written an economic policy brief on
how to achieve economic rationality with func­
tioning markets in Flungary. It is a book de­
signed to undo the damage of Marxian fallacies.
All reform in the Soviet Union and other 
satellite countries would do well to peruse this 
book. For American economists and students of 
economics all over the world it is a first-rate 
introduction into the currently popular “transi­
tional economics”.
T H E A T R E  &  F IL M
Tamás Koltai
Season of Take-Overs
The Hungarian theatre world is in ferment.The old order is collapsing and the new is 
yet to be bom . Those in the theatre have launched 
a battle against a rashly introduced subsidy sys­
tem, which would allot money according to the 
seating capacity of the theatres. Private capital 
is expected to come into play soon. The coali­
tion parties and the opposition are about to 
discuss draft bills in parliamentary committee, 
and these may determine the financial manage­
ment of the theatres in the long run. Money, 
money, money— this is where most of the dis­
cussions end up. Meanwhile, the Katona József 
Theatre of Budapest has built up an interna­
tional reputation; they are practically perma­
nently travelling betwen Europe and America. 
Their latest production, Chekhov’s Platonov 
went almost right away to Paris.
The winds of change are blowing the theatre 
onto new, uncharted waters. The shipwrecked 
characters of Marivaux’s The Island o f Slaves 
come to an island where everything is topsy­
turvy: the servants have become the masters 
and the gentlemen servants. When, early in the 
autumn o f 1989, the Csiky Gergely Theatre of 
Kaposvár opened its season with this 250 year- 
old piece by a playwright who is rarely per­
formed in Hungary, the country was on the 
threshold of changing regimes. It could be felt 
that the somewhat constrained Marivaudage 
was a poetic parable for what was taking place 
and, even more, of what was about to take place.
What actually took place in society found the 
theatre unprepared. Theatre companies were 
left behind by the changes. By the time they put 
on plays which had earlier been banned, mostly 
rushing into premieres prematurely, the indi­
vidual productions were already confronted by 
a new situation. Pasternak and Koestler, or even
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Havel, no longer caused any real sensation. To 
meet aesthetic demands once again took prior­
ity over satisfying the day-to-day political 
appetite. Uncertainty prevailed in the theatre: it 
was amazed by the speed of changes as much as 
society itself, and it reacted to it in the same 
fidgety confusion. As a young playwright has 
tellingly described the situation, while 1989 
was a dramatic year, with conflicts similar to 
those of King Lear, Moliére would be more 
becoming for 1990.
Nonetheless, Moliére proved a failure in the 
Madách Theatre in Budapest. The only striking 
element in Don Juan was when the eponymous 
hero was beaten to death with the metal plates 
torn off the statue of the Governor. In Hungary, 
the demolishing of a statue unavoidably carries 
metaphoric value; accordingly, everybody tried 
to explain the director’s concept of the play 
through this scene. Did it mean that, instead of 
a transcendent power, it is the enraged crowd 
that does away with moral insanity? Does the 
victim, elevated into a statue, become the means 
of revenge in the hands of the people? Does the 
iconoclastic mob liquidate a provocative indi­
vidual? Does the incensed multitude throw off 
the shadow of the past and the present evil 
together at the same time? None of these suppo­
sitions add up: I have been unable to link the 
comic sight of the statue, deprived of its mail 
and “stripped to the pants” with what went 
before. All I could deduce from Tamás Szirtes’s 
production was that he wanted to do something 
more rough, more real, more modem, more 
“Katona-József-Theatre”.
The Moliére esprit was substituted for by the 
Marivaux prelude, which turned out to be a little 
too artistic. Some critics failed to notice the 
irony concealed in the beauty of the Kaposvár 
production. Its French director, Sophie Lou- 
cachevsky, gave an apolitical rendering to a 
theme almost begging for vulgarisation: the 
change of power that “had been in the air”. It 
was to be expected that the subject would be
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repeated in several variations and different 
orechestrations, as in fact happened later. The 
shipwrecked characters of the season one by 
one landed on the “island of the changing sys­
tems”.
Commissioned by the National or, more 
exactly, by director Imre Csiszár, István Eörsi 
made a new translation of Sophocles’s An­
tigone. The text is laconic and rational enough 
for an interpretation that breaks with antiquity 
and takes its pattern by the working o f the 
mechanics of power in the recent past. Accord­
ingly, Creon maintains his position with the aid 
of the compromising consensus of the Chorus 
of intellectuals, until Antigone, having lost faith 
in the movement, rebels against him “within the 
family”. Anna Ráckevei’s interpretation made 
it clear that the faithful follower of Creon, who 
so far accepted his ideology, tactics and poli­
cies, has been seized by hubris once the king 
denied permission for the burial. It is at this 
point that Antigone becomes an oppositionist, 
refusing to cooperate with the dogmatists of 
power. The conflict does not remain within the 
family, the pillars of the order. The intellectual 
advisors are balancing, with growing hesita­
tion, between Creon and Antigone, but they 
take the side of the girl unanimously only when 
her martydrom has already caused the fall of the 
regime. You cannot cast a veil of forgiveness 
over the past— this is Eörsi’s only major inter­
vention in the original work. It is not so much 
the formulation as the exterior that lends the 
semblance of anachronism to the production; 
Györgyi Szakács stylised the antique costume 
into the loden-type coats of the ’fifties, Interior 
Ministry uniforms and the suits worn by activ­
ists, while Tamás Vayer placed the whole into 
a flagstoned street of a large city. However, this 
is not disturbing because it consistently re­
places Greek mythology by something more 
familiar to the audience, something they have 
lived through personally in recent decades.
The other production of the National com­
pany, Shakespeare’s TheTempest, ismuchmore 
lenient. János Taub has produced a fairy-tale 
idyll in which the change of regime and the 
twists that occur in exile do not have to be taken 
seriously. Imre Sinkovicts’s Prospero spends 
his exile on an island of peace. He is a mixture 
of stoical old gentleman and retired buffoon, 
displaying the early signs of sclerosis; at one 
point he cannot find the magic rod in his pocket, 
hauling it out at the last minute to paralyse
Caliban as he embraces Miranda. He is alone 
and somewhat bored, with no diversion left to 
him but to watch the gymnastic training of the 
young, talented Ariel, who supposedly is pre­
paring for a competition. But one can have 
enough of this too, and so Sinkovits-Prospero 
conjures his former enemies to the island to 
marry off his daughter to Ferdinand, whom he 
has selected for her. On the stage of the Na­
tional, Shakespeare’s shipwrecked characters 
strikingly resemble those of Marivaux in their 
smirks and simpering. Their clothes have been 
washed white by the sea, and their souls by the 
atmosphere of Prospero’s island. Their spiteful 
plans are the gestures of a narcotic dream cho­
reographed into a slow-motion picture. In fact 
there is no longer any need to break the magic 
rod. The evil ones have mended their ways, the 
lovers have found each other, and Ariel, who 
dwelt on his promised freedom without any real 
conviction, has presumably been freer in the 
island training camp than he will be in the 
selected gym nastic team at the court. 
Shakespeare’s characters appear on the curtain 
that frames the open-air stage in the island—  
Machiavellian king s, fools, “a pair of star cross ’ d 
lovers”, the regicidal couple, the notorious wine- 
swigger and listen in meek agreement to the 
conciliatory appeal. I infer some soft irony in 
this ending anyway.
The forgiveness of The Tempest is a reversal 
of the prevailing fashion in staging Shakespeare. 
The Hungarian public has become accustomed 
to a beclouding of merriment in the comedies, 
rather than the dispersing of thunder clouds. 
Tamás Fodor, who directed As You Like It in the 
Szigligeti Theatre o f Szolnok, interprets the 
idyll of banishment with more bitterness than 
János Taub does. In fact, here too, it is a ques­
tion of a shift of power, a revenge that does not 
take place, and forgiveness. Fodor portrays the 
court of the Duke with darker colours than has 
been traditional. He dwells long on the business 
in which the strapping Duke— who has no court 
wrestler but measures his own strength with 
Orlando— manhandles the members of his 
household and the guards. The perfomance by 
János Derzsi leaves no doubt as to the Duke 
being a gangster. So the melancholy exiles are 
bound to reckon with the situation after their 
return. Fodor has opted for a singular solution to 
put across the paradox of power. What he pres­
ents with “irony” is not the conversion of the 
bad monarch but the turn that takes place in the
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Situation. The suddenly immobile characters 
are combed through by a set element which has 
opened up on their escape to the forest of Arden 
and now closes back on them to lock them into 
the fate that follows for them because of the 
rotation of power. Far from being relaxed, the 
moment is rather fearful. Jacques is the only one 
who knows why, and he draws his conclusion 
when he chooses the freedom of exile.
Typical of the atmosphere in the country 
which has spilled over into the theatre as well, 
one of the most straightforward of Shakespeare’s 
comedies, Much Ado About Nothing, has been 
breathed onto by Central-East Europe. In István 
Iglódi’s production, in the József Attila The­
atre, the young men returning victorious from 
battle to sunny Messina, have forgotten to leave 
their military manners behind, and they manage 
their love affairs with a kind of Prussian prim­
ness. Even Benedick is able to break out of this 
militarism only by changing into civilian clothes: 
before the last act he must have applied for 
discharge. Finally, even if at the price of some 
ordeals, the Latin spirit most fitting to the play 
triumphs, and the military parades and proces­
sions peter out.
A fully developed version of militarism 
appeared in Edward Bond’s Lear, staged in the 
Madách Studio, a production by Viktor Nagy. 
The production was lent an unexpected timeli­
ness by the breaching and destruction of the 
Berlin Wall, which had not been envisaged 
during the preparations for the first night. The 
actual politics do not correspond with Bond’s 
approach, which lags behind the times by at 
least twenty years. At the end of the British 
playwright’s version of Lear, the tyrant-tumed- 
captive is liquidated by the machinery of the 
“revolutionary state” when he has recognised 
that there is no need for a wall keeping Europe 
on the other side. For Bond the play still ends 
with the terror of the “party state”; the run in the 
Madách has lasted longer than it took the East­
ern European systems to collapse. So the pro­
duction in a certain sense has aquired a retro­
spective tinge, even though in its coverage of 
reality and its style it had been intended to 
reflect on the company’s foresightedness.
Two Schiller productions have also been un­avoidably linked to the changes in the po­
litical landscape. Don Carlos, in the Pécs Na­
tional, countersigned the impossibility of social 
reform. Accordingly, in Menyhért Szegváry’s
production, Ákos Kőszegi, in the part of the 
Marquis Posa, has become the protagonist. The 
actor stood out from his environment: instead of 
a historical figure, he rather looked a university 
political science student who is unexpectedly 
given the chance to make good use of what he 
has learned in actual practice. Naive intellec­
tual conspiracy has been against the power 
represented by the Church and an, at times 
seemingly human, tyranny, which is personi­
fied by the king, who is wont to declare his 
intrasigency from a balustrade resembling a 
mausoleum. Apart from a few pieces of inten­
tional anacronism—e.g., when Philip II takes 
the file of Posa, whom he has chosen as his 
confidant, out of an office filing system—the 
production is not far from the traditional con­
cept: had it reached the stage a few years earlier, 
it would in all probability have stirred greater 
excitement.
The other Schiller production was in fact a 
paraphrase. János Mohácsi, who wrote and 
directed it for the Csiky Gergely Theatre of 
Kaposvár, considered his Luise Miller as the 
raw material for a political pamphlet in which 
the last hours of an irrational dictatorship are 
followed as it collapses into a reign of terror. 
The adaptation treated the original without much 
respect: the minister von Walter is turned into 
the prime minister, Lady Milford’s love for 
Ferdinand has become fulfilled at least physi­
cally in a rash act and, after her burst of gener­
osity, she is beaten to death by her own servants; 
the lovers are being observed by a hidden camera, 
the Millers are dragged away by a commando 
squad, the characters move about by lift, they 
fire out of glass-barrelled guns—and the pro­
duction is accompained by jazz music. Several 
critics took exception to all this but the com­
pany has been invited to the Mannheim Schiller 
Festival. The premiere took place in December 
1989, one week before the revolutionary events 
just before Christmas in Temesvár and 
Bucharest. So life imitates the theatre after all. 
The production is perfectly worked out, 
professionally faultless and stylistically con­
sistent—good stagecraft despite shortcomings 
that follow from its chaotic assembly. And as 
time passes, the conditions in the Balkans are 
providing a justification for the production’s 
exposition and dramatic embroglio and, 
slowly, even the Shakespearean dénouement, 
in which power degenerating into lunacy 
gives way to a pacifying dictatorship.
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The classical drama of disappointment in 
revolution, Georg Büchner’s D a n to n ’s  D eath  
also came onto the stage (or, more exactly, into 
a large room temporarily transformed from a 
scene-dock in the Móricz Zsigmond Theatre of 
Nyíregyháza). The director, Erzsébet Gaál, 
complemented the drastically abridged text by 
inserting excerpts from W oyzeck  and from 
Büchner’s letters, in order to achieve a relative 
equilibrium between the dramatic “above” and 
“below”, the quarelling leaders of the revolu­
tion and the people, its mass support. The scenes 
presented under the title D an ton , show a singu­
lar contrapuntal technique; the soliloquising 
protagonists—especially Danton, Robespierre 
and Saint-Just—see their words accompained 
by the permanent turmoil of the crowd. The 
events that take place at the lower levels of the 
revolution are acted out by the various groups in 
a forceful stylization and carefully choerogra- 
phed sound and movement. The most striking 
element is provided by these revolutionary 
walkers-on, who are given the stature of pro­
tagonists. And even their physical looks ac­
quire metaphoric meaning: they are students 
from a local secondary school specialising in 
drama.
The people—the crowd—would have a 
similar role in B o ris  G odu nov. Pushkin’s his­
torical fresco is set, even if not in a revolution­
ary period, but in troubled times or, to use a 
slightly frivolous current term, in a “soft dicta­
torship”. It may even be called a crisis of legiti­
macy, for Tsar Boris is accused of having assas­
sinated the lawful Tsar and a political fraud is 
using a false legitimation to achieve power. The 
real protagonist, caught between the two of 
them, is the people, and they are sinking into 
apathy. It is, however, fairly difficult to stage 
the apathy of the masses who have had enough 
of the demagogy and manipulation meant to 
rouse them. Andor Lukáts’s direction for the 
Csiky Gergely Theatre of Kaposvár does not 
offer more than a sketchy, two-dimensional 
picture-book. Yet it could have been no acci­
dent that he opted for a dramatized medieval 
putsch, at the end of which the people, called 
upon to cheer the new Tsar, remain silent.
The newly discovered representataive of the 
“lost” people in Brecht’s parable, The C a u ca ­
sian  C halk  C irc le , is Azdak. This, too, takes 
place in troubled times, when Georgia is living 
through a state of lawlessness; the ruler has 
been overthrown and until the dynasty returns,
the military place the village clerk onto the 
judge’s bench. For the time being, the law is 
being represented by this uneducated, quick­
witted son of the people. True, he works for his 
own benefit, but according to Brecht, he cannot 
be so evil as not to enforce, through instinctive 
class-consciousness, the interest of the oppressed 
people, as against the judges of the expelled 
ruling class, representing the law of the jungle 
of capitalism. By now something somewhat 
different has been experienced concerning the 
courts of the descendants of Azdak’s class 
brethren. This, however, does not decrease the 
enjoyment of Brecht’s malicious humour. Imre 
Csiszár’s production at the Budapest National 
has this crude folk comedy as its best part, 
allowing György Cserhalmi to engage in bra­
vura comedy, while the other keynote, the stag­
gering temptation to good deeds, is somewhat 
paler.
Twentieth century drama obviously offers a 
number of points of linkage to current social 
processes. The M an da te , by the Soviet writer 
Nikolay Erdman, and directed by a Polish guest, 
Andrzey Rozhin, in the Gárdonyi Géza Theatre 
at Eger, could have turned into a bitingly funny 
play if the humour in it had been treated with 
blood-curdling seriousness. In one of the scenes, 
at the climax of farcical misunderstandings, the 
characters, overdoing party ideology, mistake a 
servant-maid dressed in a historical costume for 
a Grand Duchess and think that communism is 
over and the Tsar has returned. At the opening 
of the season, in 1989, this Gogolean scene 
would still have seemed a self-ironical trouvaille , 
as audiences might have felt they were laughing 
at their own expense in their boundless euphory. 
Unfortunately, the production borrowed from 
Feydeau more liberally than from Gogol, and 
this did not help either the acting or Erdman’s 
more pithy satire.
Miklós Gábor was much more careful about 
proportions in his production of The P o rtra it  
by Mrozek in the Buda Castle Theatre. Essen­
tially the play is about the process of a form of 
exorcism, the goal being to shake off the image 
of Stalin that lives on within us, even though the 
photograph had been taken down from the wall 
long ago. Mrozek uses fairly complicated trans­
positions, as for instance double casts, to dem­
onstrate this schizophrenic state, while in liter­
ary techniques he prefers the simplest means: 
cabaret jokes and brief, absurd dialogue. So The 
P o rtra it has remained an intellectual delicacy
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rather than developing into an awkward, emo­
tional analysis, or a political exorcism, which 
would register physical and mental breakdown. 
It is a frivolous Ionesco laugh rather than a 
painful Beckett grotesque.
One way to sum up the season would perhaps 
be through Peter Hall and Richard Peaslee’s 
musical adaptation of Orwell ’s Animal Farm in 
the Csiky Gergely Theatre at Kaposvár. This is 
the story, in the form of a fable, of the triumph 
and distortion of social revolution led by the 
Soviet Communist (Bolshevik) Party, in words 
and song. The Hungarian version, translated by 
István Eörsi and produced by Tamás Ascher, 
has placed the leading cadres and all the inhabi­
tants of the farm in Hungarian conditions. 
Comrade Napólajos (coined out of Napoleon
and the Hungarian for the name of Louis), who 
was not “a pig for words”, and Vamzi and 
company all realise, in words and deeds, the 
familiar Hungarian scenario of the past forty 
years. It is an almost perfect production, with 
the Kaposvár actors catching perfectly the party 
bureaucrat pigs, the carthorse sinking under the 
voluntarily carried burden, the sheep impos­
sible to teach, the wisely opportunist ass and all 
the others—almost as if they were playing 
Chekhov. Orwell, of course, is not Chekhov, 
which would not matter if only he offered a 
somewhat better stage quality, and if his satire 
had not been overtaken by time. Animal Farm 
ought to have been put on when it was impos­
sible to do so. This is not the only paradox of the 
season of take-overs.
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Gergely Bikácsy
Breaking the Rules
Ildikó Enyedi: Az én huszadik századom (My Twentieth Century); 
Ferenc Grunwalsky: Kicsi, de nagyon erős (Little but Tough)
N o Hungarian film was invited into official competition at the Cannes Festival this 
year. In Venice, Hungarian films have not done 
well over the last few years. On the other hand, 
in 1989, the European Film Prize went to Géza 
Bereményi’s E ldorado . So the assessments 
made by the different festivals seem to be fairly 
contradictory—but, then, who knows whether 
it’s really worth keeping track of prizes. What 
it amounts to is perhaps a radical change rather 
than a decline in the Hungarian cinema and film 
making. The last two of the annual presenta­
tions of new Hungarian films were dominated 
by documentaries—which came as no suprise. 
These are works which reveal and reconstruct 
facts and events, replace history books. Two of 
them have attracted attention: Judit Ember’s 
P ó csp e tr i, which, after years in its can was 
released (and also shown on TV), and R ecsk, by 
Géza Böszörmény i and Livia Gy armathy, which 
interviews the former prisoners and— 
uniquely—the former guards of the infamous 
(and for long secret and denied) Hungarian 
forced labour camp of the 1950s. (The title of 
the two films are the names of two villages: 
Pócsperti was the scene of a murder committed 
in the late 1940s, whose circumstances have 
remained unclarified to the present: it was used 
for a show trial directed at the Catholic Church; 
Recsk was the site of the ill-famed forced la­
bour or, rather, annihilating camp in North- 
Eastern Hungary).
However, after this year’s film presentation, 
both critics and audiences felt saturated with 
documentaries (most of which were in an inter­
view format, and the impression was of attend-
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ing a television rather than a film review); the 
novelty of political outspokenness also seems 
to have been exhausted. The weakness of the 
feature films was also striking. Yet it is pre­
cisely in the feature films that a certain change 
can be observed, or, more precisely, the desire 
for it. The main line in Hungarian feature films 
so far has led to a gloomy art, imbued with sym­
bolism and conjuring up history. Despite all the 
differences in their form of expression, Miklós 
Jancsó, and even András Kovács in his best film 
so far, C o ld  D a y s , and indeed, despite all his 
stylistic changes, István Szabó as well, ex­
pressed collective dreams and traumas that had 
been suppressed. Now the age of suppression 
has come to an end; the cultural policy based on 
the alternation of prohibition and tolerance has 
ceased to exist, and the old system of film 
production and distribution that was is also 
coming to an end. In the new situation all that 
can be done is to conjecture, to predict or to 
“chart” development in a doctrinaire manner. I 
would prefer to call attention to two possible 
paths that can be taken by the new Hungarian 
film; they deserve attention precisely because 
they opened up unexpectedly and have no tradi­
tions behind them—thus they could have been 
neither “conjectured” nor “charted”.
M y  T w en tie th  C entury, the first full-length feature film by Ildikó Enyedi, a young, fairly unknown director, with only a few shorts 
to her name, presents an imaginary twentieth 
century. The film is set in those years of promise 
at the turn of the century, and the ideals centred 
on are Light and Science, and Nature. The film 
is permeated by a nostalgia for those unrealized 
promises, with a pantheistic naivety which is in 
tension with the irony of retrospective knowl­
edge in it. Although the film presents a caval­
cade of ideals, beliefs, and of human intentions 
and sciences, it also has two flesh and blood
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heroines. It is a compound of fairytale and 
moral philosophy about a pair of twins, Dóra 
and Lili, the 20th century opportunities open to 
Woman. One of them is a scatter-brained anar­
chist, ready to use bombs, the other an adven­
turess, a p o u le  d e  luxe, the heroine of her own 
body. Between them is a man, appearing in a 
dim though strong outline, almost mythical 
even in the enigmas of his contours, an amateur 
scientist, inventor and globe-trotter. The ad­
ventures of the protagonist are scientific; they 
sit in on the lectures of Otto Weininger, and en­
gage in laboratory experiments on animals. 
Their adventures are fabulous: travel to Bor­
neo; one of the women is rescued from the 
snowy wastes of Siberia by a dog-sledge pro­
duced by angels. Their adventures are senti­
mental as well: indeed, the adventuress is per­
meated by emotion in much the same way as her 
anarchistic twin is. Yet sentimentality is per­
haps not the right word. Animals too play an 
important part—just as they would in a folk­
tale. For instance, a grey donkey leads the Man 
into a labyrinth of mirrors where he can see both 
girls at the same time and come to sense that 
what he had considered to be the sole object of 
his love (and whose strange behaviour his male 
understanding had failed to grasp) in fact is not 
one but, two women—thus he can sense some­
thing of the ambivalence of feminity, of the 
feminine roles. The donkey calmly waits beside 
the man immersed in his problems, as if animals 
were the wiser. At another point, a chimpanzee 
in the zoo relates in a human voice the story of 
its capture. (The chimpanzee is the most attrac­
tive supporting player in the film.) And there is 
all the rest of the animals too. As if one were 
walking in God’s great zoo where man is one, 
though not necessarily the most sensible, of 
beings. It is not sentimentality that permeates 
Miss Enyedi’s film, rather some naive, panthe­
istic disposition that is present in every scene.
Naivety, however, is the subject rather than 
the manner of the film. In one of the key scenes, 
Lili the anarchist strays into a lecture by Otto 
Weininger. The Viennese scholar is enlarging 
on woman: she is not only a stupid and amoral 
being, but (with some sophistry) he proves that 
woman does not even exist, she is merely the sin 
of man. The audience is made up of emanci­
pated women; they protest vehemently, only 
Lili sits there with a pensive smile, as if regis­
tering that science can be as naive as a goose. 
The seeming naivety of the film always features
in delicate quotation marks. The scenes of the 
bomb-throwing are also imbued with an under­
standing irony; it is the men who react in the 
most cowardly fashion, and Lili exhibits pity 
and understanding when she does not blow 
them up. But there is another bomb, an ex­
ploded one: we are attending a kind of kine- 
toscope projection. It is here that the anarchists’ 
bomb goes off and the room is already empty as 
the projected picture still flickers and moves. 
Bomb and light, immobility and motion pic­
ture, hesitant emotions, mistaken ideas, and the 
ambivalence of almost all this are transmitted 
by the seemingly naive form of presentation.
Ildikó Enyedi boldly draws on film history; 
her choice of names refers to Dorothy and 
Lillian Gish, Griffith’s two actresses, and it is 
not difficult to discover in the plot a few motifs 
from Griffith’s classical mush, O rphan s o f  the  
Storm . M yT w en tie th  C entury  succeeds in avoid­
ing the didactic, anti-art clichés of the philo­
sophical film wrestling with universal ideas 
(and of philosophical art as such—if such a 
thing exists). In this, she is aided by that playful­
ness of the early masters of the film, Méliés and 
Griffith. The conceptual elements are not drawn 
directly or oppressively, but filtered in a play­
ful, fairy-tale-like story, ironically. Hungarian 
critics have generally stressed the influence of 
Gábor Body, the director who died young, and 
particularly bxsN arcissus a n d  P sych e. Buteven 
this influence is indirect rather than direct, 
mainly evident in the creative freedom that 
rejects the “rules” of film-making.
One of the central figures in M y T w en tie th  
C entury  is reason, another emotion. They are 
twins—just as are Lili and Dóra. Reason, if it 
cares for its reputation, always remains pessi­
mistic. Only the will, and the physical functions 
themselves, can be optimistic. This film, as if it 
were a living being itself, draws energy from an 
engaging biological optimism.
E ver since the mid-1970s, when the mythi­cal, symbolic, historicizing film and man­
ner—till then mainly present through (and in 
the wake of) Miklós Jancsó’s masterpieces— 
became deflated, a certain neo-academicism, 
conservatism, emptiness in the garb of realism 
and a regularity of form, have increasingly 
dominated the Hungarian cinema. These were 
the years of the doubtful triumph of the misun­
derstood well-made film. These years saw 
“average films” with average plots, and com­
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monplace heroes meant to be typical, without 
an internal world of their own. It was mainly 
directors of what is now the middle-aged gen­
eration who drifted onto this plain, so boring 
and barren to real explorers. Many of them 
arrived there after original, irregular and prom­
ising starts with some disturbing first films. 
This is what makes the career (or course correc­
tion?) of Ferenc Grunwalsky, who is now al­
most fifty, worthy of attention. Striving against 
the main current of Hungarian films in general, 
Grunwalsky, a former assistant of Miklós 
Jancsó’s, has in his latest films rejected conser­
vatism and the false demands of well-made 
films.
Grunwalsky is also an experienced camera­
man: he was the director of photography for 
György Szomjas’s films (whose bitter come­
dies and works in general show many kindred 
features with Grunwalsky’s). Almost uniquely 
in the Hungarian cinema, he is his own camera­
man as well. State subsidies for films being on 
the wane, Grunwalsky’s production method 
also has a lesson in it: he works with an ex­
tremely small team and records his material on 
video from which it is then copied onto film. 
His films, like those of Szomjas, use much 
improvisation, and the scenario for him is a 
skeleton, a possibility. He employs many ama­
teurs, and even professional actors shake off all 
their stage or film mannerism. The viewer— 
and perhaps the reader, too—has the sense of 
being taken back to the early ’sixties, the emer­
gence of the French New Wave; the members of 
the former middle generation who are now so 
utterly conservative—István Szabó, Ferenc 
Kardos, Zsolt Kézdi-Kovács and the others— 
did at the time draw from Truffaut and Godard.
Grunwalsky still draws from them now when 
all this seems to have become “passé”, and 
indeed, when fashion would enjoin something 
quite different. His last but one film, A F ull D a y , 
received the Hungarian film critics’ prize. His 
latest film, L ittle  bu t Tough, though it had 
similar virtues, did not come as the same surp- 
ise; even so it has proved to be a radical rejec­
tion of the dusty conservatism of the last Hun­
garian feature film review.
Both films have people driven to the fringe of 
society as their protagonists: in A F ull D a y  a 
young taxi driver, unable to pay off a big debt, 
and a worker with a double life: a factory-hand 
by day and burgler by night, in L ittle  bu t Tough. 
“The world in which we live is not well made,
and that’s why all the well made films, whose 
reassurance and conservatism is their content, 
structure and form, are lying”, Grunwalsky said 
and he added that his experiments with an 
irregular formal idiom were not merely aes­
thetic but involve artistic perspicacity and truth 
as well. Grunwalsky’s films, with their heroes 
wriggling in the vice of horrific external, mate­
rial constraints, have no traditional structures, 
no plots that lend themselves to summary nar­
ration. The stories consist of episodes, falling 
into pieces in a mosaic, deliberately.ground 
small. The taxi driver must repay his debt within 
24 hours and he is being blackmailed, through 
his young, very empty and very physical wife, 
by his creditors (moustached and well-fed 
moguls of the Budapest underworld). The taxi 
journeys of “a full day” make up the film. Of 
course, the money cannot be repaid, and for 
want of anything better, only the unfaithful wife 
(who at least puts up with blackmail passively, 
even with her body) can be murdered.
All this has nothing of grandeur in it, no real 
tragedy. This is black comedy, washed with 
absurd elements. These lives and situations or 
the pictures portraying them have no centre. 
Grunwalsky consistently composes his shots, 
and even whole sequences, “defectively”, off- 
centre. In this sense the film has no central scene 
or episode of major importance; even the rela­
tive length of the scenes is of no significance. I 
mentioned the French and also the Czech new 
waves as forebears to the director; one could 
also mention John Cassavetes’s early films, 
principally H usban ds. This is cunningly delib­
erate art of decomposition. It should also be 
mentioned that the fabric of the film is deter­
mined by a verbal humour which unfortunately 
can hardly be followed or appreciated by for­
eign viewers. The film is an uncoordinated pile, 
one might say, a refuse dump of waste words 
and waste sentences: taxi drivers’ slang, slum 
patois, a higgledy-piggledy admixture of the 
different stylistic layers of the spoken language.
Grunwalsky’s latest film can be considered a 
sequel, though a certain change in style can be 
seen in it too. L ittle  bu t Tough, the story of an 
ex-convict turning burglar and finally mur­
derer, does not follow the idiom of the old 
n ou velle  va g u e  so closely; it is a work less loose 
in structure and with less of the gambolling and 
somersaulting. It kicks about desperately, drag­
ging along spasmodically; indeed, it moves 
spasmodically as its own protagonist does. This
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character no longer believes that he could repay 
any kind of debt he might contract or that he 
could make a living out of any kind of work. He 
sets out to burgle like other people set out to 
work; yet he is not a true professional criminal. 
He is not a member of any criminal gang (in­
deed, finally he is forced to get even with his 
former fellow prisoner in self defence). He is a 
man steeped in hatred; Hungarian films have 
never had such a terrible character.
The sequences at the beginning and the end 
provide the film with a singular frame. In the in­
troductory sequence the protagonist tries, fairly 
unsuccessfully, to express himself in a long, 
broken, incoherent monologue. He is seen in 
close shot, with tears rolling down his stubbled 
face. In the final shots, after a multiple murder, 
he flees along the river bank shown now for 
the first time. His route continues under water. 
He moves on, clattering with stubborn determi­
nation under water, as if refusing to believe 
that he is finished.
Flanked by these sequences there are frag­
ments of days, minutes, seconds of banal life. In 
the earlier film there had been a great deal of 
blabber from many characters, here hardly 
anything is being said. Here the fragmentary 
sentences, broken off and leaving no scope 
for interpretation, weigh threateningly. The 
film is mainly in close-up; almost everywhere 
Grunwalsky has deliberately eliminated not 
just the transitory cuts but all other cuts too in 
favour of close shots. This lends unbelievable 
weight even to the simplest, indifferent looks 
and glances, the most neutral ones included. It 
is the film of disconsolation.
After the beginning of the century, here is 
one facet of the Hungarian//« de siede: after 
vegetative joie de vivre, the pessimism of 
reason.
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Ildikó Nagy
Modem to Postmodern
The New Hungarian Gallery in Székesfehérvár
E arlier this year, in May, an unusual invita­tion arrived in the post. On a poster folded 
into eight, the István Király Museum of 
Székesfehérvár invited “relatives, friends and 
business partners” to the opening of a contem­
porary arts exhibiton. The drawings on the 
poster, shirts, blazers and a cheerful travelling 
bag, reminded us that we have been travelling 
for more than a quarter century—as if on a 
pilgrimage—to Székesfehérvár when we wanted 
to see a good exhibition.
This city of 170,000 inhabitants, sixty kilo­
metres from Budapest off the road leading to 
Lake Balaton, looks back to a great past. Its ca­
thedral was founded at the turn of the first 
millenium by the first king of Hungary, Saint 
Stephen (István), who is also buried there. The 
cathedral—only the remains of the original 
walls can still be seen today—was, until the 
Turkish conquest in the 16th century, where the 
kings of Hungary were crowned and buried. 
The city’s museum was established in 1873 and 
bears the name of King Stephen. It has a signifi­
cant local history and archeology collection— 
for instance, it is very rich in finds from the 
Roman era; for a long time it did not have any 
fine arts holdings. This collection was estab­
lished in the past twenty-five years by two 
outstanding art critics. The friendly invitation 
thus was in fact also one to anniversary celebra­
tions.
Márta Kovalovszky and Péter Kovács began 
work at the museum in 1962 with the ink barely 
dry on their diplomas. In their first year they 
attracted attention by arranging the exhibition 
on Tivadar Csontváry Kosztka. This totally 
original and then unjustly ignored painter died
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in 1919. Although the best of the critics had 
stood up for him, and his paintings had been a 
great success at the Brussels World Fair in 
1958, the ideological watchdogs ensured that 
no museum in Hungary dared to show his 
paintings at the time. The exhibition at 
Székesfehérvár was simultaneously a profes­
sional success and an official stumbling stone; 
this duality was to overshadow the work of the 
two art critics all the time.
The Csontváry exhibition set a standard 
which could be sustained only by a well thought- 
out long-term programme. The museum started 
on two parallel series of exhibitions. One pre­
sented the history of twentieth century Hungar­
ian art according to styles, schools, groups; the 
other covered individual and collective exhibi­
tions of contemporary Hungarian artists. Al­
though these exhibitions were frequently sub­
ject to delays on account of objections raised by 
the guardians of the official cultural policy— 
some exhibitions were banned outright—the 
two series conjoined in 1987 when the exhibi­
tion “Old and new avant-garde” brought the 
historic series together with the contemporary. 
The Székesfehérvár exhibitions were among 
the most important events in the Hungarian arts, 
and writers, musicians, artists, art historians, 
spiritual “relations, friends and business part­
ners” met regularly at their vernissages. At the 
exhibitions themselves all new movements and 
important artists, the great names of the avant- 
garde and the young novices (many discovered 
by the museum) were to be seen.
Along with the exhibitions, and inseparably 
from them, the two enthusiasts started collect­
ing works for the museum. A letter addressed 
“honoured master”, which was sent to one 
hundred artists in 1964, asking them to present 
one of their works to the museum for the collec­
tion of contemporary art to be established, was 
how it all started. The museum ’ s collection then
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expanded through purchase, gifts, legacies, until 
today it can claim to be the most important 
collection of contemporary art in Hungary.
The New Hungarian Gallery, which con­
tains the permanent collection of the museum, 
selects from this quarter century of collecting. 
Apart from some halls in the museum of Pécs, 
this is the only place where modem Hungarian 
art is on permanent exhibition. The exhibition is 
housed in a former Cistercian monastery in six 
halls and the corridor running in front of them. 
Although the arrangement pays attention to 
chronology, it does not strictly rely on his­
toricity. It is rather essayistic and hints inces­
santly at the present through striking associa­
tions. The organizers do not deny that they are 
even now looking at “modern” Hungarian art 
from the point of view of post-modernism. 
What is surprising is exactly how the many 
kinds of divergent trends in the past half century 
can be seen in a unity in this way. This is 
confirmed also by the artistic careers, because 
numerous artists, who set out in the 1960s in 
abstract art, had returned by the 1990s—after 
various detours—to the beginnings. The “new 
ecclecticism” of the end of the century seems to 
be resolving contradictions which once ap­
peared to be irreconcilable.
The exhibition starts with the older genera­
tion of the avant-garde, members of the erst­
while European School, thus in abstraction and 
surrealism. The lyric branch of abstract paint­
ing, which can be linked to experience of na­
ture, is represented by Béla Veszelszky and Ilka 
Gedő, while the expressive line by Júlia Vajda 
and Dezső Komiss’s C a llig ra p h y  (1964). But 
through another Komiss painting (A M em ory o f  
a  Sum m er, 1950), indicative abstract painting is 
also present, and this perhaps had the greater 
influence on the generation embarking on their 
careers in the 1960s. They are to be found in the 
nearby halls. But in between there are two 
painters, Béla Kondor and Lili Ország. Today it 
can be seen clearly that these two artists, who 
differ so much in many respects, dealt with the 
same thing, the past. Kondor experienced it as 
history, Lili Ország as time (G a te  to  A ll S ecre ts , 
1972). Kondor in the 1960s was counted as a 
traditionalist painter compared to the avant- 
garde but is surprisingly up-to-date in the age of 
postmodernism. His D ea th  o f  K in g  L ouis II 
(1972)—which never had of course the effect of 
an “historic” painting—appears very fresh 
today, precisely because of its pictorial virtues.
The first hall of the exhibition is mostly 
devoted to IPARTERV. The new Hungarian 
avant-garde appeared collectively for the first 
time in 1968 in the club premises of an architec­
tural design institute (IPARTERV). They intro­
duced into Hungarian art the objective approach 
which relies on autonomy, the freedom of for­
mation, the primary joy of colours, patches and 
lines. The laws of artistic creation are no longer 
set by spectacle, the work is not depicting 
something but is primarily an intellectual crea­
tion. Ilona Keserű indicated even through the 
title of her painting that it has no topic: B ig  
M erry  (1970). The picture is a composition of 
colours, shapes, materials, plainly painted and 
plastic raw canvass surfaces; on the opposite 
wall hangs its twin, painted twenty years later, 
H om m age á  L éger. The same elements prove 
primarily a special sensitivity to colour and 
shape through an almost rococo richness of 
forms—alluding also to Léger—and this, what­
ever she has done in the past quarter century, 
has always determined her paintings, statuettes, 
interiors, theatre sets, painted objects, and tex­
tiles.
At the end of the 1960s Hungarian art expe­
rienced the shock of the appearance of Ameri­
can pop art in Europe. Although the attraction 
of Andy Warhol, the tremendous suggestivity 
of his works could not be overlooked, works by 
Lakner, Konkoly and Jovánovics have already 
assimilated and gone beyond Warhol. István 
Haraszty’s C a g e  (1972) is a kinetic work 
which could only have been created here in 
Eastern Europe. The door of the cage is open all 
the time and is only closed when the bird wants 
to fly out through it.
The topic in the second hall is time. These 
works might also be called conceptual, yet the 
works by Erdély, Hajas or Baranyay do not 
Compel one to make any classification. The 
classics to be seen here include Erdély’s T ravel 
through T im e (1976) or Baranyay’s S elf-por-  
tra it  w ith  Ja n e  M o rris ( 1982). Erdély’s series of 
photographs consists of five phases in each of 
which he—approaching fifty—faces the self of 
his childhood and youth. Baranyay’s photogra­
phies are the opposite of this. They involve not 
the doubling of the personality, but the unity of 
two personalities. He composes the image of 
Jane Morris, the muse of Pre-Raffaelites, into a 
self-portrait. This portrait, taking shape after 
several phases, is the image of the personality 
who has never existed. Baranyay, who has been
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deeply affected by Kirkegaard, expresses in his 
self-portraits Kirkegaard’s incognito, reflected 
pain. His portraits are hidden faces, shadows. 
Among themjhe most anguished is the work 
exhibited here, because the two faces hidden in 
each other are separated or, rather, linked, by 
death. This is the deepest confession of solitude 
and of the beauty of the meeting of spirits that 
span the ages. The personality cannot be grasped, 
cannot be expressed, but those who know the 
secret and are initiated, recognize each other 
through the experience of pain. The hope for 
this same secret meeting brought to life the 
works of György Jovánovics which can be seen 
here, the Sándor Altorjai Sundial (which is 
dedicated to his friend, the late painter), and the 
House of the Hanged Man (1984), a plaster 
relief which is a paraphrase of the picture by 
Cézanne, a postmodern remembrance of the 
painter and the experience of the painting.
The third hall is the world of geometry, the 
“combination of logic and beauty” as Péter 
Esterházy, the novelist puts it. Here the new 
geometric art and structuralism have been given 
their place. In the preceding hall barely sug­
gested contents, unexpected and meta-rational 
moments determine the works, while here eve­
rything is calculable, correct, and logical. The 
foundation of the works is not empathy, but 
philosophic discipline and system. There are of 
course differences, because Tamás Hencze or 
István Nádler remain painters even in their 
most calculated works, and their paintings rely 
on visual and pictorial effects. In contrast, Dóra 
Maurer produces concept art in which basic 
arithmetic operations and visual ideas comple­
ment each other. By contrast, Péter Türk and 
András Mengyán make the laws of mathemat­
ics visible. In his Dialectic of Forms (1978), 
Mengyán elaborated a logical sequence relying 
on the permutations of the transformation of a 
given geometric form.
Going further, we arrive in the hall of instinc­
tive-magic-grotesque works, in the centre of 
which there is the “agricultural” art of Imre 
Bukta. On the wall there are the painted guns of 
poachers, decorated like Indians’ guns and 
obviously invested with the same personal tö­
tende meaning. In the centre of the hall is 
another essential work in Bukta’s “agro-art”, 
Man Feeding Guinea-Fowl (1986). The “man” 
is here a fantastic farm machine, put together of 
wood and long iron nails (undoubtedly mascu­
line) which, if set into motion, could in prin­
ciple feed the guinea-fowl which stands on top 
of a pyramid facing it. Part of the work is a great 
number of glass pearls spread on the ground, 
and some objects and forms through which we 
cannot associate to feeding the bird but to the 
world “pearl” (in Hungarian the guinea-fowl is 
called “pearl-fowl”). These elements include a 
small table standing on curved legs, or repeated 
double spirals of wrought iron (so typical of 
fencing), but also with inlaid pearls. Perhaps 
this is sufficient to indicate how freely Bukta’s 
art handles objects, philosophic, picturial and 
linguistic associations, the mixture it makes of 
the magic and of the profane, of the trivial and 
of the refined. This too is why the organizers 
placing of István Mazzag’s pictures in the same 
hall was a palpable hit. We are familiar with the 
refined decadent colour harmony of Picture of 
Lovers and of Romeo (violets, greens, golds, 
reds) from Art Nouveau interiors, and they are 
rather distant from poaching and agro-art. But 
Romeo is a sad dog—in a yellowish-green field 
with red drops of blood and a knife—with a 
violet sky in the background. Mazzag mixes 
contrasts just as Bukta does; the mixture is in a 
different proportion. In Bukta there is more 
emphasis on the trivial, in Mazzag on the re­
fined.
From here it is just a step—both in thought 
and in reality—to the New Sensibility, the topic 
of the fifth hall. To the analysing, objective, 
conceptual and impersonal works of the 1970s, 
the sensibility of the turn of the 1980s was a 
natural reaction; personal involvement and 
sentiment, the reclaiming of the individual 
mythologies. Besides Csilla Kelecsényi, Gábor 
Roskó, Zsigmond Károlyi, here the plastic art 
of Lujza Gecser attracts attention. The floating 
white textile figure made rigid with varnish had 
a transcendental effect at the time it was made 
for its phantom-like effect. Today, knowing 
that the artist died suddenly at the age of 45, it 
is like a message from the grave.
The sixth hall is given over to postmoder­
nism. On the main wall there is Géza Pemeczky ’ s 
Postmodern Train from 1984. The train is pulled 
by a steam engine, the smoke from its stack 
shapes repetitions of the words YES and NO. 
This refers not only to one of Pemeczky’s 
earlier works (Yes-No Strategy, 1972), but also 
to the strategy of thinking for a whole period. 
This is a conceptual-philosophic token which 
unites the binary language of computers with 
the dichotomy of “art—non art”. In the wag­
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gons of the postmodern train there are the key 
notions (“secret”, “shadow”), its emblems (eyes, 
Mickey-Mouse, sphinx, cubes, butterflies, heads 
of Marx) and idols (Marilyn Monroe, Andy 
Warhol), which are also the principal motifs in 
Perneczky’s art. This train carries also a per­
sonal history, in which the elements of the past 
are nearly lined up beside each other. This 
postmodernism is not a synthesis of the past but 
its addition on a raised level.
On leaving the final hall, visitors find them­
selves again in the corridor from which they set 
out, but this time on the other side. On the wall 
on the right there is Tamás Soós’s C a ra va g g io  
(1985). Postmodernism frequently invokes 
Warhol from the immediate and Caravaggio 
from the more distant past (Tibor Csemus, a 
Hungarian painter living in Paris, built an entire 
oeuvre on it, claiming that “Caravaggio is my 
theory”, and the British film director Derek 
Jarman made him a synonym for artistic exis­
tence in his film.) Tamás Soós’s picture is a 
paraphrase of S t John the B a p tis t, which is in 
the Doria Pamphili in Rome. The Caravaggio 
bambino sits embracing the head of the ram, as 
in the original picture; what is missing is the 
transcendental substance. Consequently, the title 
is very exact. The contemporary painter can no 
longer invoke the faith, only Caravaggio.
Unjustifiably little has been said of the sculp­
ture in the exhibition. For lack of space—since 
premises created out of the cells of the monas­
tery are small—there is only room for smaller
plastic works. Nevertheless here four designs, 
made for the competition for a memorial to the 
victims of the 1956 revolution, are to be seen. 
Gyula Gulyás is represented by his portrait of 
A n dy W arh ol (1983). Warhol is here no longer 
the daredevil, as he is in the photographs from 
the 1960s. He is tired and aged; his hair painted 
silver and dandyish bow-tie make him see frail 
and grotesque, but a face destroyed by drugs 
still retains the consciousness of his greatness. 
The artist can go through the innermost circles 
of hell in his life (as did Caravaggio or Warhol), 
yet he remains pure, if his work transcends this 
journey.
What is then the afterlife of the artist and of 
the work? Postmodernism no longer destroys 
idols as violently as the avant-garde did, be­
cause it does not believe that it can build new 
idols in their place. It looks at them rather with 
loving irony and distorts them into grotesque 
grimaces. Tamás Somogyi’s statue (T ogether, 
1987) makes a limp and bald A pollo  o f  B e lv e ­
d e re  embrace Meunier’s drunken Sack  H ea v ­
ers. What has become of these two pillars of 
sculpture, the classics of light elegance and 
serene human dignity? Two tottering pigs hold­
ing each other. But it is far from being worth­
while to feel sad about this. It suffices to make 
a half-turn, and at the other end wall of the 
corridor stands unchanged Béla Veszelszky’s 
beautiful abstract L an dscape , where the exhi­
bition starts. If we wish, we too can make a new 
start, both with the exhibition and with faith.
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M U S IC
János Fancsali
The Founding of the Hungarian 
Conservatoire in Kolozsvár in 1819
U  A strange little country is this Transylva-
I \ .  nia... Here is this country on the very 
limits of European civilization... But I believe 
I have never told the reader what sort of a place 
this Klausenburg is. Well then, it is a pretty little 
town of about twenty-five thousand inhabi­
tants, situated in the valley of the Szamos and 
overlooked by hills on every side. It is built 
round a large square, in the centre of which 
stands the fine old Gothic cathedral. From this 
square, almost all the streets run off at right 
angles”.1
Although in the mid-18th century the seat of 
the governor of Transylvania was still Nagy­
szeben (Herrmannstadt—Sibiu), during the 
reign of Joseph II, and particularly in the years 
that followed, Kolozsvár (Cluj—Klausenburg) 
constantly grew in significance. First it became 
a county seat and one of the two High Courts 
moved there. In October 1790, the governor, 
György Bánffy, also moved his seat to 
Kolozsvár. All this meant more than a political 
and social attraction induced by the diets. The 
governor’s seat and the High Court, with the of­
ficials they involved, and the delegates and sen­
ior clerks from the counties needed a total of 
729 dwellings. Construction work to modern­
ise the town included the pulling down of out­
dated fortifications, castle walls and ancient 
barbicans, and a previously undreamed-of 
expansion outside the city walls. The paving of 
public roads (1790-1822), the building of aroad 
leading from the city to Felek (1823-7), daily 
postal links with Buda (1804), and the recon-
János Fancsali left K o lo zsv á r , T ransylvan ia , 
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A n cien t M usic. O ld  T ran sylvan ian  instrum ents 
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struction of two bridges over the Szamos (1801- 
24) all went hand in hand with the growing role 
Hungarians were playing again both in 
Kolozsvár and Transylvania as a whole. At the 
end of 1790, a Transylvanian Saxon, Michael 
Conrad, wrote about the first diet held in 
Kolozsvár: “ Even the Governor Bánffy no 
longer spoke in German. German customs, head 
dresses and clothes were abandoned, and in less 
than a month one saw Hungarian ladies walking 
about, instead of in the former German bonnets 
and other clothes, in Hungarian csákó  hats and 
short m en te .”2
By the end of 1827, street lighting was in­
stalled in the city. The new public buildings 
included the Karolina Hospital, a new town 
hall, and barracks, which relieved citizens of 
the burdens of billeting. The water supply was 
improved and a decision taken to establish a 
town park. That was when the town centre of 
Kolozsvár became outlined. The streets were 
extended to lead from the Castle district beyond 
the castle walls, and they have remained to the 
present day the principal traffic conduits of the 
city.
Alongside public buildings, private building 
also went up. In 1830, the use of timber in 
housing was restricted, and from 1832 on a 
town architect was appointed to supervise build­
ing. The new century brought with it many fine 
late Baroque buildings: the Bánffy, Teleki and 
Toldalagi-Korda mansions in the Main Square, 
and the smaller houses of the Thoroczkay, 
Rhédey, Kemény, Jósika, Kendeffy, Pataki and 
Mikó families. These names feature in practi­
cally all the public events in Kolozsvár. New 
centres included a Calvinist college (1801- 
1804), a Unitarian school (1802-1804) and a 
Catholic school( 1817-1821), while the Redoute, 
the venue for balls, festivals, concerts, and also 
the Transylvanian diets (where Liszt played in 
1846), was opened in the early 1820s. Later, in
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the summer of 1848, it was there that the diet 
proclaimed unification with Hungary.
Perhaps the most significant event in this 
process was the raising of a building of national 
significance, the first permanent Hungarian the­
atre built in stone. The diet voted for the build­
ing of a theatre in Kolozsvár at the end of the 
18th century, but lacking finances, the first 
piece of land was only purchased in 1803, out of 
the donations of the nobility. The building was 
completed by the middle of 1817, and the next 
step was to pave the way for performances in 
Hungarian in Transylvania. Finally, the new 
theatre was opened on March 12,1821, provid­
ing a worthy setting for Hungarian acting, whose 
roots in Transylvania reached back to 1792. 
The opening production was Z rín yi, by Theo­
dor Körner, put on by an amateur dramatic 
society recruited among the Kolozsvár no­
bility.
Other things Kolozsvár had to offer included 
the Calvinist college, the Catholic Piarist school, 
the 19th century palaces of the Teleki and 
Count Nemes families, and the Hungarian 
University designed by Ignác Alpár, which all 
contributed to the beauty of the city.
Financial sacrifices could not be expected 
form the burghers, even though it was they who 
were directly interested in progress; however, 
the aristocrats of Transylvania were generous 
patrons of national culture. Later, their role in 
the diets and in the 1848 revolution also proved 
this, and they looked at the espousal of the cause 
of music and theatre as also serving the public 
interest. After all, in the 1810s, Kolozsvár was 
still a small town of 18,000 inhabitants, in spite 
of its role in Transylvania. The E rd é ly i M úzeum  
(Transylvanian Musem), the first literary and 
scholarly periodical printed in Hungarian, which 
appeared between 1814 and 1818, provided an 
outlet for Hungarian writing. The subscribers 
ranged from students to aristocrats throughout 
Transylvania and also in Hungary, and it main­
tained its position as the best literary periodical 
of the day.
Musical institutions were nonexistent at the 
end of the 18th century. Most is known about 
music in the houses of the aristocracy, where 
most music teachers were Austrian or Bohe­
mian. The writer Ferenc Kazinczy toured Tran­
sylvania in the summer of 1816, and recounted 
his impressions in E rd é ly i leve lek  (Letters from 
Transylvania). Of Farkas Wesselényi he wrote: 
“He is a great lover and cultivator of music; to
his own delight, and to teach the children of the 
two houses, he keeps a famous voice-master, 
Caudela, and a skilful singer, Ménard, at the 
house. Caudela is always willing to play, and 
we were willing to listen, and on the fortepiano, 
one of the best I have heard, he played works by 
Gluck, the two Bachs. Haydn, Mozart, Pleyel, 
Salieri, and Rossini from morning till late at 
night.”
Josefa Palm, the wife of Count György 
Bánffy, was Viennese, and she was said to have 
been a pupil of Mozart’s. “According to news 
regarding music in Kolozsvár, several families 
of good repute keep piano masters of their own, 
decent music receives magnanimous support, 
and there are several skilful dilettantes in culti­
vated circles, of whom Count Imre Wass [... ] is 
eminent on the flute [...] These private institu­
tions, however, very rarely comprise the male 
sex, as the majority of men, due to other, more 
important engagements, are not closely inter­
ested in music.”3 On the other hand, “Ladies of 
the upper classes receive a very good and care­
ful education. There are few among them who 
do not know at least three languages, and, 
moreover, do not receive training in art.”4 Paget 
also noted this: “I know many ladies to whom 
the names and works of all our best classics are 
familiar, either in the originals or translations, 
and there are very few who cannot talk lear­
nedly of Byron and Scott. This may not be 
thought to show any very great proficiency in 
literature but I am afraid if we were to ask 
English ladies how much they know—not of 
Hungarian writers—but of those of Germany 
even, we should often find their knowledge still 
more shallow.”5
About music-making in aristocratic homes, 
Paget has this to say: “A soirée, the first of the 
season, at the Countess. [...] With some ama­
teur music [...] the party broke up at ten.”6 
Alongside the playing of and education in music 
cultivated in Transylvania, the performance of 
musical theatre in the Hungarian theatre in 
Kolozsvár was of major importance. The fol­
lowing are only a few of many: Johann Schenk’s 
D e r D o rfb a rb ie r  in 1794, Dittersdorf’s D o c to r  
und A p o th ek er  in 1799, Méhul’s L e tré so r  sup- 
p o s é  in 1800, Gluck’s O rfeo  e d  E u rid ice  in 
1804, and Martin y Soler’s L ’a lb o re d iD ia n a  in 
1806. From the very beginning, the signifi­
cance of the Hungarian theatre in Kolozsvár 
grew beyond local needs, as people from Szeged 
and Debrecen, from Marosvásárhely and later
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the other towns in Transylvania, too, flocked to 
the theatre.
In 1800, a Vienna paper, published in Hun­
garian, expressed the general demand for qual­
ity musical works for the stage: “The non­
existence of music... has prevented many fine 
things taking place.”7 The magazine E rdély i 
M úzeum  carried an article by its editor, Gábor 
Döbrentei, which may have been of crucial 
importance for the foundation of the Kolozsvár 
conservatoire. “To support the blossoming of 
our theatre, we have to disseminate the love of 
music among us as well. The reason why music 
and fine singing prosper among Italians is that 
there are several conservatories in Italy, which, 
as hospitals, serve as singing and music 
schools... There are four such institutes in 
Venice, the largest being the Spedale della 
Pieta, where [...] seventy children learn music 
and singing. They all also learn to play different 
wind instruments and the violin. On holidays 
and Sundays, the girls perform oratorios in the 
Church of the Hospital. How delightful it was 
for me to listen to such music-making in 1814. 
In the same way, the finest church music is 
provided by male and female children at the 
other notable institute (the Conservatorio dei 
mendicanti)... In the three conservatories in 
Naples, more than 400 boys learn singing, in­
strumental music and composition. In Paris too, 
a great Conservatoire was established after the 
Revolution. Free instruction is provided for 300 
children of both sexes. [...] Our pure Hungarian 
towns, whether in Transylvania or Hungary, 
provide no instruction for Hungarian compos­
ers and singers [...] Will we thus ever be able to 
hear genuine Hungarian Sin gsp ie le , with the 
music written by a Hungarian, and sung by 
good Hungarian singers, so that together they 
can attract well-deserved attention? Without a 
Hungarian singing school with this end in view, 
this will never take place.”8
There is an unquestionable connection be­
tween the Kolozsvár theatre and the foundation 
of the Music Society. The project was initiated 
by Antal Hollaki, the g u b ern ia lis  secre tar iu s  
(government secretary). He started canvassing 
for the establishment of the society as early as 
1819. He called on several Kolozsvár burghers 
and other patriots in their homes, trying to win 
them over. Having adequately prepared the 
ground, he called a large meeting in his own 
home for June 8, 1819. According to the list of 
names, the meeting was attended by 39 citizens,
representing all sections of society from the 
postmaster to the barons.
At the foundation meeting, voluntary finan­
cial offers were made by 80 members, amount­
ing to 1700 forints. An invitation to join was 
sent to the Governor, Count György Bánffy, 
and a body of officials was elected.
From that time on, events gathered speed. 
The committee of the Music Society met on 
lune 11; they interviewed noted music teachers 
in Kolozsvár, set down regulations, and, on 
lune 22, issued a printed appeal. “The doors of 
the school teaching singing and the violin are to 
open on the first day of July to receive children 
and the young of both sexes and any religion. 
From the first of November a third master will 
also be available for proper instruction in wind 
instruments. (...) To open this noble Institute in 
a worthy manner, the Musical Society, whose 
voluntary donations serve to establish such 
schools and pay the teachers, has decided to 
(admit) children of both sexes of the inhabitants 
of this noble city, coming from all walks of 
life.”9 “The doors of the first Hungarian music 
school, the Music Institute, were thus open to 
all the children of Kolozsvár without discrimi­
nation.
Instruction started on 1 July. Governor Count 
Bánffy sent a letter assuring the Society of his 
support. Meanwhile, opinions started to come 
on the E lem entarbuch  fü r  d ie  S in gkunst zum  
G ebrau ch e  d e s  M u sikverein s in C lausen burg  
(Elementary B ook of the Art of S inging, for Use 
of the Music Society in Kolozsvár), by the 
director, Antal Polz, which had been submitted 
to a nine-member committee. This work must 
have been the first singing tutor in Transylva­
nia, and work on it must have started earlier. 
The seal of the Institute read in Hungarian: 
Muzsikai Egyesület Kolozsvárt (Musical Soci­
ety in Kolozsvár), and it headed the circular that 
was sent to cultural institutions and noted per­
sonalities in Transylvania, asking for their 
support. Soon musical academies were also 
held, but the programmes of these events have 
not come down to us. They wrote tutors for the 
violin, flute and bassoon. Girls were taught in 
the little-shool (the school next to the Greater 
Church), and boys in the college. The teachers 
of singing and violin were joined by a third in­
structor, who taught the flute, the clarinet, the 
bassoon and the Waldhorn. The rules of the 
Institute prescribed rehearsals to be held every 
three months, with a full, public rehearsal once
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a year, during the week before Whitsunday. 
Conditions for admittance for students called 
for a knowledge of reading and writing, the 
lower age limit being ten. Students had to use 
their own writing instruments, music-paper and 
violin. The wind instruments were purchased 
from donations, and handed to the pupils. Tui­
tion fees were left to the parents’ discretion and 
poor children were exempted from the payment 
of fees. “Conscientious instruction and human 
treatment are the duty of teachers.”10
The account for the first year shows the 
receipt of 1373 forints from 74 donors. The fees 
collected from the students amounted to 213 
guilders from 70 girls and 52 guilders from 
boys, both groups learning singing, 59 guilders 
from 41 students of the violin, and 9 guilders 
from 18 students of wind instruments—alto­
gether 333 guilders from 201 pupils.
In the first year of its existence, the Institute 
held a music academy in honour of Governor 
Count Bánffy, on December 22. In the years 
that followed up till 1823, two or three public 
concerts were given annually, which generated 
a considerable income. Antal Hollaki translated 
the libretto of Méhul’s opera, Joseph, into 
Hungarian, and this resulted in the most impos­
ing production of the early years, which the 
Music Society gave with the contribution of the 
members of the theatre company, the first per­
formance being on May 15, 1821. In the years 
that followed, they worked out more detailed 
regulations, which stipulated thorough and strict 
principles for the running of the school.
Besides manuals by local teachers (those by 
Polz, mentioned already), the committee de­
cided late in July 1819, to order singing, violin, 
bassoon, Waldhorn and flute tutors from Paris, 
costing 50 guilders. Early in 1820, they pur­
chased Schultz’s Singing Tutor, and “spent 6 
forints on orders for various needed choruses, 
overtures and symphonies.”11 Surviving rec­
ords indicate a great many valuable donations 
of scores. The school term ended with a public 
examination.
The music school had its golden age under György Ruzitska (1789-1869) and Ödön 
Farkas (1851-1912). Ruzitska, of a Bohemian 
family, was bom and educated in Vienna. He 
came to Transylvania as the music master of a 
Hungarian aristocratic family. An organist and 
pianist, he also played the cello. Being an effi­
cient oganizer, he insisted that the pupils should
be given a good education, and he also laid the 
foundations of orchestral playing in Kolozsvár. 
Having devoted much time to track down his 
music library, I can safely state that he kept 
abreast of European music, which he popular­
ised in the city. He was the author of the first 
Hungarian Singing Tutor, which appeared in 
1839. Ruzitska was the most reputable com­
poser in contemporary Transylvania. His works 
in excellent taste followed Classical and Ro­
mantic models. There seems to be an interesting 
parallel between activities and mentalities of 
Ruzitska and Ödön Farkas. Farkas became the 
director of the Conservatory in 1879. He watched 
over the high standards of the institution with a 
jealous eye. He too, was a noted composer, and 
an outstanding representative of Impression­
ism in Transylvania, particularly in his songs to 
poems by Endre Ady. His efforts were concen­
trated on gathering the musical force of 
Kolozsvár around the conservatorium, which 
he developed as the centre of the city’s musical 
scene. He expanded the scope of the institution, 
and under his direction nearly 400 pupils re­
ceived instruction in piano, violin, cello, contra­
bass, singing (both solo and choral), composi­
tion, musical theory, harmony, music history 
and chamber music. By the time he died, in 
1912, the Conservatory even provided training 
for its future teachers, and it was equal in rank 
to the Budapest Academy of Music.
After Transylvania had been annexed to 
Rumania in the autumn of 1919 (the centenary 
of the school), the Rumanian “governing coun­
cil dealt strangely with it [...] when it simply 
expelled it from the fine Baroque building in 
Király utca. Of course, the expensive instru­
ments, furniture and scores remained there. All 
the complaints and petitions were in vain. The 
school had to fall back on the hospitality of the 
three Hungarian gimnáziuma, and the Mari- 
anum, wandering through ever new classrooms 
placed at their disposal as a favour, meanwhile 
trying to draft new articles of foundation to 
have their rights recognised. The statutes, elabo­
rated in 1926, were followed by new attempts 
and lobbying. It was reclassified as a private 
school and compelled to introduce Rumanian 
as the language of instruction.”12 It could still 
continue functioning until 1940, under the noted 
Rezső Zsizsmann.
During the Second World War, the Institute 
continued, under János Visky and Ferenc Far­
kas, to do decent and serious work. After the
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war, it made a last effort, but in the early 1950s 
it was amalgamated with the Rumanian conser­
vatory, which had been founded in 1920.
Today there is no institutionalised musical 
education in Hungarian in Kolozsvár.
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Paul Griffiths
Zoltán Jeney’s Song Cycle: 
Brilliantly Simple
There can be no question which of these four records of new Hungarian music must lead 
this review: Zoltán Jeney’s set of Twelve Songs 
is a very remarkable work, and it has a very 
remarkable performance from the soprano Luisa 
Castellani, the violinist András Keller and the 
pianist Zoltán Kocsis on SLPX 12971. Each of 
these songs is a small miracle of purity and 
control, a crystal of sounds perfectly transpar­
ent in its structural strategies; each is a moment 
of beauty achieved in a different way, and yet 
the twelve together make a consistent family 
marked not only by candour of design and tone 
but also by certain favourite intervals, melodic 
turns and harmonies. If one is looking for defi­
nitions, Jeney has to be called a minimalist, but 
he is— despite an obvious kinship with Cage 
extending here to the use of poems of Cum­
mings in eight of the songs— a minimalist in his 
own manner, and a minimalist who is master of 
a wide range of techniques. To an outsider, his 
achievement seems distinctively Hungarian, 
comparable with that of Weöres and Tandori in 
verse (the notes supplied with the recording 
remind us that both were noted translators of 
Cummings, and one poem by each of them is set 
in Jeney’s cycle), and of Bartók or Kurtág in 
writing piano music for children.
What distinguishes all these artists is the 
ability to be simple in a fresh way. The fifth of 
Jeney’s songs, for example, is a little duet for 
voice and violin or, rather, a dialogue in which 
the two parts exchange roles halfway through in 
order to respect Cummings’ punctuation: in the 
first half the violin “sings” the words in brack­
ets; in the second it is the other way round. Or 
take the single Blake song “Silent, Silent Night”,
Paul G riffiths is music critic o f The Times 
and regular record reviewer o/N H Q.
which shivers with the same vibrant harmony 
all through in a state of excitement. Or the 
following number, where a tiny Weöres poem 
using just eight similar words (Hold /  Holt bolt! 
Volt kort hord /  Zord fo lt /  Hold) is set in mono- 
tones, the vocal pitch differently coloured each 
time by the piano chord. The ideas in each case 
are utterly elementary; the effect wondrous. 
And though dealing in simplicities and overt 
constructions might suggest a certain playful­
ness, along with the wonder one hears much 
more a sense of vacancy. A fragment of Höld­
erlin, set in the final song as a beautiful long 
melody for violin with dabs of vocal accompa­
niment, acts as a kind of moral to the rest: “We 
are a sign, without any sense, /  We are painless 
and have almost forgotten /  How to speak in 
alien lands.”
The key word there is “almost”: Jeney has 
not quite forgotten how to speak, or to sing, but 
oblivion is all around, and indeed within, him. 
What can be achieved under these circum­
stances may seem slight, but at night one appre­
ciates even starlight. The performance is such 
as to redouble one’s appreciation. In particular, 
Jeney’s vocal writing demands precision tun­
ing, even in repeated attacks on the high regis­
ter, and this it receives from Castellani, who has 
the right angel-child voice. Her only fault is 
poor English pronunciation (Jeney sets all the 
poems in their original languages, so that nine 
of the songs have English words, or near-words). 
But maybe that will encourage other singers to 
attempt this half-hour cycle, which certainly 
deserves to be widely performed and known.
The songs were written at different times 
between 1975 and 1983, and are joined on this 
record by three works from around the close of 
that period. Two of them, Spaziosa calma to 
poems by Ungaretti (1984), and Cantos para 
todos with Spanish words (1983), are for voice 
and chamber ensemble, and again feature the
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simply brilliant, brilliantly simple singing of 
Castellani. Péter Eötvös conducts the outstand­
ing ASKO ensemble who present Jeney’s de­
liberately strained but stationary chords with 
coolness and fragile beauty. The miniature 
Heraclitus’s Watermark (1985), a repeated 
wandering melody which perhaps stands as an 
emblem' of constancy in constant change, is 
played by the cellist Miklós Perényi and, again, 
Kocsis. Altogether this is a fascinating, revela­
tory release.
B arnabás Dukay points in roughly the same direction as Jeney: he was one of the per­
formers on an earlier Jeney record, and now he 
introduces himself with a record devoted mostly 
to piano music (SLPX 31125). It is, though, a 
different introduction. The sleeve carries no 
information about the composer or his music, 
only some maddeningly fragmentary extracts 
from a Hungarian folk tale, and there is some­
thing maddeningly fragmentary about the music 
too. The solo piano piece The Coming o f Light, 
played by the composer, is a big work, lasting 
for almost half an hour, but in its spaced, 
crumpled progress it keeps coming to an end, 
landing on a sudden diatonic chord. Invisible 
Fire in a Winter Night, almost as long and 
requiring two players (the other is András 
Wilheim), has a more regular rhythmic conti­
nuity, but it is again slow, reluctant and trapped 
into repeated concords. There are also two tiny 
pieces, Rondino that Touches the Heart, for 
piano, and As... as the Sun, for voice and piano, 
the former worryingly suggesting that Dukay’s 
pursuit o f simplicity may lead him into replicat­
ing composition exercises rather than to achiev­
ing the Jeney-like innocence and clarity inti­
mated by the latter. His choice of a child’s 
drawing (presumably by his daughter) for the 
cover picture hints at a Klee-like reverence for 
pure infant vision; his music indicates how very 
hard this is to reach.
Zsolt Durkó, by contrast, is very much a 
grown-up. His language is one of avant-garde 
sophistication formed in the 1960s, and he is a
supreme orchestrator, as is demonstrated by 
this new record (SLPX 12753). There are four 
works, all linked, as the programme note points 
out, by a studious delight in the principle of 
varying short motifs, a feature that may argue a 
kinship with Bartók, though it is so general in 
twentieth-century music as to be anonymus. 
And it is a similar anonymity, a lack of power 
and individuality in the ideas however masterly 
their handling, that is most disappointing here. 
Perhaps the strongest piece is the biggest, the 
Second Cantata (1972), setting a poem by Ady 
for chorus and orchestra. Also included are two 
orchestral works, Refrains for violin and cham­
ber groups (1979), and Ornamenti no. 2 for full 
orchestra (1985), as well as the virtuoso organ 
test piece Lande (1986). The big orchestral 
work, in particular, shows that Durkó often 
seems to be on the brink of a massive Bergian 
statement but then draws back; the restraint is 
beautifully achieved, but it would be interesting 
to see what might happen if it were to be 
released.
I f there is, then, something tantalising here, a new record of cimbalom concertos (SLPX 
31127) dashes all hopes. This is a wonderful 
instrument, and it is winningly played by Ágnes 
Szakály, but the repertory must surely contain 
better pieces than these. Kamilló Lendvay’s 
Concertino semplice (1986) is at least what it 
says it is: a nine minute piece of expert neoclas­
sicism, visited by the spirit of Renard. The 
names of the other two composers were un­
known to me, and I had imagined that they must 
be, like Lendvay, in their sixties, if not in their 
eighties. But no. Attila Reményi, composer of 
Al tramonto delmondo (1984) and L’aurora del 
mondo (1986), was bom in 1959, and László 
Király, whose Suite Concertante (1987) has 
Márta Fábián playing in the second cimbalom 
part, dates from 1954. It is depressing to find 
composers in their twenties and early thirties 
writing music that would not have caused them 
much trouble in the darkest days of socialist 
realism.
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Current affairs M y undeserved joy , surm ounting all 
m y pains and all m y troubles, is m y  
‘doctor’, w hich  is said to have gone
History through e lev en  ed ition s in Italy (in a lto­
gether six  m onths). A s soon  as he appears
Documents in Paris, do try to m ake his acquintance, and then write to m e, I b eg  you . I have  
alw ays considered  it m y goal to exp ect
Fiction the best and to inspire hope for it in those  
I love. A nd n ow , as I am writing to you,
Poetry
with great tiredness o f  spirit, I find no 
trace o f  it in m yself. Obtain a French copy  
o f  the doctor, and be in good  health.
Essays From Boris Pasternak’s unpublished 
1958 postcard to Gyula Illyés, on p. 32.
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